

Hegel's System of Logic

*The Absolute Idea
as Form of Forms*

Stephen Theron

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This book is dedicated to the memory of Fernando Inciarte, former Director of the *Philosophisches Seminar* at the University of Muenster (the Latin title of whose book, *Forma Formarum*, I have transposed to my English title) and of Professor Joseph Pieper, former Associate Professor there and internationally well-known philosophical author (e.g. of *Happiness and Contemplation*), both of them sources of inspiration and my kind patrons, *in memoriam*. It is also for Fergus Kerr, editor of *New Blackfriars*, Oxford, as of the collection *Contemplating Aquinas* (inspiration, in turn, for much here), SCM, London, 2003, and for the former Dom Dunstan O'Keefe as also for Dom Charles Lombard Fitzgerald, both former editors of *The Downside Review*, for their constant help and encouragement. In a special way, though, I dedicate it to my wife Regina, without whose unwavering support in all senses through these last fifty years this book and much else would surely not have come to be.

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PREFACE

There is a connection of causality between analogy and “supposition” in the sense of the Aristotelian theory of reference (*suppositio*: “standing for”), or, rather, between analogy and related varieties of such supposition diagnosed for the same term in different uses. In other words there is an analogy between the concepts of analogy itself and *suppositio*, inasmuch as any identification of the latter has to be made against a background of partly equivocal possibilities of reference (a more limited term than *suppositio*). As Aristotle had it (*De soph. el. c*, 1, 165a 7-16), there are more things and entities in general than there are words. The possibility of using the same word with more than one reference is therefore very much needed if language is to cater adequately to the universal, let us rather say to the infinite, scope of intellect. Now the condition for this possibility, of course, is that there exist likenesses between individual entities, relations permitting an ordered system of verbal and indeed conceptual association.

The most obvious case of this is the likeness between individuals of the same species, permitting the same word to be used for more than one individual. This description is valid, whether or not the first occasion for uttering a certain sound as a word was upon familiarity with (or first sighting of) an individual only, or after a realisation that there existed a species or family of similar individuals (forming one species or several closely related species). It is valid because we are reasoning from experiences of appearance, not from developed knowledge and observation of the conditions for and limitations upon reproductive possibilities. Again, the fact, if it is a fact, that words name concepts, i.e. that we naturally “abstract” (or act as if abstracting) common “dematerialised” natures, is a power or limitation from within the subject only. It cannot be imposed upon the world observed without further ado.

All we can say is that a world with “sets” of beings resembling one another (or reminding the observer the one of the other) results in a use of analogous meanings (and references) of words corresponding to observed likenesses (with individual differences) in reality. This is why, to anticipate, we will want to say there is an analogy between subject and predicate as such (as the same term can have material or formal *suppositio* in traditional logical theory), or even between being and essence, on the general principle that contraries depend upon a common nature.

But before going further into the ramifications of analogy, so essential for any hope of *saying the world's truth*, we will here attempt to clarify further the range of those instruments of our reason, logic and language, though we speak improperly here, given that the three instruments proper (*organa*) of reason, Aristotle finds, are concept, judgment and argument. Thus logic, the science of these three, is only an instrument as *logica utens* or, rather, it is there reason itself and hence no instrument. Any instrument is finite and hence subject to evaluation. Reason, however, as evaluating all else without further recourse, can only be infinite if there is to be any science at all. Nor, therefore, does the situation change where reason thinks itself (it does not merely reflect upon itself) as what is then, in the old terminology, *logica docens*, indistinguishable from as in vital *rapport* with metaphysics. If logic is thought then language is the latter's prime mode, should it indeed have one. Language can be thought to reduce to one Word, which is the world. Hence, and only hence, can it be the case that "the limits of my language are the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein) and conversely. As rational beings, however, we can only aspire to have not a world but *the* world, which is, again, one word, thought's one *exitus*. "World" thus used is distinguished from "Earth" as proper name for a finite place.

The notion, the tradition, of *suppositio* as just mentioned, is based upon something quite lost in the idea of *reference*. Reference says nothing about the referring instrument or *word* referring as carrying back to or "standing for" our concepts in every case, while at this level we have nothing to do with empiricism, this nothing being of the essence of logic. The analysts, however, do not think of going beyond language as their frame, again, of reference, as we do here in referring to mind. Just therefore they do not consider *the nature of* this universal *means* of reference but only how what I *mean* to say is or may be intended by what I *do* say.

Suppositio explains specifically the existence and function of the word as *substituting* for things, something Wittgenstein might seem, but only seem, rather to mock at the start of his *Investigations*, as part of establishing the truth that "a language is a form of life". ●ne has words, however, only because "one cannot manipulate the things themselves in discourse about them", as Aristotle puts it, again (*De soph. el.* I, 165a 7-16). ●ne may feel a need to apologise a little for the term "things" here. Yet this, in fact, is the spirituality of discourse. ●ne needs to discourse on things (which just might by extension be called "manipulation". Hence in some areas one might literally manipulate instead, e.g. to communicate that A is, or is to be placed, i.e. by order, to the left of B) as effect of one's understanding things, knowing how they are. This bringing of them to attention, for its part, is a bringing that leaves them unchanged, called "intentional", the peculiarity of

knowing, when finite at least. For *discourse*, specifically, is about “things”, but about them by means of indeed manipulating substitute counters, i.e. material words, paralleled in thinking by concepts, the *verba interiora* which not only “stand for” things but are (formal) signs of them (*signa formalia*) in, say, the theory of Jean Poinsoot “of St. Thomas”, Descartes’ contemporary, signs, rather, of their specific or generic natures (there is no science of the abstractly conceived or imagined individual) and nothing else. They are thus, perhaps, no more, these concepts, than the *relation* between thinker and thing thought, ultimately one of identity, or even that thing thought as itself ideal as, insofar as they are finite, in Hegel. This has to mean, though, that in thus apparently being manipulated the things manipulate themselves, i.e. that the world, as object become subject, thus *manipulates itself*. There is thus no place for an individual active subject and therefore none for such an object either. This Hegel calls “the ideality of the finite”. These two notions, of subject and object, become thus absorbed in what Hegel calls the Idea itself, seen as absolute or as his account of what in religion is pictured as God, thus, again, to be seen as absorbing the world as object rather than as, in classical pantheism, being absorbed into it. It is the Idea rather, as he says at the end of the greater *Science of Logic*: “The method is the pure Concept which only relates to itself as such (*nur zu sich selbst verhaelt*); it is therefore the simple relation to self which is Being, now concrete (*erfuelltes*) being as ‘thought thinking itself... as the simple intensive totality’ (*Wissenschaft der Logik* II, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt: *Werke*, vol. 6 p. 572, my translation). The freedom of thought, that is, is ultimate being, the Aristotelian *nous* in its self-comprehension, again, wherein all finds its or their fulfilment, absolute knowing as one is known, one might say, in “simple intensive totality” (Hegel’s phrase again). This Hermetic side to Hegel’s system, congenial or not, cannot be ignored.

So there is a parallel, or analogical likeness rather, between word and thought, words as used signifying the latter. It will be seen though, as Aristotle continues, in the text of his cited above (165a 7-16), that this relation between names will not be the same as the relations between things. Nor will that between concepts be the same, since those names bear directly upon abstracted entities, pairings or groupings of which often, or always so in the case of predication (S is P), form a unity in “objective” (in Hegel’s sense of this term) reality. Thus a conceptual identity is declared between the referents of two different subject and predicate names (as having the same *suppositio*, though each in its own proper manner), i.e. that is what predication is, Fx, always, whether I say “Cicero is Cicero” or “Cicero is Tully” (Compare our “Subject and Predicate Logic”, final section: *The*

Modern Schoolman LXVI, January 1989). Since this itself is the uniquely logical relation it cannot be affected logically by any general theory of extra-mental or extra-logical relations, e.g. the Russellian one, without great mental confusion.

*

St. Bonaventura wrote of the univocity of plural usages of “the same” term, as the likeness merely of two or more such usages to one another, *similitudo univocationis*, as if in fact the same term, as itself a usage, were not the same (cf. *I Sent.* 48) or as if, more generally, the same were, necessarily, the different, mere likeness enfolding both univocity and analogy. The latter, however, has been defined as itself a species of equivocation. *This is the same thesis as Hegel’s, that the same and the different are the same in their very difference.* All this relates to “our” use of words, applying them to a world supposed, again, different (from thought, as Kant in his way explored). As the term is itself a usage the same term, again, used of two or on two occasions, is not the same. Wittgenstein said, accordingly, that the meaning is the use (and therefore not the meaning), without however fully bringing out this consequent impasse or, it must seem, unresolved clash, developed as it had been, however, in the Preface to Hegel’s *The Phenomenology of Mind*, called accordingly spirit, *Geist*. It is the genius of quite ordinary German speech to identify mind and spirit thus, in clear contrast to English, for example, as Anglo-Saxon developed after the Norman or Franco-Latin conquest. Our concern here, however, must completely transcend the vagaries or individual character of any particular language, since its aim is precisely to transcend, to get behind, language itself as phenomenon merely.

We have, then, either analogy or equivocation between analogy and equivocation themselves! This is because analogy is itself irreducible to univocity, as is at first unthinkingly demanded or supposed. The relation of *suppositio* in fact, which we have been discussing above, holds between words and non-words or things, though indeed this second *relatandum*, “thing”, might itself be another word, then or in consequence “materially” considered (the term is significant as negatively de-fining mind as *immaterial*). This has been fundamentally forgotten in modern philosophy’s central trend, Wittgenstein making a virtue, or so he was interpreted, of such forgetting, e.g. by those putting together his unfinished *Philosophical Investigations* (for thus they had interpreted his earlier *Tractatus*). This relation, however, is a matter of things processing through the mind, of the world’s thus becoming conscious of itself to itself. This equivalence,

however, is one with Absolute Idealism's suspension of all notions of realism, its identification of idealism with realism, namely, the Idea being "the true being", as Hegel declares at the end of his first or "greater" *Science of Logic*.

It is, again, because the supply of words is limited that we have analogy, in the "exemplary" form of analogous uses or significations of the same term. Note here that if there can be analogous uses then there can be analogous things and ultimately analogous beings generally, this eventually implying a prime analogate, as something which anything and everything resembles in this way and which must underlie any use of "the same as", as when we find Hegel saying, at the same time as he disclaims it, since then, he says, good is just not good nor evil evil, that "good is the same as evil".

Putting it thus, however, can seem to confirm the theory that analogy is "only" a logical doctrine within some larger theatre. This immediate impression, though, is false to the universality of logic as the very "form of the world" (Hegel). Analogy is inexplicable unless there are likenesses between *things*, even though, or because, "each thing is itself and not another thing". The truth is that each "thing" (this term itself names a category in Hegel's *Science of Logic*), just as being itself, becomes every other thing. There is an absolute fluidity, itself determined as such by this primary resistance to or indeed negation of it in the first or "abstracting" positing of a definite term, the interchangeability, namely, of the discrete and the continuous. So where two things are analogous, as by this analogy of being they have to be, we have two analogous uses of one term, as in "dinner table" and "the table of the virtues". The logical doctrine here is not to be confused with metaphor as a restrictedly linguistic phenomenon evidencing it. The thinking process here issues finally, in Hegel in particular, in the one "word", the Concept, as all in all. Every particular, thereby, named or imagined, is a (logical) moment of the Concept, even, Hegel will claim to demonstrate, Nature as a whole or the Idea's free going forth (cf. *Enc.* 244). This "passing" quality of the logical moment in its finitude is reflected, namely, in our notions and experience of Time. Meanwhile, therefore, logic itself, the Concept, God in Aquinas or related theology, has no real relation to us corresponding to "our", the creation's "real" relation (in a moderate realist and hence dualist philosophy) to the former. God "shall be all in all" - the at first sight temporal quality of "shall" retains, also in everyday speech, a certain normative quality.

Not only therefore is the identity relation *the* logical relation but, as fundament of this actuality, there is a circularity of relations between moments, whether conceptual or personal or both, each of which is an absolute end and the same end. Although this relation is Trinitarian in form

(here we touch upon Hegel's theology, the aspect under which his system *is* theology philosophically, i.e. the Aristotelian sense of *nous*) there is no definite *number* of its moments (Hegel says: "It is useless to count" as lying "outside the Concept"), ever arising and departing as they do, but only to return without end, which are called, whether as one or many in the particular cases, persons or, as Hegel at times has it, spirits, "stainless forms and shapes of heaven" (cf. *Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. Baillie, V, B, c: "Reason as Test of Laws"). A further issue of this, as we noted above, is that the term "analogous" is itself irreducibly analogous, on pain of not being analogous at all, i.e. if there were some univocal fundament to which all reduced. This Trinity or *triunity* is the only rational conception of God therefore, Hegel variously affirms.

*

So we have truth and being. Falsehood is the mind contradicting being or, that is to say, itself, since the mind, the Idea, *is* finally being, Hegel declares at the end of the greater *Science of Logic*, again. In itself, however, this, i.e. falsity, is a stage in the recognition, the revelation, of truth, to itself or to mind indifferently. The finite mind as a "power of the soul", or as life, is not mind or spirit. Death, Hegel says, is, accordingly, "the entry into spirit", itself, spirit, *Geist*, mind, called "life" in a figure (of speech), though pluriform speech itself, we have seen, is nothing but figure. Mind, therefore, its idea, that is to say, is violated in word or deed indifferently, whereas, it follows already, it is in itself *inviolable*. Thus, just as there is no language but in figure, so there are (this is the inviolability) no events but in figure, again, neither this nor any other. "Practical truth" is simply truth as the ultimate *act*. Conversely, the action to and/or *in* which the practical syllogism concludes is itself represented thought, itself thus transcending the presentation, before it is anything else. Action is contemplation, entailing no turning away, as, conversely, *theoria* is the highest *praxis*, as Aristotle had declared. Thought is itself already the "far better thing" that I do without need. Re-flection, thus "bending back", is itself act. The theological notion of *sin*, deriving from ritual but itself imagined or represented as past, is here dissolved. There cannot be an infinite offence, in the way generally "represented", and regarding this attribution (of infinity) as quite distinct from its supposed effect, of being "mortal" in an intended sense best caught in English by "death-ing" or killing, just inasmuch as it can be turned away from, whatever it is, since offence is itself a passing or finite moment, logically speaking, of the infinite itself, to be, in a figure, forgotten since as such unknowable. The invitation to judgment,

that is, is illusory, depending on a makeshift or faulty picture of the true state of affairs, whereby the last shall be first, the first last, the scarlet turning into, or including, the "white as snow" while, *ipso facto*, the converse of this (the "elder brother" syndrome) will also hold. One or another, we are the same. Religion attempts to express this when it says, for example: "There, but for the grace of God, go I". This, all the same, is all too easily a judgment on the ungraced nature of the other part, inevitable so long as we continue to form material images of "sin", that original ritual fault. For here too we should worship "neither on this mountain nor on that". This is shown in religion itself, however, when it is said that the "spotless" mediator was (is) "made sin for us" or even, figure within figure, that he "nails it (sin) to the Cross" and so on. Hence death too, Hegel affirms, is the opposite of what we imagine, is without "sting", not life vanquished but life's *meaning*, as to be found in logic itself, Hegel claims, life as itself being "only the Idea immediate". This, though, is said within a discourse in which mediation itself is sublated or "put by" while, furthermore, neither Life nor Existence as logical categories are to be confused with any empirical or material species or representation of the same. Hegel has chosen to transpose the ordinary names of things in this way for his exposition of "the true reason-world", asking us only to keep this in mind. The alternative would be to have a purely algebraic scheme where each item could be looked up (under what letter?) in, or learned by heart from, an appended index, or, why not, put in brackets beside, which shows the futility of this demand. Besides this, Hegel's further claim, I would hazard, is to show that these concepts themselves as we manipulate them in common life are in fact open to as *logically* requiring the refinement his *method* universally exhibits, especially as this refers to our concept of ourselves, of Self, showing us thereby that we do not after all inhabit a free-standing objectively finite world, are not thereby even our true selves as *in it* but are, rather, the individuals transcending themselves "as individual".

The distinction, then, of self-consciousness from the essential nature (*Wesen*) is completely transparent. Because of this the distinctions found within that nature itself are not accidental characteristics. On the contrary, because of the unity of the essence with self-consciousness (from which alone discordance, incongruity might have come), they are articulated groups (*Massen*) of the unity permeated by its own life, unsundered spirits transparent to themselves, stainless forms and shapes of heaven, that preserve amidst their differences the untarnished innocence and concord of their essential nature. (cited partially above already, with the reference, from Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Mind*).

This analysis or one similar, I would claim, is implicit in the evangelical declaration that “your sins are forgiven”, removing sin to the one sin of that “against the spirit”, as Hegel in one place condemns “certainty against the spirit” (1830 third Preface to the *Encyclopaedia*). In this sense God, “who but” as the Pharisees indignantly asked, forgives sins, i.e. sublates their notion as a finite picture of finitude. Thus forgiveness, by God or of one another, plays a key-role, even that of lynch-pin, in the argument constituting *The Phenomenology of Mind* (VI Cc3). The thesis here is equivalent to the Dostoyevskian “We are all responsible for all” as finally involved in the meaning of **Substance** and hence of personality, to which action is assimilated, as analysed (cf. *Enc.* 151 with the important *Zusatz* on the development from Spinoza to Leibniz).

*

Talk of a legislating God, then, is sociomorphic transference. Human rights equally are but analogously forensic in their notion, a fiction, as it is said nowadays, stuff for the street. Love does not transcend or absorb them, but is rather itself alone the realisation of eternal truth. It is not that love makes us respect a *pre-existing* right merely. With love, rather, life in the spirit, which is yet more or other than life, is first or in logical priority as underlying all birth, all who are born. Or, the last, i.e. the human right or rights, both as passive entitlement(s) and as active obligation(s), is, was ever and shall be first, as *in* love, and hence not rights specifically. They are fictions, again. Else love would be nothing as conferring nothing, would not be at all. Being, however, is necessity, in the immutable freedom of the Idea as being Idea of itself exclusively as, precisely, all-inclusive, hence of love too. Yet is not love, rather, the actualising energy of being itself in the first place, i.e. even in the very first place and not just in human or maybe other finite generation, as it appears? Some utterances by Jakob Boehme, a thinker regarded highly by Hegel, concerning an aboriginal will, touch upon this point, which would also imply that no one has a *right* to be loved. Hence it cannot, strictly, be earned either. There is just this chance, not, in the nature of the case, to be gambled upon, however, that if you have it you might get it or, equally, its opposite, however. This is that dark cause which we, or Scripture itself, prefer, to some extent forgivingly or compassionately, to call being hated “without a cause”. These categories as such, however, let us make no mistake, “lie outside the Concept”, are “empty thoughts” (an expression of Hegel’s) yet useful, as here, for communication. The philosophy of love, he makes quite clear, is in fact swallowed up in that of Being, of, that is, the Absolute Idea (cp. *Enc.* 159).

Such an account, of love principally, McTaggart has forcefully argued, is, so to say, the soul and spirit of immortality, called in religion, again, resurrection or, finally, ascension, the “going up” to the Holy City. Such iconography, like this philosophy, is the stuff of human achievement, to use now that figure. Nothing is achieved where “everything is accomplished”, as Hegel says when commenting on teleology, on its notion. He there gives a version, as it were, of Kant’s notion of the person, any person, as an end (in itself) though without any of the wistfulness of the Kantian “ought”, the “as if” of attitude or recommended mind-set.

All religions, it thus turns out, but *via* the essential mediation, historically, of a self-begetting or emergent logic within religion’s eventual self-expression, within religion itself as concrete, hatch out as philosophy, serving only itself in perfect worship. It is this that the recent notion of “globalisation” figures forth, the whole processing through mind without distinction as to beginning or terminus. This, though, is based necessarily upon a particular and even individual foundation, as the very shape of history cannot but picture and as is now pictured also, in its own individual way, in “natural history” or evolution, but without prejudice to necessity. Thus we learn from David Attenborough and others that there has been a plurality of developments of sight-organs as a vital response to light, even though just one, the eye, may have survived. The thrust towards sight, we may therefore hazard, is a necessity of nature, more general even than any supposed thrust of a given species towards some sort of collective “survival” of those species or individuals, it seems not to matter which, judged thereafter to have been, not surprisingly, most fit to survive. It is thus, as what is fit, that “the factual is normative” (Hegel).

*

Thus analogy as we have been discussing it covers, takes in, both language and things, since language is itself but one “thing”. This of course is the opposite speech to that in which it is said that “purity of heart is to will one thing” (Kierkegaard). Without such analogy, however, this last, where “thing” names the analogy which all things have to one another, since they are otherwise not plurified, the opposed univocity itself could not occur. What it says, all the same, is that will defines itself as willing the good categorically, as the “good will”, therefore, with **Volition** as furthest form of **Cognition** itself, the *former* being placed, we should note, immediately anterior in the *Logic*, and hence posterior to Cognition, i.e. as an *advance* (239), to the **Speculative** or **Absolute Idea** (see the relevant chapters on this theme concluding this book). This is real or actually existent in a manner

sublating both these finite terms, volition and goodness namely, along with cognition itself as crowned in volition, terms taken from now sublated or superseded finite categories in thought's, the Idea's, all the same ever-returning course, going out in order to return, as truth in itself, Hegel claims, can only be result.

Ideas, if not less ideal, are yet, as in the Platonist perspective, more concrete and abiding than things. Spirit is, so to say, super-matter. Hence arises our theme, as to what is real, what actually exists. Things thus proceeding in the mind are no longer things but ideas. The external thing is itself an idea. Thought cannot conceptually restrict itself in the way generally or immediately assumed, just as one cannot abstract praxis from *theoria*. Everything is thought. The practical syllogism is truly a syllogism, with the concluding action (activity as a whole then) intrinsic to it. It is the ultimate syllogism, as volition succeeds upon cognition, the good upon the true. Thus, as Fernando Inciarte well showed (e.g. in his *Substance and Action*, George Olms, Hildesheim, 2002), the soul or mind turns out to be the man as agent. The composite of soul and body (Aquinas) is a representation. Resurrection is the picture of man's own reality as a living spirit, upon which the whole of biology hangs or is hung, in mere objectification of self-consciousness itself, of mind universalising such self-consciousness to a zero-point as regards its individuality while enhancing its personal quality as *concrete* universal, thus yielding science, Hegel claims.

This is about the relation of created to creator as pure spirit. To vary the insight: we see small ants running on the cloth and think it improbable, or perhaps, like Hegel's village schoolmaster in LPR, wonderful that God bothers to know each individual ant and all its movements at all times. The insight into the object, however, is God's knowing the object and *thus* making it be or, rather, be-ing it, actively. God runs on the cloth, if you like, or God is not God. There are not two things, the ant and God's knowledge of it. God's knowledge *ants* (but since it includes the ant's motion it is not itself moved), a Fregean might say in form of a verb, applying this in fact to predication generally, such that the true logical form of "This is a fish" is, rather, "This *fishises" (the asterisk signifying an improper formation), Fx, standing for predicate as an incomplete function generally. So there is indeed a certain esoteric knowledge involved in such logical theory. Whatever we predicate thereby becomes something else, a form or act. For Aquinas a predicate signifies only *quasi*-formally, which seems better as excluding the absurd view that only certain types of formal things can be predicates or, more importantly, predicated, and not "just anything or everything" (Henry Veatch: "St. Thomas's Doctrine of Subject and Predicate" in *St. Thomas Aquinas* (1274-1974), Vol. II, Toronto 1974). Yet

it is because we are ourselves thoughts (of God, of Mind), i.e. we *are* that, that we see what are other thoughts, see the persons, as at a (non-momentary) level of their own and not at that of the thinker whose world, whose mind it is, or, rather, not at the one without being at the other, each being both subject and object and hence neither but rather, in each case, the other of self. The Idea is thus the true self, uniquely. As Hegel puts it, untouched however by negative or abstract Unitarianism, "God is the absolute person" (151, *Zus.*).

We speak of God's knowledge of "possibles". This only means that everything is possible. God does not have as it were to "imagine" things, sea-battles etc., before making them or before eventuation. The possible is thus more than the possibly actual and we do not get over this "everything" by mentally actualising abstractly "possible worlds". It, the possible, *is* the actual. Nothing, no class of elements, can, so to say, be ahead of as other than God, the Idea, which he might, so to say, consult. Hence they cannot be in him either under this sobriquet. As being God his thought of them, his thought of anything, has to be the thing, even of course if he should think of a thought, for example his own. God never knows what he cannot or will not do since his doing of anything is itself the knowing as nothing else is. In this sense too, supremely even, "Everything", the Good as cognate with Being, with the Idea in freedom, "is accomplished". That is what it means to be God. There is no abstract class of possibles, such as we often imagine with our invitations to "suppose", and this might indeed be what Hegel says "induced Kant to make possibility a modality", i.e. something merely abstract, like a woman giving birth to kittens, say. So no, we won't thus suppose. Really possibility is actuality and conversely and with a grasp of this our thought shall find its freedom and strength. When God conceives a higher mountain-top than Everest on this earth then there will *be* one, it is the same idea, or if there has been one then that was and is his conception, as Christ "saw Satan (under whatever mode) falling from heaven" (under whatever mode) or "saw" and knew Nathaniel under the fig-tree, to the latter's amazement (*John* 1, 48: the historical "correctness" or otherwise of this account is not at issue here). So when we say that God as God must know all possibles we have then to determine whether an abstract or unrealised possibility, in contradistinction from actuality, is itself a possible as, in the final analysis, by Hegelian logic, it is not and this, rather, is what God knows. He does not say to himself, as it were, I could rather have done this or that, simply because it is his *own* being as Idea that determines the formalities of actuality and possibility, the latter being identified with the former in the dialectical Advance, in the first place. Such, anyhow, is

Hegel's decided view, which is thus the truth of the "butterfly's wing" view of things.

The **Notion** is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realised. It is a systematic whole, in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it. Thus in its self-identity it has original and complete determinateness. (160)

Nor, of course, does God work by or with propositions anyhow. That is why, the main reason why, a propositionalist ethic is defective as being a "rationalist" ethic, why reasoning generally is one with action, in which the premises themselves are completed. Such action, as act, is "thought thinking itself" (cf. Aristotle's Greek text from *Metaphysics* XI 7 stating this, as cited by Hegel as concluding the whole *Encyclopaedia*, but unreasonably omitted, as is even a translation thereof, from the English text on the Internet from the University of Idaho). So howcome God? Well, God is reason, *nous*, within which alone all questions and our own being as questioner are founded, while even "nothing", the **Negative**, is thus a rational notion.

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Besides *The Analogy of God and the World* (Hampus Lyttkens' title for his doctoral thesis: Uppsala, c.1950, lent to me in MS form by Peter Geach at Leeds in 1979) there is the analogy of things, again, with one another. **Thing**, I repeat, is a passing category in Hegel's *Logic*. The analogy holds between all that exists, in a common likeness forming the basis for a common love or community of being, bound together in the reciprocal causality not precisely of system but of universal intelligibility.

We have explored analogy far enough to uncover an analogy (of being) between **Being** and **Essence**, to which Being accordingly yields, *via* the mediation of the Substrate as within **Measure**. It is Hegel's merit to have shown that analogy *of Being specifically* holds also between the logical categories, i.e. those of thought, which are accordingly, although analogously again, **One**, and of which **Analogy** itself is one category (EL 190), i.e. analogy, again, is itself analogical as between Logic and Being or as, again, the very being of the Idea, its essential freedom as first necessity. There is thus an analogy between analogy and *materia prima* as the necessary potentiality conditioning Nature, necessary just as the substantial Subject or, for Aquinas, individual human soul is necessary. Confer here the essay on natural necessity in Thomas Aquinas by Patterson Brown in Anthony Kenny's collection of essays, *Aquinas* (Macmillan Paperback, London 1970). It is necessary in the freedom of the divine Idea, thus named

as expressing the unity or singularity of absolute thought. Natural necessity, the necessity which is nature, is absorbed in logical necessity.

Thus in his demonstration itself of God by "the third way" Thomas Aquinas "admits the possibility of a *plurality* of necessary beings" (Patterson Brown), some of them caused, giving as examples "the heavenly bodies", as believed "incorruptible", the human soul, (intellectual principle), prime matter and angels, the common characteristic being incorruptibility.

The equation of natural with logical necessity, the former being thus absorbed in the latter, however, is the conception behind Leibniz's theorem of the "best of all possible worlds", seemingly bypassing Nature's tangible self-alienation, but rather absorbing it, again, as a mere moment of the Idea finally, everything resulting necessary in view of the absolute idealism Leibniz was at least, after Berkeley, approaching towards, thus landing himself, according to Hegel, it seems with some admiration, in a "philosophy of perfect contradiction".

All this is the same as to say that there must be an analogy between any pair of contraries in so far as they must be grounded in a common nature in order to be contraries in the first place. Thus it is "the character of thought" that "the moments as much are as they are not" (Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Baillie, 1967 edition, p. 777). Analogy, unnamed, is the controlling reality in Hegel's thinking, I venture to affirm.

The moments are, that is, unlike within a likeness, which is just the definition of analogy as, it turns out, the condition for the disparateness of concepts relative to one another as, logically viewed, just one class (of all classes, viz. *the* Concept, as in Hegel). This is in fact Hegel's version of Aristotle's on the face of it univocal statement that there is no univocal universal of the "things which are", or that "being is *said* in many ways". Being, rather, is an "analogical set" comprehensive enough to include, of logical necessity, non-being. "The moments as much are as they are not." So, parallel to **Existence** and **Essence** as a logical pair we have, as a pair, reference and sense or meaning, *Bedeutung* and *Sinn* in Frege's development of this. Thus, the morning star is, analogously (i.e. it is not), the evening star. In Fregean logic, indeed (for which I hold no especial brief), these correspond, in a particularly defined way, to Subject and Predicate as being, if we return to Hegel, **Object** and Concept. Even in Aquinas, accordingly, the predicate signifies *as if* formally, we have noted, the subject *as if* materially (*quasi*), whereas in Frege the subject really is the matter, the predicate the form, i.e. they are for him, it can seem, irreducibly different entities and not merely separated by their respective quality of being posited, *quasi* materially or *quasi* formally. So they cannot be the same, there cannot be an identity. Just therefore a special "*is of identity*" has

to be posited, “Socrates is Socrates” differing *toto caeli* from “Socrates is a man” (cf. our “Subject and Predicate Logic”, *The Modern Schoolman*, January 1989, pp. 129-139, esp. section IV). Even if x “fishises” yet x, in Frege, whatever it is, i.e. any x, is not the “fishising” but separate substantially while accidentally or essentially “fishising”. The difference is, then, that for Aquinas or Aristotle as cited above *both* subject and predicate refer, *supponunt pro*, and to the same thing or *ens*. As Aquinas expresses it (in *De ente et essentia*), “only wholes are predicated of wholes” (cf. the article by Veatch cited above). The Idea, in its actual *naming*, by “supposition” or reference, is not abstract (cf. Aquinas’s *De ente et essentia*). It is the Idea. Thus thought knows itself.

An identity of reference, therefore, can ground an analogy between subject and predicate and hence between reference and sense themselves as logical operations. The two *different* ways of referring (the predicate “connotes”) to the same thing give analogy, or a situation midway between identity and disparity, so-called intentional identity. There is not, therefore, a dualistic chasm between sense and reference, between the world of meaning, of “intellectual formalities”, and the real world, each of which can therefore be assimilated to the other indifferently. This, seen as giving an opening to pantheism, is really its refutation, opening rather, as Hegel clearly suggests, towards Trinitarianism as “the only rational” theology. Awareness of this is the possibility of knowledge as seen by Aristotelians and *a fortiori* Platonists, among whom Hegelians should accordingly be counted, for whom the form in the knower is the form of the thing known, which therefore, as Hegel works it out, is what alone knows itself. That the intelligible form is found *alio modo* in “the external world” (we cannot say “in nature”, *qua* moment of the Idea, still less “in things”, the thing being also a passing “methodical” category finally, for thought, absorbed in the Idea) is ultimately another way of affirming the nothingness of this “external world” (*Enc.* 50). Subject, as becoming thus absolute, vanishes *qua* subject specifically or as contradistinguished against object, just as, one-sidedly, does the object in, say, Berkeleyan idealism. Yet for both “of course God is the object” (Hegel) just in being found to be absolute subject, all-inclusive as having nothing “appearing beside” as Aristotelian *paremphenomenon*, as indeed Aristotle uses this term in proving the immateriality of thought, *nous*, of mind, *res cogitans*, as knowing, in its essential freedom, being or existence as absorbed in essence, as itself *qua* mind necessary for the possibility of this identity with eventually all that would be otherwise other, i.e. for knowledge or science. The principle of non-contradiction, again, is thus the first or controlling instance of reference

specifically, even when referring, as does Hegel, even or especially, to the contradictions constituting "reality".

In this way reference, *suppositio*, is contained within the ambit of meaning (*significatio*), intentional "objects" being the things known themselves, this, the *id quid*, "that which", being the final sense of the *id quo*, "that by which", in the famous passage from Aquinas at *Summa theol.* I, 85, 2, where, in confirmation of this, the *id quo* is itself-known, necessarily posited, as an *id quid*, if there is not to be infinite regress. Interpreting concepts as "formal signs" does not alter this since even the unknowable, as even relations, has and have to be known as precisely such. By this route, in fact, concepts tend to become mere relations between knower and known, as Andre de Muralt points out in his *L'enjeu de la philosophie medievale* (Brill, Leyden 1991). In fact the fight against the falsification which is abstraction needs to be acknowledged as properly fought out within reason itself, as bearing upon ideas "knowable in themselves" rather than upon things as "more knowable to us", the very divide Aristotle, one with Hegel in this, declares his intention to bridge at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*, thus acknowledging empiricism in the discounting of it. This also is the key to P.T. Geach's polemic against abstractionism, as not represented, he claims, even by Aquinas:

In accepting the comparison whereby the *intellectus agens*, the mind's concept-forming power, is likened to a light that enables the mind's eye to see the intelligible features of things, as the bodily eye sees colours, Aquinas is careful to add that this comparison goes on all fours only if we suppose that colours are generated by kindling the light - that the light is not just revealing colours that already existed in the dark (*Summa theol.* Ia q. 79 art. 3 ad 2um). Furthermore he says that when we form a judgment expressed in words, our use of concepts is to be compared, not to seeing something, but rather to forming a visual image of something we are not now seeing, or even never have seen (*Ibid.* q. 85 art. 2 ad 3um). So he expresses anti-abstractionist views both on the formation and on the exercise of concepts. (Peter Geach: *Mental Acts*, RKP London 1957, p.139. The 1971 edition of this now classic work included a new and important Preface).

That the mind makes concepts is explained by Hegel with his thesis that Mind is itself the self-knowing and final, actually self-producing Concept. This is his account of logical form, whereby form constitutes the world or, as the scholastic tag had it, *forma dat esse*, form gives being and hence, as the Idea, *is* being ultimately, as Hegel spells out, again, at the end of his "Greater Logic". Aquinas's position that the mind (as abstractly human or finite, i.e. as soul) can know being without itself being or becoming it was always, even self-confessedly or in his own case, necessarily midway or

provisional. Human souls, like angels, prime matter and “the celestial” bodies are, in his realist system, created or caused (by God) necessary beings, as such or “*per se* incorruptible”, it is claimed at *Summa contra Gentiles* II, 30, “How Absolute Necessity can exist in created things”, a passage cited in full by Patterson Brown in his article referred to above here. Brown contrasts this with what Kant writes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* at A606-607, B634/635 as, *qua* refutation, “completely off the mark”. The error of nineteenth century Neo-Scholasticism, first proposed as a corrective to, *inter alia*, the Hegelian *method*, was, by contrast, to attempt to absolutise that provisional position. This claim as to Hegelian method, as if it might be considered in parallel with the Scholastic method it conceptually transcends (see below in our text here *passim*), shows more than anything else the incomprehension of those promoting Thomist revival, however excellent a project, as I consider it, in itself, but not, indeed, as instrumental for something else, given the claim to revive Thomist *philosophy*. Hegel’s philosophical method, in other words, is itself deep theology. There is no place for “handmaids”, *ancillae*, here. The *unreadiness*, this philosophical incomprehension, which this movement of reaction embodied, its enforced triumph in clerical and related circles, left the way open for the parallel Marxist materialisation of the Hegelian Concept and “method”, for the wars, revolutions and worse enormities of the immediate future. This was a repeat, at one level higher, one might well think, of the 1607 refusal of the papacy (*Congregatio de auxiliis*) to confirm the *Thomist* position that God *qua* God, as the light enabling all our knowledge, necessarily determines the human free act as free, is never passive to it as “leaving it alone” (“liberty of indifference”), a refusal which played its part, one might well think, again, in opening the way for the modern atheist movement or for the relative triumph, in Europe, of the Kantian anti-philosophy, an absolutisation of mere phenomenalism as Hegel denominated it. But perhaps the Pope judged this practical refusal, i.e. not one of thought, as the lesser of two evils, the other being incomprehension on the part of the larger body of “the faithful”. Such a consideration, however well meant or “correct” in its sphere rather than true (*Enc.* 172), lies, like numbers, “outside the Concept”, while as mere or abstract practice, e.g. “in” a university or when conferring generally, even philosophy itself is of course just “phenomenal”. The “mistake”, as it would be at least if intending a purely philosophical stance, which it is doubtful that it did, was again repeated c. 1860 when “the Holy Office” condemned five propositions, there would be more layer, of the nascent movement of Hegelian “ontologism” as “not safe for teaching”, a curious phrase.

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There is, though, we have mentioned, a further point (i.e. apart from that of the identity of being and essence) at which meaning is itself the purest instance of reference. This is expressed by the principle of non-contradiction, which of course Hegel is not, contradictorily, attempting to deny in his critique of “the soulless word *is*”. He uses it, rather, as do all who argue anything, to establish contradictory moments in or of existence as itself a finitely self-contradictory or, as abstract, false category. In and by this principle as constitutive the understanding apprehends reality in its very formalities. It is not then merely a rule for speaking among humans specifically, being itself rather the *possibility of reference* as even the latter’s primal *act* or form, as already referred to being. This successful reference, the affirmative identification of (any) being with itself, with the denial of its negation, is the first achievement of sense, of meaning. As Aristotle puts it (*Metaphysics* IV, 4●), one cannot know what this principle means without believing it true, though not at all in virtue of a reduction of truth to correct speaking merely. This would be to confound the theoretical with the abstractly pragmatic, where the useful is no longer useful (for anything). Thus the animals strive to survive merely in virtue of being alive, life, like suicide, its contrary, having no specific meaning for them collectively taken. Each, as finite, like a passing or finite category in the logic, is purely phenomenal, false even, except insofar as it might have and hence *be* Mind, the Idea, which determines even how Nature as a whole is to be viewed as a moment, though alienated or “petrified” (Schelling), of the Concept, individual insects, to use an example of Hegel’s, lying “outside of” this. This, in fact, is why he calls the evolutionary hypothesis, taken in abstract isolation at least, an “empty thought”. “Life”, “the initial particularisation”, as “in point of its immediacy this individual living thing” (216), “no more than the idea immediate” (221), “runs away” (221, *Zus.*), as he also puts it. In “the process of Kind”, “the highest point of its vitality”, “the immediate living being mediates itself with itself”, a difficult notion at first blush. The “real result” of this process of Kind, the dominant notion in evolution as we typically view natural life today, viewing now this very process “notionally” (i.e. this result is not a *temporal* event), however, “is to merge and overcome that immediacy with which the *idea in the shape of life*, is still beset” (stress added). It is as this *idea*, namely, that Life is treated in the Logic, as merging into the following category of **Kind**, the individual conceptually *becoming*, i.e. of itself, the universal as Nature is merged, absorbed into Mind in its very Idea, again. Each is called, we might say, to become not *all*, as it were distributively, but the universal, the Kantian

“Kingdom of ends” merging here into the logical circle having its centre, or its being whole, i.e. wholly, at every point. However, as Hegel, seeming to show exact prescience of the future Marxist deformation of his system, wryly comments:

Human nature, not much to its credit, is more ready to believe that a system denies God, than that it denies the world. A denial of the God seems so much more intelligible than a denial of the world. (50)

The reference to a readiness to believe mirrors exactly a passage of the *Summa contra gentes* of Thomas Aquinas mentioning “sins against faith”, as a virtue, he means. This can be either by excess or defect, i.e. wilful refusal, in his view, or, as here, excess in a too great readiness to believe what should still be tried and tested, the world and its ways, namely. Here in Hegel, such unconditional faith in the world, so to say, is a matter of “just missing the notion”.

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So a general scepticism, or consistent denial rather, is expressed here in our sources concerning time and, consequently events or “happenings” as time-bound. These, and associated phenomena, including even the world or our entire if transient life, do not “belong to the notion” or Concept. This, as bearing upon time, events and the world, as objects of belief declared here, by our reading, to be objectively nothing, is thus a *formal* causality prior to its positing as “efficient” cause. It, the Concept, God, is the *form* of the world as disclosed to the subject (which it itself nonetheless is, in this unity of self and other necessarily proper to infinity), constituting it in being as intellect, spirit. Hence spirit, here as mind (*Geist*) or soul (*anima*), is *quodammodo omnia* or, for Heidegger, just *omnia*. The *quodammodo*, however, though ignored by Heidegger, is the noting of an analogy between spirit and world, ultimately, as at the opening, the becoming, of Hegel’s logic, between being and nothing, the negativity of absolute freedom, as also, or correspondingly rather, between macrocosm and microcosm, as developed in Cusanus or Leibniz and further by Hegelian monism, where whole and part are interchangeable in mutual cancellation. What was developed was thus the further reaches of analogy, of likeness, finally of identity *in* difference, where the many as such are one but *in* their remaining many, as they do not in that *oneness* (of the blackness of cows at night, in Hegel’s words) that they would have, Aquinas observes, if there were no analogy. This identity, that is, is the analogy *of being* specifically, just as set or found (and not merely “posited” *in* being). Why is there such an analogy,

to which "creation" or the procession of likenesses corresponds, unless as deriving logically from the Absolute Idea, viz. that there should be a plurality in unity of such beings, on the Trinitarian analogy in fact, Hegel would add, while wishing, like Aquinas, to downplay or eliminate any numerical aspect in just this naming of "three", which he therefore in a measure cannot but deprecate or otherwise modify? *Numeri non ponuntur in divinis* (Aquinas), i.e. numbers play, can play, no part in theology. "It is useless to count" (Hegel). By such logic these or "God's good pleasure" and similar expressions are but figures, though in incarnating or expressing logic they are as necessary, these "picture ideas", as is incarnation itself, individual and only thus actual, as Hegel expounds this theology and its necessity. It thus would appear that the familiar exclamation of naïve or realist thinking that God "could have acted differently" is objectively impious, goodness and indeed freedom being more surely based in or, more especially, as necessity, with "no shadow of turning". God did not "repent himself" but then neither did he specifically "send" the Flood, for example. It, along with such sending, is absorbed, sublated, as moment in or of the whole. Here too, as in that later "betrayal", "is the son of man glorified", man, again, being a, or, as always, *the* divine moment. So God indeed wills himself to be and that freely, so that this his self-constitutive act, *is* being, his being is freedom. It is his being, in its necessity, that is chosen or willed, while if it were not there would be no will or being thus not to will. The necessity, that is, is entirely immanent to what we call necessary being.

So there has to be analogy between mind, spirit, and God, who thus *is* spirit. Univocity is itself mere phenomenon, therefore. "Turn but a stone and you touch a wing" and not just a butterfly's, though an absolute unity, beyond the very possibility of event, is finally implied, nullifying the show of "groaning and travailing". This is the rational seal of peace upon every conflict, as upon conflict as such.

As pointed out earlier on, however, in the analogy of God and the world, of which the analogy between finite beings is itself an analogy – i.e. analogy is itself an analogous concept – , the primary analogate is, as the whole potential, the one which simply *is* without qualification. It is, as the prime *matter* (speaking now of God as *analogandum*), pure potentiality or potency indifferently, and, *as such*, necessary, a being that is only such by analogy with our normal or unthinking usage. That is, we speak of the *absolute* in negative analogy with Being taken normally, so to say. Analogy is the web of discourse, of thought even, itself. This, anyhow, is the analogy *of* being as this is analogous to the analogy *between* beings, in their very capacity as beings. In the primal analogy between Being and Nothing, consequently, neither is *prime* analogate as enabling the other. Negative theology is thus

wholly and unmixedly positive. This is what *underpins* Aquinas's dictum, which may be taken equally as about knowledge itself, as Hegel will expound it, that "we know most about God when we know that we know nothing about him", about the cause in as identical in absolute difference with and from the effect as a whole even. "This *also* is thou, neither is this thou". This is what Hegel further develops in his final *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, which are *equally* in their subject/matter about the nature of the contingent.

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Subject and predicate both refer to, intend, the identical *suppositum*. This, however, insofar as they are "bits of language", is only possible by way of the *idea* (cf. J. Deely: "How Language Refers", in *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia*, 1972). That is to say, the idea, the thought, is the *suppositum*, is what they stand for. Words name ideas, concepts. This only implies a so-called three-level semantics if empiricist realism has been assumed. It is not only words that are pictures in general, however. Rather, this category also includes any significant phrase, such as "things in themselves". This is a picture, as of course is "picture", the word, itself, taken in fact from painting originally (Latin: *pingo*, *pictum*). So when we explain our world's constitutive freezing of the finite moments (and "freeze" of course is yet another picture) by language, "verbalisation", we are linguistically explaining language itself or explaining linguistic explanation. The concept of explanation, therefore, is not that of final or absolute knowledge, which, very properly, Hegel does not therefore properly explain. He rather shows, as he elsewhere states, that we must go beyond the mirage that is explanation, where one set of terms is simply substituted for another without addressing at all the problem of reference, which we are saying here are equally those of meaning, i.e. the terms both mean and refer to the same reality. So "this dog", subject, and "a dog" predicate, both refer to or stand for the same *whole*. By the same reasoning they both ultimately name or *think* the Concept as it results from speculative logic in Hegel's system of the same. There is no *individuum vagum*. Thus if I say "a dog" simply then nothing is thereby asserted or even merely proposed, while "Dog!" without the article, spoken by a child, is likely to be a disguised if indefinite statement, assertion or command.

This gives to subject and predicate an analogical function *with regard to each other*. They both refer but after their respective manner. This corrective to Fregean dualism only goes halfway, however, as Hegel shows. The judgment in fact, as reversible, destroys equally both of its terms. Language

as such does indeed “bewitch intelligence”, in Wittgenstein’s phrase. Thus God and being, Hegel’s example, must be thought *at once*, as one, neither delimiting the other. Or, if you can say God *is* anything then you can no longer talk of God. The same, however, applies to being. If being is anything other than itself, for example if it is nothing, then being is not being. This leads to the situation Hegel calls Becoming, here not at all implying, however, that anything ever becomes. If that were meant then we would not have the correct, so to say transcendent category here. For Hegel, in the last analysis, only the Idea itself becomes, and that constitutively. Failure to see this led Hans Kueng absurdly to suggest that “historical”, like “being” (or “is”), “one”, “true” and “good”, but as part of his interpretation of Hegel, was a “transcendental predicate” in the Thomist or associated sense (see his *The Incarnation of God*, London 1970), Logical becoming is not historical, history, like time, having no place in the logic. The “Bacchanalian whirl” (of concepts or even as such), that is, is a superior form of standing still, hence a “whirl”. This, one may note, is perhaps the first insight needed for a worthy philosophy of the dance, as for music itself, miscalled “music of time” as if there were some other music. Music, rather, is time de-figured. As such it is absorbed into or fulfilled in thought, contemplation, as thought thinking itself in that necessity where nothing, least of all the contingent, is omitted. I am thinking of course of the music often miscalled “abstract”. As art it is absolute, rather, but as always attaining the universal in individual form.

So the analogy here is between subject and predicate as referring instruments and not, therefore, between *supposita* as referred by these, since of these there is just one finally, namely the Idea (or concept, originally, in his *On Interpretation*, Aristotle’s first and hence prime act of the understanding) or equivalently (as Hegel finally concludes to it as *der sich begreifende Begriff*) Being, Greek *to on*, as analogy itself, as between good and evil, positive and negative, or, this is the point, any two elements whatever, for the simple reason that duality itself is sublated. Being, that is, is not said “in many ways” (Aristotle) merely, but in every possible way. “Why do you call me good? There is none good but God”. The Scripture here supports Hegel’s stance. In so far as we condescend to speech, however, he adds, we must strenuously deny such identifications, of good and evil for example. Speech, as the aboriginal “letter”, is in fact false and kills. “Things”, as spiritual (this is both conclusion and presupposition to philosophy), are only comprehensible spiritually, *geistlich*.

The analogy then lies in a qualified identity of reference, such as is even carried over into actual identity statements such as “Cicero is Cicero”, inasmuch as this might be intending anything, or as when we say “God is

God". It is from this identity, in fact, that this analogy of conceptual subject and predicate is deduced, every judgment thus being of the form "A is A". The second A, as in "A is B(A)", is a mere picture of the first form, of the truth. In other words, "A is B", the expression, is analogous to "A is A", whatever we might want to "mean" thereby and the whole situation is thus analogous to Hegel's treatment of the one-word utterance "I" at *Enc.* 20. This situation is generalised in the universal or popular commendation of the supposedly self-destroying judgment (which actually destroys the world, rather), universally applicable, viz. "This also is thou, neither is this thou". The meaning, as Hegel says, is that all judgments are false; they kill, as does the science of anatomy absolutely taken. As McTaggart put it, we make no judgments "in heaven" or where all is *perceived*, rather. Berkeley had said that *esse* IS *percipi* (in exquisite speculative self-contradiction, whatever limitation Hegel may have found in his thought generally).

So it is not that analogy bridges a chasm but that there is no chasm, but rather a sameness of form, *as in knower and known*. Knowing, we may therefore say, initially establishes being, a statement holding just as much as the converse, since they are (this is the only explanation) actually the same. Being then is self-knowing, the Idea. The analogy between Subject and Predicate, then, is the overcoming of their difference before, logically before, any judgment is made. Thus, as it were anteriorly, "all things are a judgment" just as, Hegel will also say, "Everything is a syllogism". Our logic simply retraces this in abstract detail but with a view to putting it together again. We live in between the beginning and the end, which are, however, the same, which means that our living, life, is "only the Idea immediate", i.e. is not the Idea, being "but a melon" or "but a melancholy flower" indifferently, as the popular round suggests. It must "cessate", therefore, with death, Hegel notes. This is the same as to say it must cease continually, as in reality, this ceasing, the daily dying of Scripture, is "the entry into spirit" (i.e. mind) where we anyhow *are* "all the time", as we revealingly say. Whenever we think we take distance from life immediate. This too is why Hegel dismisses the posited objects of sense-perception, from which "we" nonetheless have to start, as possible object of knowledge (*Phenomenology of Mind*, "Introduction" and first sections of the main text).

Thus the judgment, any judgment, identifies not Subject and Predicate as such, again, but what both "stand for", though differently, *quasi* materially or *quasi* formally respectively, as one account, we have noted, has it, at the same time as it states that "only wholes are predicated of wholes" (Aquinas: *On Being and Essence*; cf. Henry Veatch: "St. Thomas's Doctrine of Subject and Predicate" in *St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974), Commemorative Studies*, Vol. II, Toronto 1974). This so to say independently existing pre-confirmation

of Hegel's view, of which he gives little sign of having been aware (apart from the generally Aristotelian basis of both thinkers), well illustrates philosophy's unity.

Analogy as here treated holds equally between all beings regarded as individual or distinct, which, again, they both are and are not (Hegel's "ruin of the individual"). Although, then, there are, in natural perspective, "natural kinds", yet each thing is itself before it is a member of a class, this being but an instance of our conclusion above, following Hegel, that "A is B" exemplifies "A is A". Equally, however, it has followed, this position is the entire contrary of the abstract "Each thing is itself and not another thing". Each thing is precisely every other thing if it is anything. So it is not in alienation from self a member of a class since it is its own class, as is said firstly or routinely of God, that he is his deity. Hegelian thought, for instance, shows the analogous reflection of this universally. In the process, however, analogy is made to a species of identity, analogy itself thus ceasing to be, as it was classically explained, a species of equivocation. Here too, then, analogy is analogous to itself. The nearest analogue to this is the picture McTaggart gives of the infinitely mirrored perception of their perceiving made by persons in eternity by what he calls, somewhat opaquely, "determining correspondence" and which he "claims to have been proved" (Peter Geach, *Truth, Love and Immortality*, "An Introduction to McTaggart's Philosophy", Hutchinson of London, 1979, p. 135). Analogy, that is, is only a restriction upon identity inasmuch as the latter conceptually amplifies analogy. Both terms are thereby "sublated", *aufgehoben*, in and by the Idea as absolute.

Although each thing, or person, is itself before it is a member of a class or kind yet the person, or I, may agree that for him *as living* to be is to live, *esse est vivere*, to be a human being in short. Yet being has no parts, again, as being found whole in each "part", "grain of sand" etc. It is, so to say, omni-present or active, wholly, precisely as being the Idea (the "true being", Hegel says at the conclusion of the "greater" and earlier *Science of Logic*). This, however, is but to agree with Aristotle that the specific difference, *of which the whole individuality is an instance*, determines everything else, this being the difference between things as they are in themselves and things as they are "in notions", in discursively finite thinking or predication. Hence this difference, as thus differentiated, is not something merely added on, cannot be thus thought (i.e. think-ed) specifically over again. Hence, again, of this too we may affirm, with Hobbes, that we shall no sooner know it than enjoy it. The individual, self or other, is immediately enjoyed, beyond objectivity, is not and cannot be made an object of thought. There is no science of it, no judging, since, again, it is not even determinately "itself and

not another thing". "There is one closer to me than I am to myself" (Augustine of Hippo). Yet this one, there is now no reason to deny, is, less than any other, "itself and not another thing" but rather *omnia*, not in the sense of pantheism but in the sense that, finally, there are no "other things", i.e. it is the *ultimate* specific difference as outlined here. This is the abiding negative as most positive of as consuming all, anciently pictured as fire, "in the head" or elsewhere indifferently.

I

BECOMING

●ne might rightly be cautioned against taking Hegel's remarks in his *Encyclopaedia*, paragraph 81, about understanding dialectic, its "nature", as being an attempt to define it. For this would make it, some say, into just one more metaphysics of the understanding and this would be a *mis*understanding. By this, however, all understanding is misunderstanding if one stays with it, not rising above it to the rational and "relational", the "non-oppositional" view.

The alternative, it follows, is that dialectic is only truly known in the exercise of dialectic, since the whole order of specification is thus subjected to an or the order of exercise, all specification being counted as abstraction viewed as falsification. It cannot be objectified, "specified", without being falsified, as finite object, namely. It could only be known at all by looking back from the speculative result it finally attains to, from the Idea which is the "Speculative stage or stage of Positive Reason", apprehending unity in opposition (82: such numbers as this refer to the paragraphs of "The Science of Logic" which constitutes Part ●ne of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* of 1830). Unless otherwise stated. I shall follow, as consistently as I am able, the ●UP convention as used in William Wallace's 1873 translation (1965 edition), writing the name of any of Hegel's categories in bold type at their first mention.

*

Just as it might be important not to take dialectic as descriptive of a supposed finite world, in the manner of rationalist metaphysics, so it is important not to confuse the dialectical category Hegel has chosen to call **Becoming** (88) with any theory in physics or, say, history. Hegel is not concerned to assert that physical atoms are forever in motion and cannot be observed, or that historical processes never stand still, even if the

analogy be there to be drawn and is drawn, e.g. in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

This mistake is easily made. It would be surprising if Hegel had not made it himself here and there. Thus McTaggart deprecated the choice of the name "becoming" (*Werden*) here. He suggested as alternative simply "Transition to **Being Determinate**", claiming that there is at least one other case in Hegel's logic of a transition where the category is given no definite name.

Thus Hegel's category **Cognition** differs from our ordinary usage as including volition, while **Life**, for example, is an entirely *a priori* category focussing on a certain (imperfect or finite) kind of unity. As for **Mechanism** and **Chemism**, neither category can be assumed to coincide with any actual metaphysical or scientific system.

*

In Hegel's tripartite system, or circular "encyclopaedia", treating of Logic, Nature and, finally, Spirit (or Mind, *Geist*), the mind rises to God, discovers that it is God, before "setting in order" (Anaxagoras) the ins and outs of its alienation, from which it returns leaving nothing behind. Thus the "Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms (propositions)" or, one might say, of determinations, "in their opposition". This affirmative unity follows close upon, "is involved in", their disintegration and "transition" (*Enc.* 82).

It is not that Hegel fails or stops short at resolving the problem of movement solved at its own level by Aristotle. This is not his interest, simply. In so far as we now tend to see everything as text or "realm of discourse" we are closer to Hegel (or closer to Aristotle's metaphysics). The dilemma between "realism" and "idealism" is posed, after all, precisely by conscious subjectivity. One perceives one's perceiving (of "being"). Nor should one confuse this transparency of knowledge to itself with the subsequent epistemological reflecting or bending back upon one's subjectivity. Knowledge is in itself essentially self-knowledge. The Delphic prescription was merely descriptive. No restriction or imprisonment is implied here, since I am "the universal of universals" in a coincidence of solipsisms. The individual subject disappears in the first personal pronoun's naming itself as "universal of universals".

McTaggart again remarks that it is not certain that Hegel understood just how "mystical" his philosophy was. This appears to contradict that last paragraph of the addition to section 82 of the *Encyclopaedia*. There is mystery in the mystical only for the understanding, says Hegel there. It is,

in either case, convenient here to point to the continuation (surely dialectical) of interpretation with (creative) development of a given thinker's thought. ●bscure awareness of this coincidence is surely the motive cause of the "fundamentalist" refusal to countenance Biblical or Koranic hermeneutics. This finitude of "understanding" is reproduced in the "scholastic" approach to "established" texts or thinkers, where the transmitter or teacher so to say owns the meaning of such texts. So, it follows, to transcend such finitude is to blur an imagined line between what I or anyone responding to Hegel says and what Hegel says. We become one another and interpretation can and should improve upon the original, as is recognised in Biblical hermeneutics. This is part of the infinity of any possible "Word of God" and hence, on these premises, of man. Words are themselves self-transcendent, as the message is one with the messenger. The line then is not merely blurred but denied.

It is not that such scholarly activity is quite other than philosophy, though the understanding always wishes to distinguish them. What begins maybe as scholarship, in the debate or conversation, must, as principle of its own life and liveliness, always go over into creative philosophy. The Reason which Hegel claimed to allow to unfold on its own unfolds in any and every individual, "man's ancient title of rational being" (82, *Zusatz*), one, after all, with the entitlement of universal suffrage. Hegel however includes under this also children, who show their rationality by obeying and believing parents and teachers, as do adults who have faith in accredited teachers, a faith gradually being made perfect in one's own vision. This is, he says, "the true reason world".

With **Being** Hegel would name "immediacy itself". ●nly thus does logic begin absolutely, as explicitly presuppositionless. No intuition is involved. Yet, as a predicate, being is the "first definition of the Absolute", "absolutely initial" in the ascending series of such definitions which just *is* the dialectic, in absolute priority to all external observation. ●f course the language one uses is, as such, a memory of such abstractive observation, inasmuch as the spiritual (*geistlich*) journey begins when already out at sea in a leaky boat, i.e. the language and "form of life" are alone to hand, limiting any "Cartesian" enterprises. Hegel is thus far at one with Wittgenstein, who uses this same analogy. Language itself, however, is what must question the validity of such a (finite) memory.

Such unmediatedness, absolutely negative therefore, "is just **Nothing**", the second "definition" (or identification?) of the Absolute and hence, like Being, a category. This is the "fate" of being as it is if taken as prior to any intention or meaning (mediation) of ours, any evolving of a "profounder connotation". This equivalence (with non-being) is not one with mere

nonsense. Hence he refers to "the Nothing of the Buddhists". On the necessity of beginning "logical science", and hence science as such, he thinks, with **Being** one may consult his introductory essay to the earlier *The Science of Logic* of 1812, "With what Must Science Begin?", while for a commentary upon this essay I would refer the reader to our study, *Hegel's Theology or Revelation Thematized* (CSP, Newcastle: 2018, Chapter Six, pages 41 to 75).

The co-incidence of these two, of Being and Nothing, their unity, we saw, Hegel calls **Becoming**. This unity, after all, is the same as, arises out of, their absolute difference. "The one is not what the other is." Nothing, *das Nichts*, just is non-being, even though it is the same as being, when understood as "immediacy itself. It is an *ens rationis*, Aquinas would say, while in fact all *entia rationis* are nothing, this is their definition as over against real being.

In **Becoming**, however, we have only "the readiest example", says Hegel, of how to envisage or conceive the philosophically now established unity of abstract being with nothing, with non-being, of difference with sameness. At first Hegel places Becoming on a par with "a Beginning", where "the thing" both is and is not. But this means that Beginning "is itself a case of Becoming", selected though "with an eye to further advance" merely. Confer here 88(3).

Hegel notes here that "no speculative principle can be correctly expressed in a proposition" (not even this one, presumably! Compare our opening remarks about expressing dialectic). The unity of being and nothing here asserted is, thus, all the same, exactly balanced by their absolute difference. The "unity has to be conceived in the diversity." "To become", he concludes, is the true expression of this, of that which both is and is not, absolute immediacy, in a word (though he is surely thinking too of the corresponding place in Plato's *Republic*, Book VI, here). It is both "the true expression", then, and "the readiest example" of the principled or "inherent unrest" of "To be" and "Not to be", in their unity. This equivalence, of the true and the "readiest", is something upon which McTaggart fastens in his *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, its free or "zigzagging" open-endedness, so to say.

This, though, is in absolute abstraction from any "that", any Heracleitian world of fiery flickering, as mind, ultimately, thinks nothing other, which means nothing less, than itself. There is nothing less than mind, since "everything finite is false". Such is the unanimous witness of that mysticism or "highest truth" with which Hegel identifies at *Enc.* 82 (*Zusatz*) and to which he constantly concludes. Such Becoming is the mind's constitutive "to be or not to be", he writes, prefiguring a formal

transcendence of "mere existence" as a finite category of the doctrine of essence (cf. *Enc.* 213) in his system.

Implicit here, it will emerge, is an absolute voluntarism or freedom of the substance-transcending subject, corresponding to the divine creation which is yet necessary beyond all our perception (the cunning of Reason). Such necessity however he shows to be itself freedom beyond all limit and in no sense a restriction. It is connected with the argument that the Absolute both has to be seen as manifestation itself and, just therefore, again, as not possibly manifesting anything other than itself. This, so to speak, is the necessity of necessity which is the necessity of freedom such as mind knows itself to possess. There is therefore no finite determinism or denial of freedom, either of God or creature, in Hegel's system. We may compare the Augustinian paradox, as it might at first seem, that angels (or humans) "established in grace" such that they cannot "sin" or err have a more perfect freedom than those who may "fall". Much more than a merely ideological changing of the meaning of a word is here intended and communicated. "I will be what I will be" gives the essence of "I am what I am". Both reduce to "I am" and finally "I", the **Notion** or Concept as refusing all predication.

Hegel speaks here (§§), somewhat figuratively, of the "inherent unrest" of that which is "at war within itself", to be unified in **Being Determinate**, the following category which yet, as such, will also be "one-sided and finite". "Being is the passage into Nought, and Nought the passage into Being." This is what Hegel calls Becoming, a passage. It is the opposite of the view that "from nothing comes nothing", which is equivalent to denying Becoming merely and which rests upon "absolute identity as upheld by the understanding". In Reason, in Mind, the case is different. Here Reason creates. "This Being which does not lose itself in Nothing is Becoming", creation *ex nihilo*. "Becoming is only the explicit statement of what Being is in its truth." It is in harmony with this when, in reasoned Christian belief, the Absolute is conceived as the Act and only the Act (cp. the Aristotelian *actus purus*) of ever generating the "Word" or, ultimately, itself, absolute Becoming indeed. *Ecce omnia nova facio*, I make all things new, continually. This is the Reason at work within us, on Hegel's principles.

Becoming is "the first concrete thought-term", as abstract Being and Nothing were not. As first it must include all that is to come, but in its most schematic or reduced form. It marks Hegel's dialectical thought as essentially fluid, volatile. Yet it also gives the *meaning of Being*, as Hegel consistently says; not of **Nothing**, however, but of any Being one might conceive "which does not lose itself in Nothing". The distinction remains,

all the same, between Becoming as "explicit statement" of Being and "abstract" Being (*Enc.* 88, *Zus.*).

Being, Hegel notes, is the name for "what is wholly identical and affirmative". This however applies equally to thought, seeming here to touch on the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction as governing thinking and being equally. In Aristotle, however, this principle governs thinking *because* it governs being (cf. *Post An. II*: 17), as is not the case here, where the thinking is itself the being (see the earlier or "greater" *Science of Logic*, final section). Being rather is, ultimately, the Idea. This, however, it should be said, is also Aristotle's final conclusion in his *Metaphysics*, as to "thought thinking itself".

Becoming, though, and not "utterly abstract" Being, is "the first concrete thought-term", again. The thought of Heraclitus is but an analogue of this first "stage of the logical Idea", not yet reached by the Eleatics. Becoming too is "an extremely poor term", to be replaced by such "terms" as Life, a Becoming indeed but not only that, or, better still, Mind (**Cognition**), more "intensive" than either "mere logical" Becoming or than Life itself. Mind indeed is constituted by "the system of the logical Idea and of Nature". This "and", in a *Zusatz*, surely implies that these two are one, or form a unity, since a mere summation of disparate characterisations is for Hegel the mark of the Understanding as negatively compared with Reason. There is, that is to say, no contingent dependence of the one over the other, viewed either way. The Idea, in fact, and so not Nature, is "the absolute *prius*", even if we should see it as "resulting", in some consequently notionally modified sense, from Nature, as it were fooled again by the Hegelian "cunning of reason". Rather, it is a matter of what we have to say or "predicate" in our finite and, he implies, ultimately false way. This seeming paradox is seriously analysed by contemporaries such as Derrida (1972, 1993; cf. bibliography), working with Hegel's semiological remarks, as it was by McTaggart.

Even Dialectic itself requires manifestation and hence a certain self-alienation of the Idea. The latter would not otherwise be knowable, or be, since it is in itself manifestation. Here Hegel faithfully follows Anselm's classical argument which, all the same, he is willing to criticise (*Enc.* 193, last paragraph). A certain mystery therefore remains, as coincident with this "unsuitability" of predication for expressing (manifesting) truth. This again is the cunning of Reason, as we see it, with which Dialectic would come to terms. "This also is thou; neither is this thou" – a saying applicable to anything in this Logic as referable to God or to the Idea itself, necessarily not falling short of the personal in its transcending of it.

II

FROM BECOMING TO THE IDEALITY OF THE FINITE IN HEGEL'S DOCTRINE OF BEING

In Hegel's logic, particularly as embodied in his *Encyclopaedia*, Becoming collapses into Being Determinate (*Dasein*) in the dialectic of categories. These categories, as this particular transition well shows, are categories not so much for naming as for apprehending the Absolute, itself understood as essentially the negation of categories in final freedom from them. The Absolute is still a notion or concept, discovered however to be Notion or Concept (*Begriff*) as such and hence, uniquely, the self-conceived, in religion the self-manifesting (one "brings forth" a conception) or Word, the message which is the messenger. This is in essentials Hegel's mind in asserting that philosophy and religion have the same content, though the *form* of the latter is imperfect, even though capable, in so far as it too, religion, can be called absolute, of as it were transcending its imperfection on its own terms. This "theological" process though, like Nature as a whole, remains provisional to the finally grasped and enjoyed but ever-present and sole reality of "thought thinking itself" in the "pure play" of the Notion. It would be a challenge and pleasure to trace the same dialectical contour with respect to Art, the last (of these three modes of Hegelian absolute spirit or mind, viz. art, religion and philosophy) becoming first in some respects at least, as Hegel himself indicates in his *Lectures on Aesthetics*. Within time and space, our modes of apprehension, art can at its best become absolute within its very finitude, self-transcending. Yet all, again, is provisional to eternity, the "city" or community or absolute unity where one finds no temple and no art, both having become Spirit or, in a figure, "living stones" and whatever thus corresponds to art's apotheosis in Spirit.

Religion and art, exercised within *Werden* or, in Greek, *kinesis*, movement and change (*motus*), ever pass over or go up into philosophy and its "consolation". For Boethius could not have intended to refer to consolations extrinsic to philosophy's essence in his classical *De*

consolatione (singular) *philosophiae*.¹ Hegel denominates Christianity “the religion of consolation, and even of absolute consolation” (*Enc.* 147, *Zus.*). Nor is it mere figure, we may divine from his other writings, when he makes of the Idea itself, of Philosophy, a person, as Socrates once learned final truth from the mouth, the breathing (*spiritus*), of Diotima. In our sacral past “mystics” were often advised, or advised themselves, to “cease all thinking” (*The Cloud of Unknowing*, John of the Cross *et al.*). But Hegel, like Augustine before him, tells us to continue reasoning, to let Reason itself, and not our own finite notions, thereby develop, up to the point of contact as it were. Here, with the pinpointing (*Feststellung*) of Becoming, the curtain goes up upon a world of intellectual representations within the theatre, the cave, of language, where Reason, philosophy, is already at home with herself in parousial anticipation. Predication, in practice, leads to contemplation, *theoria*, the “highest praxis” axiologically considered. This transition is called variously reading or listening, each however forming thereby his or her own *verbum interius* as a would/be unified conception, identical yet different, in an activity intrinsic to the Notion.

*

The “vanishing factors” of Being and Nothing collapse and are absorbed into *Dasein*. Rather, Becoming itself, their unity, thus collapses. It is a unity which thus collapses “into” a further unity, its result. This is a kind of self-absorption upwards, or onwards in dialectical advance, though “zigzagging” somewhat, as *Dasein*, as **Being Determinate**. Now *Dasein*, as Being Determinate, is man and none other, Kant’s “rational creature”. But this man is a category, an exemplar, not a multi-individuated species. To the necessity of this category answers the necessary “incarnation” of God as man. There can be no *post hoc*. Hence any *felix culpa* is part and parcel of divinity’s necessarily “realised End”. “And this is the Idea”. There can, to repeat (or specify), be no *post hoc* divine decisions.

¹ The reference becomes more pointed for Hegelian interpretation, and development, if one accepts the identification of Boethius Severus Manlius, awaiting execution under Theodosius in Gothic Italy, with the San Severino venerated around Mantua as a Christian martyr. Anselm, a central figure for Hegel, appears to be citing Manlius Severinus Boethius on several occasions. Anselm, Boethius, Erigena and Justin Martyr have in common with Hegel the negative *praxis* of not citing Scripture in their work, nonetheless often construed as apologetic or somehow formally Christian.

The Hegelian dialectic demands and expects such a creative interpretation, in retailing it, as follows from what we said about reading and listening. Some oppose, in pure *Verstand* (the faculty of finite understanding distinguished from *Vernunft* by Wolff and Kant but also found earlier among the Scholastics, who, as do Fichte and Hegel, rather accord to intellect a higher function than discursive *ratio*, viz. *Verstand*), what they see as vain spouting of slavish but supposedly mandatory reproduction of Hegel. Yet any idea one has is one's own, the *verbum cordis*, and this is not the mere word-play upon which G.E. Moore tried to critically fasten ("The Refutation of Idealism"). What such champions of the "correct" interpretation stress, though, is rather a valid moment from which to advance, like the dogmas of the Church perhaps. Listening or reading! Do we read the man, woman, or the text? We have here the root notion of a sacred text, self-giving of a person, as such infinite or free. Of persons we say, with the prophet, "Not a bone of him shall be broken". Persons, that is, are integral, "wholes", respecting themselves and one another in one and the same act, "members one of another". Philosophy, Berdyaev used to insist, has to be personal as, say, Aristotle and Plotinus each succeeded Plato in their own way. It is not a matter of being "pre-scientific". Philosophy, constrained by the truth itself (i.e. unconstrained), is a liberal pursuit or study. That is why it can never have a technical and univocal terminology. The distinction between Understanding and Reason covers this aspect also. Nor does what is personal have to coincide with what is finite, with "opinion" (*doxa*)

Hence we will not find anything where we "cannot and must not point to contradictions or opposite attributes" (*Enc.* 89), Hegel adds just here, in apparent self-justification or, rather, exigence of this creativity in interpretation. Analytic insistence upon consistency becomes Procrustean, "forcible insistence", "a real effort to obscure", dogmatism and ideology in two words, such as some of us may have met with in the fashions imposed by an all too academic and finite "philosophy", by insecure "teachers". The finite resists its liberating transfiguration and destruction by the "ungrateful" infinite it has brought forth. This Pythagorean moment, as *vita contemplativa*, is intrinsic to philosophy, however, and not to be separated from it in a higher theology of "grace" to which it is ever the handmaid. This is to falsify both philosophy and grace itself. For the Absolute Idea it is natural, intrinsically so, for nature to be fulfilled in and by thought's action, called grace as supervenient but not thereby extrinsic, a term used by Aquinas only to signify a liberality in the giver not elicitable by or in the finite receiver.

This contradictoriness, indeed, gives us "a Nothing which includes Being" and *vice versa*. Hence Being Determinate is "the unity of Being and Nothing", as was (is) Becoming. Their "contradiction vanishes in their mutual connexion", however. This is synthesis or reconciliation, the more fundamental unity. So far, though, we merely repeat the note of Becoming. Yet as "simple unity with itself" Being Determinate is also Being, albeit "with negation or determinateness", and this is the advance over Becoming. It is "Becoming expressly put in the form of ... Being", with Nothing as "one of its elements".

If Hegel has made a choice here, at a fork in the road, it is a choice made, he would have us understand, by Reason itself, the measure, more than is Man himself, of all things. Yet "it is evident that it is this man that thinks" (Aquinas), always. Here though we are at the level of common-sense truth, purely formal identity, a mere moment of the Doctrine of Essence, where "everything is itself and not another thing". What, after all, is a man, or this man? Hegel will show, along with Aristotle and, indeed, Aquinas himself, that thought thinking itself is the entire or final truth.

This is the first of the succession of results which constitute dialectic. This turn to Determinate Being, in its specificity therefore, first constitutes this constitutiveness. So Hegel reminds us that Becoming has to be becoming something, as result. It cannot remain itself (and not another thing). That inability is what it is. It is a not being anything, a not-being, thus far. This though is still an abstract restlessness² which cannot be self-maintained but must dialectically destroy itself or, rather, "vanish", move on, like or in turn with the Being or Nothing giving rise to it. Yet we must not thereby return to Nothing but move on to "Being identical with the negation", finite, an *Abgrenzung*, "being then and there", something that "has become".

Time in the form of tense seems here intruded, though it will later appear as one of the Idea's self-alienations, or even its essential alienation, in or partially constituting Nature. This impression though is illusory. A result, like (but not the same as) a conclusion in geometry, is not of necessity a temporal outcome. Thus the perfect tense which Hegel uses expresses, though more consistently in Greek (and even English) than in German, a result composing an actual and possibly timeless present, unlike the simple past or aorist tense.

Hegel goes on (*Enc.* 90) to equate *Dasein* with "Being with a character or mode - which simply is... unmediated." This unmediated specificity, "thisness" as, *mutatis mutandis*, Scotus had it, he calls Quality, the same name as he uses, confusingly for the unwary, for the whole of the Doctrine

² We might compare Augustine's *non aliquo modo est, sed est, est...*

of Being up to Quantity.³ Just in this specificity, this Determinateness, this concrete particularity which is the negation of anything "abstract", *Dasein* is *Etwas*, something, "an existent". We should note though that **Existence** too is a finite and hence finally untrue category in the Doctrine of Essence (*Enc.* 122). We are still at a momentary stage in the dialectic.

Here, just here, Hegel adds, as if summarising, that "The Categories which issue by a closer analysis of Determinate Being need only be mentioned briefly." **Quality**, just mentioned (but see *Enc.* 90), was the first of these, somehow constituting the succession of the ones to come, right up to the end of the logic and beyond, one would have to say. So quality, he says here (90 *Zus.*), is "the determinate mode immediate and identical with Being", unlike **Quantity**, which, though, he is keen to show, unfolds non-adventitiously out of **Quality**, to which it is yet "indifferent and external".⁴ Thus any Something, *Dasein*, "is what it is in virtue of its quality", by which it is "what it is". *Forma dat esse*.

Quality, however, he here surprisingly adds, "is completely a category only of the finite" and so "has its proper place in Nature, not in the world of Mind." So oxygen, nitrogen etc., "styled the elementary bodies", are in his sense (should be regarded as) "existing qualities", i.e. without their being abstractions. There is more than a hint of the all-encompassing idealism here, which might however swing round to its polar opposite, thus cancelling the fancied opposition. This might recall to us his mention not of oxygen etc. but of light, in his Philosophy of Nature, as "the first ideality" as nature unfolds within the true and philosophical "ideality of the finite". This sense of ideality actually within Nature was earlier prepared, one might think, noting at any rate a parallel, by Anselm, again, saying that "God exists through himself in this sense that to be belongs to his essence as to shine belongs to light" (*Monologium* 6).

In Mind, by contrast, it is only "the state of mind of a deranged person" which might be described as **Quality**, i.e. as a (clinical) phenomenon in Nature not pertaining to Mind as such.⁵ Mind as subject, he seems to be implying, is beyond substance or quality, wholly or infinitely in each of its manifestations, ever "at home with itself". The language of mental character (quality) is analogical.

One might want to ask, if quality belongs in Nature, the finite, but not in "the world of Mind", i.e. logic, then why introduce it here? The fact is that with Being Determinate, out of which quality arises, one introduces

³ I follow the text of the *Encyclopaedia* throughout here.

⁴ One is reminded, at the macro-level, of Nature in regard to Logic as such.

⁵ Cf. Hegel's contemporary Wordsworth applying to the life (mind) of the deranged the Scriptural epithet "hid with Christ in God", i.e. we cannot know or judge them.

the idea of the finite, which is anyhow, he will later show, included in the Infinite, since this, in its very idea, cannot be limited even by this conception of a supposedly extrinsic finite realm or domain. Quality has anyhow been introduced as the first grade of Being (*Enc.* 85 *Zus.*) and as such not peculiar to Nature but "identical with" Being. In a sense quality and quantity are only abstractly separated from each other, i.e. they are contra-distinguished in the Understanding specifically.

Here (90) quality reappears as a sub-division of Being Determinate, along with Limit and Being-for Self (95). Being Determinate, however, is the second division, after "Being" (now itself referred to as a category within the "doctrine of" Being) and before Being-for-self, of Quality as first introduced. Hegel thus shares with Aquinas this refusal to make his terms technically univocal. Perhaps there is a virtue in this, then, something proper to philosophy as an aspiration to wisdom merely, rather than wisdom itself. Despite all Hegel's efforts one cannot "own" Spirit, or stop it blowing as it will, as he would himself agree. Reason, spirit, is the individual's "ruin" but not, therefore, in the manner of the particular sciences exclusively.

The idea of oxygen and nitrogen as "existing qualities" in Nature is intriguing. Given the infinitude (not infinity as such) and ideality of space this is consistent; one could not just assume that the amount of oxygen in reality has a definite mass. Could one deny it? The implicit contrast with substance here, however, engages with merely another momentary or disposable (false) concept.

The quality appearing "in a subordinate way only" in subjective mind as character is more like our ordinary notion of quality as "accident". For this reason it is not really quality. As for morbid mind, madness, or even just passion, Hegel would here be denying, by his own principles, that any such representation of mind or consciousness ranks as an "I" (note 5). He merely says that such states "may suitably be described as Quality". This suits our general perceptions. Lunacy, that is, poses no especial threat to absolute idealism.

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As determinate Reality (91) quality is bound up with Negation. Like essence in Thomist thought it places a limit upon *esse*, thus determining it. Negation, what the thing is not, is thus an Otherness, as in fact any Something is *aliquid*, *aliud quid*. This is for Aquinas the fourth

transcendental concept, at which negation originates in our thought.⁶ Hegel, however, takes Nothing, and hence negation, as immediate to Mind as Absolute Freedom.⁷

God, who is the truth, is known by us in His Truth, that is, as absolute spirit, only in so far as we at the same time recognise that the world which he created, nature and the finite spirit, are, in their difference from God, untrue (83, *Zus.*).

The "by us" would in Aquinas limit the validity of such knowledge, making it analogical, but this is not Hegel's intention. Spirit as such, he shows progressively, is not finite, is rather absolute subjectivity. Hence he says the finite spirit is untrue. Nor should this repel the orthodox. "I am the truth... why do you call me good? There is none good but God alone." Yet God found the creation "very good", as became historically a watchword against the Manichees. All the same "creatures", "all things", are reckoned ultimately as nothing, from *Isaiah* ("drop of water on the rim of the bucket") through St. Paul ("I count all things as dung") and St. Catherine ("You are she who is not") to Hegel, picking up from Aristotle (Mind thinking itself). The reproach that Aristotle's God has no thought or care for the individual, the sparrow, the numbered hairs on the head, is levelled out if the individual is itself untrue apart from God or the absolute, apart, that is, from God as identical with the absolute. Like the Johannine Christ, thus far, I, any I, was before I am or, rather, am before I was. To this corresponds the primal intuition that I, subject, cannot be one of the finite number of those I see, phenomenally. As religion teaches, "I have loved thee from the foundation of the world" and even "I and my father are one". Any other I, "the finite spirit", is not I. It is not this man or a man at all who thinks, not the fancied composite. This, *mutatis mutandis*, is the argument of Aristotle at *Metaphysics* VII, the "culmination of Aristotle's argument concerning material substance in the essential form" which, claimed the otherwise Thomistically inclined Fernando Inciarte, Aquinas "systematically overlooks".⁸

"Let him deny himself." Here we seem to have the force of that injunction, much more than a behavioural directive, except in so far as

⁶ Cf. L.J. Elders, "Le premier principe de la vie intellectuelle", *Autour de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Vol. 1, Bruges, Éditions Tabor, 1987.

⁷ Cp. *I John*, "God is light and in him is no darkness at all." But is negation "darkness"?

⁸ F. Inciarte, "Die Einheit der aristotelischen Metaphysik", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 101, 1994, note 15. In translation this forms chapter 5 of Inciarte's *Substance and Action*, Verlag George Olms, Hildesheim, c. 2002.

philosophising is a behaviour. All is Act. Word is "deed", no word at all unless as uttered. But Hegel does not theologise. On the contrary he appropriates and thus "accomplishes" not merely theology but religion itself along, therefore, though this is less seldom noted, with art. Therefore religion is just as little destroyed as is art by this eternal identity of content with Absolute Spirit.

Thus in reading Hegel's text I appropriate and accomplish it, it too. There can be no other view of what "reading" is.⁹ It can never be a mere slavish running through, with the eye, of an alien text. Appropriation changes the starting-point, as Hegel says of the "ontological argument". For a text too is a phenomenon, an immediate appearance. Thus to affirm the finitude of scholarship is a task not to be neglected by anyone happening to be a scholar. Did Hegel neglect it? I believe not, yet he left it by choice as implicit, but immediately so, as when he says that all predication is false, as it were self-refutingly. That has to be brought out, as we find, for example, Derrida doing.¹⁰

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Since the otherness, though a determination of Quality itself, is in the first instance distinct from it, Quality is Being-for-another. It is, after all, the text shows, other of the other, negation of its negation. Determination is not that which denies or "others" it. There is no question here of negations merely cancelling out, as in an exercise of *Verstand* controlled by a merely formal concept of identity. Determination, quality, **Being-for-another** is in fact negation in this positive sense! As such, quality now is "an expansion of the mere point of Determinate Being, or of Somewhat (*Etwas*)". Quality's "being-as-such", although quality has just been denominated as Being-for-another, is ("contrasted with this reference to something else") **Being-by-self**, *an-sich-sein*. The thing to remember though is that quality too, this *an-sich-sein*, will never be more than a moment, even in its very denial of the momentary, except as taken as a denomination, again, of the Absolute, as standing for the Notion. Otherwise "determinate things" are merely pinned down "under the form of being" by the unreflecting observer (§1, *Zus.*). Such being is not therefore an ultimate category here, rather "utter emptiness and instability". The *Zusatz* even speaks of confusion with "abstract being" in speaking here of *Dasein*, of Being (*Sein*) Determinate. The confusion,

⁹ Cf. the discussion of *reading* in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.

¹⁰ J. Derrida, "Speech and Writing according to Hegel", in *G.W.F. Hegel, Critical Assessments*, ed. Stern, Routledge 1993, also mentioned above here.

however, implies perception of the determinate nature of reality, that it is **One** (and so not indeterminate) as is brought out in the next category, Being-for-self. So we have real individual action, body, law, world. Ultimately though "reality" is caught still by Plato's insights, a real man is a man agreeing with man's notion and so "not distinct from the ideality" first met here in Being-for-self, instanced in the "I". In this sense a person may be urged to "become what you are", this being the natural law (*lex naturalis*).

Where (92) quality is considered apart from its implicit **Other** it is "only the vacant abstraction of Being". The determinateness, that is, is "one with" Being. We thus regard Reality itself here as Limit, barrier, inseparable from any kind of perfection (the old Greek idea). It is finite and alterable, always some definite but variable "thing" (*Etwas*). "A thing is what it is, only in and by reason of its limit." This again is the old principle of essence. In realist systems, however, essence is preserved, if analogically, right through to the highest and infinite (essence as identical with existence). Spurning analogy, by contrast, Hegel will leave behind both essence and existence in "the doctrine of the notion", where thought thinks itself in pure act. Both of these concepts, however, are fully present in Aristotle and Aquinas alongside the aforesaid analogy. They strive to show what being and therefore substance ultimately is. This too, conversely, this moment, is found in Hegel, inasmuch as Being is "the notion implicit and in germ" (*Enc.* 83) as, differently, in Spinoza and Leibniz. Forsaking analogy Hegel endeavours to see things as God himself sees them or, to speak philosophically, absolutely. This is the only reasonable term or result of the pedagogy called revelation. Like Augustine, Hegel, the theology student, has had to believe in order to understand, taking in death along the way to which, his writings make clear, thought comes to understand itself as indifferent. He has had to insert himself into a developing tradition, focussing now, however, upon this notion of development itself.¹¹

The limit is not external to being thus considered. To be is to be this and not that. It is "qualitative", giving the universal in the particular, the distinctively human thing, it is often said. Reason shows though, Hegel urges, that this is ultimately untrue, a moment merely. This, incidentally, is the positive aspect of Kant's view of Reason as entailing "a division within

¹¹ He thereby, in my **opinion**, prepared the way, among the theologians, for Newman's *The Development of Christian Doctrine* of 1845. The focus, the **doctrine**, however, implies that development itself will have to develop, as actually **occurs** within Hegel's dialectic, while Newman treats of it simply in historical interpretation, for the most part at least.

man himself".¹² In fact it is just here that the soul-body dualism is overcome, as is the plain meaning of soul or intellect as being the body's form. It is what "the body" is; there is no "I and my body", but only I, universal of universals, having the unity of all within myself. "Man", like "God", is not directly a philosophical term. It takes too much for granted. Abstract body is mere cipher, along with the letters on this or any page. We need a body as words or letters need a page or voice, though these are no part of them. Further, (phonetic) letters are no "part" of words, of signs and manifestations which, like the Limit, are intrinsic to Absolute Being as essentially or intrinsically manifesting itself. As the Idea it, this Absolute, is Revelation (of self), Hegel and Aquinas agree: *creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse*, to create is essential to God.¹³

Man, however, whom Hegel for once mentions here, must set a limit to himself "if he wishes to be actual". Setting a limit to oneself, however, is the prerogative of the infinite or unlimited, and so what is negated will remain intrinsic to the choice as its Other. Limit thus involves a contradiction in itself, as dialectical. It is "a nothing which is". Something and another are the same, *aliud ... aliud*. This is thought's absolute or "universal" at-homeness with itself, at all levels, to be prefigured in pure quantity. Hegel recalls Plato's *Timaeus*:

God made the world out of the nature of the "one" and "the other" (*tou heterou*): having brought these together, he formed from them a third, which is of the nature of the "one" and the "other".

This both is and is not, Plato says elsewhere, a view not convertible without violence to "the linguistic idiom of our time" merely, as is often attempted. Plato here shows the falsity of the Finite, which just in comparison "undergoes alteration", its twin category. Alteration "exhibits the inherent contradiction" of determinate being and thus "forces it out of its own bounds". This applies to existence itself, as finite. Hence thought transcends and incidentally denies (*aufhebt*) it. Changeableness lies "in the notion of existence", as the living "bear in themselves the germ of death". Hegel's thought on this contradictory nature of the Contingent is most

¹² K. Wojtyła as Pope in *Veritatis splendor* (see my *Natural Law Reconsidered*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt 2002, chapter 14).

¹³ Aquinas: *Summa theologiae* Ia, 45, 6. Revelation in the narrower sense is thus called in Scripture a second or new creation. Yet it is, as Scotus claims, a culmination within the "first", what was necessarily (though by no means unfreely) to come about.

fully developed in his *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, unfinished at his death.

Such perpetual Becoming gives us a first, negative notion reflected in the very word "in-finity", of the category called **Infinity**. Yet as related to the finite merely it is precisely not infinite, this notion, since thus related. Thus in theology properly done God has no real relation to creatures, since they *are not* in the same sense as is God. Yet they, in their nothingness, are really related to him who is not related to them, Aquinas will insist.¹⁴ All will then depend upon the standing of this "they" in the eternal perspective of absolute necessity, which is freedom. The whole community in its universality is inherently necessary to the individual person, as is he or she to it, bearing this perfect unity within and born by it. Each is all and all each. Being, the Absolute, has no parts, that is, and so really it is no whole either. The part-whole relation is no more than a logical moment in the "Doctrine of Essence". Each is the body and yet each is the head, inasmuch as "I live and yet not I, but Christ lives in me". Such "becoming what one is" is programmed in religion after its fashion, and held up "in enigma" in art. Art is "a greater revelation than the whole of religion and philosophy" (Beethoven) only in its greater closeness to sense, its subjective intuition, whereby it gets across to us what we have yet to learn how to say, and yet not to say, since it is ineffable, as philosophy more than art. Music proceeds from and ends in silence, which it nonetheless creates.

The finite, though, "is never got rid of" (*Enc. 94*), as "something (*Etwas*) in its passage into other only joins with itself". "To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the other, is the genuine infinity", the "many-splendoured thing" that we "miss". "Turn but a stone and you touch a wing", one, that is, of "the thoughts of one mind" and this mind your own. We might refer here to Hegel's comments upon the Hindu Krishna, at the end of his "Philosophy of Mind", *Enc. III*). "Thus Being, but as negation of the negation, is restored again: it is now Being-for-self." This Infinite is disclosed within Becoming itself, where to alter, or to "other", is to become other of the other, otherness itself thus becoming (seen as) identity. Now seeing, the analysts claim, is "a success verb". What is seen is so, and what might be taken here as a mere refinement upon appearance is yet, *ipso facto*, reality, essence and the whole notion implicit. The

¹⁴ An analogy might be the relation of the "fan" to a "star", who however knows nothing of the fan whose destiny he partly at least determines. God though does not know the creature as outside of himself; nothing indeed is "outside" finally. So, in my thinking this, Reason itself knows itself, while, if I am mistaken it knows my mistake, eternally, as somehow within itself (as in a McTaggartian D-series, *qv*).

outside is the inside and *vice versa*. In the end, along this line, I am all I see, am "universal of universals". So much is implicit, later to be brought out, in the infinity we have reached, as it was in Being, from "the beginning".

Here, just here (*Enc.* 95), we have "the category of Ideality". That is why we should not over-insist upon Idealism at the level of the Absolute. The term "absolute idealism" is thus, as Hegel might say, self-cancelling. Yet "this ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every genuine philosophy is idealism". It is only so, however, from the finite perception of the individual looking upon philosophy from without. God is not an idealist, absolute or otherwise, but is rather (the) Absolute and Subject, is absoluteness and subjectivity as, in theology, God (*Deus*) is his godhead (*deitas*) if he is anything at all. "The truth of the finite is rather its ideality." As McTaggart has it, in the final "series" the misperceptions of finitude are truly perceived precisely as misperceptions, as what shall be dust is the dust to which it "shall" return, in what is misperceived as future.

How does the infinite come "to the resolution of issuing out of itself"? The question assumes a false because "rigid opposition". Thus "the infinite eternally proceeds out of itself" as intrinsic or "essential" self-manifestation "and yet does not proceed out of itself" (94, *Zus.*). It proceeds out of itself within itself. Here again his maxim that "the outside is the inside" finds application. This also is thou; neither is this thou. This is "only an attempt", Hegel adds (like everything predicated), referring, though, to "the infinity of reflection", as an "ought to be". He will make good this claim, in itself "a never-ending approximation" merely made, he as if disapprovingly remarks, "an argument for the immortality of the soul". His own angle on this is more radical, transcending both soul and (animate) life itself. *Anima est quodammodo omnia*, Aristotle had concluded, as *nous*, "setting in order all things" (Anaxagoras). Hegel will not stress the reservation *quodammodo* or "in some way", any more than did Heidegger, we noted. The mind (*anima*) is all things, simply.

Mention of process, proceeding, may recall theology, the Trinitarian processions from which it is claimed¹⁵ causality as such derives or, rather, descends, and so is caused to be cause! Hegel, however, treats both Trinity and causality dialectically (the former issues exclusively in Spirit) and nothing McTaggart says, for example, can show, as he wishes, that this, maybe tomorrow's interpretation in the line of doctrinal development, is opposed to today's or yesterday's orthodoxy. The same applies here as it

¹⁵ Cf. Heinrich Reinhardt, "Processio und causa bei Thomas von Aquin", *Forum Katholische Theologie*, 5. Jahrgang, Heft 1/1989, pp. 44-51.

does (did) to Augustine's daring reformulation of Trinitarianism on the model of the human mind, i.e. intellect and will, as made in the divine image in the first place. This circular vision was long ago received into at least Western theology, though not always conscious of the circularity. We cannot be made in God's image without God being made in ours, we who advance this thought. Eckhart will stress this. In both cases, anyhow, the stimulus to such reformulation lies to hand in the earlier version of such doctrines. So, then, where was I when he laid the foundations of the earth, he, again, who is supremely I, subject and subjectivity both.

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In a measure the Trinity arises dialectically from the beginning of Christian thought. This is, so to say, conceded as soon as will, *voluntas*, is explained as the intrinsic inclination of intellect as such. Yet, conversely, intellect, *contemplatio*, *theoria*, is judged as "the highest praxis", Augustine ("this only is desirable for itself") concurring with Aristotle ("a little of this is worth all of the rest") without consciously building upon him. It is a dialectic of desire (end) equally manifest, as the same necessity, in the Judaic Johannine theology: "this is eternal life, to know God ..."

There are thus not two separate "processions"¹⁶. As St. Paul says, the end result, which yet abides all the time as initiator, just as does Hegel's absolute, is love alone as including knowledge.¹⁷ Thinking, says Hegel, "means a liberation ... called I" as "that which is actual having itself not as something else, but as its own being and creation, in the other actuality with which it is bound up by the force of necessity."¹⁸ It "is free Spirit... it is Love ... the notion itself realises for its own both the power of necessity and actual freedom."

The Aristotelians, including Aquinas, spoke rather of the "having of the other as other" as characterising thought. But it is the same, since "other as other" is had in either case, as is brought out already in the treatments of infinity and of quantity which stand at the door (in our text). Thought transcends quality or individual character. We may again recall Augustine's *non aliquo modo est, sed est, est ...*, no longer needing to take it merely abstractly. In this sense Being is the *perfectio perfectionum* (Anselm, Aquinas) and to Being thus conceived, whether as being-for-self

¹⁶ This is a better translation of *processio* than "process" for what is seen as a continuous going-out-from without term.

¹⁷ I *Corinthians* 13.

¹⁸ *Enc.* 159.

or as later in the philosophy of Spirit, Hegel too represents Reason itself as attaining. If he makes thought prior then so does Aquinas when he says that being (*ens*) is the first to fall, as notion therefore, *into* the mind (*primum quod cadit in intellectum*). It is Mind that conceives it as outside while finally, in "God", the outside is the inside. Aquinas though had, maybe, yet to formalise the frame and solution of "absolute idealism" already or forever latent. His thought too "forms a vital stage in the historical evolution of the Idea".¹⁹ One may recall how Aristotle builds upon the Presocratics when introducing his *Metaphysics*.

The necessity Hegel mentions is not, again, that of a naive assumption of the subject's contingent creation. Such is rather an open contradiction, a being there before or in illogical priority to being there. The necessity is rather just that, being and being there, of Spirit, of Thought, of I. I am, the I is, apart even from the creation of man as represented in *Genesis*, using two contrasting accounts as we now know. That I, or Adam, "became a living soul" (what was he before?) belongs, quite simply, like life itself, to a fleeting moment or stage of the dialectic, accomplished in the Idea before it even begins and as itself giving rise to it, i.e. they give rise to one another. This is the significance of Hegel's final insistence that "the method is not an extraneous form, but the soul and notion of the content" (*Enc.* 243, q.v.), which dismayed McTaggart. "The science in this manner concludes by apprehending the notion of itself." It also exemplifies, and requires, his treatment of cause and effect as necessarily reciprocal. This is no mere dialectical trick (as, say, Findlay seems to represent it). The Necessity binding self and other and thereby eliciting the Freedom which is Thinking (of self, ultimately) is the necessary differentiation of the Absolute²⁰ or real Infinite, its Idea as antithesis of a merely abstract simplicity.

As Thinker, as thinking, as "conscious", I am infinitely simple (infinity repels in its notion parts or composition: such is not the differentiation). This entails infinite relation to an infinite number (quantity) of others equally thus related, both continuously and discretely²¹, we will see, each "at home" in all the others and thus transcending quality in totally absorbing it. Trinitarian thought includes this in germ. You who are many are one Spirit, one Body, members one of another. All are "in" the one as they are in one another in the infinite substitution and coinherence called

¹⁹ Cf. *Enc.* 98 (*Zus.* 1) where, however, Atomism is the example of this.

²⁰ With this thesis in mind we may well read over the treatment of the One and the Many as of the essence of Being-for-self (*Enc.* 96-98).

²¹ Hence the infinity of number, the transcending of it. In the *Phenomenology of Mind* Hegel speaks, if mysteriously, of "articulated groups" of spirits.

Love, the very "bond of being" or the reality miscalled "ideal" as if ever unrealised, a mere "ought". This is the ground for the ancient identification of sin with mistake (*hamartia*, missing the target, *peccatum*), Hegel's much slandered "factual as normative". It goes very deep, rooted here in the first steps of the Logic.

This bond of being is much more than any logical bond of analogy in speech and predication. It means that no element is truly thought apart from (e.g. as "substance") or as itself other than a relation to the relational whole, necessary to it as this whole is to it.²² All are "members one of another" and, hence, more and other than members. This is the truth with which neither we nor, in religion, the Bible, presenting the same dialectic in its way, could have begun. It is essential accomplishment.

We here "thematise" the popular or religious doctrine of Creation as we should also do with Resurrection and as we have elsewhere done with Revelation. This is an essential task, not imposed extrinsically by a theology taking a fictitiously superior distance from philosophy, while still relying upon this very naivete or populism, but arising intrinsically within Thought itself. This task is pursued in an upright confidence that the result will coincide with or, rather, more than fulfil the expectations of the *sensus fidelium*, to which theologians like to appeal, imagining that with this blanket phrase they have themselves thematised faith as a whole.

Even within religion itself we find the same distinction of category between those to whom the content is mediated in parables or likenesses and those attaining Truth itself in intimate communication, such as, of course, all should aim at and hence have a right to as rational beings. This is not, however, a contrast between nominal and genuine Christians or, say, Buddhists. Thus a good parable should communicate everything and maybe with more force than the bald statement of its "moral" (as we find appended at the end of some children's editions of the fables of Aesop). Here art comes in, reminding us that art, religion and philosophy are not hermetically sealed off from one another but that here too the discrete is also the continuous. This is one aspect of the ● *Freunde* prose passage in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, as the content moves from music to implicit philosophy and back then to the, for Hegel, "higher" art of poetry, of

²² It can be argued, not only by McTaggart, that only "persons" can transcend whole and part in this way without being dissolved in their idea. Whether we can construe dogs, roses, or particles in quantum physics as such persons or, rather, as ultimately mere misperception is then the next question. "This also is thou, neither is this thou." That though, that adage, is the question over again, it might seem, rather than the answer, reciprocity (of question and answer) being here too at work, however.

Schiller's philosophical poetry and from thence to the purely instrumental, i.e. musical and "fugal" section there, as of naked spirit indeed revealing itself (that is what it does) through the simplest or most lowly phenomena of sense, as and where it will, just like "the lilies of the field" transcending Solomonic glory. Of such we must think, while soberly tracing philosophy's "grey on grey".

Thus, regarding, say, Resurrection, the belief however born, it is necessary to know what is believed, since as Truth it cannot but require formulation in philosophy, since this is none other than integral aspiration to truth in its entirety. Understanding²³ must follow belief; in this sense no truths can be "above" reason. If this title or right is denied to philosophy then it becomes otiose and corrupts from within. It becomes an extinct and lifeless mine from which one extracts materials merely for an ideology or rule of *ad hoc* ways of speaking.

The moment of belief, of acting and thinking on the word of another, is, all the same, itself offered by Hegel in proof of rationality, e.g. in children, while Aquinas similarly presents *faith* as a virtue of intellect. We should not, therefore, aim at destroying belief, either in ourselves or in others, but at fulfilling it in eliciting its rationality. Thus, in recent times, belief in creation is routinely harmonised with the evolutionary account of nature as latest "scientific" account of the phenomena, even though this at first seemed blank denial of creation. The same applies to revelation in respect to Biblical criticism and research, while the reality of inspiration is accordingly re-described.

Returning to Resurrection, we find this as exclusive endorsement of the One sent, the pleasing one to whom one should listen, beyond all figure or as himself trans-figured, both before and in resurrection. Here, though, resurrection is itself shown as figuring Spirit. For the one concerned is recalled as declaring that those believing in him "shall never die", as those eating him "shall live forever". He declares, again, that Abraham and the prophets cannot be dead and so did not die, since "God is a God of the living", even, presumably *in hora mortis*, as the daughter of Jairus was said, by her "raiser", to be "not dead but sleeping". Death is denied. One does not merely rise from it. This would be a contradiction, were death once admitted. Hegel puts this by saying that Mind perdures through (its own?) death, as supreme example of self in other (Golgotha of Spirit). So

²³ *Intellectus* now rather than limited *Verstand*, as in *credo ut intelligam*, though this is distinguished in the sources from *comprehensio*, of or by Reason itself, in Hegel's perspective. The distinction though, made in humility, depends upon refusal to negate otherness, resolve to seek an identity in difference, which the same sources so richly celebrate ("I in them" etc.).

the risen one did not himself die, except as within the phenomenal representation we call life and within which he himself wept at the tomb of his friend, as it is, again phenomenally, related.²⁴

Here we see the confusion of those proposing a suicide of intellect as heroic perfection of faith. Intellect itself rather is that which confronts, goes through, death and denial without dying, serenely. "Dying we live." Intellect itself transcends death, but also life. It thus differs conceptually from soul or life-principle. This is not denied by the teaching that the intellectual soul is the form of the body, provided one does not take body as an independent "thing". Body is rather *manifestation* of spirit, of intellect, and the truth of this manifestation is what is itself manifested, in figurative representation, in resurrection. Only this way of seeing the latter makes sense of its duplication at an arbitrary point in the series of events, i.e. before death, in what is aptly called Transfiguration.

This *locus* also, however, is aimed at showing that its subject is the "one who is to come", the messenger become the message (eternal manifestation) he brings, thus ending history, but in thought alone. This continued acknowledgement of the reality of finitude and alteration entails postulation of a second Coming, first postulated as a virtually immediate return, an expectation identified in the writings, or muddled up with, the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. Here too Hegel could quote his reproach to the Crusaders, "He is not here: he is risen." As to this final coming, "of that hour knoweth no man." This is to say figuratively that it is not an hour at all, as the community, whose life is Spirit, settles to the timeless self-reflection in transfiguration which is liturgical and sacramental life. Even marriage henceforth finds its truth in representing this eternal Sunday where spirit, and hence philosophy and art, manifests itself to itself, life itself being just one figure of this, the All. All again transcends any Whole projecting a correlation of merely abstract parts. All is all in all.

²⁴ Regarding the import of the resurrection experiences, one can note the suggestion (e.g. in E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., *Jesus*, London 1978) that there is no lost ending to Mark's Gospel, which rather represents, in its not originally having this "ending", a group of Christians, later marginalised, who deprecated appeal to an ocular or "miraculous" appearance as decisive. Or as Hegel has it, the doctrines of Christianity, in their sublimity, are their own argument. He himself applies the "He is not here; he is risen" in criticism of the Crusaders' enterprise as based upon the tomb of Christ as *locus* of ultimate miracle. But we are concerned here not to decide this question but merely to situate its import.

III

FROM BEING-FOR-SELF TO QUANTITY

Being-for-self names, after Being and Being Determinate, the third section of the first of the three parts, viz. **Q**uality, of the Doctrine of Being. As such it leads into **Q**uantity, the second part. The second section, Being Determinate, however, itself progresses from **Q**uality (in a more specified sense), Limit or the **F**inite and **A**lterability to Infinity, whether "bad" or genuine and, *via* the latter, to Being-for-self as evincing "the category of **I**deality", proper to the finite. Its "readiest instance", however, is "found in the 'I'" and it is upon this we will focus when charting the real or *philosophical* emergence of quantity from quality. By this we mean a *procedural* necessity, though not that the Absolute is necessitated as if constrained to "create" in quantity, as it were. This passage, rather, as *logical* or of the Mind, is intrinsic to Absolute Being itself, disclosed as Beginning (it is logically or conceptually one with it) by, finally, some form of an "**O**ntological Argument". In this sense God creates *in* and not merely "at" the beginning.¹ To the necessary all things, all categories of thought, are necessary and this is one with or is the **G**round of "blessedness" and *Freedom*. It will be noticed that I am following, as far as may be practicable, a convention of putting categories of Hegel's logic, but when first mentioned only, in bold type.

Logic thus ends at the Beginning and even absolutely so, in that the **I**dea (cf. *Enc.* 213) is finally one with the **M**ethod itself (cf. 227 and 228) of the whole, of Thinking. No hole, no opening, is left such as are routinely taken as an escape from what we mistake for the *compulsion* of Reason. The Freedom which Reason finally *is*, superseding any separation of cognition and volition, is the presence of All to and in all, the identity of self with other and with other again, not limited to the maintenance of the initial, as it appears, individual self, "ruined" before it begins. This "quality" is one with the universal of universals which I, as conscious, am,

¹ Augustine relates the angelic creation (of spirits) to this seeming wordplay; doubly relevant to us should there in fact be no angels other than ourselves.

subject become or passed to subjectivity. As such I disclose pure quantity, a quantity which, as pure, is one with the **One** (96), however, the continuous not excluding the discrete (or non-continuous) or anything else.

As Hegel sums it up (*Enc.* 98, *Zus.* 2), and it is characteristic that the insight comes to the fore in a consideration of philosophical *atomism*, asking "whence these categories (quality and quantity) originate":

The fact is, quantity just means quality superseded and absorbed: and it is by the dialectic of quality here examined that this supersession is effected ...

i.e. absolutely or, which is the same, rationally. As Cicero had long ago argued, reason is divine and therefore Law (*De legibus* II, 4, 10). This is the same as to say that reason itself is absolute, the being loosed (*soluta*) from all or, in a word, Freedom, the overcoming, whether in being or in exercise, i.e. in **actuality** (142), of the categorical, of the limit (*Grenze*) or barrier (*Schranke*). These two are distinguished in Hegel, Wallace tells us in a note to *Enc.* 92, citing what seems a crucial remark of Kant's that Hume only *einschraenkt* our intellect, *ohne ihn zu begrenzen* (as Kant himself pretended to do). Hegel goes on:

First of all, we had Being: as the truth of Being, came Becoming: which formed the passage to Being Determinate: and the truth of that we found to be Alteration. And in its result Alteration showed itself to be Being-for-self, exempt from implication of another and from passage into another ... (98, *Zus.*)

As such, finally, in **Repulsion** and **Attraction** (here we have Atomism, but also the dialectic of finite love) Being-for-self "is clearly seen to annul itself", *while yet remaining*, and thus, all along the line "to annul quality in the totality of its stages". The saying, again, "This also is thou, neither is this thou", highly speculative as it is, expresses (as distinct from explaining) the developed "mystical" perception of this.² Quality thus emerges, not as "abstract and featureless" but as indifferent to "determinateness or character", i.e. as **Quantity**, here become figure for or expression of Mind, of Freedom, or the undetermined, transcendent character thereof. Hence Quality was said, as a category "only of the finite" (90, *Zus.*), to belong not properly to Mind but to Nature. Alternatively, as we might interpret or vary³ Hegel here, quality thus having become quantity, as a moment of

² Hegel, we noted earlier, positively claimed a mystical character for philosophy.

³ This identification, of interpretation and variation, has become a truism of hermeneutics.

Logic and hence necessary, presages (for us) the necessity of Nature, of the Idea in alienation.

*

"If we now ask for the difference between something and another it turns out that they are the same." With these words Hegel marks variability, **Diversity** or Variety (117), becoming other, as of the essence of, as *identical with*, Determinate Being.⁴ Here, just therefore, we must situate Time, variability's measure, and not make an absolute out of it. McTaggart and not the lesser theologians was right here, at least if we are interpreting Hegel and with him Aquinas, Augustine and the Apostle Paul. With God, absolutely speaking, or, simply, there is neither change nor shadow of turning. Change is *maya* and to be known absolutely as such. I am forever what I will be while I never *was* anything. What is past is not. In realist philosophy the future is an *ens rationis* or, actually, non-being. This however is merely to display the finitude of being, which the Absolute Idea is not. Infinitude transcends being, in freedom, though equally, as Hegel wrote at the end of the Greater Logic, such transcendence of being in freedom *is* the true being. In the phrase "will be", in fact, the "be" attempts to contradict or immobilise the "will", in vain. There is a continuous moving, ever new, symbolised by the wheel of fire, perpetual creative utterance of the one entire Word, without parts, toward which the Parmenidean being strove.

We have no need, therefore, to try to justify or to conform ourselves to the *language* of the Bible. The letter kills and this is first premise of philosophy's freedom, its opening, as a moment, even to total scepticism as witness, cited by Hegel, to the *untruth* of any and every predication, even this one. This too finds its parallel, however, within the books of the Bible itself, as in *Ecclesiastes*, the Preacher.⁵

In other words the Bible too is rational, along with Semitic or oriental thought in general. Hegel's *categorisation* of "the content" into philosophy, religion and art is just that, i.e. abstract. Any one of these qualities is generally found linked inseparably in reality with one or both of the other two. In this sense the final absolutised "method" is not merely and purely philosophy but, rather, Thought, and so Heidegger stands on good Hegelian ground here in refusing to call his own later work philosophy

⁴ Compare our tentative identification of variation and determinate interpretation, as cited from *Enc.* 98, in our previous paragraph.

⁵ Some exegetes claim that St. John's Gospel was conceived as an explicit answer to this book.

simply. The main work of Parmenides was, again under one aspect, a poem. Thus we may after all take seriously, in acceptance or rejection, Beethoven's dictum, cited above, that "music is a greater revelation than the whole of religion and philosophy", as a philosophical statement, or assertions as to "the truth of poetry" or comparisons of Aquinas's thought to a cathedral.

Apologists such as Maritain set up an ultimately false opposition when they refer to the Greeks as "the chosen people of Reason", as if Israel were "chosen" in total abstraction from Reason:

How odd of God
To choose the Jews!

It is not odd at all. Maritain touches on something concealed here which relates to Hegel's identification of I, of subjecthood, as "universal of universals" and, hence, most reasonable of all. Just *in* reasoning one chooses to be chosen, one "legislates for the universe". Election, that is, falls away as self-cancelling and the finite infinitude of Jehovah, as it is often understood, with it. Rational self-awareness perfects the sense of election, of everlasting transcendence, or that it is *my* world, as Jerusalem was taken, in a figure, as its still centre. So the Israelites won victory after victory, not by force but by trickery or *cunning*, to use Hegel's term. They relied specifically upon "the reason that is in the world. For what is the world without the reason" (G. Frege: *The Foundations of Mathematics*). Insofar as we identify with reason the world is saved from unreason. "Salvation is of the Jews". The simple claim is built upon the former truism and Hegel sees it as fulfilled, in embryo maybe, in the unique discovery of human personality as such, illustrated by the vanishing of slavery from the European home of the Judaeo-Christian development. The later Wilberforce did not have the monopoly here; this process indeed got well under way in early Christian times and has roots in ancient Israel as recorded too in the Old Testament. This belongs with our theme of revelation, unveiling, as truth simply. Faith is not to be set against reason and is not finally separate from it. This is the sense of *credo ut intelligam*, as of Greek *paideia* or development in general. One has to begin by accepting a traditional teaching, by being a pupil.

We find then that "something in its passage into another only joins with itself ... self-related in the passage" (*Enc.* 95). This is "the genuine infinity", negating negation, "restoring" Being as Being-for-self. So Hegel's philosophy is not at all a philosophy of pure Becoming but *exactly the opposite*. So the only thing that is odd is talk of choosing at all. Absolute freedom necessitates itself from within.

The Infinite cannot share anything, even Time, with the finite, without itself becoming finite and partial. The being of the finite is only analogous, a way of speaking. Really, it *is not*. This is the contradiction of the Contingent, its being as non-being, upon which Hegel dilates in his final, unfinished set of lectures (LPEG). "Touched ... by the infinite" it, the "being of the finite", is indeed "annihilated", it never was. So there is no "unity of finite and infinite". The former is rather a world of shadows and we with it. Time, then, is eternity's "moving image", as music best illustrates.

The absence of dualism when thus viewing the nothingness of the finite just *is* what is termed Being-for-self. Here the finite is "absorbed", no longer what it was in our habitual misperception, the "habit of nature" as distinct from natural law or as, in the tradition, *opposed* to "grace", having "contrary workings". Such nature, Hegel makes plain in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, must be totally killed, being doomed intrinsically anyhow. Here, just here, again, enters **Ideality** and with it, as Being-for-self, enters "I" as its, and Ideality's, "readiest example" (96, *Zus.*). The "I" knows itself to be at the centre, as none of Leibniz's monads have inter-subjective contact with any other. This is being-for-self, to be for self, in utter freedom, the kind of being attributed traditionally to God and which alone can satisfy us, since we are rational beings, as if chosen, therefore, to "know the universal". We are *quodammodo omnia* and, just as such or immediately, spirit. Anything mediating would "appear beside" as *paremphenomenon* or material interference.⁶

This Ideality, however, is a prime instance of what Hegel calls "this double usage of language", marking the "speculative spirit" of German in particular, as he might seem to be saying, though he may have all language in mind. Just as *aufheben* can signal both annulling and preserving, he says, so is it with Ideality, which he first equates with Being-there-and-then, not expressly put as a category, however. This, "and even finitude", is in the first instance what "has reality". Confer here, however, 90 and 91, on **Quality**, "a category only of the finite", hence having "its proper place in Nature, not in the world of Mind", which only gets to be **Quality** inasmuch as the person in question becomes "deranged".

Hence we have the two-faced character of Ideality in relation, in fact, to an Infinity itself two-faced in concept as able to be "good" or "bad". The latter is an infinity with respect only to its alterability, which knows no end inasmuch as "finitude and alterability", the other becoming yet an other,

⁶ This is Aristotle's argument for the spirituality (*immaterialitas*) of Mind in his book *On the Soul* (uniquely praised by Hegel).

appertain to its after all intrinsically finite being. The infinity of mathematics can also appear to instance this.

What Hegel is attempting to isolate is finite being as itself intrinsically ideal in the sense of not real or as less than real, at the same time as he wishes to mark the ideal, *viz.* infinity, as the sole and true reality or being, as he says of the Idea, no less, at the close of the Greater Logic (cf. 92, *Zus.*). He refers to the Latin construction *aliud – aliud* here, as indicating the sameness of something and another, he says. Really every something, e.g. the moon, has its other implicit in it. He quotes Plato as saying that “God made the world out of the nature of the ‘one’ and the ‘other’ (*tou heterou*): having brought these together, he formed from them a third, which is of the nature of the ‘one’ and the ‘other’” (*Timaeus* 35). “In these words we have in general terms a statement of the nature of the finite”, he says. It is tolerably clear that we have here a prime source of his own thought as to the ideality of the finite in its “inherent contradiction”, which, again, he elsewhere categorises as the **Contingent**.

This alternating *ad infinitum*, however, “is the wrong or negative infinity” (94), a mere “*ought-to-be* elimination of the finite”. It is the “infinity of reflection”. We have thus to recognise that something and the other into which it passes are “quite the same ... since both have one and the same attribute, *viz. to be an other*” (stress added). “To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the other, is the genuine Infinity”:

● Or ... what is altered is the other, it becomes the other of the other. Thus Being, but as negation of the negation, is restored again: it is now Being-for-self. (95)

The issue of this examination, Hegel here claims, tends “to show the nullity of the distinction made by understanding between the finite and the infinite” (95, my stress). But nor are they one or a unity. The finite, rather, must be “expressly stated to be absorbed”, made nothing, in fact, while the true infinite retains “its edge”. There is no “give-and-take” since, as one might also say, the infinite is the finite, as the finite itself is not. This again is “the negation of negation”.

So even granted the finite, Being-there-and-then, the contingent, yet “the truth of the finite is rather its ideality” and this is “the chief maxim of philosophy”, its Absolute Idealism”, we might somewhat confusingly, but not confusedly, add. So “every genuine philosophy is idealism”, even that of Aristotle if one looks deep enough, Hegel elsewhere says. But idealism, the Idea, must not be made particular and finite. It must therefore “include” the latter in all its nothingness, its contradictoriness. Finally the ideal, the Idea, is “the truth of Being and Essence”, that it is no particular

"thing" whatever. *Non aliquo modo est, sed est*, est, wrote St. Augustine, just in consequence going on to ask: "What then do I love when I love my God?" His question fascinated, even gripped, Derrida. Freedom is Hegel's answer and this, and nothing else, is "The Doctrine of the Concept" (159) as "Necessity realised" (157), the true or absolute Idealism mentioned.

*

Understood thus the Being-for-self is just *one*, an exclusive unit even if it exclude by wholly negating others. This **One** (the category) is in a sense All and so already quantity, without character. Yet as such it is, he says, completed **Quality**. "The **One** is simple Self-Reference", "simple Being". As *the One* it is not *a* one or one of many since, rather, it "has the unity of all within itself".⁷ Still it is "being modified", even though it "is immediacy". As such it is determinate, but not thereby finite. It is, we might say, simple being but not simply or abstract being. This, the abstract category, is altogether determinable or "empty" just because being itself is the most fundamental reality or actuality "of every form".⁸ It cannot itself then have a form. There is no one kind of the things that are, Aristotle had said, not, however, through their multiplicity but through concrete unity itself, the **One**, instanced in the "I". It is Mind, rather, we will find, that is Form, the true **One** or Being-for-self which is the Idea.

This is truth of intellect or of any intellect. As such it is what we call person and if intelligence could be constructed artificially then this would be personal, like the purported creature of Mary Shelley's Count Frankenstein or like Kubrick's "Hal" (in the film "2001"), though if *either* of these indeed should have had intelligence is an undecidable question. The personal is the necessary differentiation of the real or concrete (non-abstract) infinity. **Only** persons can have the unity of all within themselves by being essentially other and other of the other again. In this sense the *bad* infinite is *as known* the good infinite, in its intrinsic ideality. It is and only is as known or thought and this only by itself, thus identifiable, in its infinity, however, with a more than myriad others, made thus themselves one and this **One**. So, as transcending being, infinity, the **One**, *is not*, as the *me on* (Greek: not in the sense of other than being) is contrasted with the merely *ouk on* (non/being) in later Greek thought.

⁷ Cf. J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge 1901, Chapter 2, "Immortality".

⁸ Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia, 3, 4. Cp. Theron, "ESSE", *The New Scholasticism* LIII, No. 2, Spring 1979, pp.206-221.

So any person is, has to be, this relation to all as, indifferently, relation to self which is other. Leibniz's monads each had to be personal and hence not absolutely intercommunicative, remaining separate or non-identical (compare the Johannine "I in you and you in me"). Whether they then could ever, as fundamentally simple, be atoms or particles "in nature", as they are in thought, is either left open or simply discounted. If they could then these things would not be finite but infinite in Hegel's (good) sense, each being "the world" as the latter in turn gives place or yields to the Idea (*Enc.* 50) as true being or God. This is the plain sense of Hegel's system, by no means a mere re-description of immediate reality in the manner of Berkeley, "an abstract empty idealism" (*Phenomenology of Mind*, Harper Torchbooks 1967, p.279).

The Monads are each an object..., indeed the total representation of the world... Nothing from without comes into the monad: it is the whole notion in itself, only distinguished by its own greater or less development... The philosophy of Leibnitz, therefore, represents contradiction in its complete development. (*Enc.* 194)

This in fact is Hegel's true "reason world... beyond the compass of understanding" but common to child or adult (*Enc.* 82, *Zus.*). Hegel, though, asserts that "natural things never attain a free Being-for-self", i.e. if man is "distinguished... from nature altogether", just by "knowing himself as 'I'". *I am You* is the title of a book (Springer, New York, 2004) by Daniel Kolak where he quotes the physicist Erwin Schrödinger (p. xv) as defending the same or a closely similar position:

It is not possible that this unity of knowledge, feeling and choice which you call your own should have sprung into being from nothingness at a given moment not so long ago; rather this knowledge, feeling and choice are essentially eternal and unchangeable and numerically one in all men, nay in all sensitive beings. But not in this sense - that you are a part, a piece, of an eternal, infinite being, an aspect or modification of it ... For we should then have the same baffling question: which part, which aspect are you? What, objectively, differentiates it from the others? No ... you - and all other conscious beings as such - are all in all. Hence this life of yours... is in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance (Erwin Schrödinger: *How I See the World*, 1964, pp. 21-22).⁹

⁹ Regarding this "whole" (*sic*) we may compare Hegel's remark on "the unchangeable" which "came to light as the experience through which self-consciousness passes in its unhappy state of diremption". "This experience is now doubtless not its own one-sided process; for it is itself unchangeable

Witness also Aquinas's *Sumit unus sumunt mille*, not intelligible if abstractly restricted to its immediate eucharistic context. How is it that I can be one of the contingent and finite many, the child asks himself in uneasy wonderment. The answer is that he cannot be, that he begets them all within himself, that we, if we should ever speak of "we", beget one another, beget those who beget us. Thus we "cancel" the finite notion of begetting as that of "members" is cancelled in the Pauline phrase "You are all members one of another", an impossible anatomy taken literally. This is effectively Leibniz's conception too, only relatively a "position". That is, philosophy or thought is the reality, not "Leibniz". Oneness is identity, the most "complete development" of contradiction, comments Hegel without taking distance. He rather commends Leibniz above Spinoza as attaining to the personal (*Enc.* 194, 151). This should be related to Hegel's thesis regarding individuality, particularity and universality in relation to syllogistic formal logic as treated in his "Doctrine of the Notion". Leibniz gave individuality "a philosophic shape" in denying that it is *abstractly* individual (151).

Being-for-self then is ideality, which is "the truth of reality" and not merely "parallel" to it, but what it "implicitly is". As McTaggart interpreted it, reality consists of persons, largely leaving implicit just how one person is another and hence all. Ideality is "all in all". Yet "ideality only has a meaning when it is the ideality of something" (96, *Zus.*). Nature cannot "exist without Mind" but the converse also holds, *mutatis mutandis*. Mind, though "beyond Nature", "involves Nature as absorbed in itself". We rise "above the mere 'Either - or' of understanding". The temporal pre-existence of nature before mind's presence in it as man is, analogically, nature's Old Testament, we might say, this and the later development, man and Christ, mirroring or "revealing" one another, the common and the unique, the many and the one. It is not that Hegel "reduces" the uniqueness in thus situating it, such that Nature cannot "exist without mind". Or, God's sustaining order is already presence, the message the messenger and the messenger self.

Our remark above concerning Reason and "election" in the light of rational self-awareness indicates a deeper sense in Aquinas's remark, whether *malgré lui* or not, that "it is evident that it is this man who thinks". The one thinking, that is, is precisely *one* and *the* one, legislating for the universe as the phrase goes. This is the sense of Being-for-self, as it is of

consciousness; and this latter, consequently, is a particular consciousness as well" (*The Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1967, pp. 253-4: Hegel remarks that this consideration is "here out of place", not so in our text above, however).

Ideality within it (95) yet superseding it dialectically, though still within Being's "doctrine". Reality is all now "the thoughts of one mind", self-referring, immediate. What is not I (or me) is yet, more deeply, I. Ideality is the *truth* of just finite reality.

As simple, immediate, such being, as **One**, "excludes the other from itself." It is *the One* and *knows no other*. Hence it is not even alone. So it is not finite but infinite as containing distinction or determinateness "absorbed and annulled in itself". Monad-wise it has no conceivable contact with anything else. *For* it, as being *for* self, there *is* nothing else and truly so. This, we may say without contradiction, is the **truth** of contradiction, which Mind, the concept, originates.

This reference-to-self which is infinite is thus "at the same time negative". Further, the "relation of the negative to itself is a negative relation" (97). I am, in another idiom, nothing at all, known only in my union with each and every other. The I is that which, in its particularity, is constitutively denied, since it is universal or, rather, universality, the "this man that thinks" and so loses himself as never having been and not merely *as if* this.

In this way the **One** *repels* itself and thus "makes *Many Ones*". This category of **Repulsion** may have arisen, for Hegel, with historical Atomism in mind (98) but it is not thereby speciously "yanked" in:

... the philosophic notion teaches ... that the **One** forms the pre-supposition of the *Many*; and in the thought of the **One** is implied that it explicitly make itself *Many* (97, *Zus.*).¹⁰

This is contrary, that is, to our picture of "the *Many* as a primary datum", the presumption of empiricism, treating "the **One** as only one among the *Many*". Thus Hegel in fact explains the (necessary) origin of historical Atomism by *re-discovering* it, rather than basing his enquiry, which is utterly *a priori*, upon it. The world is thus necessarily, and so in utter freedom, *created* within the intrinsic recesses of absolute Mind. "In God we live and move and have our being", declares Paul, no "pantheist" (in *Acts of the Apostles*). It is freedom because dependent upon nothing extrinsic. Mind but consults itself and this is the legitimate, *free* sense of "emanation" (which contemporary Thomists such as David Burrell are re-discovering). By this reversal of empiricism Bentham's "Each to count for one and none for more than one" should rather be, as our ethical sense indicates, "Each to count for all and none for less than all".

¹⁰ Note that the text here has "make" and not merely "makes".

The ●ne repels itself as Many within its own thought of itself. Even Trinitarian doctrine absolutises this absolute repulsion. The Son, though *one* with the Father, is *other* than he, as begetting is not being begotten but there are two *real* relations (and not of reason only or in "our" way of thinking) in one absolute *processio*.¹¹ Here, anyhow, every "atom" of the many would be in the same case. Meanwhile, "No man comes to the Father except through me" because precisely the Father, Being-for-Self, the ●ne, totally empties himself, by a negation, into that ●ther (himself emptying in turn), or any other. This is the deeper, philosophic meaning of that "religious" text and not some specifically religious exclusivism. Reason, as itself exclusive rather, as the ●ne that is one with all, *thus* "setting all in order" (Anaxagoras) and thus, again, negating itself, stands at the centre,

a "this" which is then everywhere, the point having become all as if "elect". Christianity, the "absolute religion", is thus susceptible of the same absolute or philosophic interpretation as any other religion. It is thus no religion at all. Are the others? Some Australian aborigines believe that their ancestors created the world: and themselves along with it, therefore? That need not follow, in view of Hegel's analysis of the *causa sui* or "self-caused, of which they maybe share a version, in this "true reason world". That is, anyhow, thus far, validly a (valid or invalid or a mix of both) *philosophy*, to which they might or might not respond (correspond) *theurgically* like the Pythagoreans or some Neo-Platonists, if they so chose, or like some French revolutionaries placing, as the goddess Reason, upon the altar of *Notre Dame* a, to all appearances at least, very different lady from the titular.

In repulsion here, the ●ne making Many ●nes in intrinsic negation, there is no trace of analogy, no opening for it in the dialectic. Christianity is thus susceptible of the same absolute or philosophic interpretation as any other religion. It is thus no religion at all. Are the others? We have rather, as development of the text will show, that unity beyond the organic, in which each person is necessary and immortal but as having the unity of all *within* self and hence not *abstractly* individual, the unity which McTaggart so celebrates. For Hegel, however, this is seen, is presented, as the unfolding of divine or absolute Mind, a theism become atheism while remaining theism precisely in its implicit infinitude of conception, as the first Christians were judged atheists, or the Israelites of old tormented by

¹¹ Relation in Aristotelian and hence scholastic thinking is an accident of just one substance, its subject. So where there are two subjects there are two relations (though in the case of man and God the converse relation of the pair, God to man, is that of *non*-relation, as Hegel concurs with Aquinas in affirming).

the idolatrous or pagan taunt, "Where is thy God?" The godly must take the godless to themselves and *vice versa*. This, of course, would raise a question about prayer. Thought thinks itself and that is prayer in the ground of its possibility if not in its fullest exercise. It is contemplation, such as even Dostoyevsky's Stavrogin knew, though the author endeavours to make us shudder at it.¹² Anyhow, "we who are many are one body" so whatever you do to one of these you do to me, to "I" and hence yourself too, we may all say in "conscientisation", as it is lately called.

If we start with the Many we cannot say whence they come, as we can say that the One comes of itself within the doctrine of Being, the immediate. The One makes itself many "explicitly". It "is not, like Being, void of all connective reference". This *void*, however, is Repulsion, is not merely as it was "presented under the image of the nothing existing between the atoms".

The One is "a reference", not as connecting something (*Etwas*) with an other but as the unity of something and its other or, more generally, of some and other. It is a *negative* connection with itself (rather as Being is "reduced" to Nothing earlier on), a "self-repulsion". What it makes itself to be, in explicit self-denial or incompatibility, is the Many. This is what the Many, the "they", is. "They" are not a mere brute fact, just as there is no "God before creation", as Boehme says, since God *is* here, thus far, this self-repulsion. Where we might differ from Boehme is in his seemingly speaking of God as *being* something else, such as a not-being, "before" creation. But ultimately there is agreement. One might take Boehme as meaning that a God taken *alongside* creation as extrinsic to him is precisely finite and no God, that this that we call God is precisely what is not God. "I and my father are one" or, to take a feminine variant, "I am he who is; you are she who is not" (and yet you *are* she, we cannot help but add, as mother within the father and/or Father and *contrariwise*), recorded as "heard" by Catherine of Siena, one of the Boehme family after all.

So why is there a world? There is a world because thought thinks and, moreover, thinks but itself. Or, alienation, "othering", is the state *proper* to just *the Idea* in nature. Repulsion is a *figurative* term, though *all* language is manifestly built upon figure for "the process of Being-for-self", is taken from "the study of matter". The One though is not "the repellent and the

¹² There is thus an ambiguity concerning his or anyone else's suicide, *prima facie* taken as failure or despair. "No man takes my life from me; I lay it down of myself." May we not "imitate" that too, if and when the "hour" comes? Controversy between Donatists and the orthodox Augustine hinged on precisely that point while the sentiment is shared in the old warrior ethos, seeking glorious death (*sic*) in battle.

Many the repelled". The ●ne just is repulsion and "each of the Many... is itself a ●ne." For Aquinas, the soul only knew itself *in* knowing another and here we get the deeper *ratio* of that insight. Anyhow, such "all-round repulsion, just in virtue of its exceptionlessness, is by one stroke converted into its opposite, - Attraction." I can only *love* another, even in loving myself in fact. That is all that is said here. Self-love *of itself* becomes love for and between others.

Thus far the Many are "one the same as another", each is ●ne or one of the Many. They "are consequently one and the same." The centre is everywhere. As "those to which the ●ne is related in its act of repulsion are ones, it is in them thrown into relation with itself" and "has an equal right to be called **Attraction**": i.e. the ●ne, Being-for-self, "suppresses itself". Quality, character, at its extreme point of being determined in and for itself, *passes over*, of itself or in the original sphere which is Mind, into Quantity.

The philosophy of the Atomists is the doctrine in which the Absolute "is formulated as Being-for-self, as ●ne and many ones" (98). It too had or has its hour, as did Hegel's philosophy. This latter, however, was the moment of the discovery of history, of "hour" as such, the hour of discovering the hour. In becoming thus conscious of history, however, Hegel, or Reason, negates it as dialectic *within* which Time itself is a moment (of alienation). This dialectic becomes its own end as Method (*Enc.* 237) just as thought thinking itself is this very thinking, *actus purus*. Method, however, does not appear to be put as a category in the *Encyclopaedia*, whether or not one might so put it. ●r, in religious figure, it is the Word or *logos* (logic) being ever-generated. ●r, in art, it is a fugal return upon the scene as in a "garden of forking paths" within which one ever returns upon self as all, unlimited therefore. ●r it is the book to "explain" all books within Mind's infinite library, which *must* be there to be found. If there are composites there *must* be simples, wrote Leibniz, as good or as bad an example as any of the "synthetic *a priori*".

These simples or "ones" are "surrendered" in empirical physics, which rather "pins its faith" on molecules or particles, still today, but with increasing stretching of these *quanta* back in the philosophical direction, despite the huge incidental expenses of cyclotrons *et cetera*. The absolutely simple which must be, or where the spade turns, can never be discovered in that empirical way, though it may seem to lead re-flection ever nearer. ●ne has to stop digging and bend back (re-flect) upon thought's very first thinking, as the ancient Atomists, "physicists" in the sense of their *philosophical* orientation, were still trying to do. Schrödinger, Bohr and others have understood this, that the whole world is

mine alone, that I am the One, night and day, so to say. I am you, writes Kolak, himself originally a doctoral candidate in physics. Music, even of Cole Porter, declares this. For if you are "the one", then what else am I? The one seed, that is, does not "abide alone", "if it die" to all finite categories and thus only incidentally, as it were, to life itself. Such is logic and nothing else can explain its terrible fascination, its perpetual attempting to stifle itself in, literally, terror, seeking spurious relief from thinking.

In the nascent physics of Hegel's time the Repulsion which "has an equal right to be called Attraction" is represented with Attraction as two contrasted "natural forces". Force as a category will get its contradiction exposed when it is later put by (*aufgehoben*) in the Doctrine of Essence. Hegel links this tendency, not so much a development as a popular falling back from the metaphysics hitherto pursued within a select class of society, with the "modern" atomism in political science. There "the will of individuals as such is the creative principle of the State" and the in his view spurious "attracting force" is their "special wants". This is the weakness of contractualism, reducing the State to an "external compact". Hegel here rejoins, as he will later develop, the Aristotelian view that it is natural or *intrinsic* to man to belong to or, rather, *constitute* a State. Individuals abstracted from this are, precisely, abstract. We who are many are One precisely because we who are one are many Ones, precisely *in that sense*, and *vice versa*. Democracy then is the high requirement upon each to stand, and stand up, for all; "one man one vote" in a somewhat altered sense. Each to count for all and none for less than all, as we might, to repeat, rephrase Bentham.

"The atom, in fact, is itself a thought" and "The only mere physicists are the animals". In repudiating metaphysics we "adopt one-sided forms of thought" or *unconscious* metaphysics, Kuhn's "paradigms", "instead of the concrete logical idea", i.e. just that, whatever it is, which is not one-sided. Hegel claims to reveal or uncover what it is, but we anyhow need the type of enquiry it must intrinsically embody.

The nexus binding the many with the One is "founded upon their very nature". The ancients, in misidentifying this as chance (or did they rather reinterpret chance itself?¹³), failed to note that the Void was figure merely for an *intrinsic* Repulsion or, indeed, *nothing* "between the atoms". This repulsion, along with attraction, Hegel has deduced and not taken for granted. He thus establishes the necessity of matter precisely though as a passing or alienated phenomenon within the dialectic. Only by this route,

¹³ Cf. P.T. Geach, "The Ordainer of the Lottery", in *Providence and Evil*, C.U.P., Cambridge 1977.

he implies, will we come to our end as self-possessed absolute Mind, the being bathed or swathed in "glory" as envisaged by religion. Mind becomes incarnate or thus alienates itself in "matter", as in space and time, under the primal play of light as first ideality¹⁴, however, for and in each "one" of us. All the same, in speaking of "the true reason world", open even to the child, Hegel shows himself at one with Clement of Alexandria, a sub-Apostolic Church Father, who speaks of a Christian *Gnosis* open to all the faithful, simple or learned, just as they are. There is no "spiritual aristocracy" on the purely philosophical plane, however exalted, necessary and generally helpful be the latter's findings.

As regards matter, however, even Kant stressed that such "matter" just *is* the unity of attraction and repulsion which is Being-for-self. It is not some third "substrate" but just nothing actual at all, our name for the pure potentiality of nature as experienced. Here atomism was already being transcended, as by Aristotle too.

Such then is the transition from Quality to Quantity, shown to "just mean" "quality superseded and absorbed" and not something beside it merely. Here Being-for-self annuls itself and thereby quality. The "indifference to determinateness" which we identified with Mind's universal at-homeness (as Quality) is here as it were reduced to "the conception of an indifferent and external character or mode". It, Quantity, that is to say, is precisely named as one of our "ordinary conceptions", here to be got behind in a search for "whence these *categories* originate" and "how they are related". Thus we have passed from Being-for-self to Quantity. For, after all, "a thing remains what it is, though its quantity is altered (cf. the **alterable**, at *Enc.* 92), and the thing becomes greater or less" (cf. 99, *Zus.*). The whole doctrine of **Degree** (103) or hierarchy moves under the surface here, willy-nilly, while the question of Number too can no longer be avoided, as flowers need "roots" to multiply themselves, deep in our primal and inductive earth or Ground. Thus philosophy itself induces a kind of Joycean joy of words, through which we view the thing-in-itself indeed, supremely expressible inasmuch as itself expressive or revealing and manifest in an excess of "clarity"

¹⁴ For this identification see *Enc.*, "Philosophy of Nature". Under the rubric of "necessary beings" Aquinas indifferently places God, angels, human souls and prime matter. For references see the article by Patterson Brown in *Aquinas*, a collection of essays edited by Anthony Kenny, Macmillan Paperbacks, London 1970. Only an intuition of identity, driving principle of the later thinker's dialectic, could have caused such a bhrring of the customary chasm between created and creator.

(*claritas*), most "knowable in itself"¹⁵ as, so to say, its own method and message thus manifest.

¹⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 1.

IV

(PURE) QUANTITY

However correct and self-evident the definition of quantity usual in mathematics may be it will still fail to satisfy the wish to see how far this particular thought is founded in universal thought, and in that way necessary ... Quantity, of course, is a stage of the Idea: and as such it must have its due, first as a logical category, and then in the world of objects, natural as well as spiritual. (99, *Zus*)

Hegel manifests here not so much an anti- as a supra-empirical approach. Absolute idealism claims to show how such an approach, method even, is philosophically or, in Hegel's understanding, logically necessary. Mind, "universal thought", orders all things. Religious content is thereby vindicated while the form of this content is corrected or even perfected or "accomplished". This does not entail that "true religion", any more than true art (the first of the three forms of absolute mind), just is philosophy, even if these two should be destined to "vanish away" or be absorbed, like faith and hope in *caritas*, love.. The final "theological virtue" may indeed be philosophical, may indeed be philosophy, beyond all sign and writing, absolute content indeed and hence absolute consciousness (*Enc.* 424). Yet Hegel might still claim with Aquinas, without contradiction, that the content of a revelation to all men is better presented in imperfect figures and metaphors as closer to the itself figurative world of nature. Nature is the alienated Idea, in which men, or women, have their being as men specifically, the *Lebenswelt* of individuals set, as such, towards "ruin", itself, however, "the 'procession' of spirit" (222).

The Idea itself needs such a world, best of all possible or, that is to say, simply necessary, as is the contingent generally, not out of finitude but due to its own active plenitude, mediate and manifest, intrinsically, as becoming or being itself in Spirit and truth. The Leibnizian "best of all possible worlds" entails also as principle the necessity of creation or of world as such, a necessity at this level indistinguishable from absolute freedom (158). We are "worlds" away from theological nominalism of the Ockhamist or Hobbesian variety. In the opposite direction, however, any

world, *qua* mobile or changeable being, entails an infinite and perfect ultimate. The world for Hegel is the (divine) Word's phenomenon, fulfilling itself in the world of men as this is fulfilled in the Word itself made concretely human in an individual human nature, in that sense the necessary mediator, as Hegel acknowledges, of whom it was truly said: "Behold the man!" or, whatever the procurator's intentions, "Behold man!", *Ecce homo*. So Jean Wahl's apparent idea that the created world is put in Hegel as a kind of divine decline into evil would be far removed from what we find here. In that sense Quality is negated and gone beyond in this next "stage of the Idea":

Quantity is pure being, where the mode or character is no longer taken as one with the being itself, but explicitly put as superseded and indifferent. (99)

It is not, that is, a backward collapse or loss. In terms of the historical mediator, born of a woman, the becoming subject, through death, on the part of this all-redeeming or mediative substance, clearly requires foundation in just this one time historical substance, felt as that "God Himself is dead" (*Phenomenology of Mind*, Baillie, p. 782). For Hegel, that is, there is no divorce of the historic Christ from the Mystical Body, the Church or community which the former indeed founded, rock-like. Hence the apparent anguish with which, at the end of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, he cites the promise of the demise of "the gates of Hell", its plain contrast with the contempt in which the Church in his day was being held, the rejected masonry destined to become cornerstone. "You shall weep and lament but the world shall rejoice". In becoming cornerstone, however, as it were in reverse, the historical is as such sublated or absorbed, is shown to be phenomenal appearance all along, in keeping with all and any history whatever. The logic's clear demonstration of this is summed up in the proposition, "The end is realised", traditionally, as Hegel will have known, the penultimate "word from the Cross", *tetelestai*, the perfect passive tense at least suggesting that this realised end held and holds sway all along, backwards or forwards indifferently and that *this* is what was here "revealed" in temporal translation, mediating thereby appropriation of the mystic or notional original by all and sundry.

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A so to say lazy absolutisation of mathematical views is what is chiefly warned against in this section. With the eighteenth century French

materialists in view Hegel points out how quantity's "range of validity" gets "exaggerated" when we take the "lower" or quantitative (he says "mathematical") sciences or "objects" as normative. This "identifies the Idea with one of its special stages". Quantity is more prominent, however, in inorganic than in organic nature, in mechanics than in chemistry (not to be confounded with his "stipulated" categories of Mechanism and Chemism). Thus the number three has not the same prominence "in speaking of God as Trinity as for the three sides of a triangle". *Numeri non ponuntur in divinis*, concurred the Trinitarian Aquinas.

By this route Hegel winds up by re-affirming quality:

Mind to be sure is more than Nature and the animal is more than the plant: but we know very little of these objects ... if a more and less is enough for us, and if we do not proceed to ... their qualitative character.

Yet these distinctions are what have just been negated (*aufgehoben*) in previous sections, so where are we going? Nowhere! For the progression (the stepping forward) of the dialectic is logical and not a duplication upon the spatial and temporal, upon motion, which leaves behind (in change) an earlier "position" or place. Quality is more clearly affirmed than ever here by its subsumption into Quantity and both are only finally or truly thought in the Notion from which or rather within which they necessarily emanate, since it is itself manifestation, *verbum procedens*, alienation returning home *in spiritu*. Thus Spirit itself, in self-spiration dialectically negating or superseding generating and being generated, paternity and filiation (McTaggart's interpretation of Hegelian Trinitarianism), does not leave behind or forsake these "positions" but rather affirms them in their true and complete perspective, free from abstraction.¹ The beginning is the end, the first last, as the Father is first seen in Christ, the man; as Christ has to "go away" for Spirit to come to us. It is plain, if we come so far, that

¹ Especially the abstraction endemic to a would-be "sacred" theology. What is sacred draws all unto itself and thus includes the temple it stands outside of as superseding it, the veil rent in twain. It is daily bread and water, food and drink. More generally, on the absolutisation of mathematics just mentioned, see again Jacques Derrida's "Speech and Writing in Hegel" in *G.W.F. Hegel, Critical Assessments*, ed. Robert Stern, Routledge 1993, final page especially: "In assigning limits to universal, that is mute writing, writing not bound to the voice and to natural languages, in assigning limits to the function of the mathematical symbolism and calculus, considered as the work of formal understanding, Hegel wishes to show that such a reduction of speech would interrupt the movement of *Aufhebung*, which is the movement of idealisation, of the history of mind and the reappropriation of *logos* in the presence to itself and infinite *parousia*".

religion has to explain these notions in terms of the logical processes considered, of, more widely, logic, nature and spirit and the "method" or philosophy thereof, all however being contained notionally in the first.

All this was present to Hegel's mind, however it square or not with our own prejudices and mind-sets. One does not understand him better by abstracting from it, though one may make better use of him, for a time, in Procrustean fashion for this or that finite end. This, however, will be of no interest for philosophy, though it turn the world upside down, within time or "for a time". This, of course, is also the fault of religion where reduced to a "religious movement" (as distinct from eternal "processions"). Omega-point is eternally "accomplished". I am alpha and omega. This "I" we discussed in chapter III.

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Hegel is keen to distance Quantity from Magnitude which "especially marks determinate Quantity". Here accordingly we speak of "quantity in general", the presupposition of magnitude as of things *having* quantity. Magnitude implies change as "what can be increased or diminished" whereas "The Absolute is pure Quantity." We are reminded of Plato's "tallness itself" or "the tall", not individual but not abstract either.

Hegel equates this "point of view", as he calls it although he himself has just asserted it (§§), "upon the whole" with defining the Absolute as Matter. Matter, that is, not as separate from form, in abstraction, but as intrinsically prescinding from form inasmuch as being the necessary fundament (substrate, *hypokeimenon*) of any form whatever and so itself having none. This "prescission", unlike the older *principle*, whether of physics or in nature itself indifferently, is thus genuine contradiction, redeemed by Hegel in his progress from being as the Idea to the Idea as being, freed from all notion of a substrate. Such an Absolute meanwhile, viz. purely quantitative matter, is thus "absolute indifference". Only purely quantitative distinctions are admissible and these, surely, are the different numbers, all extrinsic alterations by addition of itself again to the unitary One. This is close in fact to how Aquinas views the angelic or spiritual creation, where each angel is itself a species or kind, hence not subject to quantity, but yet distinct from the others only as the elements of the number series are distinct. One might even conclude that angels are numbers and, as Pythagoras intimated, *vice versa*.

Pure space and time "may be taken as examples" of this inherently contradictory "absolute indifference" of Quantity if we "allow ourselves" to regard the real as whatever fills them up, "it matters not what". This

would have to be space and time in the Cartesian *plenary* sense, a notion by no means dead, whether in Heidegger ("being and time"> they are the same) or some recent speculations in physics. The Kantian *a priori* form of (all) intuition is a variant upon this plenary character. Space and time, though, would have to be analogies and not instances of Hegelian quantity in its "absolute indifference". Even if they should coincide with it they could not be instances, since quantity is here posited as absolute, as quantity itself. The participation relation (*methexis*) could never be reduced to an *instance* (the "third man" argument). That was precisely Aristotle's objection to it. Hegel himself, however, does not "allow himself" so to regard the real (as matter), which is rather Thought, the notion. A thought, Augustine had noted, has no duration and no parts, no place, as do the pack of cards in *the thought that* the pack of cards is on the table, however we are stuck for explaining how I can "think of" this pack of cards (as thus being on the table). Ultimately there is just one thought, which is thought itself thinking itself, inclusive of all its moments, of which temporality or here quantity simultaneously, are each but one (and yet the same), which is why there need or should be no break in contemplation, of self and God in and as one. The shared prefix "con" with con-sciousness, con-scious, is not fortuitous, con-science in turn denoting self as "aboriginal vicar of Christ" (Newman). Quantity, anyhow, as Number, "is the thought nearest the sensible" and "is undoubtedly a thought", "the thought of the sensible itself", in fact (104, *Zus.* 3).

We are concerned, exclusively, with "the notion of quantity reached by logical development", not by mathematical abstraction from a material reality previously posited. This notion has no intrinsic connection with potential alteration, as has **Magnitude**. What though is this "free self-evolution of thought"? We have followed it indeed up to here, where the question arises, for normal intuition, more acutely. Quantity is absolute, an ever to be reckoned with "stage of the Idea", of Spirit, and yet it is most associated with lower or more evanescent phenomena. It will of course yield to categories of intensive magnitude or **Degree**, such as one finds in notions of more or less "created" grace in theology. In this it rises above the contraries of Greek science. We are made aware here from the start, however, of quantity as infinite, as in the number series, which however refers to or, rather, embodies extensive magnitude or quantity exclusively, "in its complete specialisation". "Number is... thought in its complete self-externalisation."

Because it is a thought, it does not belong to perception: but it is a thought which is characterised by the externality of perception. Not only therefore

may the quantum be increased or diminished without end: the very notion of quantum is thus to push out and beyond itself (104).

This, though, is "only the meaningless repetition of one and the same contradiction, which attaches to the quantum both generally and... as degree" (104). For, Hegel cites, joining with Aristotle (actually Simplicius²) in approval of Zeno, "It is the same to say a thing once, and to say it for ever". There is a "continual extrusion of quantity... beyond itself... false infinity." "The quantitative form of this infinite progression" is "a mere imaginary infinity", as he quotes from Spinoza.

These at least at first sight paradoxes of quantity as now presented can call in question our whole apprehension of the Hegelian scheme of reality, as if itself paradoxical. This is supposedly mirrored in the scheme of the *Encyclopaedia* itself, as scheme within a scheme, rather as a map (whether or not in "globe"-form) of the world is imposed upon it as a smaller copy of itself, as a map upon itself, *ad infinitum*. For we think of, we read, the map in "reading" the world. This is presupposed to the possibility of reading and makes our commentary, again, a copy of a copy. Reading, that is, modulates into thinking and there the infinitude, supposed discrete, is yet continuous. "He that has seen me has seen the Father" parallels this.

Does the mirror cloud here, we are asking. Does Hegel, as McTaggart suspects, slip into considering quantity abstractly rather than as a necessary category or, indeed, manifestation of "existence"? For this we have to ask, does quantity appear to Absolute Mind just as it occurs to our collectively philosophising minds? Answer: I who am thinking am *all* (if I am thinking), beyond even "the whole". But do I, taken absolutely, work upwards from "immediate being" or downwards from the Idea which I am? Do I upload or download? The latter, we answer, this being the absorption of ontology by logic, in which ontology or the "ontic" dies to be born again or, more simply, is recast "in the spirit", in mind. This is "the cunning of Reason" or, again simply, "understanding spiritual things spiritually". Where being is necessary it is no longer a special factor. I am, in any case.

Where then is quantity's necessity, thus considered? Answer: we are that Absolute misperceiving ourselves. Thus philosophy as a linguistic or vocal project, as predication, is our very climbing out of that misperception, "from shadows to reality". It is, in an impossible figure, both the ladder and that which kicks the ladder away, is not only beginning and end but, again impossibly, both means and end. The impossibility, however, resides in the falsity of all the categories, as finite, apart from their trans-categorical

² Cf. *The Logic of Hegel* (ed. Wallace), OUP 1965 (1873), note on pp. 414-5.

term where they are all realised as one and indistinguishable, as inseparably reciprocal relations. In this they might recall quantity itself, the indifference of the "ones". So we are not actually doing the dialectic, in this finite and hesitant way. It is forever kicked away, this activity, and really denied in the "ingratitude" of Spirit as its ever-present Result. This is fate or predestination, actuality rather and apotheosis of "method". For us the dialectic is done and as such we recapitulate it. We reduplicate it, as in the Greek tense for what is perfected or realised, even initially. Hence the true or correct name, of this tense, is the "present perfect".

We can however rephrase the question, our question, in terms of the three Encyclopaedic parts of reality, the "Trinitarian" dialectic we referred to. As with the Word-become-flesh in the Trinity, so Nature here as the self-alienated Idea, is the king-pin. There is really no "flesh", since this notion, valid for "ordinary" or phenomenal discourse, cancels or transcends itself. The "free evolution of thought" then is simply Manifestation, Showing, in religion Glory, in art Perfection, in philosophy *sophia*, called *sancta*. Nature, as self-alienated Idea, is the Idea *qua* manifest (and not itself absolutely). In nature, in another terminology, lie coiled all the *ideae divinae*, the divine ideas, each and any one of which is identical with "the divine essence".³ This is "eternity in a grain of sand" and is why, to continue with Blake, "the fool sees not the same tree as a wise man sees". We are all fools most of "the time".

So Nature is every finite idea, every possible "othering" of the Absolute, including a man or woman "writing philosophy" and not only "birds, trees and flowers". The Infinite Idea as containing all can only be itself as othering itself in entirety within itself. This is not itself repeatable, *ad infinitum*, say, since then it would not be genuinely infinite. The two (three, a million) "persons" are one being, one relation, one manifestation. Their perfect accord, called return, *reditus*, by a temporal analogy only, is Spirit as "breathed" forth, the Idea as not merely manifest but as uttered in eternal exchange. Again, however, there is no Nature that is not thought, the finite is ideal, as ideal as a word (*logos*). As I am you, so the Father and the Son, say, "are not two Gods but one". Similarly, two lovers become "one flesh" while, as regards the sexes, they dwell within one another in that final difference which is sameness, each inwardly or more truly the other, rather as in Jung's "system" of *anima* and *animus*. Hence each is the whole figure of attraction to the other, towards which each repels itself. This is so whether we suppose two sexes or, say, thirty-two, all opposites, such as meet in love, being all the same, as a matter of logic, just two.

³ Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia, 15.

Regarding figure, let us just note here that figure is a modulation of Image, which denotes all that is manifest, though not the manifesting. For manifesting is Act, absolute or "loosed from" all the identities of predication which image it. For predication itself is a compound non-identity just as being a positing of identity. Thus, as touching nature or history, we can say, with one English version of Scripture, "now these things happened in a figure." Whether this is more or less insightful than the Greek original is not germane to our enquiry here. Happening is figure, phenomenon. "No birth, no death." This again is "the cunning of Reason", ever setting us on an indirect path to itself as the Result determining the whole, as if phenomena result from what they result in. We are caused by **Cause** to find the cause, but this is also, more fundamentally, the inherent **Reciprocity** of causality, insofar as reciprocity is itself found to be a category superior to causality, into which causality "passes" (154).

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Quantity then appears as idea or necessary notion into which the idea of quality, quality "itself", "passes" and has to pass as overtopping itself, being finite. Reason brooks no finitude as absolute. All flows towards the end (*finis*) or end without end or limit (as it were an *in-finis**) which is thus also the beginning, as containing what vanishes into it. The idea of a mere temporal finish is accomplished in the idea of accomplishment, as circularity is the perfect motion, reflected uniquely in philosophy as science of sciences. An absolute starting-point is not to be found. Therefore Hegel was "justified" in starting with being as immediate. But therefore too one may start anywhere, as in the various styles of philosophy Hegel claims to reconcile and bring to fuller self-consciousness "for the time being", and still conclude in the Hegelian synthesis or, in the fullest sense, *summa* or, as catching this circular "motion", *encyclopaedia* (16, 17). Philosophy has "to arrive at the notion of its notion", as "practice made perfect". "Why do you call me good since there is none good but God?" More radically, "all predication is false". The problems of ethics do not belong finally in philosophy, which is "first" and entire, *theologia* as Aristotle termed it. Hegel has been much vilified for showing this, how ethical discourse pushed beyond a limit lands in contradiction, even though its whole meaning, aim and definition be the transcending of limit. This is the contradiction not merely of "ought"⁴ but

⁴ For an interpretation of Hegel's relation to Kantian ethics or, rather, meta-ethics, more focussed upon just this relation, see Robert M. Wallace, *Reality, Freedom and God*, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

of every virtue left to itself as being, just as well, the multitude of "sins" which love, charity "covers", absorbing even faith and hope, themselves merely directed towards the Absolute which Love is. It is not a bad name and the atheist McTaggart defends its employment here well and in full implicit accord with Hegel, for whatever that may be worth.

Does this mean though that, so to say, God *had to* think quantity, as placed on the circle? That cannot be right. This "had to" is a phrase saturated with materialistic imaginings, whatever we say about circles. Quantity rather takes its place in the run-up to the absolute and unique reality, which is Reason knowing itself, as equally descending from it in that necessity of self-decree, self-positing, which is supreme freedom, ever accomplishing itself prior to, though not "before", all question, all contingency. Or, more precisely still, in thinking quantity we touch, conceive, the Absolute in one of those fleeting modes under which alone it manifests itself, since it is manifestation. One sees not the Lord but "the glory of" the Lord, of the everywhere "implicit"⁵, but only as swallowed up into it. One may compare the notion of *lumen gloriae* as corresponding to the Scriptural "In thy light shall we see light", the term as the beginning again. This "theological", even "dogmatic" moment, *mutatis mutandis*, has itself also to be accounted for and not to be gainsaid in this continuing development which is thought, which is thinking itself. Hegel does not gainsay it.⁶ All is *aufgehoben*, antiquity, patristics, scholasticism, the "new time" (*Neuzeit* as not exclusively *re-naissance*), enlightenment (every stage was/is enlightenment, in a measure), romanticism, including the earlier *Phenomenology of Mind* of Hegel himself and, to generalise, up to where we stand now, after Hegel, "after virtue", after modernism and so on. No one can "step into the same river twice", the misconception of all and any scholasticism, even the Hegelian. Hegel too may be understood "correctly" but not finally except in the effort to *make* something of him, as the *intellectus agens* "makes" its concepts... "notion and object are implicitly the same" (193).

Quantity, as we saw, has two sources: the exclusive unit, and the identification or equalisation of these units (100).

⁵ The key notion of Eugene Gendlin's philosophy.

⁶ We may compare recent interpretations of Aquinas's moral theology as a sustained effort to exhibit the continuity of Christian thought and practice with the ancient philosophical tradition. Cf. *Contemplating Aquinas* (edited Fergus Kerr), London 2003, reviewed by me for *Amario tomistico*, Pamplona.

We did see this, the continuous self-sameness "made explicit by attraction" annulling all distinguishing quality, the discreteness of the mutually repelling units evoked implicitly as presupposed to any continuousness whatever. As composites imply simples, so simples compose. There never actually was a pure chaos of atoms, since time itself comes in with mirroring their composition, the continuum. Yet this, the continuum in its purest form, can itself be divided infinitely as well or even better than anything else. Precisely when we "invest time, space or matter with the attribute of continuous quantity alone" we make it divisible *ad infinitum*, i.e. the final "simple" this form of intuition (ultimately *Verstand*) builds upon is unthinkable. Each view evokes, as "inadequate", the other, as the waves and particles of physics but, as *a priori*, in a yet stricter identity. There are not two kinds of magnitude, just as there is no attraction without repulsion. This is the paradox of love (Empedocles), of same and other, of male and female, intrinsic reciprocity, pure relation not relating anything (cf. 124, 125, on "thing", "thing-in-itself"). We may say, there is no species without individual, as space has points, the basic continuum is "potentially" discrete. So, conversely, there are no individuals without species (100, *Zus.*), no sameness as such but only the same *x* or *y*. Continuity and Discreteness entirely exhaust (and do not merely specify) the same quantity, "its own idea". For the "elements" of an idea are one with that idea as any *idea divina*, in Augustine's sense, is one with the divine essence. Thus Aquinas was forced to speak of the existing species he hypothesised to explain angels, those divine "messengers", as "individual forms". Yet, he knew, they were, in his own system, precisely not "individualised", as if spirit were some superior matter, matter being *principium individuationis*. "Individual" became here a totally analogical notion, rather as we are now suggesting of persons in reciprocal implication or relation to the point of identity with that implication. So in the end we find that "I" is "the universal of universals".

So is Hegel simply serving up the old scholastic metaphysics, along with Trinitarianism even? As he himself makes clear, going beyond is not running away from, "the earlier are preserved in the later; but subordinated and submerged" (86 *Zus.*). One comes "not to destroy but to fulfil", this being, we might say, philosophy's *consolatio*, in final vision or comprehension. The new or submerging element here is that quantity, once abstractly identified as the *partes extra partes* of matter specifically, just as Hegel says, is now seen as presupposed and hence necessary to the reciprocal co-implication of an intrinsically "ideal" final yet trans-finite reality. It transcends all composite totality without thereby being abstractly simple simply.

V

NUMBER

Quantity is, so to say, the midwife of finitude. Quantity is limited quantity, *Quantum*, How Much, or, though Hegel does not say it, *tantum*, so much:

Quantum is, as it were, the determinate Being of quantity; where mere quantity corresponds to abstract Being, and the Degree, which is next to be considered, corresponds to Being-for-self (101, *Zus.*).

What is this correspondence? Why is it? The repeated form of this "advance" is that the implicit is made explicit. At paragraph 239 we may note the *Zusatz* where advance is paired with beginning as exhibiting itself in steps or stages of the Speculative Method, now analytical, now synthetical. "in Being, an other and transition into an other", in Essence or Notion something else again. "In the advance of the idea the beginning exhibits itself as what it is implicitly". The beginning, that is, does not advance but it, that is to say immediate becoming true Being, is what is progressively grasped in the advance, which is just this grasping. Where we are at now this beginning has become Quantity. Furthermore,

It is only for the consciousness which is itself immediate, that Nature forms the commencement or immediacy, and that Spirit appears as what is mediated by Nature. The truth is that Nature is the creation of Spirit, and it is Spirit itself which gives itself a presupposition in Nature. (239, *Zus.*)

Spirit, namely, makes itself, in infinite freedom, to be Result, in this case Nature as its "presupposition". We are dealing here with the end-result of the entire Hegelian system of logic, namely Nature given to us without mediation as starting-point merely but necessarily. In this way "the percipient Idea is Nature", i.e. its perceiving itself or its being perception simply, since there is nothing else. This is "its unity with itself" (244).

This does not contradict the more usual or orthodox view¹, since infinite freedom "overlaps", without denying or removing, our more immediate notion of the alternatives "could have" or "was not forced to". It is one with as not less than necessity without being reduced to it. For "necessity is transfigured into freedom" inasmuch as Essence gives way to the Notion as the "truth of Being and Essence". This "truth of Necessity", in pure self-reciprocation, "is Freedom" (158, 159). We advance into truth, as from Being-for-self, *via* Quantum and Number, into Degree. It is this truth though that "presupposes" quantity. God, so to say, did not just "make it up" or, if he did, he thereby constituted himself, as with all the other "moments" of logic and nature. Compare Eckhart's "If I were not, God would not be", posited in and with its converse/ This agrees with the view of Augustine and Aquinas that each and any divine idea is one with the divine essence. It also shows the sense in which Descartes was right, and not merely "voluntarist", to say that God has dominion (the "could have") over the laws of logic. For if the presupposition to Spirit in Nature is itself given by Spirit then this applies *a fortiori* to Logic as, in Hegel's system but indeed universally (as the "reason in the world"), presupposed to Nature.² Reason itself is pure freedom, *ratio est ad opposita*, as, again, conversely, even though or if it constitutes itself as the unbreakable law(s) of logic which thus becomes, in the necessities of eternity, its own "nature" as Mind or Spirit. This is the nature which has no nature other than the self-imposed, in freedom again, i.e. *sich* is the concept, which is what it is not and is not what it is

The difficulty people find in these conceptions is due solely to sticking to the term "is", and forgetting the character of thought, where the moments as much are as they are not, - are only the process which is Spirit. It is this spiritual unity - unity where the distinctions are merely in the form of moments, or are as transcended - which became known to pictorial thinking in that atoning reconciliation spoken of above. And since this unity is the universality of self-consciousness, self-consciousness has ceased to be figurative or pictorial in its thinking; the process has turned back into it. (*The Phenomenology of Mind*, Harper Torchbooks 1967, translated Baillie, p.777-8)

¹ Compare Cyril O'Regan's excellent *The Unorthodox Hegel*, SUNY Albany, 1994, however, on this general point, and the discussions of his view in my *The Orthodox Hegel*, CSP Newcastle-on-Tyne, 2014.

² Cf. G. Frege: "what are things independent of the reason? To answer that would be as much as to judge without judging, or to wash the fur without wetting it" (*The Foundations of Arithmetic*, tr. J.L. Austin, Oxford, 1953, p. 36e.

That we have here Hegel's spirituality here, in all senses, is made yet clearer in the following paragraph, q.v. Quantity-in-general, meanwhile, if we return to our immediate topic, "now appears as we have distinguished or limited it". It is the principle of finitude which infinity needs to have within itself as, again, overlapping it, in order to be or remain itself infinite, the infinite or the absolute Idea. Infinity is idea, that is, as Being beyond (transfigured) Being is the negation of the negation of itself, pure Mind minding only itself as All.

The Idea has to be Idea, self-determiningly as it were, precisely as transcending quantity. Quantity nonetheless belongs to the ideality of the finite specifically and is thus in itself an antinomy or paradox, a "moment" therefore merely, as a finite category to be ultimately, i.e. in itself and forever, "put by", *aufgehoben*.

So any quantum, as any **Continuous** magnitude, implies, we say, **Discrete** magnitude (100), itself "breaks up into an indefinite multitude of Quanta or definite magnitudes." "Each of these... forms a unity while on the other hand, viewed *per se* it is a many." This is precisely **Number**, where any unit whatever is fractionally divisible or multipliable, as the numerals themselves are progressive "products" of unity, as three is three times one, by coincidence of an addition or sum of one to one to one, before "three" is given a sense. This, in fact, is the very principle of the dialectic, according to which the categories are thought before and in independence of the names they are then, more or less arbitrarily³, given. In this way number can be seen as the continuum itself, in which capacity it is virtually the foundation and "secret" of absolute music, so-called, "the sensuous set down as negated ... This earliest inwardness of matter ... furnishes the medium for the mental inwardness ... into which mind concentrates itself". By the same token it "has within itself... a relation of quantity conformable to the understanding"⁴. Yet number, of course (the integers), also founds discreteness itself, presupposed, again, to any continuum. Therefore Hegel says that Pythagoras went not "too far" but "not far enough" (104, *Zus.* 3).

³ Cf. *Enc.* 458: "In signifying intelligence therefore manifests a will (*Willkür*: choice, free will) and a mastery (*Herrschaft*) in the use of intuitions which are not manifest in symbolising" (quoted in Derrida, 1971, "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology", reprinted from *Margins of Philosophy* 1972, tr. Bass, in G.W.F. Hegel, *Critical Assessments*, ed. Robert Stern, Routledge 1993. Also in *Philosophy Today*, 1985. This same article is cited in a note to my previous chapter here, above, as "Speech and Writing according to Hegel").

⁴ Hegel, *Lectures on Aesthetics* III, 4c(2), my italics.

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The theory of number, the question "What are numbers?", the "philosophy of mathematics", as of natural science in general, has occupied a dominant position in "professional"⁵ philosophy both before and after Hegel, whether we think of Descartes or Frege. We must not forget, however, that the same principles apply here as throughout the dialectic or the development of logic at Hegel's hands. One of these, again, is that the names he gives to his categories must not be simply presumed to match with what the same names may or may not name in unreflective speech. Thus, we have seen, "being" or "becoming" have their own meanings at the start of the dialectic, differing, whether by reduction or expansion or however it may be, from their senses in, say, Aquinas or Heraclitus.

Another such principle, a further aspect, rather, of the same one, is that each category has no other purpose or justification for its introduction than its emergence as a step towards revealing the necessity of the final result of the dialectic as alone entirely true, as indeed *initiating* the entire process. It is thus "kicked away" by "ungrateful" Reason in the sense that it only finds its final truth in the result to which it leads.

There is thus a twofold aspect in that the matter or content of the or any category, admittedly "taken" from experience in the sense that it is not considered in abstraction from it (this would not be the meaning of the *a priori*), is yet reshaped or worked upon, not so much with the end in view, as final product, since this has still to appear, firstly as a category in "The Doctrine of the Notion" (204) as with a view to the end (as final cause). The End causes us to apprehend it already in each of the means to it. Reason itself, that is, which is the end, corrects the common conception or, in some cases, simply fashions an entirely unique dialectical tool. These two strands of analysis (of the discrete elements of the dialectic, discrete in so far as named) are woven inseparably into one another. Some genuine

⁵ Of course philosophy, as perfecting art and religion, as perfect form of "the absolute content", can never be professional as such, any more than religion could ever have been as if by right the exclusive "expertise" of "professed" monks or nuns yet called, exclusively, the "religious" (as against "laymen" or the "secular", i.e. of this world or age, *saeculum*, clergy). Literal "training" may find application still in becoming an artist, but the true "master", to which one subjects oneself as regards the "content", in producing art, in praying, despite "techniques" of meditation, or in thinking, is always the present world and culture where first is last, last first, where one "considers the lilies of the field", where "no man shall teach another saying 'Know the Lord'", where discipline is nothing unless a prologue to an increasing degree of self-discipline, viz. the dialectic as, actively, "thinking itself" (this pronoun being reflexive accusative).

dialectical steps indeed have no name and, if we wish to be subtle, we can even say that the notion of step itself or stage contradicts itself as finite if taken absolutely. For there are indeed, in the thought and even, imperfectly, in the language used, steps within steps *ad infinitum*. This is the truth Lewis (Dodgson) Carroll had got hold of in his claim, often taken as a mere joke, that it requires an infinite number of mental "steps" to reach the conclusion of a syllogism. For p and q to imply r , namely, we need as a premise that p and q imply r and so on *ad infinitum*, unless, that is, a simple seeing of logical truth as conceptual before it is propositional be admitted as prime condition for speech itself, as runs the argument of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* IV, initiating the march to the Idea, *nous*, at XII through Books VII to IX: this is "the unity of Aristotle's metaphysics" (F. Inciarte). It is simply ignored in Peter Geach's handbook, *Reason and Argument*, which leaves the concept of an abstract "argument form" unquestioned. No argument in fact ever attains to its "form" as other than itself since the one implies the other as much or as little as the other implies the one. Thus here too the truth is that the continuous is implicit in the discrete and *vice versa*, as Hegel has been claiming. Compare here our own "Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy" in *Acta Philosophica* (Rome, vol. 6, 1997, no. 2, pp. 303-310).

We have to overcome our feeling that at least some categories "must mean exactly what they say", apart from their harnessing to the dialectic. Thus we tend to want to protest when causality is "tuned into" something reciprocal or is "put by" (*aufgehoben*) simply. The claim, however, here too, is that this is what causality must really be, in view of the absoluteness of the result, of the freedom or necessarily unconditioned which is Reason. Hegel is at least as radical as Hume, whose philosophy, like ancient scepticism or any other, he is not about to "set aside" or ignore. Hume, unlike Kant, respects reason's necessary unlimitedness, as we found Kant himself acknowledging.

The same applies to Number. Even if we should find that Hegel is not only necessarily ignorant but less than duly prescient of future development in mathematics, or even that he may be less than an expert in the science of his own time, this would not *per se* invalidate this part of the dialectic. Quantity, as a necessary stage or component in the self-actualisation of Spirit, is, in this light alone, necessary within nature. Pythagoras, he suggests, was, as it were discretely considered, the "first" to realise this, going on to "conceive the essence of things as mere number" (104, *Zus.*(3)). To the complaint that Pythagoras "went too far" Hegel replies, again, that the "reverse" is nearer the mark. He "did not go far enough", or as far as his Eleatic successors. The "bare thought of

number is still insufficient to enunciate the definite notion or essence of things". It is, however, the first step to metaphysics. Number is

the thought nearest the sensible, or, more precisely expressed, it is the thought of the sensible itself, if we take the sensible to mean what is many, and in reciprocal exclusion. (104, *Zus.* (3))

This is the nub of what Hegel is doing here, "tracing things back to thoughts" and ultimately to Thought, *nous*.

While the former (sc. the Ionians), as Aristotle says, never get beyond viewing the essence of things as material (*hyle*), and the latter, especially Parmenides, advanced as far as pure thought, in the shape of Being, the principle of the Pythagorean philosophy forms, as it were, the bridge from the sensible to the super-sensible.

Here we can see how the conspectus of the logic, its plan of development, namely to allow it to develop itself, is essentially the same as that of *The Phenomenology of Mind* prefacing it in the life of Hegel, this "new Aristotle". He offers us eternal method as the "thought of" development as Number is the "thought of" the sensible.

"It thus appears that the method is not an extraneous form but the soul and notion of the content ... only one idea ... the notion of itself" (243).

"This is the *noesis noeseos* which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the idea" (236, *Zus.*), thought thinking itself. It is in this light that we should see the treatment, the adumbration rather, of Number before us. It will not aim at being comprehensive, since anyhow all comprehensiveness, all separateness "of substance" short of the idea, is illusory.

"Number is a thought, but thought in its complete self-externalisation" (104). Again, "to get a species of calculation it is necessary that what we count up should be numbers already and no longer a mere unit" (102). This appears to be the Hegelian variant upon the Fregean-Pythagorean view that "numbers are objects".

McTaggart asks in his *Commentary* of 1910 why "the whole Quantity" should not have a number, whether we know it or not, in so far as "we now have a definite quantum" (cf. McTaggart 101, "Quantity... is Quantum: i.e. limited quantity." There is "an advance from mere quantity to quantum... described as Number"). Hegel "does not seem to have considered the possibility that there should be a finite number of Ones". McTaggart backs this up by saying we

... must remember that the Ones are not Somethings. The latter had to be infinite in number, since each of them required a fresh Something beyond it. But the Ones have Being for Self, and so avoided, as we saw, this infinite series... each One is a simple Quality, which is not divisible. (McTaggart, 1910, *loc. cit.*)

Of course this Number could not have a limit, since there is nothing outside it, but as having Being-for-Self they, the Ones, "can reciprocally determine each other".

McTaggart here takes a leaf out of (the book of) Trinitarianism, perhaps unconsciously, where, namely, the relations or persons are ultimately three, a definite or finite number, even if *numeri non ponuntur in divinis* (Aquinas). We would have an extended "Trinity" of however many Ones there are. He reminds us that the categories "refer only to what is existent", are not "purely abstract" conceptions as Hegel often slips into thinking. Is he right about this? Is not Hegel rehearsing creation as it were prior to existence? Does he not rather relate Being to necessary conceptions, not, even *qua* conceptions, "abstract"? Between the necessary existence or, better, being (*esse*) of the Scholastics and the necessities of logic there is no mere equivocation but a real connection. As in Plato's philosophy so in Hegel's, phenomenal things "both are and are not" (*Republic* V, VI), while the highest things *more than* exist merely, existence being a finite category in (the doctrine of) Essence.

Thus Hegel intimates that his "Being" is both the immediate and "the beginning", which he merely *calls* being. McTaggart ought to have understood this, since, we have seen, he makes the same point about the categories in general. Again, the question of a number for the Ones loses point if we take to ourselves the unity of identity and difference, that we, or "things" (or we as the only things and conversely: McTaggart's reading, correct in my view), can be in one another or, indeed, have our being in "the whole" or, better, Absolute. We can each be identical with the whole Trinity as postulated if we have it "in" us, as Trinitarians have routinely taught. The whole Hegelian philosophy might be conceived as leaving, or upstaging, the question about being as unresolved, or make us stop asking it. "God is not being; God is freedom" (N. Berdyaev, *The Destiny of Man*, in a Hegelian moment).

Hegel's exaggeration, according to McTaggart in 1910, of the comprehensiveness of the dialectic lies in the following:

Having secured, as he rightly believed, an absolute starting-point for the dialectic process in the category of Being, he assumed that this was not only

the absolute starting-point of the dialectic, but of all philosophy ... Nothing in philosophy was prior to the dialectic process.

Here again there seems to be an error. For example, what is the subject-matter to which the whole dialectic applies?

Hegel regards it as applying to all reality ... But ... it becomes clear that he is only speaking of what is existent, and that his results do not apply, and were not meant to apply, to what is held by some ... to be real but not existent - for example, propositions, the terms of propositions, and possibilities ... Hegel... held nothing to be real but the existent ... (Reality and Existence, as used by Hegel, refers ... to particular stages of the dialectic) ... But the view ... cannot be asserted without discussion ... Hegel has no right to take a dialectic of existence as equivalent to a dialectic of reality. (McTaggart: *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, CUP 1910).

This passage can be seen as anticipating the view advanced in Richard Sylvan's Meinongian "sistology", an association indicating a possible relapse into Kantian phenomenalism on McTaggart's part. But Hegel's Aristotelian downplaying of ex-istence in favour of thought is *the reverse* of phenomenalist, since it rather pulls the rug from under its possibility, that possibility being a conceived notion of objective substance never abandoned, even when at last declared a or *the*, rather, completely unknowable *Ding-an-sich*, unknowable as to its characteristics, and yet known as certain, as not otherwise than thinkable just as Substance must be thought, as the oh so definite article underlines. This corresponds completely to the more immediate notions also of God, which Hegel is at pains to transcend, to the point where many have concluded him to be atheist, as the idolators viewed the choice Israelites of old.

One could reply, we said, that Hegel rather relates Being to necessary conceptions which, even as such, are real and existent (*entia rationis*, beings of reason). He has in fact a whole section on the sign and on speech and writing in the third part of the *Encyclopaedia* (458 to 459, admirably singled out by the late Jacques Derrida: see our note 3). Between the necessary existence or, better, being (*esse*) of the Scholastics and the necessities of logic (rules of syllogistic etc. as in "The Doctrine of the Notion") there is, again, real connection and progress between one and the other, as in Plato's thought, we noted, phenomenal things "both are and are not", so that the highest things more than are. Thus when Hegel speaks finally of **Existence** (a category of Essence at 123) he seems to dismiss what McTaggart later will attribute to him:

Because it has no existence for starting-point... the Idea is frequently treated as a mere logical form. Such a view must be abandoned to those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. (213)

That is, Hegel does not do that. He rejects the dichotomy, existence or abstraction, like the Neo-Platonists before him (they, as we remarked earlier, distinguished the abstract *ouk on* from the negatively real *mee on*). What "gives reality to itself" is more free than existence, is not merely (Greek *mee*) that but transcends it. The notion is not "an abstract unity" but concrete "subjectivity". Even the stages themselves of Being and Essence are "not something permanent" but "dialectical... dynamic elements of the Idea" (213, *Zus.*).

McTaggart's criticism applies more directly to the thought and terminology of Aquinas, though even here it could be contested (see our reference above to *entia rationis*⁶). Hegel's "Being", anyhow, is both the Immediate (as such) and "the beginning" (as such). These he merely *calls* "Being", in line with his praxis throughout the dialectic, as noted above (see our discussion of "Becoming" in Chapter One). Implicit is a distinction between Thought and language, its sign. This is taken up, to note this again, in the "Philosophy of Spirit" (*Enc.* III), where too voice (sound) is given priority over sight, e.g. of writing, as more immediate to thought. He takes a certain distance from language even in the act of speaking, as we do not need to consider the process of digestion when eating (his own example). This observed process is not what we do but how we do it "extensively" considered. The "intensive" reality, e.g. eating, is a step nearer to the Idea, as to the voice rather than the page. Or, more generally, he preserves the original connection of "spell", generally magical as altering the *mind* of the hearer, with "word", by and in whom or which, anyhow, all things are said to be made and not otherwise. Compare our "Gospel", God's spell and/or *word* of God. A word is a spell. As voice, like yet other than music, it penetrates within and that, once learned, immediately. The speculation of Rudolf Steiner that before the invention (as it must have been?) of language a natural telepathy plus *clairvoyance* must have held sway between "rational creatures" is not without interest, though we may wonder what there may be to *read*, other than the Concept itself (or is that "just it"?), in a mind innocent of words, or how this would have differed from the instinct of the higher animals.

⁶ See also our "Entia rationis I: Medieval Theories" in *Dictionary of Metaphysics and Ontology* (ed. Burkhardt & Smith), Philosophia Verlag, Munich 1990.

Might they too then have the Concept, the "true reason world", as Hegel attributes this to children? But then children "grow up" and quickly. Be that as it may, nothing corresponding to "the universal" is to be found in "the brain", not, I mean, in any possible world, though people even of some culture may arrive at this pseudo-necessity, or spend their lives looking for it, either by analysis or surgery, as Pythagoreans concluded to justice as "the number four" (Peter Geach's example).

Again, the question of a number for the Ones loses point in so far as identity and difference give way, as abstract, to identity *in* difference. We can be in one another or, indeed, have all our being in the whole, as relational rather than "substantive". We can each be identical with the whole Trinity as postulated if we have it, conversely, in us (taught, in much theology, to be the "routine" effect of baptism!) as we have each the other as being in one another.⁷ "Where one receives (the sacrament) a thousand receive" indifferently, wrote Aquinas, again, in the hymn he composed for the then new feast of *Corpus Christi*. *Sumit unus sumunt mille*. This may now be situated without prejudice within a generally negative transcending of number on the road to the Concept. Or, if anything is miraculous then everything is; or again, if everything is miraculous, then, in the finite sense of miracle, nothing is. This is the speculative necessity, the Concept. The whole Hegelian philosophy might thus leave the "question" about Being unresolved or, more fundamentally, make us stop asking it. He here, and in his making method absolute, anticipates earlier or later Wittgenstein indifferently who thus, contrariwise, is misinterpreted when taken as a tiredly reductionist "relativist" merely. The truth as to relation is not relativist, as Thought thinking itself is so little self-defeating that it is the highest and ultimate thought.

Hegel, then, presents number solely as a Pythagorean candidate for thinking Mind itself or the essence of things, "so-called reality". He distinguishes Sum and Unity as corresponding to Repulsion and Attraction in each of the Ones (102), "two qualitative factors or functions". The nature of each One indeed, as in Leibniz, is "a simple and unique Quality". It is not clear, again, that these Ones, any more than numbers, are to be thought of as existent just when or because their abstractness is denied. A similar error occurs when people designate Plato's forms as necessarily abstract (though, as they say, "reified"). This Procrustean fork of being or non-being was dismissed at the very start of the dialectic.

⁷ Cf. Kolak, *op. cit.*, or the Biblical doctrine of the Body of Christ, only later called *corpus mysticum* specifically. Totalitarian ideologies took over this notion, whether defectively or not.

One might relate Hegel's discussion of number to Frege's denial that numbers change as "the number of the inhabitants of Berlin", which is not a number, changes. Yet, after all, pure quantity has no limit and number is a re-thinking, a more precise characterisation, of Quantity. This number is never that number and that they necessarily form a series, are indeed the principle of series as such, simply *means* that they do not change. "They", therefore, is a most inappropriate term. We consider number rather than numbers, the quality become quantity become quantum and, firstly, discrete quantum, rooted, however, in the continuum inasmuch as the Ones are, *pace* McTaggart, indistinguishable (as pure relation transcends "being related to one another").

Number, the idea, evokes arithmetic, and so Hegel must look for "necessity and meaning" in its operations coming from a principle characteristic of number itself as constituted by sum and unity (unit) together. Hegel speaks, not at first easily intelligibly, of the "equality" of "empirical numbers" which is Unity. He seems to mean that the summation of units itself makes a unity (or unit). It is not only the number one, that is, as first of the series merely, that can be a unity. Rather, it includes all the others to follow, *ad infinitum*, one cannot avoid saying, as their *type* (at the very least) and identity. Hence we have "the equality of these two modes", sum and unity. Hence also, as we noted, the advance, the process of dialectic, was all the time the advance of *the Beginning*, which is thus, quite straightforwardly, finally found to be the end, the Idea as "true Being".

Numbers are "indifferent towards each other". Well, in what sense? One goes on to the next number. It becomes that just because one goes on, names apart. One counts. One adds one (more). This indifference reflects, however, "the aspect of an external colligation", i.e. it is a mere "aspect", less evident in a binary system, for example, or, why not, a unitary "system", where one is simply added to one forever, like marks on a cell-wall. In this sense groups as such *count themselves*, since elephants in a group do not differ relevantly from (a group of) such marks, whatever "intentions" are involved (or not). It is likewise with units and unitary "things". All reckoning is therefore counting, says Hegel. The child's counting the names of numbers as he has learned them is the same operation as our counting any other discrete quantum or, more specifically, as our multiplying or dividing. He can break off at any point. So can we, after any complete operation recognisable as such, as is his "going on to the next number".

Numbers, be they integers or fractions, are thus both unequal (there are more than one) and equal. They "make one unity". When I say "The ships

on the horizon are three" I put them together, "colligate" them as a unity (we may bypass analysis of the "there are" form just here). Hegel connects this with multiplication in the general sense (of the term) as lying behind the arithmetical sense. What is multiplied, e.g. a population, remains one. The same population is now other, as sum and unity are "equal". "Either may be sum and either may be unity."

This equality of Sum and Unity he connects with squaring, as exhibiting it. One may similarly subtract, look for the square root, divide. Number may also be employed to "determine" continuous magnitudes, as in geometry, by use of discrete units against these magnitudes (or just by "rulers"), so as to fix their reciprocal relations or "ratios", for example (as in measuring).

VI

DEGREE

"The limit (in a quantum) is identical with the whole of the quantum itself."
(103)

Having identified limit and quantum in this at first sight unintelligible way Hegel specifies, as if ramming home this identification, that the limit, as the quantum, can be "in itself multiple", as "extensive magnitude". Less startlingly, the limit is, "as Intensive magnitude or **Degree**", "in itself simple determinateness (qualitative simplicity)."

Extensive or Intensive magnitudes, as conceived here, apply only to specified or limited quantity, the "how much" (*quantum*), whereas Quantity itself may be viewed as having both Continuous and Discrete magnitude. In either case we have not to do with two differing species of a more general reality but with two reciprocal aspects of the latter.

It comes out here, more than ever, how "Quantity", and the same will apply to "Degree", names, *qua* category, a specific moment in the dialectical march to the Absolute Idea, in turn determining this moment, and nothing else. Although this might apply to any doctrine of categories it is more strictly true of Hegel's than of either Aristotle's or Kant's, as being categories of predication and of phenomenal mind respectively. Quantity is the extreme or last result of Quality as such, but also only as this category too was here defined. This applies all the way back to the immediate Beginning which began the dialectic and which was only *called* Being, as Becoming was only *called* Becoming, whatever we say of Nothing and, for example, why it was not rather called Non-Being. The dialectic does not merely pick or take up its stages as, so to say, previously named. Naming and extensional linguistic explanation (also of a certain intensive "magnitude" of course) are rather used here as ways for communicating the prior reality of Thought or Reason, *logos*. Hence this study, this communication, is Logic. If correct, therefore, it represents a huge advance in philosophical method, though even this term, *qua* term, must be regarded as analogically taken from the workaday world of

established practices. As speculative Hegel will identify such method with the Absolute Idea itself, at least as "the specific consciousness", which the Idea has in thinking itself, "of the value and currency of the 'moments' in its development." The "Method of this content" will be, as it were finally, all "that at this stage is left as form for the idea" (237). It is analogical as referring first to the concrete process, or rather action, of thinking (ideating*?) the Idea and not to the chapter and verse of the various texts (at least two) setting forth or, rather, recording, like fossils in a rock, such a life. This is the mystery of reading, or, *a fortiori*, of writing. It lies behind a question once asked by Aquinas, "Can one man or woman teach another?" He answers that teaching is activating the other's own intellect (making the flame leap, said Plato) as the physician only "heals" by getting the other's nature to heal itself. Ultimately, as implicit ground for this possibility, self and other are the same and what is done to one is done to all (the essential misery of murder).

As Thought the dialectic has a stake in thus transcending language. Hegel deals with this, though without the exclusive emphasis of a more partial or technical "linguistics", in his *Philosophy of Spirit*, under the more general rubric of a theory of signs, of semiotic.¹

So here, under Quantity², quantity is dealt with not in abstraction from but in disregard of mathematics, as a more pure *a priori*. One can say this despite the hundred or so pages of disquisition upon mathematical themes in Hegel's earlier *The Science of Logic* and even though Number itself, as with Pythagoras, has here presented itself as a genuine category. From this viewpoint one cannot even be sure antecedently that mathematicians, as such, concern themselves with Number itself. Thus in attempting this Frege, the mathematician, became a self-reflective philosopher *in actu* while, conversely, it is still not clear whether extensional "mathematical logic" is indeed logic. Its famous "great strides" may rather argue the opposite, a striding away, a reduction of everything to "extensive magnitudes" in search of a "convenience" better served by not thinking at all, as Hegel remarks (103, *Zus.*).³

¹ Cf. Derrida, *op. cit.*

² By using initial capitals I attempt to keep the category-name distinct from the more general term, begging the reader's indulgence where, I fear, I may fail to keep to this rule.

³ In support of these suggestions (not meant as mere insinuations) I cite the work on logic of a late friend and mentor, Henry B. Veatch, especially his *Intentional Logic* of 1952. For exposure of the misapprehension etc. evidenced in reviews of and comments upon this work see my *Philosophy or Dialectic*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1995, I, 5 (pp. 61-70).

It is rather the other way round. What first confronts us is the unitary or continuous magnitude, though in the first place, as Hegel (along with Spinoza) emphasises, this refers primarily to the whole. By analogy or, rather, metonymy with this we single out or "break off" other wholes. Analytic "discretion", to pun in irony, the discrete, comes later and to thus break something (a quantum) off is a tool, a praxis⁴, which often or always harms or distorts what it works with, as, *ex hypothesi*, does the observer of "quanta" in contemporary physics. For he is himself an analysis or abstracted aspect (thus by no means a fragment) and not the whole which "counts itself".⁵ Quantity, again, is only contingently connected (not to say "related") to our "normal" more mathematical notion of it.

Quantity first appeared, in fact, as the quality not which changes but which occurs to or is instanced in but without affecting "the being itself", to which it is "external". Nonetheless, "the Absolute is pure Quantity" (99), which however Hegel relates to the "definition" of the Absolute as Matter.⁶ The material realm, namely, is that where things are outside of or alienated from one another, *partes extra partes*, precisely the situation the "analytical method" tries to bring about in regard to thoughts.

So Quantity as a "stage of the Idea" refers more to negation than to externality. The latter is mere picture. Thus intensive magnitude permits the notion "more of the same", i.e. without being different, more without becoming several, *mehr* that is not *mehreres*. Greek science worked in general with opposites and their relative proportions, like hot and cold, dry and wet. Even in Aristotle's ethics there is not much room for growth in virtue, though he has of course the notion of habit. However it only becomes a virtue at all when it is thus "had", as *hexis*, *habitus*, the "having" of it which it is, in perfection! You either have it or you don't. But contrast growth in spirit or in wisdom, in "grace"? Here intensive

⁴ Cf. 104: "Not only therefore may the quantum be increased or diminished without end: the very notion of quantum is thus to push out and out beyond itself." Thus Hegel overcomes the restrictive Kantian (or Lockean) conceptualism by maximising it, in true dialectical fashion. All possible conceptions, like all the possible worlds of modern physics, are stabs at the final result, moments of the method. This is not of course to say that all conceptions are possible.

⁵ A conception breached in V here, q.v.

⁶ Hegel writes "when it is defined to be" matter (as Wallace translates) and that is exactly right, given Hegel's account of ideal reality. Here definition becomes a more open or less exclusive variety of identification than we usually intend with this latter term. The Absolute may and has to be thus identified with any and every category "in passing", as it were. Here Hegel, having recast definition, rescues identity from "the Philosophy of Identity" (cf. 103, *Zus.*, last paragraph).

magnitude, more of the same without being different and in that sense an external quality, is needed.

In the sense that the Absolute is pure quantity we cannot but be referred to the dialectic as Hegel's attempt to get behind the ultimately sham discreteness of language, the "broken off" spaces between words, to the continuum as reflected in the being of finite things. Such being is identical with just their specific finitude, their degree on a scale, the limit, the finite intensity (of "magnitude") appropriate to each thing (its "measure", we will see later). In this sense qualitative changes, for example (change is not essential to this picture), are at bottom quantitative, as water gets more and more cold to become ice. Or as, in Christian theology, the Devil is not God's opposite but a kind of final minimum of good. He is good as a created spirit. This conception implicitly rejects the idea that "moral" and "physical" good are equivocal varieties of the latter. The Kantian "good will" is, *malgré* Kant, good as is a given bottle of beer, viz. good in its kind, though, we may agree, of more practical and indeed ontic importance. Here, however, if we are moving towards an ontology of pure spirit or spirits, partially heralded by Kant's two spheres (and Manicheism everywhere), the picture, though not perhaps the meanings of words, changes. We may compare Hegel's distinction between truth and correctness. Nonetheless if we said it is true that the cat is on the mat we would say the same, by "true", as if we said "It is true that God exists", which is precisely why a Hegelian might well be inclined to deny the truth of the first "it is true that". Here too Hegel's distinction between saying and meaning must hold, in so to say the opposite direction to his when speaking of "I", where we say the universal of universals, though meaning (trying to mean), impossibly, "this individual". "I cannot say what I merely mean" (20).

In this sense, equally, a man can always become worse, "piling sin on sin" (Aquinas), and contrariwise. The Absolute here is Quantity itself, along with, in final identity, goodness, but not evil as antithesis or second member of a putative triad. This is always finite, as even Nothing denies Being before itself being anything.⁷ The movement is after all similar to

⁷ One might think, all the same, that Hegel, in his first triad, posits purely abstract being as "no better than" (the Buddhistic) nothing, as if he might as well have begun with Nothing instead. This speculation, however, I at least suspect will not go through. Such a nothing would be something, if not yet an *Etwas* or "somewhat". We would anyhow, whatever ontic prejudices are implied in our language, never be warranted in reality in passing from nothing to being. What reality? If "nothing" is a name for not anything it is not a name for any thing. It is

that of Aquinas's Fourth ("Platonic") Way to God, miscalled proof, reasoning from the more or less "external" to absolute and hence mutually identical qualities as such.

So we have quantity, matter, degree. Hegel cannot but have had in mind the Augustinian catch-phrase, culled from the Psalter and handed down (*traditum*) further by Leibniz, that God created all things "in" number, weight and measure. Still, the notion of matter suggested at paragraph 99 has little to do with weight (*pondus*) and more with "substrate", *hypokeimenon* in Greek philosophy, introduced with or without need in Hegel's earlier *The Science of Logic*. This *materia prima* or pure potentiality easily switches over, in materialism, to absolute power or "force", an intrinsic dialectical relation more than it is a misunderstanding merely, as some would loftily maintain.

So we have indeed "nullified" quality. As regards Atomism, Hegel distinguishes sharply a philosophical (dialectical) moment of that name, first appearing in antiquity, from the corresponding reductionist or extensionalist notion in a later physics, where the crucial reciprocity of repulsion and attraction is discarded or simply missed. Instead, a new autonomous or natural "attractive force" is "put beside" **Repulsion**. Hegel finds this "confusion" also in Kant. He relates it to the political notion of a group of existing "atomic" individuals willing to form a compact as State. We are rather attracted to one another, however, to the point of compenetration, inasmuch as we repel one another, "One and many ones" (98). Again one notes the kinship with a later, post-Nietzschean psychology, without its being a matter of "reading in". Rather, to read just is to read in, as Hegel himself amply demonstrates, in his reading of ancient Atomism here, for example. The "mutual implication of the two" has to be "wrested from obscurity and confusion". The "Many are one the same as another" so that Repulsion "is just as essentially a connective reference", the Void being a mere picture for "the Nothing" which separates, i.e. does not separate them, since it is nothing. Thus the Void is not put as a category, as is even Attraction, which he finds, remarkably no doubt, an alternative name for its conventional opposite: "The repulsion therefore has an equal right to be called **Attraction**" (98). Perversity, it would follow, has deeper roots, is more natural, than we may have realised. The One meanwhile, it is implied, is wrongly "fixed as one". One is rather or as well "Being-for-self in the shape of the Many" and not only in Atomism. Thus the Infinite, the Idea, is necessarily differentiated or, which is the same, though put at and as the end of the Logic, "in its own

not a name, as its use thus absolutely pretends of it. The "nothing of the Buddhists" is unavoidably a something else, as they go on to describe.

absolute truth it resolves to let the 'moment' of its particularity", as "immediate idea", "go forth as Nature"⁸, in a necessity or absoluteness which is freedom.

Thus the whole Logic itself, as one of three "parts" (of the written "work"), is an "external 'reflection'" of the Idea which, as Nature, is itself "percipient" (counting, as we said), "Intuition" (as in *in-tueor*, a looking inwards). "The outside is the inside", "the inside is the outside" (these are in fact categories, it will be shown), since "External", we said, is a picture merely. But in so far as it "goes forth" (another picture) the Idea must return, as the Spirit which it is. *Nous*, as **Order** itself or itself **Order**, sets or "has set all things in order" (Anaxagoras). The perfect tense here, signifying accomplishment or per-fection, is more perfect than the present!

Nature, that is, is truly viewed as "the thoughts", the Thought, "of one Mind", of "first and last". Does "the truth of poetry", the highest art in Hegel's view, despite the special affinity of music with the dialectic, reach further even than a philosophy still "externalised" in discrete analysis? This appears to have been Heidegger's final view. Hegel too, though, has a "style", an aesthetic character or form inseparable from the content of Thought. It is a "style of thought", as we say, a style, that is, elevated beyond a mere taste, as Beauty is finally claimed, along with unity, being, truth and goodness, as one of the "transcendental predicates" of old. It is in this sense, too, that Hegel finds Christianity, say, to be its own argument as "factual", apologetic endeavours being a misunderstanding, a failure to understand the "He is risen" or the previous "emptying" (*kenosis*).⁹ Style as it were silences argument, refuting refutation, confirming anew that everything finite, every predication, is false. In saying so, therefore, one implicitly invites to the notional, which in reality cannot be thus "prefaced", a favourite theme of Hegel's.

Thus "atoms, molecules and the like", as here considered, whether by Hegel or by his later readers, are "beyond the range of sensuous perception" where "each thing is itself and not another thing" in "externalisation". In our day even the physicists seem to be preparing to view this "empiricist" mode of perception as abstractionist and even to fuse the actual and the possible in a kind of mirror-version of Hegel's "Doctrine of the Notion". Conversely, we noted, Hegel's text can recall or evoke Freud's case-histories and dream-interpretations, full as they are of

⁸ Robert Wallace, op. cit. 6, 244, points out here how a resolve, *Entschluss*, must be for Hegel, as literally un-closing (de-closing, not yet English "disclosing"), the opposite of *eingeschlossen*, en-closed "within pure thought".

⁹ Cp. the section on religion, i.e. not that on the "unhappy consciousness", in *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

transferences and projections, of having to mean the opposite, and thereby revealing it, of what one tries to say or "mean" (*Enc.* 20) or dream.

"If there are composites there must be simples". These atoms then, as postulated in philosophy, are not the product merely of "abstract understanding which stereotypes the factor of multeity involved in the notion of Being-for-self" and which Hegel calls Quantity (103, *Zus.*) or, rather, Quantum. This "multeity" is not to be taken as "an ultimate principle", as it seemed to Hegel the physicists were doing, though none of them had "seen" an atom, without being justified in such Procrustean "extensionalism". As we said, it is rather the continuous magnitude which first confronts us, the dawn of abstraction being surely a catastrophe or "fall" for primitive man, even though "essentially a thinker" (50, cp. 24 *Zus.*). For Rudolf Steiner, again, "primitive" or pre-linguistic human beings must have been possessed of mutual *clairvoyance*, which is as much as to indicate that thinking does not consist in abstraction or, as we expressed an associated point above, that reality "counts" its own quanta. A very thin line, abstractly geometrical indeed, separates such "counting", the "reason in the world, from our own".¹⁰

We are only considering Quantity as a necessary stage, "a grade in the process of self-determining thought" (104). It is alone as self-determining, by thought, by reason, that every such grade is necessary, indifferently. It is only thus that increase and diminishment are necessarily thought and thought as necessary, even though such thought is capable of dismissing all empirical change, along with Time, as illusion and contradiction. Thought, too, for its part, will pass beyond and annul itself as and when cognition and will are identified but such final truth only results for "necessary" consideration and hence positing of it at the end of this *Logic*.

¹⁰ "Intelligent design" must mean, therefore, our own, un-conscious or alienated mind which has, so to say, to come to itself again in knowledge. Science, that is, is not just "theory-laden". It is *theoria*. My theory is my seeing is what I see. I see myself as evolving. I have not evolved to the point of being able to see, with "objectivity", that I have evolved, with time and a host of other finite entities thrown in, all of which is contradictory. The contradiction, as dialectical, is precisely that of the Object giving way, in consequence, to the Idea. The world again, and my thoughts, are also in this sense the thoughts of one mind. Thus the animals and plants are but myself projected. Myself and God, said Newman. But obviously they are one. That is the only possible way to take this "and", at least where a total universe is being supposed, as here ("two beings", says Newman). Nothing is more the creature of analysis than the gene. "If there are composites there must be simples." Thus too we beget one another, "members one of another". Only persons can be thus simple, McTaggart claimed, as if Trinitarian in his rejection of Trinity.

Das unzulängliche ist getan, thought is there in order to be negated. This, in religion, is "glory", as light is essentially the overcoming of the dark, the non-light. Light indeed, Hegel will say, is the first ideality in Nature.

So here quantum is "explicitly put", its concept (104). This occurs solely in relation, as a relation, to all other quanta and with such reciprocity that this notion quantum, as consideration of **Degree** now reveals, is overthrown or dismantled in its very positing. It is "an immediacy which immediately veers round into ... mediation (the passing beyond and over the quantum just laid down) and", for that matter, "*vice versa*".

With this **Infinite Quantitative Progression** we might seem to have simply returned to the wrong, "negative infinity" of 94. By no means, even though this present notion of or in **Quantity** will also be superseded. **Qualitative** has yielded to quantitative infinity, still within the "Doctrine of Being".

As regards a putative advance, however, Hegel claims that Degree is intensive magnitude, whereas in (discrete) extension the question of its infinity, or in this case finitude, is separate. It might seem we cannot regard the distinguishing difference as much more than stipulative. The limit of a quantum makes it what it is. Your body temperature, as 37 centigrade, is limited to that much below 40, or some other critical point ("node") in the case of a truly specifying magnitude. At paragraph 103 the limit, "as in itself multiple" (or divisible), however, is equally identified with the extensive magnitude of a quantum.

This **Limit**, as we call it (92), which is quantum's character or "mode", as essence limits being (*esse*) in earlier blueprints of the system (of philosophy), "lies quite outside it in other magnitudes". That is, we are no longer speaking of quantity as such (as "explicitly put") but of quantum as such, and hence of quanta taken distributively (any and every). There is a universal reciprocity, therefore as will be found here henceforth, although **Reciprocity** is not explicitly introduced as category, "explicitly put", until after **Cause** and **Effect** (153) near the end of the Doctrine of Essence (154).

All the same it is Intensive magnitude, not Extensive, which is identified with the new category of **Degree** (103), again, as "simple determinateness" (as we had passed earlier from Becoming to Determinate Being). Independent limit is absolute externality. My body temperature is intrinsically a relation to just anything else, such as the temperature of the sun or just any material particle near the centre of the earth somewhere or, why not, a particular state of mind or even Spirit as a whole. In fact, however, the Notion, Spirit, destroys any idea of whole as essentially

composite. The things supposed related just are the relations, which is to say that they are not relations either, not things, not a plurality and so not "one" either. This is to think in and with "the Notion" as the latter's realising itself (160).

Similarly, at a "lower" level presumed "part" (of the "whole" notion) but thus shown to annihilate all concept of part, Number is "thought in its complete self-externalisation" (104). So "the very notion of quantum is thus to push out and beyond itself". Quantum, that is, apprehends itself as set to an infinite progression. This, however, is at the level of Quantity itself still imperfectly or wrongly conceived. Thus it is that any real quantum will fulfil all the requirements of the Notion. It is, like the "Christian soldiers" of the Salvation Army hymn, marching ever "onward" till God shall be "all in all", the final self-conceptuality of the Concept as such, beneficently immolating those silly (or blessed, *selig* as cognate with "silly") soldiers. Thus this truth, about any "possible world", even itself an *a priori* truth (the dialectic reveals), is the foundation for the remorseless march, again, of the dialectic, of Logic,¹¹ that is to say, towards its Result and indeed End. Thus even as *logica docens* logic, though transcending *logica utens*, remains a *praxis*, an art, the "highest praxis" which is Thought, *theoria* as, say, ethically viewed by Aristotle or Augustine as an "intellectual virtue", more noble if less necessary than moral virtue, according to Thomas Aquinas, this in parallel with his whole treatment of the *vita contemplativa* (at the end of *Summa theol.* IIa-IIae).

In speaking of "Onward Christian soldiers" above we refer principally to a "moment" through which world cultural history necessarily passed. In accordance with the requirements of the Notion, however, what is maybe post-Christian thus taken will equally be all the more Christian, not destroyed by difference but more and more fulfilled, in history, like Quantity in the dialectic or, admittedly, like anything else. This, in a nutshell, is Hegel's doctrine of sameness in difference.

There is, therefore, "a contradiction which attaches to the quantum", as to all the categories this side of Infinity, *solutio omnium quaestionum*,

¹¹ Use of the capital L here might raise a question whether such Logic is not itself a category of the dialectic, of Thought finally disclosed as Spirit or Absolute Mind, itself led up to in an analogous way by Art and Religion. When we enquire about Mind we think first of logic and then, it may be, of nature and so on to the absolute. Or, as asking after activity of Spirit, we might think first of art, then of religion and on to thought as thinking itself (philosophy, absolute self-knowledge).

"both generally and ... as degree". This, again, just is the Infinite Quantitative Progression (104) decried, or at least¹² described, by Zeno.

The self-externalisation mentioned is the quantum's, any quantum's or Number's, quality. Quantum is a Being-for-self, therefore. As such ("explicitly put") the Quantum, which Quantity essentially is (101), is, in turn, "the Quantitative Ratio", writes Hegel (105). This is both "an immediate quantum", "in its Exponent", e.g. 2 in the ratio 3:6, 7:14 etc., and "also mediation, viz. the reference of some one quantum to another". This only explains why Ratio specifically is identified with Quantum, as if uniquely, if Ratio is taken as naming relation in infinite reciprocity as just explained, hence philosophically "justifying" the etymological coinciding of the arithmetical notion, ratio, with Latin *ratio* meaning the reason by a real identification and/or identity. There can, for that matter, be a ratio between more than two numbers where governed by one exponent, e.g. 2:4:8. Thus Ratio is also or becomes the principle of Series, a notion more fully explored by McTaggart, first as explaining away Time, in particular (A-series, B-series), then as transcending it (C-series, D-series). We are not here talking mathematics, we are talking (Hegelian) Quantity and, thereby, reality manifested as *sophia*.

The value of the quanta thus "expounded", exponentially so to say, "is only in this relation", a situation which when generalised will destroy or "cancel" the category, at least with a small c, of relation itself. Quantity thus "returns to itself" in this progression, which is also a series, the proto-series, inasmuch as we are considering here the whole "method" of the speculative logic (*logica docens*). Its quality lies just in this Externality, the "continual extrusion of number beyond itself" (my stress). Number "is determined by number", so it is, again, self-determining number, quantity, quantum, ratio (Reason), freedom. Freedom is non-finite or unbound necessity, the necessity which just is Reason. Hence "the quantitative itself in its externality is relation to self", as is, equivalently, quality, to which quantity is here, in thought, returned, after first seeming to "abrogate" quality and even Being. What, one might thus ask, has number to do with "existence"? Here though, in quantity, what can be altered yet remains the same, e.g. the same house or quality. There is an inherent contradiction, to be resolved, "for the time being", in Measure or "qualitative quantity" (cf. 106, *Zus.*).

"The two sides of the ratio are still immediate quanta" (106). In the ratio the one side is measured by the other, with the Exponent as determining result. This exponential and indeed Pythagorean number can be seen

¹² Rather as in Lockean vistas, what he was trying to say, of "primary and secondary qualities".

(though not as exhausting metaphysical resource) as the measure and, that is to say, quality of anything whatever. We will stop short of saying, will refuse to say, that "justice is the number four", an assertion compared by Peter Geach, we noted, in his book on McTaggart, with saying that thoughts are brain processes, which he wishes to reduce to the absurd. Many, however, do not stop short of saying just this, as Hegel here does not refuse to identify with Pythagoras. "The Notion is pure play". This, though, is on account of its utter seriousness. It is the *serious*, the methodical, as connected or "in a row", here, with Quantity, in *series*.

VII

FROM MEASURE TO ESSENCE

The notion of quantity ... implies inherent contradiction. This ... is what forms the dialectic of quantity. The result ... is not a mere return to quality, as if that were the true and quantity the false notion, but an advance to the unity and truth of both, to qualitative quantity or Measure (106, *Zus.*).¹

The main interest of **Measure** has to be how it can intrinsically serve as the springboard from Being to **Essence**, while it itself, like “the other stages of Being” and every category, “may serve as a definition of the Absolute”. This truth indeed alone explains how a featureless substrate, indifferent beyond all conceivable difference, may also “serve” as such a definition and the best one at that, at the moment of its appearance. Still, the *Encyclopaedia*, written later than *The Science of Logic*, and which we are following here, gets by with scarce or no mention of either this term “substrate” or its category, unless or in so far as this might be assimilable to the **Measureless** (109). For background, however, see our entry “Substrate” in *Dictionary of Metaphysics and Ontology*, ed. Smith and Burkhardt, Philosophia Verlag, Munich 1989/90.

Still, “it is the very essence of Being to characterise itself” (107, *Zus.*, and here it is “essence” with a small e), even though it should exit as a featureless substrate (in fact it never exits: Being itself brings forth or becomes Essence, as Hegel stresses – we do not in our superior dialectical wisdom replace Being with Essence, but only being as first or “immediately” apprehended). Like *materia prima*, the Substrate is abstract, i.e. it only “occurs” in reality under some “form” or other from which it is yet conceptually separate. In realist terms, it is distinct yet not separate. Nonetheless the realist Aquinas, at first sight strangely, includes *materia prima*, along with God, angels and souls indifferently as, all and each, necessary beings, though he is careful not to surrender his thesis that, all the same, God and God alone is *ipsum esse subsistens*. None of these

¹ Unless stated otherwise the numerical references in brackets in the text are to the paragraphs of the *Encyclopaedia* of Hegel (Wallace translation).

types of being, after all, is a clear example of individuality as are the objects of our immediate experience, more or less misperception for Hegel, as McTaggart will make explicit. Here we see, incidentally, otherwise than in Leibniz's usage (reduced in "analytical" philosophy to necessary truth only), how such necessity does not exclusively or unambiguously connect with any distinction between creator and creature. But if necessity is after all one, univocal, then Substrate and Absolute do in fact coincide, are identical, with that Infinity which (necessarily) differentiates itself infinitely, as, again, does being. For this is "the very essence of Being".² Or, *bonum est diffusivum sui*, again infinitely, since nothing restrains it. McTaggart's frequent suggestion that the Absolute might be finite in some respects seems perverse (there are well-known arguments), while the identity of *bonum* and all the "transcendental predicates" with being, *ens* (thus also "diffusive", though never diffuse) is widespread (86).

Hegel, indeed, will pair quality and quantity in analogous or, rather, univocal ratio with God and Nature. Ratio (English word) has to be univocal since, as Aristotle shows, itself supplying the (univocal) *ratio* (Latin), as we say, of analogy itself. Yet it is not of course unthinkable, it must indeed be conceded, that analogy is itself analogous, no doubt *ad infinitum*. This circumstance, however, returns analogy itself to univocity, which thus itself turns out to be analogical. In other words this distinction, trumpeted more by Thomists than by Thomas, is of limited use. It is a main thrust of Hegelian assertion that one can and must speak unambiguously (despite the falsity of all predication, as he claims) of the Absolute. So here Measure will reflect the reciprocal dependence upon one another of "God" and nature, whereby, as in the old doctrine of the "divine ideas", here the Notion, and notions (as Bonaventura placed them all "in" the one Word), God, the Absolute, is All in a total reversal of any possible "pantheism", where some other all is said to be God.

"Measure is the qualitative quantum" (107). It is "the completion of Being" where being, again, is gone beyond into essence where, after all, nothing is or ever was or could be just "itself and not another thing". All is inter-related, each is in fact relation, so that ultimately there is no relation (nothing to relate) and *ipso facto* no "each". Nor, though, can Essence itself be one big Being. This is the background to later discussions, in

² In this context to try to bring in, as relating to essence, "being" without a capital, i.e. not as a category, would be like trying to introduce an unbound variable. In fact being was always "nothing other" than what "first falls into the mind", *primum quod cadit in mentem*. Conversely, however, this implies all that is claimed for Absolute Mind, called in some systems, again, *ipsum esse subsistens*.

Hegel, of Existence here, which carry over into later discussions even than Hegel's, often based on Meinong's thought, of "sistology". Essence is a reality, beyond questions of Being or Non-Being, or even of abstract and concrete. We do not have to say the Absolute is a super-Individual. We will see that it is not. But neither is it abstract, since it demands all our love. Hegel is in complete agreement with *Deuteronomy* here (cf. 159, final paragraph of main text) on "the first great commandment". Love, however, it must be conceded, is nowhere treated as a category. See, however the *Zusatz* to 158, where *amor intellectualis Dei* (as in Spinoza) is equated with being "determined by the absolute idea throughout". This, a Christian or a Freudian might figuratively say, would be the fulfilment of *eros* in crucifixion and resurrection, *Aufhebung* of the category of Life (or non-life). "My *eros* is crucified" (Ignatius of Antioch). In Freud we have the death-instinct, as such aimed at some good, I would argue (*omnis agens agit propter finem*).

Even if Being as a category is replaced or gives way to Essence yet the deeper meaning, Hegel will stress, is that Being itself, with deeper penetration, discloses itself as Essence and as essentially Essence:

In the sphere of Being, when somewhat becomes another, the somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence: here there is no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one to its other. The transition of Essence is therefore at the same time no transition: for in the passage of different into different, the different does not vanish: the different terms remain in their relation (111, *Zus.*).

Difference itself is superseded by, as found based upon, that infinite (and eternal) differentiation proper to the Notion. On just one, still somewhat quantitative way of expressing or viewing it,

Big fleas have little fleas
Upon their backs to bite'em
And little fleas have smaller fleas
And so ad infinitum.

Here fleas serve not just for the particles of physics but for any units or ones. The relations, however, are ultimately self-cancelling, since there are no longer any finite "things" to make into *relata*. "Everything finite is false." This is the basic meaning (not cause) of Being's yielding, so to say, to Essence. Everything finite has its measure, beyond which it is "no more seen" since again, "the things which are seen are temporal", i.e. are not at all, as Hegel will analyse contingency, are "tensed", bound within mere

grammar, as Essence is not. We recall Wittgenstein's suggestion, "Essence as grammar?" The question should be raised, but only to be denied. Under realism language and grammar are phenomena like any other (evolution as grammar?) while under idealism the reality is Thought, Mind, the Idea, itself bringing forth language as sign (and finite category, due for "ungrateful" supersession) within itself, along with all structure. By the same token, however, Hegel might reverse Wittgenstein's question to "Grammar as essence?" in his sense of the latter term as set forth in his logic. Here it would be grammar that is superseded. The question needs to be asked, however, how far the "scientific" distinction between the manifest and the scientific or real world³ is different from that between realism and absolute idealism? The scientists may have yet to follow this basic principle through to the end, as one might think a basic contradiction in realist accounts of evolution, of the evolved brain thinking it, for example, might be moving them already to do, though more in physics than in biology. Again, however, Hegel's category-name of "Essence" cannot be equated without more ado either with this term as used in daily speech or with the various Latin scholastic conceptions of *essentia*.⁴

The relation between the three stages of the logical idea appear in a real and concrete shape thus: God, who is the truth, is known by us in his truth, that is, as absolute spirit, only in so far as we at the same time recognise that the world which he created, nature and the finite spirit, are, in their difference from God, untrue. (83, *Zus.*, concluding the chapter "Logic Further Defined and Divided")

Finite things are untrue in their difference from God, he says. Elsewhere, all the same, Hegel cautions in general against use of the unreflected term "God" in philosophy as much as does, say, the physicist Paul Davies. What he says here, all the same, gives the "secret" and pivotal meaning of Measure. It is in fact precisely as "alienated" in the "moment" we call

³ As set forth in, say, Wilfrid Sellars: *Science, Perception and Reality* (c.1966).

⁴ The biologist Richard Dawkins speaks of the superior simplicity of evolution as contrasted with God in religion, ever more complex and so no explanation of anything. Here he ignores the findings of Aquinas, Hegel and others that God, in the identity of every idea in Essence (*essentia divina* in Aquinas) is absolutely simple and this not in any "abstract" way but precisely as beyond anything finite or composite. The biologist may well supersede this "moment" in his thinking, in Thought's thinking itself. See my "Christianity Without (or Within) God?" in *Open Theology*, April 2009, online at www.opentheology.com, also, differently titled, the final chapter of my *Reason's Developing Self-Revelation*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, 2013.

Nature that the Idea seems to include things which precisely do not (*pace* Augustine) shout out their meaning (*ipse fecit nos*). They are not beings-for-self. In the eternity of the Notion, as one religious and poetical thinker expressed it, concerning this "Content":

The smallest portion of this edifice...
The very pavement is made up of life
Of holy, blessed, and immortal beings
Who hymn their Maker's praise continually.⁵

Measure, that is, is the principle of the earlier Limit, represented for the Greeks by Nemesis, says Hegel, as overtaking with destruction all excess. The excess is indeed the destruction (of the previous category of being). *Maas*, translated here as "measure", is also the German word for the cardinal virtue of *temperantia*, temperance. Yet there exists also the Latin term *mensura*. Yet it is this Measure which unites and reconciles Quality and Quantity, the what kind (*qualis*) and the how much (*quantum*), at the same time as it carries us out beyond Being, disclosing Essence.

Beyond its measure a thing (quality) ceases to be itself. This was in fact the very principle of Aristotelian substantial change, and the far-reaching agreement with the early part of Aristotle's *Physics* is unmistakable in Hegel's more detailed *The Science of Logic*. This, supremely on Hegel's principles ("every philosophy is true"), is but what we would expect. Under the figure of the "nodal line" Hegel considers the anciently remarked antinomy between quantity and quality. When does a head become bald, a heap of wheat a grain or two (or three plus)? Substantial change is in itself instantaneous, i.e. there is *no* identifiable instant, due in the first place perhaps to that very phenomenology of instants as investigated by Hegel (Now you see it, now you don't, in a sense implying that you never did or could). Here already there is paradox. If it cannot be successive at all and is yet change, then surely an identity, not merely of "prime matter" (or discrete moments) must be implicit, as Hegel will bring out. It is without "steps", as one "defining" form replaces another or "comes".

In Hegel "the quantum shows itself as specifying".⁶ A new form "comes", the "matter" as *res* or thing (not *materia prima*) is "converted

⁵ J.H. Newman: *The Dream of Gerontius*. Cp. Hegel, "Spirit is thus the self-supporting absolutely real ultimate being" (*Wesen*), *Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. Baillie, p. 459, where he also speaks of "groups of articulated spirits". The tendency of Essence, however, is to posit identity between such groupings, as indeed between praise and being, maker and made, cause and effect, q.v.

⁶ Cf. Robert M. Wallace, *op. cit.* ch. 4..

into a new quality". Yet there has always been a host of difficulties about this, about why we do not merely have to do with a new "moment" of the substrate (*hypokeimenon*) or about whether the two views might not be the same. They surely are not. Here, where quantitative addition passes a new "node" to change or indeed supersede (as therefore including it) quality, as ice becomes liquid water, "we meet... the Measureless" (109), through excess. Nemesis has intervened. Here we have not, strictly speaking, an example but an illustration. In Mind itself there can be no examples, while in the "world", the appearance of sense, the Idea, is self-alienated. Only with these provisos can "sense-cognition" be seen as *quaedam ratio*, a kind of Reason. For here *ratio*, reason, "in the world", is not Reason or Spirit in itself as thinking the world, without however any real relation to it since the world itself, as "moment", is finally not real but, as due for supersession, is superseded in primary germ. The world of immediate Being is untrue, to the point that the "I", though ever knowing itself, scarcely recognises itself there, being more certain of itself "than that I have hands or feet" (as Newman said of his certitude of God).

Only if we grasp this explanatory priority of illustration over example can we fully appreciate Hegel's view of the succession of "quantitative ratios" as being in principle infinite. That is, for this we do not have to suppose endlessness in the supply of transforming heat, water into steam and beyond, or beyond ice conversely or anything similar. Quantity, the conclusion is, "is naturally and necessarily a tendency to exceed itself" (109: this *Zusatz* has "is", not "has" merely: quantity is a tendency, irrespective of demographic "peakings" and so on). This is "the process of measure", the not being able to step into the same river twice, the ultimate ruin, looking ahead, of substance (as of individual life). The dialectic is "all of a piece". As Hegel says, we find this "nodal line" in Nature "under a variety of forms". Stringed instruments, for example, simply show how the separate sequence, ladder, scale of notes, tones, semitones, quarter-tones and beyond where the ear cannot follow, is "really" continuous flow stopping or repeating nowhere. The unbowing, spacing a new note, merely creates the illusion which the unitary dragged bow up or down the string is innocent. Legato, however, is a mere compromise. There are no instants, no points even, on the line. But, further, what of this line itself, the line of process? It too offends against, does not square with, the final simplicity from which all proceeds, as mentioned above, in which alone all is realised in, therefore, distributive and total negation of itself in its otherness from "the Notion", the self-thinking Mind itself – silence or, in an addition that adds nothing, the unique, all/embracing Word.

The immediacy, that is, is “set aside”. In “Measure” Hegel says of quality and quantity, succeeding to the more abstract “factors” of Being and Nothing, that each are “only through the instrumentality of the other”. Yet this unity too is “self-annulling” into Infinity “as a negation of negation” (111). So now this “unity is explicitly ... simple relation-to-self, which contains in it being and all its forms absorbed”. This is Hegel’s notion of the Substrate, whether or not it coincides at all with Aristotle’s conception of a universal potentiality (in nature) which is one with a natural perishability. In the first place, Hegel is not here doing philosophy of nature simply, though it might follow therefrom, but logic as he has defined it, ultimately the notion “in and for itself”. Logic has “sides” but no parts (79). Logic is not merely “objective thought” but “objectivity” itself which, as spiritual, converts into the boundless or universal Subjectivity of thought, of thinking. Such thinking, however, is no longer contrasted, as if partial, with some other reality. This is why Hegel insists that it is Being itself that modulates into Essence as always having been it. We are not dealing with a mere conceptual refinement but with a metaphysical unveiling which, he will say (has said), is ultimately revelation, but from within. **Inward** and **Outward** are mutually “cancelling”, in fact (133). One could as soon say, therefore, from without to within, as the onion unpeels while remaining the same onion.

Being thus negating itself (*forma dat esse* and here, in the Substrate, following on the Measureless, as is shown, without naming the Substrate, in 111, all forms are “absorbed” or, rather, superseded *en bloc*) “is a mediation with self and a reference to self”. This is what Hegel calls Essence, where all coincides with itself in the other, all others, in a relation beyond relation, a relatedness rather but without *relata*, as, to illustrate, positive and negative, not as being and nothing. Quality and quantity were “like some and other” but now some and other are superseded or at least on the way to it. The dialectic, again, is all of a piece, as the pious possess what they hope for in hoping for it. Being itself, in “the process of Measure”, is (and not merely has been) “thrown into abeyance and absorbed”, without “several characteristics”. “Such Being is Essence, Measure is implicitly Essence”, whether or not Measure implies a measurer. Nemesis was herself Measure, and some claim that there can be thoughts without a thinker,⁷ as with the spinning of a roulette wheel. For the dialectic, however, one thought, one *Begriff*, emerges as “thinking itself”, as Act. This process, of Being as of Measure, is one of “realising what it is implicitly”. It is not, that is, a chain of reasoning *in vacuo*. Or, it is Reason (*Vernunft*) superseding Understanding (*Verstand*), in Hegel’s

⁷ Cf. G. Frege, *Der Gedanke*.

transformation of these Kantian terms, of course “lifted” in the first place from the living language of relational life in comm-unity, the “ordinary consciousness”.

The transience of the categories is their ever referring to another, which in turn refers. So there is no “passing into”, as it may seem when one thinks immediate Being. Nothing “vanishes” here, for there is “no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one to its other”, held simultaneously as it were. Transition itself is abrogated, so that the dialectic itself must from now on be differently conceived. “In the sphere of Being the reference of one term to another is only implicit; in Essence on the contrary it is explicit” (111, *Zus.*).

VIII

ESSENCE

The Infinite, as the unity of quality and quantity in measure, is simple relation to self (*sich auf sich beziehen*) and uniquely so. For only the Infinite is itself its own measure or, we might say, “judges all things”. Now Being is immediacy simply. Hence it is the Beginning (of logic). Not that we immediately find Being without the possibility of critique (this seems to be the basis of McTaggart’s view that Hegel “had no right” to assume Being as beginning his dialectic). Rather, the immediate, immediacy, is what Being initially *names*. Any question of what is or is not immediate, however, just does not and cannot arise here. It, as category, i.e. its possibility, is the condition for anything arising, or rather resulting, at all. Or, as possible it is, just as such, actual and hence necessary. By this route Hegel obviates all thought of an absolute contingency lying at the root of things or, equivalently, builds upon (the route) the immediate absurdity of this supposition or, indeed, all suppositions taken absolutely, such as that a woman shall have given birth to kittens. Not merely won’t we thus “counterfactually” suppose. We cannot do so, since from thus supposing anything whatever follows, which, again, this conclusion, since it is destructive of mind as such, cannot be thus supposed, cannot be mediated. The immediate, again, is necessarily the beginning (of thought). Since the immediate is finite, however, it will be absorbed, put by, *aufgehoben*.

Being or immediacy, which by the negation of itself is a mediation with self and a reference to self, - which consequently is also a mediation which cancels itself into reference-to-self, or immediacy, - is Essence. (*Enc.* 111, cf. 112)

Being is **Essence**, “being and all its forms” (111). It is as if he had said that Being is immediacy beyond all idea of immediacy, since this term “immediacy” is already a (defining) mediation, a step beyond the beginning. So it “cancels itself” again, or perpetually, thus becoming or manifesting itself as Essence or, one might say, comprehensively mutual

reference as such. It is not merely the type or form of reference, i.e. the form which is reference as due, merely, to "our reflection on what takes place". That is, it is not merely the passing of one category into another, which we had, so to say, subjectively taken to be the very dialectic itself, but which was merely our starting out upon the ladder which we were going to have to kick away. It is not, that is, the mere abstract idea of reference, still less of essence. All the categories remain, but as mutually referring to the extent that "there is no real other". Anything at all has "its own other", immanently. Transition is excluded, as twice dead metaphor, giving way to relation. Yet this remaining relation is "self-relation", the same in difference. To put it differently, identity is no relation, as not between two differents absolutely taken, and just therefore is *the* logical relation, just therefore once characterised as a relation of reason only or not a "real" relation. Just here is the nexus, the hinge, upon which the rejection of "moderate realism" turns, in the first progress from Being to Essence leading into the (absolute) Idea declared to be the true Being:

Die Methode ist der reine Begriff, der sich nur zu sich selbst verhaelt; sie ist daher die einfache Beziehung auf sich, welcher Sein ist. Aber es ist nun auch erfuehltes Sein, der sich begreifende Begriff, der Sein als die konkrete, ebenso schlechthin intensive Totalitaet. (Wissenschaft der Logik II – Werke 6, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 1972, p. 572).

This is the celebrated or maligned contradiction of Trinitarianism universalized, so to say. This, quite obviously, is where Hegel the one-time seminarian is "coming from". After that we may see him as thinking his way either out of it or deeper into it. According to his philosophy, anyhow, these two processes are the same! Those who advocate skipping a line whenever Hegel mentions God simply refuse or fail to read him. Being and Nothing are now seen to have no sense except in mutual reference. "In God there is light and no darkness at all", proclaims an apostolic writer. But he still has to say it, to mention the darkness, since the two are of themselves each referred to their other, as condition for any affirmation at all. *Ratio est ad opposita* and this applies already to any perception, as distinct from pure sensation, of nature for example, the supposed *ad unum* of the in-itself, e.g. of nature, being thus fictitious, as is any thing-in-itself supposed as "outside" reason, which indeed knows only itself in a sense opposite to Kant's (so here too *ratio est ad opposita*!).

Thus the positive as positive negatives the negative, as the negative negatives the positive. This is the ancient post-Eden state of being "as gods, knowing good and evil", the *sic et non* (e.g. of Abelard as "dialectician") transcending the either/or of the abstract thinking of the

understanding. This mutual reference is "explicit". That is, it is intrinsic to any "one" whatever, in a way which finally overthrows language and predicative judgment, as has slowly to appear, again as a form of kicking away a ladder or a previous but indispensable position from which the mutual reference (of contradictories) results, rather as the era of the *algae* destroyed itself in giving way to the more complex life-forms, indispensably, or so runs the theory. "In Being everything is immediate, in Essence everything is relative." Yet in the end we will see that everything cannot be relative, that relation itself will be subverted, transformed, superseded.

Being is Essence. Yet "in essence the actual unity of the notion is not realised, but only postulated by reflection" (112). Essence "is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is relation to an Other", an Other as necessarily postulated, however. Still, "Essence ... is Being." Being, all the same, is now "deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming", to our own starting-point. Essence is so to say a more true or "objective" being, "reflecting light into itself", active. "The Absolute is the Essence" (112). In general, if everything, taken distributively, is mediated by something else, then everything is its other and every other is its other again. Therefore one cannot advance from one thing to another as if that thing, or any "thing", stood alone and independent. All, rather, must be taken at once and not merely posited thus, as if there were some anterior position from which to do this. This is Essence. Essence, that is, precludes anything's having its own exclusive and particular essence. Essence negates essence, in that self-relation which negates any possible relation. Hegel calls it immanent Being, Being gone into itself, never going beyond, being there (*Dasein* we might again say, though with new insight backwardly applied) "in the beginning". We have now to understand, however, how, all the same, the actual unity of the notion is not realised yet, but postulated by reflection. Only so will we be able later to appreciate what that realisation or "advance" will show itself ever to be. In other words, the logic moves backwards to its true starting-point as mirroring the initial posit, to the true Being, namely, which is the Idea and which the Idea is.

Hegel here makes a connection between Essence and our sense of the past, our past tense, in fact, as it emerges in (German) language before or without any explicit notion of The Past being formed. He clearly recalls a similar moment in Aristotle where, however, no appeal to any testimony of a language-form is made. Essence, says, Aristotle, is what was to be, *quod erat esse*, Greek *ti en einai*. In German too, however, he notes, *Wesen*, essence, is "the term used for the past tense", putting it the other

way round (equally validly), as it were. First we distinguish past from present, the seeming, then we begin to subvert, overcoming the finite notion of time altogether. Of course at the end of that process we will have to see that we never “began” anything at all. “No birth no death” (Buddhist saying). We might say that our unreflected notion of a past is (was) our first “model” for the changeless relation of each to other, to its other(s), as being to non-being, in the Notion which, moving backwards now, is Essence. To promote Benthamism from the Understanding to the Notion of Reason, we say in effect that each is to count for all and none for less than all. Why, though, unless each is all or I am (count for) “you”? It is only the “ought” thus based upon “is” (natural law) that could really count at all.

Everything, it is said, has an Essence; that is, things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is thus something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another, and merely to advance from qualitative to quantitative, and *vice versa*: there is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence. With respect to other meanings and uses of the category of Essence, we may note that in the German auxiliary verb ‘*sein*’ the past tense is expressed by the term for Essence (*Wesen*): we designate past being as *gewesen*. This anomaly of language implies to some extent a correct perception of the relation between Being and Essence. Essence we may certainly regard as past Being ... (112, *Zus.*).

We have, that is, finished transcending Being, while it is still “at the same time preserved”. That is, all “times” are so to say possessed, the alpha and omega of the Absolute. The past is a kind of first picture of this, since the future, in realist or common-sense perception, is just as future not real at all, an *ens rationis* or “being of reason”. The present, as immediacy, is transcended in Essence as use of the past tense is the same as *denying the immediacy of what it otherwise affirms*. In the sweep of the logic this is equivalent to *Aufhebung* of pastness and hence of Time with all its antinomies and contradiction. But the same, of course, may be said of the whole of Nature, of what is *ad unum*. We may ask, did the dinosaurs “really” rant and roar over millions of years, the sun rise and set, without rational observation? The impossibility of this would point once more, as it were from the opposite direction, to the necessary eternity of mind. Or, or therefore, in a sense “we” were there.

Hegel also notes that *Wesen* can denote aggregates, collections, as of Press, Post or Revenue (*Steuerwesen*), referring thus to them as “not to be taken single, in their immediacy, but as a complex, and then, perhaps ... in their various bearings.” He asserts: “this usage... is not very different in its

implication from our own.” This refers especially to the “various bearings”, a potential relation (bearing), as belongs to rationality, of each thing with everything and hence with every other thing, as is claimed now, today, for the particles of physics viewed, by physicists at least, as potential ultimates, *relata* salvaged while standing before the abyss of the Notion. Hegel, however, thinks we can as well begin with the *Steuerwesen*, making the last first, as he will later reverse cause and effect prior to overcoming it all together, as indeed Hume’s analysis had called for. It is quite clear that Hegel does not reject but incorporates or “saves” philosophical scepticism or even just, scepticism. “What is God”, asked Thomas Aquinas, unless finally the unknowable or “incomprehensible”? Yet, unlike the *Ding-an-sich*, God, the Absolute by definition (whether we like the proper name or not), is not, Hegel thinks, to be likewise dropped, since just anything else is a type and symbol of it. Thus *das Unzulängliches ist getan*, he will have read in Goethe, not merely as justifying imperfect actions (it forgives them rather) but as situating anything finite whatever in the dialectical advance “from shadows to reality”, a new slant on a well-rehearsed, indeed ancient conception.

“People also speak of finite Essences, such as man.” He mentions a plural he does not himself allow, in view of implications just as regarding “man” in particular. It was significant when Kant began speaking not of man but of “the rational creature”. What Hegel claims to show though is that “creature” too must overcome itself as notion, as when he says, again, that created things, nature, the finite spirit even, are, “in their difference from God, untrue” (83, *Zus.*, as finally prefacing the whole *Logic* beginning at 84). Aristotle was pointing in the same direction when he showed (*Metaphysics* VII) that the determining essence of man lay not, really, in the composite “rational animal” but, as with everything, in the ultimate or specific difference, which is rationality. The “rational soul” determines everything, even the form or appearance of the body. Thus it is *forma corporis*, which is as much as to say that “the body” has no form of its own. While the Thomists, following their master, maintain this “unicity of the substantial form” against Scotist ideas of a simultaneous hierarchy of forms (used to affirm the divinity of the dead body of Christ during the three days in the tomb, while for Aristotle any dead member or body is only equivocally a limb or body at all), they, the Thomists, are hampered by traditional constraints in following this through to the end. They need not be, however, given that a particular theory of body or matter as standing over against spirit on its own level was never essential to the Christian kerygma. The ancient heresy of Docetism was the claim that uniquely Christ was only an appearance and not real flesh. But if flesh is

overthrown intrinsically within itself as "untrue" the picture is different altogether. One should also note that "flesh" in Biblical writings, although certainly connoting an immediacy, refers principally to temporal visible life as alienated from God and as hence nothing. "All flesh is as grass", i.e. as the life of grass, "which today is and tomorrow is cast into the oven". Life, Hegel says, "runs away", ceases to be, i.e. is not, is *aufgehoben*. Resurrection, we may think, as conceptualised by the Jews already before Christian times, is a figurative attempt to capture this, rather than postulation of the same old thing, "this petty pace", all over again. This would in fact then be the *meaning* of the "glorification" of the flesh as of all else. Its burial in God, in Spirit, *is* its resurrection, not to be lost, therefore.

So the focus is not man¹, not the rational creature even, if we want to transcend figure and say it as it is (though thus using the essentially metaphorical resource which is language to its utmost), but infinitely differentiated spirit where all are one another. The "very term Essence implies that we have made a step beyond finitude:" the title therefore is "inexact" for man. Man is a disposable category, a specious identification of the "I", and even of me who writes here. I rather can identify with everyone and everything everywhere, like the Good Samaritan, hopefully, or, to a degree, the ancient totemists. Calling God the highest or supreme Essence, as one of several, Hegel now goes on to say, is unsatisfactory, since it employs the category of quantity which "has its proper place within the compass of the finite". "God... is the Being." On its own, however, this suggests "scant recognition of the finite". Yet "true Being is just the superseding of all that is immediate". Just! Say rather, precisely, that "things, as they immediately are, have no truth". The finite, we seem to find, is also something like a *caput mortuum* of abstraction, unless we take it as "in" the infinite, which thus abstracts from nothing. In fact, as Freedom, the infinite does not even abstract from Nothing or Non-Being, having its opposite within itself, as, Hegel often notes, is proper to Reason.

¹ This surely is the historical background, if there should be one, to Heidegger's reservations regarding Sartrean humanism, existentialism as belittling a free and infinite life of Mind, as we find too in Unamuno or, of course, Kierkegaard. Ultimately this is a religious handicap stemming from a spuriously sacral order in which philosophy was dubbed, impossibly, the "handmaid" (*ancilla*) of theology or divine science "handed down" (*tradita*). But if another makes one free then one is free and gratefully (grace-fully) so. Final or complete humanism is theism, is spirit indeed, subsuming all in its specific but not abstract actuality.

Self-relation in Essence is the form of Identity or of reflection-into-self, which has here taken the place of the immediacy of Being (113).

For philosophy to be genuine we ought always to be able to discern a simple or immediate scheme behind what only appears as a bunch of technicalities. That is why the supposed technicalities can negate and cancel themselves and make use of past or discarded expressions in ways that are unthinkable in the finite sciences. So behind the doctrines of being and essence we have the two moments, simply, of immediate manifestation then contrasted with the natural question as to what things really are, Lewis Carroll's bank-clerk become hippopotamus, so to say. The case is the same in Thomas Aquinas and quite obvious in the Greek philosophers from whom form and matter, say, *morphe* (shape) and *hyle* (wood), took their rise. Beginning from this Hegel arrives at a conception he calls Essence which is not immediately relatable to versions of it in other thinkers, and this is in general true of philosophical terms. The univocity, that is, is never strict. Such strictness, indeed, is just what Hegel finds to be the hallmark of the Understanding as re-stricted. He wants, we shall see, to banish it from logic in particular, though this is often or even typically identified with it.

The unintelligence of sense, to take everything limited and finite for Being, passes into the obstinacy of understanding, which views the finite as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory (113). "Everything is itself and not another thing." To this saying, beloved of the most obstinate of philosophers (G.E. Moore), Hegel opposes, implicitly, the ecstatic "This also is thou; neither is this thou". Let us not be bashful of the ecstatic, upon which philosophy has not, indeed, a handle but an intrinsic window, as being able to explain and situate both art and religion and, indeed, itself. In the logic as so far developed he has shown that this, the "inherently self-contradictory", is so. What remains is, naturally, what will follow. Of course we have here an illustration of our thesis of the necessary non-technicality of speculation, *theoria*, since Hegel's thought is as much as anyone else's of value only insofar as it does not contradict itself. Being at one time a bank-clerk and at another a hippopotamus is not a contradiction, given a certain estimate of finite reality as indeed unreality. It ought to be clear how this differs from the empty supposing rejected above as based upon possibility as a specifically abstract modality.. But of course to say that the finite is self-contradictory, even though finitely uttered, is not self-contradictory either. That is to say, Bernard Lonergan's category of a "contradiction in performance" is inherently equivocal or, to put it another way, *practical* reason is just that; it must not be reduced to Understanding, to "universal prescriptivism", for example. This is the

whole thrust of the doctrine of *epieicheia*, of interpreting the will of the law-giver so as to, as it seems, break the law. In this sense *all* use of language is practical and *hence* a “contradiction in performance”, a consideration which may assist in understanding the notion of the speculative.

What this has to do with Essence is the exhibiting of a total pattern of inter-relatedness which necessarily subverts relation as such. It is, we have seen, Indifference which is Essence. A picture is emerging of reality as something as it were “full of eyes”, in that, in any point or element (facet) of it whatever, it beholds and/or encompasses itself and all the rest within itself, as real seeing is, again, an initial form of doing. There is in English an uncanny pun, in this connection, between “eye” and “I”, since it will be eventually I, the subject, which does this, which sees, and is indeed Subjectivity as such, since otherness is ultimately subverted. This though is the same as to say that Self is subverted in the other, which is always *its* other. All this, by the way, provides intrinsic ground as to why one cannot be limited to simply expounding Hegel’s thought as a personal or individual philosophy. There are no such abstract or “precise” (prescinded) individuals. “I am you.” As he himself insisted while writing, and just here, it is Being itself which modulates into, which ever was, Essence. In this sense it is not a work of Mind, of anyone’s mind. The same must apply, ought to apply, to our own writing, as we said above about reading also. This is what was meant by “understanding spiritual things spiritually” or, for that matter, the “treasure in earthen vessels”, never mind now who said it. We attend to what was said, rather, following, here too, Hegel’s example. The parable of “the unjust steward” might seem a good precedent, as is the idea of “bringing forth from one’s treasure things new and old”. Mind, that is, is not one agent among many to be identified but the name for *act*, for *being*, rightly understood.

The task remains, however, of understanding Hegel’s text, here in the *Encyclopaedia*. We now seem to have an “external” Being contrasted with “the true Being (of Essence)”. This external Being is then “called the Unessential.

But that turns out a mistake. Because Essence is Being-in-itself, it is essential only to the extent that it has in itself its negative, i.e. reference to another, or mediation. Consequently, it has the unessential as its own proper seeming (reflection) in itself ... The sphere of Essence thus turns out to be a still imperfect combination of immediacy and mediation. (114)

That is to say, the essential and the unessential are not to be abstractly separated. Essence itself must include both itself and its other in a

seamless web of relations which, as identity (*the* specifically “logical” relation which is a non-relation, which is the “sublation” of relation, even as in the Trinitarian relations, finally real as they can only be seen or taken to be), transcends all notions of a web since in the Notion, Hegel’s final *concept*, “each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it”. (*Enc.* 160)

IX

ESSENCE UP TO GROUND

The unity "contains in it being and all its forms absorbed" (112). Again, regarding quality and quantity, each becomes the other that "it already was implicitly: and thus we get Being thrown into abeyance and absorbed, with its several characteristics negatived" (112, Zus.). This absorption seems to be the heart of the transition to Essence. Quite logically, however, it is at this point that transition itself is "absorbed" into "the passage of different into different" that is no passage, in the literal sense, at all but abiding relation or explicit "reference". So Hegel says, the "transition of Essence is therefore at the same time no transition". This is why "being and all its forms" are absorbed into Essence, not left behind as a "somewhat" that vanishes. Necessity, i.e. in its Idea, which is the Idea, will include also the Contingent or the as such unnecessary, which just by this inclusion becomes necessary, just as the infinite must include the finite, i.e. just insofar as, even as non-being, it is.

The difficulty people find in these conceptions is due solely to sticking to the term "is", and forgetting the character of thought, where the moments as much are as they are not, - are only the process which is Spirit ... And since this unity is the universality of self-consciousness, self-consciousness has ceased to be figurative or pictorial in its thinking; the process has turned back into it. (Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind*, transl. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, New York 1966, pp. 777-778)

Being was from the beginning Essence. The immediacy of being "has turned out to be self-annulling". This is the experience of everyone who thinks, that things are not as they first seem, or need not be so, are not self-evidently so. The unity, of quality and quantity in Measure, to follow Hegel's route to this point, is "simple relation-to-self" and not, for example, relation to our minds or thinking. In this sense Being, as something which "falls into the mind" (*cadit in mentem*), i.e. the immediate for us only, as mediated by mind in this way of "falling in", namely, "by the negation of itself is a mediation with self and a reference

to self". It "cancels itself" into the truer or more fundamental immediacy which is Essence, is thus "absorbed". This occurs, then, in virtue of the primacy of Mind, which even the formula of Aquinas just cited implicitly acknowledges.

The immediate Being of things is thus conceived under the image of a ring or curtain behind which the Essence lies hidden. (112, *Zus.*)

Essence as Hegel conceives it, in fact, is the initial systematisation of immediately actual Being and is thus finally disclosed, in The Science of Logic, when itself absorbed as the Idea, as the true Being, viz. the Absolute. The reader may refer to the passage in German cited previously here from the final pages of that work.

Central to this advance is therefore the primacy of Mind or of infinite consciousness. This is the same as Possibility. In an infinite time, Aquinas had said, whatever can happen does happen. The possible, Hegel will later say, is the actual and, in reverse, "Actuality is first of all Possibility" (143). This is the connection of Essence with indifference, the Substrate. The web of relations becomes here relations of relations and so no web, no relations. The possible worlds are no worlds at all, ultimately. "World" was a construct, a finite concept. This is "the true infinity of coincidence with self in another". We might even say "we", as differentiated infinity into infinities again, "beget one another" in a mutuality annulling substance. We approach, verge upon, the further wisdom of silence, whereof, after all, "one cannot speak", although it has to be the supreme Rationality. There is no need to deny the title Philosophy, or Wisdom, to it, the Notion as "pure play". This, surely, is the positive significance of "post-modernism", as people are pleased to call it.

We may find some difficulty negotiating this transition which is not a transition. The order of approach for this section is somewhat altered from that of Hegel's "Greater Logic" but, again, the textual or exegetical interest should here be subordinated to the *res*, the matter in hand. It follows from the nature of the dialectic as set up that each one's approach to it must, to some extent at least, be his own. So what the dialectic thus sets out to show is that "all roads lead to Rome". Thought, consistently pursued, has to find itself thinking itself, not becoming the path so much as path itself or progress or change and movement as categories become, are absorbed into it, not into Essence finally but into the Notion (along with **Essence** itself). For "in Essence the actual unity of the notion is not realised, but only postulated by reflection". We might say, Essence as a concept in itself is not yet for itself. Postulation, of course, is possibility. In Being we have the illusion, the impression, of going beyond possibility. Yet

possibility itself is the first, i.e. the foundational or ground-form of Actuality (as the Notion is founded upon and concludes to Being). This must be so where what is under consideration is Absolute Mind, i.e. the one and only final Being which is, it too, "neither one nor many".

Essence is self-relatedness "only in so far as it is relation to an Other." It is "Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself". That is, in shaking off the false or finite notion of Being as distinguished against our thinking of it we get nearer to true Being here and always mediating itself, under the "veil" of what we have always taken to be thinking. To think, it was anciently said, is to become the other. Or we might say, it has no empirical nature.

This though would be to assume as normative, i.e. in so far as we retain any respect at all for "empiricism", the very idea we are in process of subverting, that "each thing is itself and not another thing". The transition to, rather, the opening up of Being as Essence, precisely as putting a stop to transitions, from self or same to other, simply is an Identity, where everything, severally or together, is everything and anything else.

For in the notion, the elements distinguished are without more added at the same time declared to be identical with one another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a free being of the whole notion. (161)

"This also is thou; neither is this thou." To stop there would of course be to deny all grain to the universe, in the night where all cows or cats or black. What is emerging rather, and being shown, is a set of limitations upon absolute difference, ultimately realised in the Notion, of which Hegel says that

It is a systematic whole in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it (160).

This Identity is not the identity of formal logic, of the so-called Laws of Thought (115, where they are mentioned but not as a category). Such a law is itself put as somehow identical with the law of contradiction, and yet not of course thus identical, which already somewhat undermines this pinpointing of it, or its being used to pinpoint anything else, as "itself and not another thing". In fact one already finds within Scholastic logic, rational but not rationalist, a variety of identities. The identity between subject and predicate, for example, is spoken of by some Scholastic thinkers as an intentional identity or as an identity of reference, clearly of two expressions or conceptions otherwise disparate. This gets explained in terms of their *suppositio*, a richer and more varied notion than the more

blanket "reference" (Cf. our "The Supposition of the Predicate", *The Modern Schoolman* LXXVII, November 1999, pp. 73-78).

The unintelligence of sense, to take everything limited and finite for Being passes into the obstinacy of understanding, which views the finite as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory (113).

Each thing, that is, is *not* "itself and not another thing". Where, anyhow, everything is identical with itself everything is *ipso facto* different. This is partly covered by drawing the consequence that identity is a "relation of reason" only, reason putting two for one, so to say, however that is possible. It is not a "real" relation simply because the putative two terms are really one, i.e. have one reference, like "Cicero" and "Tully". Yet even here we still have and have to have two different names. Even this then is not the $A=A$ of the logic books. In this form indeed "being equal to" is already confounded with "being the same as", quantity and quality, just what Leibniz intended to hold apart in his Identity of Indiscernibles, declaring that the totally equal must be identical, i.e. that nothing is totally equal with another, our rationalist principle again, against which, all the same, Hegel claims to distinguish the thought of Leibniz, whose maxim, all the same, it is (117).

As Hegel expresses it, "When understanding sets itself to study Identity, it has already passed beyond it, and is looking at Difference in the shape of bare Variety" (117, *Zus.*). Difference too, that is to say, has to be differentiated, not merely treated as the opposite of the bare Identity of formal logic, with which however it is really identical in a reciprocal embrace.

In fact we discover features both of likeness and unlikeness in different or diverse things. Such a method of comparison, however, can never be the whole of science. "Its results are indeed indispensable, but they are ... only preliminary to truly intelligent cognition." Such "external" comparison only picks out the external or purely quantitative difference which is the matter of mathematics. Even as regards Leibniz's principle, "the maxim of Variety" (*sic* Hegel), Hegel is concerned to show that Leibniz is not, as is the understanding (*Verstand*), "looking at Difference in the shape of bare Variety" (117, *Zus.*).

All the same, as regards the principle of Leibniz, difference must be understood to mean not an external and indifferent diversity merely, but difference essential. Hence the very nature of things implies that they must be different".

Each thing, that is, in its own proper character, just in so far as it is anything, must itself be different and not merely as varying away from some other thing. This is the sense in which difference is not "external", not merely observed in a *comparison*, e.g. of leaves on trees, as if one might one day find two "the same". They would anyhow be various as on two different branches, say, or one held in one hand and one in the other, of the successful lady concerned.

Hegel's treatment of this issue immediately recalls the Scholastic theory of relations, based on Aristotle's account of relation as an accident of substance, as contrasting with some other theories. A relation, namely, is inherent in the subject, as is Hegel's **Difference**, and not somehow suspended between two substances or substantial qualities which it, the relation, somehow unites, e.g. as "holding between" them. This was especially developed by Jean Poincaré "of St. Thomas", a contemporary of Descartes. What we need to see here, though, is what makes this point important, indeed essential, for Hegel. He tells us:

Essence is mere Identity and reflection in itself, only as it is self-relating negativity, and in that way self-repulsion. It contains therefore essentially the characteristic of Difference. (116)

Hegel in fact introduces **Identity** at 113, **Self-Identity** at 115, as categories specifically, while he continues the point he makes about Difference in 116 (above) by relating it to Essence as a whole or as such, Essence thus being "self-relating" or even the essence (in the non-categorical sense) of self-relation. Hence, just therefore, Essence itself is one indivisible whole to be thought all in one or together, thus leading up to the Notion in this its prime regard, that "each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it", again (160). This corresponds to the overcoming of "Other-being" as "no longer qualitative, taking the shape of the character or limit" (116). In fact we are witnessing a subversion of relation, as immediately considered, in favour of Identity, since this is not really relation at all, unless as in, for example, the Trinitarian sense, where the persons themselves are put as subsistent relations. The ground for this was prepared, historically at least, by the intrinsic quality afforded by Scholastics to relations, following Aristotle's dictum that they are the weakest of accidents, i.e. that they are accidents, of some one definite Substance or other. Thus a relation itself, for example, cannot be "reflexive". Where there are two substances there will be two relations. My being brother of you and you of me, say. These are the relations holding here *secundum esse* or objectively, the so-called reflexive relation (singular) being found only *secundum dici* or in

idiomatic speech. So, for Hegel, similarly, or as part of the same idea, i.e. not merely “analogically”, each element or “thing” has its own “**determinate or specific difference as an** essential category of thought.

X

PRELUDE TO THE GROUND

Here I want to concentrate on the *Zusatz* to 119, effectively a summing up but to the point of an intensification of focus of the development in Essence so far. Incidentally, in the English (Wallace) version there is a “(1)” at 117, as also in the original German (Felix Meiner edition), standing for the first *differentiation* within **Difference** (116), viz. **Diversity**. The word “distinction” would be wrong here, where we are dealing with logic as a prime reality and not as abstract. Differentiation would name the same relation within what is considered as is found among the Divine Ideas of old, in Plato, Augustine or Aquinas, each one held by the latter to be identical with the divine essence, *realissima* indeed as one with, as identical with, the divine *esse* or being, as well say essence (*Summa theol.* Ia Q15, 1 *ad 3um*: *Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia*). They are thus, in this respect at least, “unaffected by the relation in which they stand to each other” (117) inasmuch, at least, as “different things” might correspond to their idea, as being object or situation etc. indifferently. So the ideas are not ideas, it follows, as *contradistinguished* against “reality”, our “normal” usage. Variety or diversity, that is, is as such or taken generally the negative of any such finite relation *between* things such as mind and elephant as mentioned later (173: **Infinite** judgment).

One does not find here, however, either a “(2)” or further numeral differentiation. This, then, the implied “(2)”, belongs best at 119, main text, as found in the German Meiner text cited for 119, “2) *Der Unterschied*, etc.”, so in English: “(2) Difference implicit is essential difference, the **Positive** and the **Negative**”, as *contrasting*, in what is itself a Polarity (a concept introduced as such here although as *Vorstellung*, not as a category), with “(1), immediate difference” (117), i.e. Diversity or Variety. The exposition shows that (2) is in fact seen as the *advance* upon (1) which will thus replace or, rather, absorb it. Charles Taylor appears to agree:

Hegel moves in this section from the categories of Identity and Difference, through that of Diversity to that of Opposition (*Gegensatz*) ... The upshot ... is that a characterisation of things as merely diverse is shown to pass over into a characterisation in which things are in essential, or polar opposition to each other. In polar opposition, each term is such that its interaction with another opposed entity is constitutive of its own reality. (Charles Taylor: *Hegel*, CUP 1975, p. 261)

It is here in fact that the connections of Logic with Trinitarian thought and contrariwise, incidental or more conceptually analogical, stressed previously in *The Phenomenology of Mind* and to be further systematised and made explicit in the final part of the *Encyclopaedia*, "Philosophy of Mind", start to come to the fore, though more in Hegel than in Taylor.

Under the "conception of Polarity", wanting to "get at the thoughts which are implied in it", as the physicists have not been doing (119), Hegel further settles accounts with the surd of contingency, not however in typical rationalist fashion but with profound rationality in the old metaphysical tradition (pre-Cartesian, but now integrating it with the defining Cartesian insight, the *cogito*). He introduces Polarity as if taking it from physics, where in his time it was "so dominant", where it "contains by implication the more correct definition of Opposition" (119), of which he has just been speaking, as itself opposed to Identity and yet as just in that way intrinsically necessary to it or as it were within it. "It was forgotten that Identity and Opposition are themselves opposed". Physics, however, "adheres to the ordinary logic". We might say that today our quantum physicists both adhere and do not adhere to this, so that an admission of Hegelian perspectives might help them achieve consistency. The same might be said concerning the need to, so to say, "save" the enormous intellectual investment within the post-Fregean analytical movement in an apparently mathematicised logic (as it can often appear, at least), along with its "set-theory" and, more and more, mereology. But now, as then, physics "might ... well be horrified" but might also go over to "our mathematical universe" (title of a book by the physicist Max Tegmark), to cite a recent title. Regarding the relation, of logic and mathematics, everything depends upon which is thought to absorb which. One might say the same of the original Aristotelian syllogistic in regard to this development. If one equates the latter with logic as such then syllogistic gets immediately taken as but a "small part of it" (W.V.O. Quine in *The Methods of Logic*: see also our "Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy", *Acta Philosophica*, Rome, 1997, pp. 303-310, also "The Interdependence of Semantics, Logic and Metaphysics as

Exemplified in the Aristotelian Tradition”, *International Philosophical Quarterly*, New York, March 2002, pp. 63-92).

We are speaking of new attempts at integration, which always “horrify” as seeming to overthrow or set aside the analytical intelligence or Understanding. Here though we must distinguish, in true analytical fashion, attempts at integration on this same level of Understanding from integrated application of Reason, the “faculty of the unconditioned”. (cf. paragraph 45, *Zus.*, reproduced below)

An example of the former, *viz.* integration of and by the Understanding, would be the chain of hypotheses presented with rocklike consistency in Immanuel Velikovsky’s writings over thirty or so years (c. 1950-80), proceeding from psychology (he was a pupil of Freud) through ancient history, cosmology, astrophysics, geology and biology. This “affair” (charted in *The Velikovsky Affair* by Alfred de Grazia) is now mainly considered as a phenomenon within the sociology of scientific scholarly activity, how one deals or dealt with “heretics”, principally. One sows, others reap. Velikovsky, however, is as unreflective about his own canons of reasoning, his logic, as any empiricist or rationalist. There is an underlying materialism in his method, in his notion of the “scientific”, as if he too suffers from the same “amnesia” he diagnoses as in the race at large, retaining a deliberately crass or non-reflexive methodology, one shared by his critic Carl Sagan. They merely swap one form of appearances for another, inasmuch as Absolute Idealism, as able to iron out the contradictions within biological evolutionism, say, as normally stated (cp. work on this by the late Axel Randrup of Copenhagen, some of it preserved on the Internet), is not considered.

Kant was the first definitely to signalise the distinction between Reason and Understanding. The object of the former, as he applied the term, was the infinite and unconditioned, of the latter the finite and conditioned. Kant did valuable service when he enforced the finite character of the cognitions of the understanding founded merely upon experience, and stamped their contents with the name of appearance. But his mistake was to stop at the purely negative point of view, and to limit the unconditionality of Reason to an abstract self/sameness without any shade of distinction. It degrades Reason to a finite and conditioned thing to identify it with a mere stepping beyond the finite and conditioned range of understanding. The real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature. In the same way Kant restored the Idea to its proper dignity: vindicating it for Reason as a thing distinct from abstract analytic determinations or from the merely sensible conceptions which usually appropriate to themselves the name of ideas. But

as respects the Idea also, he never got beyond its negative aspect, as what ought to be but is not.

The view that the objects of immediate consciousness, which constitute the body of experience, are mere appearances (phenomena), was another important result of the Kantian philosophy. Common Sense, that mixture of sense and understanding, believes the objects of which it has knowledge to be severally independent and self/supporting; and when it becomes evident that they tend towards and limit one another, the interdependence of one upon another is reckoned something foreign to them and to their true nature. The very opposite is the truth. The things immediately known are mere appearances in other words, the ground of their being is not in themselves but in something else. But then comes the important step of defining what this something else is. According to Kant, the things that we know about are *to us* appearances only, and we can never know their essential nature, which belongs to another world we cannot approach. Plain minds have not unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, created by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is rather as follows. The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, not for us only but in their own nature; and the true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is to have their existence founded not in themselves but in the universal divine Idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as Kant's; but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical philosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, however, though it is far in advance of vulgar realism, is by no means merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root of all religion; for religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum total of existence, to be created and governed by God. (45, *Zus.*)

Here, however, in the text we are considering, Hegel picks up the then new stress on *polarity* in physical science and applies it fruitfully to his own logical and eventually *theological* investigation, or study rather, of identity and opposition, of **Positive** and **Negative**, within "the doctrine of Essence". A similar departure might today be made, without being merely whimsical, starting from the Big Bang theory. This has been developed from observations, *via* the Doppler Effect and associated phenomena, indicating an expanding universe. No one seems to have fastened upon a Role of the **Observer** here, similar after all to that studied in quantum physics. Thus the idea of a uniform expansion outwards presupposes the viewpoint of the one observing it. He has to stand at the centre, otherwise he just moves with the rest. This remains true, even if cosmologists allow for the movement "outwards" of our own galaxy as well. Everything cannot just be moving away from everything else, since in leaving A you approach B, while if B is leaving you too then it must be coming up

against C leaving D and so on and so on. There is a central point with which the conception identifies, wherever it may be. *Our thinking* identifies, is identified, with it, without that this is said. The advancing of an Anthropic Principle, however, seems to be undertaking to reflect and/or accommodate this. This theory is covertly or unconsciously Idealist, at the very least as generally imagined, with the Big Bang standing, in that case, for the Absoluteness of the Subject, of Subjectivity. We, the scientists or knowers, are thinking ourselves or ourselves thinking (indifferently) under these images. That the Big Bang is not proposable literally is obvious. First, there would be no ears to hear the Bang. Second, as a temporal occurrence it must have a before and a before and a before, at best in circular format. A temporal and spatial occurrence cannot itself bring about space and time. Therefore I suggest we find here a covert or unconscious idealism, functioning at a deep level of the intelligence. Contradictions within evolutionary theory, as I noted above, suggest something similar there, as regards circularity, but that would take us too far from the present commentary. If mind be biologically conditioned we should stop thinking, thought dictates. But the arguments of Axel Randrup of Copenhagen, for the necessity of philosophical idealism for biology to advance further, to be found on the Internet, merit consideration, in my view.

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Meanwhile, we read in this *Zusatz* to 119:

With the positive we return to identity, but in its higher truth as identical self-relation, and at the same time with the note that it is not the negative. The negative *per se* is the same as difference itself. The identical as such is primarily the yet uncharacterised: the positive on the other hand is what is self-identical, but with the mark of antithesis to another. And the negative is difference as such, characterised as not identity. This is the difference of difference within its own self.

Hegel wants to stress self-identity (in anything) as having “the mark of antithesis” to its own other, which is thus only identifiable as being within it in some way, and this is contradiction, contradiction “successfully” realised, that is to say, as logic taken in abstraction merely will not allow. This is the finitude and hence eventual falsity of the Understanding. Thus Hegel takes up but trans-forms the Kantian insights, as he will do those of Hume.

Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference. The two however are at bottom the same: the name of either might be transferred to the other... *the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and to ascertain the necessity of things* (my stress). By that means the other is seen to stand over against *its* other. Thus for example inorganic nature is not to be considered merely something else than organic nature, but the necessary antithesis of it.

This, recalling his earlier dialectic of Being and Nothing, is the insight exemplified also in poetry as and when intellectual, in Shakespeare over and over again, as if directly intuited:

Alas that love, whose view is muffled still
Should without eyes finds pathways to his will: ...
Why then, o hating love, o loving hate
O anything of nothing first create? (*Romeo and Juliet*).

Hegel cites debts and assets, east and west, to show that "positive and negative are intrinsically conditioned by one another" as, ultimately, since he takes up contradiction, the true by the false, the false by the true and, indeed, that which is by that which is not. This might indeed seem a kind of "logical Manicheism" and the imposition of it upon reality, moreover. Where then will be the absolute necessity (in perfect freedom) of the Notion? We shall see. "God is light and in him is no darkness at all", while in the same scriptures a victory of light over darkness is eternally celebrated. So we find Hegel saying, at the end of the Logic, that the Idea is (the true) Being, not that it is Nothing, even if it is in some way Nothing, Non-Being, inasmuch as it is absolute freedom. Yet this Nothing is thereby the true Being, this Being in turn only Nothing inasmuch as Nothing too might be posited as being's own other, *and contrariwise*, however. One might wish to recall the "still small voice" heard by Elijah and only him, as subject, when "the Lord was not in the earthquake" or other mighty natural phenomena, these as it were not there and then signifying.

Similarly, in Hegelian philosophy, the Notion is intrinsically result, necessarily resulting from the finite or, Hegel is explicit, from the false. "Everything finite is false." This indeed is much more than a "victory", which is a mere image taken from contingent representations. "Result" is not thus normally understood, whatever etymologies from one language to another someone might care to dig up. They are dead and forgotten. The Ricoeurian studies of language as metaphor, that is, abstract from our linguistic intentions. Language never constrains us to say what we do not intend to say, the false namely, even though Hegel himself teaches,

referring to the "I" (20), that through it we say more than we "merely mean", as John makes Caiaphas unknowingly prophecy when he says "It is expedient that one man die for the people". This too, along with similar Biblical stories, belongs to the complex ancestry of Hegel's thesis of "the cunning of reason". It rather proves the point made in the long passage cited above (on Kant) than otherwise. "I", that is, never did in itself mean anything other than the universality. In it "we have thought before us in its utter purity" (24, *Zus.*). So language has its own truth, its bewitchment of intelligence consisting in its own misuse. That too is, so to say, a "dogma of philosophy", necessarily, as searching for the true Word. For Hegel, this "I" is not, as with Kant, "the mere act of our personal self-consciousness". Or, rather, it is this, but no longer as "mere" or as using "self" in any kind of restricted way. The absolute unity thus introduced into the variety of sense, thinking still of Kant, "this identity is the absolute", in us as we are in it, but "at the end of the day", as it were (cf. 42, *Zus.* on Kant, further, and subjective idealism). It is intrinsic to the Notion not only to *think exclusively itself*, but also to do it to the point where this act which it is belongs exclusively to itself. Such exclusivity, however, includes all from which it results, which returns us to Contradiction. The result, that is, is as much first as final, means and end coalescing. Proverbially, as the tree leans so shall it fall, but because "in its end is its beginning".

"Everything finite is false"! But only when taken in separation from the absolute, the Notion, "in whom we live and move and have our being". This is an imperfect statement (it's a citation from a Greek poet) of the true Content, according to Hegel (last section of *Philosophy of Mind*, "Absolute Mind"), even though "whom" seems superior to "which", as (the latter) more immediately or merely linguistically appropriate to the expression "the notion". One cannot hang much upon this, however, if one is prepared to speak, with Aristotle, of "thought thinking itself" or, in Christian terms, of a Word that "dwelt among us". Personality itself is only called "whom" so as to distinguish it from "which", so if everything is "who" this "who" is then equivalently covered by "which", linguistically. This is another example of the infinite absorbing the finite and not being, impossibly, contradistinguished against it.

In opposition, then, the different is not confronted by just any other, but by *its* other. Here Hegel sees what we may call the bond of contradiction, "the very moving principle of the world". This is all the more so in that, again, "the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and to ascertain the necessity of things." This programme of course necessitates a "deconstruction" of at least some notions of contingency, as Aristotle carried this out for "chance" in *Physics* IV. We get it later on in this

"Doctrine of Essence". "Indifference" here carries us back to Identity and Difference, to be buried, banished and absorbed in the **Ground** (as succeeding category). What really is a category? It is where we so to say "accuse" (*kategoros*) the irresistible, try to make it stop. We cannot. It is illusion. The river, thought, has flowed on in the very attempt, as music, *qua* music, "is fled". So do we wake or sleep? Philosophical *language* thus conducts itself as between waking and sleeping, in comparison with the attentive mind. So language, this medium, is indeed treated by Hegel as phenomenal in the semiotic section of the *Encyclopaedia* (455-460) and elsewhere. He thus comments upon his own activity while doing it. Nothing, though, forbids us to do this.

We should stop trying to think that "Of course something else is also possible", of a "what would have happened". All "true thinking ... is a thinking of necessity", we find the first part of this *Zusatz* concluding. Counter-examples spring to mind and one needs to expend effort to discover, if it is not already clear, what Hegel means here. He explains it in terms of contradiction as "moving principle", the other always standing over against its other, as in "self and world", we might say, which yet is it. Hegel insists here that we cannot, either, retain "mere variety... as a valid category side by side with opposition", as he thinks the physicists do. He refers in illustration to contemporary dithering, as distinct from the disagreements which also then existed, about colour theory. Could there be black without white? Or grey without either of them?

Part (2) of this *Zusatz* to 119 has its obscurities. "Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself." In itself! This is the truth behind the abstract "either/or" maintained by the understanding. This, as finite, is false and must be "absorbed" in the fuller truth of Reason just cited. There exists no such alternative, no such either/or, not "in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature". "Everything is opposite", rather. The two pairs, heaven and earth, mind and nature, form an interesting equivalence. Mind is already "heaven", as Hegel indeed repeatedly indicates, calling thinking blessedness at the climax of this Doctrine of Essence (159). But "heaven" of course, while capturing the Content, belongs to the imperfect form of Religion. When Hegel, anyhow, goes on to speak of the finitude of "things" he is not referring to "whatever exists" as just mentioned. This is the "concrete". They, things, rather, have a "want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are". Hegel never wavers from this characterisation of the contingent, affirmed in most detail in his posthumous *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*.

This passage, anyhow, refers us to immediacy as characterising Being before Being shall have been discovered, at **Measure** in the text, to be “essentially” or mediate Essence. As we said earlier on, this “Being”, for Hegel, refers simply and exclusively to the Beginning. It is the name for the beginning of the dialectic and is thus immediate. The dialectic, however, shows it to be mediate, and so “Essence”, in turn, is the name for the mediate, for what Being, going into itself, shows itself (no longer part of a complex between thought and thinker) to be. Where we speak of or “thematise” “shine” (seeming), therefore, appearance or even “the given” we are already, in truth, delving beyond that sheer appearance which would be unsayable. We make a contrast with what we pretend not yet to know.

Hegel’s example of the acid base is not easily graspable. The point though is that it “is not something that persists quietly”, as “itself and not another thing”. Its “only being consists in its relation to its other”. “Its” is the point. It is becoming what it is not, in an “effort to realise what it potentially is”. Why effort? Well, the effort is not ours, finally, nor the acid’s. It belongs to the “moving principle”, the saying against, the “not this” which drives the dialectic to its antecedent and originating result, at once cause and effect and so neither of these. Yet it “cancels itself”, not so as to leave “abstract identity”. Rather, the “proximate result of opposition (when realised as contradiction) is the Ground”. This is what we must now look into.

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Paragraph 120 of the *Encyclopaedia* is at first sight as arrestingly bizarre as some South German wood-carving placed over an entrance to some deeper architectural mystery (*sic* Findlay), in this case “the **Ground**”. Probably there is no other way to approach these profound conceptions, to which Hegel is compelled by, simply, logic, reflecting upon the thought-forms as much as any “mystic” meditating upon the forms of faith. Such a one takes these too as thought-forms, inasmuch as he must believe in their compatibility with reason, more, in their rationality, as having identical content with it. It belongs to the concept of God, as indeed to that of the Absolute and Infinite, that we not abstract rationality from it as some second “thing” which it possesses. Hegel himself has anyhow just suggested that we, or physics, “may well be horrified” (119).

Contrariety then has two forms. The Positive is the aforesaid various (different) which is understood to be independent, and yet at the same time not to be unaffected by its relation to its other. The Negative is to be, no less

independently, negative self-relating, self-subsistent, and yet at the same time as Negative must on every point have this its self-relation, i.e. its Positive, only in the other. (120)

Hegel was surely aware of the "Square of Opposition" of the traditional logic teaching. While this opposed contrary propositions (both can be false) to contradictories (one must be true, one false) Hegel would assimilate contraries to contradictories, under "polarity", where each has "its self-relation", i.e. its Positive, only in the other. Yet these two forms, Positive and Negative, are themselves both contraries (Positive, "various") and contradictories (Negative, "different") and so themselves exemplify "contrariety" over again or, rather, are contrariety. As such the Positive is absorbed into the negatively infinite conception of polarity, on the model of the final exemplary Idea outside of which is indeed Nothing as its, and being's, contrary. In general, what we first or immediately see as merely various has to be reduced or "ground down" to the logically necessary polarity. This, incidentally, is the thinking behind Hegel's "astonishing" (Findlay) assertion that an unalienated Nature would require just two species of each genus.

Here at 120 as cited the "not to be unaffected" says everything. The Positive is so to say conditioned by the negative, light by darkness. We may recall Plato's analysis of pleasure as the absence of pain, as, namely, what we wish to continue (Aristotle) and hence, in necessary polarity, of pain as what we wish to stop, i.e. we do not merely wish pain to stop, as it were contingently. Pain, that is to say, is, is equivalent to, that which we wish to stop. *Qua* pain it has no other "quality". Masochism is thus either perfect contradiction or an unusual preference merely. The Positive, he is saying here, is never contingent, as may be the various. Nor then is the Negative, which is, rather, "self-subsistent", but negatively. That is, it has "this its self-relation, i.e. its Positive", what is positive about it insofar as it is negative, "only in the other". So here we seem to have an endless see-saw of contradiction, since the Positive in turn is the negative of the Negative and so on, but only, of course, insofar as we persist in keeping them separate. "I die of not being able to die", said a saint. Negation, Aquinas had already declared, is a "being of reason", an *ens rationis* only. Hegel goes further or is, rather, more explicit, no doubt with the Kantian antinomies in mind, showing how the whole world of Understanding is overthrown or, rather, absorbed into a less finite vista as thought, *nous*, flows back, in a continuum, towards the Absolute that it has never left, since it is itself that. Thought was and is never able to deal with its other, its negative, other than by denying and thus consuming or absorbing it. The Word in becoming "incarnate", it is declared in the liturgy for

Christmas, “came down from the heaven he never left”. “Before Abraham was, I am”, the Idea, namely. The question Hegel’s thought raises is whether we, each one, as followers or “imitators” of Christ, can and should say the same without destroying the shape and form of what we follow and which would, it may be, thus develop, rather, into what would be yet again a polarity, of development versus destruction in stressing the final unity of the End as the absorption, as of the finite in the infinite, in the identity, the indifference even of difference. This is indeed “contradiction in its perfect development” beyond, presumably, even what Hegel found in Leibniz as defining there the Object merely and not yet the Idea (194):

The Object is immediate being, because insensible to difference, which in it has suspended itself. It is further a totality in itself, whilst at the same time ... it is equally indifferent to its immediate unity. It thus breaks up into distinct parts, each of which is itself the totality. Hence the object is the absolute contradiction between a complete independence of the multiplicity and the equally complete non-independence of the different pieces.

What it calls for, therefore, in Hegel’s thought as implied here, is the ultimate “ruin” of individual self/consciousness in truly Socratic “self-relation”, also called “absolute knowledge”, ultimately “the Idea”, the individual, we might say, being elevated to the personal, where God, Hegel does not scruple to say, “is the absolute person”, ignoring the traditional terminology of the orthodoxy he is interpreting throughout this *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

“Both Positive and Negative are therefore explicit contradiction; both are potentially the same.” This, one might say, is the absolutisation of Reconciliation to a point where it is no longer able to be made an object of thought. The adversary is disarmed in his very opposition, as it were laughed at (“The notion is pure play”). Hegel adds, in a curious formulation, “Both are so actually also”, i.e. both are “explicit contradiction” and hence each “self-abrogating” just in being mutually other-abrogating. *Beide sind es auch fuer sich*. That is, I take it, they are both equally (non-)Actuality as they “fall to the Ground”. Either “is the abrogation of the other and of itself”. *The dualist world of affirmation and negation is self-abrogating*. This, again, agrees with the later affirmation (!) that judgment or predication finds no place in the final perspective of the Notion. In the traditional logic, indeed, notion or concept (in *apprehensio simplex*) precisely precedes the making of judgments (second operation of intellect or reason in Aristotle’s *On Interpretation*).

"Thus they fall to the Ground." He adds "•", *oder*, as if explaining (not to say clarifying), "the essential difference, as a difference, is only the difference of it from itself, and thus contains the identical". The "it" refers to difference again. So difference contains the identical, i.e. it is not difference, absolutely speaking. The other is the same. Hegel reaches complete agreement with the judgement, passed from the absolute viewpoint upon any finite "quality", "thing", whatever, that "This also is thou, neither is this thou", where "thou" addresses the Absolute as it were personally. This is but in agreement with his general programme, if we have followed him so far. Difference is only a difference of a thing (and even, we have just seen, of difference) from itself, in which case the other type, variety, cannot arise in the first place but is essentially otiose. The contradiction, the opposition, goes deeper than the everyday can allow. Hegel outdoes Hume at his own game, so to say, except that it is not a game but an ascent away from the finite which, as we said, it kicks away or, simply, annihilates or consumes or absorbs. Simple negation is revealed as abstract merely, even if our everyday language will doubtless continue as it is, if we insist on speaking. "God", said John of the Cross, praising silence (it is not only Hegel who won't "shut up" about this silence, any more than did Wittgenstein, as we must say if we are appreciative of his continued "work" subsequent to *Tractatus*), "has spoken only one Word" (from *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*).

Difference and identity both belong to difference. "As self-relating difference it is likewise virtually enunciated as the self-identical." There is no leap, no gap, in the reasoning here. "And the opposite is in general that which includes the one and its other, itself and its opposite", the various become the different. This "immanence of essence", as Hegel now calls it (and we need to have understood why), "is the Ground".

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To understand this we need to go back again to Leibniz, with whom indeed Hegel shows himself here in explicit continuity (121, *Zus.*). Leibniz did not proffer his Principle of Sufficient Reason as mere stale repetition of the maxim that "everything has a cause", but showed himself conscious of exhibiting an advance upon that. The vulgar or unreflected notion of cause is, rather, referred back to Reason and its all-sufficiency. Nor does he, as often is assumed, preserve unchanged a sheer duality between efficient and final causality. The sufficient reason is rather the last (*dernière*) reason or, for that matter, cause. All "causality" thus becomes final, if we are to speak "sufficiently". There is a reason for everything, we

say. This, however, should be referred to Reason itself as reasoning. This is misunderstood if put as mechanical causality, since even the self-alienation of the Idea in Nature is itself an idea, and an intermediate or "momentary" one at that, i.e. it is a Moment of the Idea. Thinking transcends or rather "puts by" (*aufhebt*) and overthrows nature with its causality. The thinking we ourselves attain to empirically overcomes or "puts by" the empirical consciousness of its (empirical) origins as being a mere seeming, a mis-perception (McTaggart's term), as entailed by the findings of Logic.

Self-relation of finite things, along with both Identity and Being as immediate, is the same basic abstraction and hence false (113). The acid does not remain an acid as it goes up into the compound, though thus realising its native potential. Thus "contradiction is the very moving principle of the world". The world is thus contradiction. It is neither what is nor what it is, but is the Notion finally which Essence is on the way to, so to say, representing. For it, essence, is not it, the notion (rather, it hides this identity from itself), nor does it really "become", since it is still formal. In truth, nothing becomes, there is no Becoming. In eternity, which is the Absolute, which is Idea, we finally, i.e. logically, perceive ourselves, or whatever such selves finally (i.e. by final analysis rather than by becoming) are. We even perceive ourselves misperceiving ourselves in what, like the acid, has gone up, as a moment, into the whole or, rather, into the Notion. Being itself is replaced by Necessity, by, that is to say, full Possibility, of all contraries.

Unintelligence, passing empirically into understanding, the *vis cogitativa* of old, views the finite as self-identical or precisely not as self-contradictory, as passing essentially, or *ipso facto*, i.e. as finite, into its other. Such final identity remains yet one with the immediacy of Being, as if this immediacy were not itself mediated by Essence. Aristotle had insisted there is no essence or nature of the things which are. Essence here, however, does not mean nature. In some respects it is, rather, **Appearance** (131), which again is not "mere" appearance since the latter is essential (to Essence). The unessential (like, if we would compare, the contingent) is essential, since essence has the unessential "as its own proper seeming (reflection) in itself". We might say, it is what we are (ever) *talking* about ("talk" is cognate with Scandinavian *tolk*, meaning precisely an interpreter, one who "represents", in this case the talk, *over again*, ever unessential, of others). Essence is essence, is Being-in-self (not immediate), "only to the extent that it has in itself its own negative, i.e. reference to another" (my stress). Speaking still of another, though, implies retention of the form of identity, "in the mode of Being". "The

sphere of Essence thus turns out to be a still imperfect combination of immediacy and mediation" (114). Every term in it is both self-related and forced beyond itself. He says "term", for it is a sphere of discourse, a shadow-realm still of the momentary, destined to be "ungratefully" kicked away and made as if it never was, in thought's thinking of itself, finally, as Result in its essential nature. In religious terms, in religion rather, this is represented as the glorified wounds of Christ, "slain before the foundations of the world". Here in philosophy this is "put by" and yet retained as (eternally) "accomplished". Thought accomplishes what the thing itself ("thing" too is a momentary category) was said to accomplish. In other words, cataphatics pass into apophatics, not as optional alternative (the error of Charles Williams or even of Berdyaev, it might seem) but as more perfect. What, though, is no longer spoken of is not God, the absolute, but the religious material itself which has brought us to where we now stand, Hegel insists (cf. 163, *Zus.*). We might, more fundamentally, more *poetically*, as attending to the ground-form of Absolute Spirit as it first appears, recall finding still our material or ground, i.e. fundamental, form first in the deliverances of the senses in their confrontation with nature in all her pristine freshness. "Turn but a stone and you touch a wing", not under but *in* or *as* the stone, that is. We "turn" it by mediate apprehension of just it.

● Of Essence Hegel says:

It has Being, - reflected being, a being in which another shows, and which shows in another. And so it is also the sphere in which the contradiction, still implicit in the sphere of Being, is made explicit. (114)

The Becoming of the "doctrine of Being" is here "represented by the Ground of determinate being". This **Ground**, we have seen, is Essence. It is, like all the categories in fact, a kind of formal pre-play of the eventual Notion as entire reality, but more clearly so. We have pursued it through the lenses of Identity and Difference. It is, so to say, the substrate of infinite possibility which is indeed Sufficient Reason for all, is Reason itself, able to endure its own demise while yet thinking this very demise. "Everything has its Sufficient Ground" (121).

As following Leibniz, though, Hegel interprets him, again, by selecting the one word *Grund*, which has, i.e. which *names*, two sides rather than being ambiguous. Leibniz, with his "sufficient reason", seems closer to the idea of *nous* as setting all in order (Anaxagoras). *Grund*, being purely formal, does not yet set anything in order. It is both the reason for things and the actual, or factual, foundation. Hegel points out, somewhat impatiently perhaps, that a reason exists (and can be given) for anything.

● *omnis agens agit propter finem*, be he thief or deserter (121, *Zus.*). More generally, electricity is the “ground” for electrical phenomena. This is to give “the formal difference of mediation”, adding nothing, but yet translating “into the form of inwardness”. What is inwardness here, we might want to ask?

● On one hand any ground suffices: on the other no ground suffices as mere ground; because, as already said, it is yet void of a content objectively and intrinsically determined, and is therefore not self-acting and productive.

● One notes that in English we ask for “grounds” of a statement (“your” grounds, we say) but never for “the ground” (though one might occasionally hear “● on what ground?”). We speak of grounding a proposition.

A content thus objectively and intrinsically determined, and hence self-acting, will hereafter come before us as the notion: and it is the notion which Leibniz had in his eye when he spoke of sufficient ground, and urged the study of things under its point of view. (121, *Zus.*)

He sought a “full and concrete” knowledge, transcending the cleavage between efficient and finite causality, as we remarked above, or rather he insisted “on the place of final causes to which the efficient were to lead up”. This of course is nothing new. Aquinas insists over and over that God is the end of all things and processes, which is as much as to say that the absolute, the Notion, is one. We must not be misled by his habitually religious style of writing, mandatory in a sacral civilisation, which Hegel, we may say, has now put firmly in its place as second in perfection to the philosophical. Thus those who protest at a re-theologising of philosophy here may well be rather holding out for a continued absolute validity “in its own sphere”, as they would say, for such religious language. But it is valid merely finitely, until the philosophical insight into it is reached. It is destined for *Aufhebung*, as the seer saw no temple in the heavenly Jerusalem, where God is the or the inhabitants’ sun. We must not be foolishly scandalised at his using the word “God”. Language anyhow, is irredeemably metaphorical, as noted above, and the Truth actually brooks no linguistic or predicative judgement whatever, Hegel in no way shrinks from saying. Predication, rather, is not suited for truth, he presumes to “say” (pre-dicate). This too is then provisional, momentary, and this naturally makes the parameters of ongoing dialectic very liberal, though even this liberality should be exactly described, which is not to say “demarcated”. The Ground, that is, is Ground without boundaries. It is not *Grundstück*. This term itself, if understood partitively, “piece of ground”, confirms what Hegel is saying. The *Grund*, however, cannot be literally

carved up, even as Possibility, the potential, of the Absolute, is not reducible to a class of possibilities to which it relates as object. It is essentially and entirely self-relating (has its own "difference": there is at least an analogy here with the Scotist *haecceitas*) and only as such can *Grund* be predicated of it as containing all, all "existences", as we will later say, and their opposites, all "things", the Positive as such and its Negative and the Negative of that over again. Yet it is no longer mere Substrate, even if it is only formally Actuality, i.e. it is not Actuality. As Ground, though, it is "sufficient reason" for any and every totality. It is in that sense that Hegel says that each thing has its own Ground, meaning that the boundless Ground becomes in each case just the "defining" Ground of that thing, which is to say that each thing, each element, is endlessly related to everything else distributively and otherwise:

The reflection-on-another of the existent is however inseparable from the reflection-on-self: the ground is their unity, from which existence has issued. The existent therefore includes relativity, and has on its own part its multiple interconnexions with other existents: it is reflected on itself as its ground (124).

This, indeed, is how it becomes dialectically, as next category, a (the) **Thing** (124), though preceded by **Existence** (122). Existence, however, in the *Encyclopaedia* version of the dialectic, is a new departure or step from "(a). - *The pure principles or categories of Reflection*", viz. Identity, Difference and Ground", since "(b) - Existence" constitutes, at 123 and following, after the former threefold division, itself the second, namely, of the three divisions of "A. - ESSENCE AS GROUND OF EXISTENCE", so "(c) - The Thing" is the third, before we pass to "B. - APPEARANCE" and, terminating or accomplishing Essence, and not merely its "doctrine", if that were possible, "C. - ACTUALITY".

Hegel is often blamed for this kind of complexity, for using the same names over again for higher or lower grades of his system of thought. We should rather look for the positive motive in this, which is to show, surely, the insufficiency, as he states frequently enough, of linguistic or predicative representation of things, of, that is, the pure dialectical continuum which is a "flowing into" the final viewpoint as eternal result. Flow, that is, is metaphor for the utter transcendence of that misperception we *first* call flow. The music is indeed "heard all at once", though music is represented to us as the specific *opposite* of this, as the very type of flow, of progression, of unfolding. Finite things and conceptions indeed find their destruction in their opposites at the very moment of their absolutisation, of their self-denial. This is the point, too, about "the absolute religion". The contemporary philosopher of it, the

“theologian”, may therefore recognise himself, as does surely today’s quantum physicist, in Hegel’s journey here.

XI

EXISTENCE

Existence (122), then, appears at just this place in the Logic as a category in the Doctrine of Essence, succeeding upon Ground, as described at the end of Chapter X here, where we cited 122. Essence is “intermediation in itself” and Ground, correspondingly, is the totality of possibility which is, indeed, the very ground of Mind or Thought, *ad opposita* or not *determinatum ad unum* or determined to one thing, as is the case with or in Nature. Nature, thus, is the Idea, this Idea, in an alienated state. There, in nature, this web of inter-relation is, so to say, abstracted from, in that the intermediation, the circle, the opposite including the one and its other and the other of this other and beyond, “is annulled”.

This “going forth as nature”, however, inevitable since it is possible, yet for all that freely chosen, in and as Mind’s self-constitutive process, since *Freedom*, “the truth of necessity” (158), is one with this **Necessity** (147), of the Ground namely, as will be shown, is first conceived and hence posited *within the dialectic itself*, just here at 122. So we will here give it preliminary consideration as part of establishing an awareness of where *we* are going, so to say.

“An Existence only *proceeds from* the ground.” It is *after* this, i.e. logically or conceptually after, that it is *represented* as a kind of journey *out of* the dialectic, the Logic, into a new mode (of what, nonetheless, will remain dialectical). Thus Hegel tells us that the Logic represents the divine or absolute Mind in itself and as such we may say that the *exitus* from Mind is itself thought by Mind itself and that that this is, so to say, its essence, as it is expressed in consciously pictorial analogy: *ipse fecit nos* (Augustine). There is, that is to say, also in the Logic itself, necessarily, a moment of the “Idea freely going forth”, *viz.* the very idea, the category, of this, last moment (of thought) of the Advance as second stage of Speculative or Philosophical Method, the first stage of which is the Beginning simply. There, however, it is not represented absolutely as an Idea going forth, since it remains, along with every other element of

thought, within this logic as simply a stage in the dialectic, not as such (not “yet”) rendering “explicit the *judgment* implicit in the Idea” (239).

In the advance of the idea, the Beginning exhibits itself as what it is implicitly. It is seen to be mediated and derivative, and neither to have proper being nor proper immediacy. It is only for the consciousness that is itself immediate, that Nature forms the commencement or immediacy, and that Spirit appears as what is mediated by Nature. The truth is that Nature is the creation of Spirit, and it is Spirit itself which gives a pre-supposition to Nature. (239, *Zus.*)

At the end of the advance, i.e. absolutely, Being and Essence, their difference having thus received “its due”, fuse in the Idea as each “completes itself to the totality”. Of which was at first “the germ”:

The abstract form of the advance is, in Being, an other and transition into an other; in Essence showing or reflection in the opposite; in Notion, the distinction of individual from universality, which continues itself as such into, and is as an identity with, what is distinguished from it. (240)

As represented “for” thought, that is, this distinction works in both directions. The individual is the universal and *vice versa*. So given that the abstract individual is “ruined” (Hegel), then so is the abstract universal. Meanwhile, this version of the “emanation” we here consider is therefore closer to the absolute conception of it than its later representation, in this *Encyclopaedia*, as a passing out from the logic into a “philosophy of nature” (244). Hegel had thus to offer a philosophy of nature even though having in a sense forestalled it. Within the divine mind, in other words, there is not found this absolute cleavage between what is and what is not. Absolute Mind is *ad opposita* and there also the Negative is. Still less could there be such an absolutisation of this category, in Essence, of Existence, as a development of Being but also as that which Essence finally *is*, or is on the way to becoming in and as the Idea, viz. “true being” (cf. GL, *The Science of Logic*, 1812, final section). In religious terms, “In God we live and move and have our being.” That is to say, apart from this one infinite existence anything else is false, as Hegel baldly and frequently asserts. “In”, however, should rather be expanded to mean Identity and this as a general rule.

For really, Hegel implies, existence (in other philosophies *actus essendi*, being) is not contradistinguished against thought. Nothing is nor can be thus distinguished. In *The Phenomenology of Mind* he relates this to the Gospel saying, “He is not here, he is risen”, coming “after” the “Golgotha” of spirit which is precisely this self-realisation of contradiction as “the

very moving principle of the world" though not, of course, of the dialectic itself as finally surmounting all contradiction in the union of all opposites, the unity of opposition itself, which is the very *understanding* and "reason of being" of contradiction viewed as a judgment by thought upon language. Existence is not contradistinguished against thought since it is conceived and hence realised within it, within Mind as the necessity which is spirit. It is in its immediacy a reflection upon the appearances of consciousness, upon *phenomena*. The later "going forth as nature" should be seen in this light. Quite obviously the Idea never literally went forth but remains ever the same as originating Result which is in no sense "pre-originating", apart, that is, from the *categorical* priority contained in the very notion of Result freed from all considerations of time and change.

*

Immediacy was "intermediated" by annulling the intermediation in, so to say, the flat formality, effecting nothing, of the Ground (122). The Being that this returns us to is Existence. This says Hegel is the explicit putting of Essence's "unity with itself" when (he says "when") "it has completed the circle of intermediation". This "when" refers though and must refer to a purely dialectical advance. Nor should we interpret this as the dialectical or absolute conception of existence as a possibility in distinction from being freely actualised or not in a separable creation. This would be precisely to deny or annihilate the dialectic as Absolute Mind. Mind itself could then never be absolute or, hence, Mind at all, reduced thus to a mere epiphenomenon in our speculation. Rather, the dialectic is itself the overcoming of this opposition between possible and actual. Thus in the very doctrine of the Divine Ideas as earlier developed (Augustine, Aquinas, Bonaventure) we find it stated and fully argued that any and every divine idea is one with the divine essence, or with the most real of all.¹ This is why Existence is a "poor" category to apply exclusively to or as defining Mind, "our true and essential self" (194, *Zus.*). The development is implicit when it is first conceived that a man is God, "not by conversion of the godhead into flesh but by taking of the manhood into God".² Man too, however, the composite, disappears in this process in favour of mind or spirit³, as is confirmed by the *Aufhebung*, in the dialectic, of the category of Life in favour of the Idea. In a later idiom, all

¹ Aquinas: *Summa Theologica*, Ia Q. XV.

² These words occur in the document (8th or 9th century) known as the Creed of Athanasius.

³ Cf. Aristotle: *Metaphysics* VII, on the ultimate and hence specifying difference.

else is a "cultural posit", including culture itself. We posit culture. Who then are, or is, the "we" that posits? The question has been sufficiently answered or, which is the same, "ruled out" in preceding pages here, which asked, rather, but as positing merely, "Who am I", as subject. Thought as thought, namely, does not being from any kind of consciousness but from itself only and purely, in order to *be*, in identity rather than as an *actus essendi*, "for the moment" as we say, thought.

*

The ground "is the unity of identity and difference; and because it unifies them it has at the same time to distinguish itself from itself" (123, *Zus.*). That is, it is the third (after identity and difference) of those "categories of reflection", of "shining or showing in self", which is Essence, or "Being gone into itself". It unites these two categories, identity and difference, as they are themselves found to be identical. So the ground includes absolutely everything, each thing and its other and the other of this other, but formally only. But just in virtue of this power of uniting of opposites it must itself be united with its opposite, must "distinguish itself from itself". Yet this that is distinguished cannot, by the same reasoning, itself be mere difference, or the ground itself mere abstract self-identity. Rather,

The ground works its own suspension: and when suspended, the result of its negation is existence. Having issued from the ground, existence contains the ground in it... the ground does not remain, as it were, behind existence, but by its very nature supersedes itself and translates itself into existence. (123, *Zus.*)

This paragraph sums up all we have been saying so far concerning existence in particular. The conception of ground precedes, conditions and indeed grounds causality, motive and so on. Hegel therefore, taking account of the Humean and Kantian critique of causality, supplies what should take its place as necessary ground-axiom. At the same time he overcomes certain contradictions in the unreflected notion of divine creation of a world, affirmed all the same, we noted, in the addition to 239. To be sure, this forms no part of the dialectic here but is rather, in McTaggart's terminology, a cosmological consequence of it, too striking for us to avoid mentioning it.

The ground is alone proportioned to infinite Essence as infinite Being. It is the sufficient ground for all things, which Leibniz had already made into a logical principle. Those who imagine that he therefore intended merely to say that everything must have its own cause and explanation misread

Leibniz, Hegel argues. "On one hand any ground suffices" or is "sufficient", since otherwise it is no ground at all. On the other, "no ground suffices as mere ground; ... it is yet void of a content, and is therefore not self-acting and productive". (121, *Zus.*)

A content thus objectively and intrinsically determined, and hence self-acting, will hereafter come before us as the notion: and it is the notion which Leibniz had in his eye when he spoke of sufficient ground ... It is unfair to Leibniz to suppose that he was content with anything so poor as this formal law of the ground.

Hegel identifies this formalism with adopting a "mechanical" principle of explanation. He thus sees finite causality as itself a mere matter of moving a problem one step backwards. One claims to sufficiently explain the circulation of the blood by the contractions of the heart, or claims punishment's purpose "to lie in deterring people from crime, in rendering the criminal harmless, or in other extraneous grounds of the same kind." Elsewhere he shows how he conceives getting behind this extraneousness when he explains punishment as what crime itself requires for its conceptual completion. The point here is that he sees mechanical causality as merely a describing of the same phenomenon in other terms which, he elsewhere argues, may as well be represented backwards or reciprocally, cause and effect being one.

Here we should note that ground is represented, as it should be, as a preliminary "stab" at the content, which is indeed the notion. This is the Content that he claims philosophy and religion both set forth, as indeed does art, but imperfectly in the two latter cases. We are on central Hegelian "ground".

The ground "translates itself into existence." This is the next point to make. It cannot "abide alone". The Absolute, as such, cannot have knowledge of or commerce with unrealised possibilities. All possibility, which is ground, is merely **Actuality** (142, looking ahead again) as abstracted from, in abstracted form. Hence existence is just one such actuality. Rather, every non-existence is itself existence too, for thought, is actualised, is itself, though fundamentally and reciprocally related to its other, to its Negative, in this case the negative of its negative, though it applies equally in the opposite direction since also, we have seen, all opposites are one. Reason is *ad opposita* indeed, as was said, but actually so and not merely as a kind of unprejudiced preliminary, as one might have been tempted to take it. Reason does not just stand at the beginning between two opposites as if preparing to exercise its indeed unique but

subsidiary or immediate freedom to choose between alternatives. Reason takes in both opposites, opposites together, the opposition itself, whole.

This position seems at first to go beyond that of Aquinas concerning the necessary divine knowledge of all possibles, realised or not. Yet, as Hegel says, "existence is just one such actuality", which is precisely the ground (!) for Aquinas's affirmation concerning "unrealised" possibilities as known. They are not in fact, just therefore, just as known, unrealised. Both opposites *are*, always and necessarily, on the ground of logic alone. It is in this sense, on this "ground", that nature *has to be* the "best of all possible worlds", this being the acme of divine freedom. People have been too ready to dismiss Leibniz as simple-minded, in comparison with themselves, - with some excuse, however. For it is not in fact merely best of a host of possible worlds, but the one, only and necessary, necessarily. For one thing the modality of necessity depends upon absolute mind's actively thinking it. In no way can necessity hang over as determining the infinite that is its own necessity and all necessity therefore. Necessity too is thus in a sense abrogated, is one-sided in the light of freedom of which necessity, its contemplation, teaches us to understand what it, freedom, as "the truth of necessity" (158), is not, i.e. what it is.

"The ground works its own suspension" into Existence. Even "in our ordinary mode of thinking ... we look upon the ground of a thing ... as itself also an existent" and not "something abstractly inward". This would mean, in context, that even existence is, as it were, formal or "ideal". Or, the one existent is grounded in another. Such indeed is the ordinary aspect in which the existent would originally appear to reflection, as an indefinite crowd of things existent, which being simultaneously reflected on themselves and on one another are related reciprocally as ground and consequence.

Anything then is also ground of itself. But simultaneously

In this motley play of the world ... there is nowhere a firm footing to be found; everything bears an aspect of relativity, conditioned by and conditioning something else ... the question touching an ultimate design is so far left unanswered... (123, *Zus.*)

This is the pure possibility which is the Ground, the absolute potentiality. Indeed the proof of an Absolute is not ultimately "design" but the world itself, any world and, what is more, the Ground is one with such an Absolute as being genuinely if momentarily predicated of it. We will, that is, pass "beyond this position of mere relativity".

With the ground, then, we as it were dismantle finite causality in the very act of "grounding" it. Insofar as the ground "suspends itself" to

existence, to a world, the world remains within the ground and never goes out from it. This is Essence or "Being gone into itself". There is not and cannot be, as a mere matter of logic, any "ontological discontinuity" between the Absolute and something else. Hegel is thus far in agreement with what he elsewhere calls Spinoza's "acosmism".

Hegel's solution to the problems posed by Kantian dualism is thus in certain respects or, which is the same, a qualified return to the monistic position of Spinoza and, above all, Leibniz, again. ●f Spinoza he says that he "defrauds the principle of difference or finitude of its due" (151, *Zus.*). "It is true that God is necessity, or ... he is the absolute Thing." Yet that "he is the absolute Person... is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never reached". This is important as showing that such theistic utterances belong for Hegel in philosophy, whatever may have been his not very well observed reservations about use of the name "God" there. Spinoza has an "●oriental view of the unity of substance" from which Hegel here distances himself, despite his stress on the falsity of "everything finite". ●ne does not immediately see how contradiction is avoided with positions already outlined here, according to which indeed "the nature of the finite world seems frail and transient". The solution, however, lies in Hegel's dialectical *Aufhebung* of the category of **Substance** itself, based as it is upon the "abstract" identity that "each thing is itself and not another thing", his opposition to which has been abundantly demonstrated here. Substance "is not the final idea". It lacks "the principle of individuality, which first appeared under a philosophical shape... in the *Monadology* of Leibniz." (151, *Zus.*)

This is a very striking concession, or rather attribution, on Hegel's part, appearing to compel us to view his philosophy, a logic, as an elaboration and development of such *Monadology*. This, Hegel will go on to say, "represents contradiction in its complete development" (194), contradiction as "the moving principle of the world" and, differently, of dialectic. Leibniz, however, stops at stating "that the Absolute is the ●bject", a position Hegel claims to "put by" or "transcend" in his **Notion** (160) which is "the absolute Idea" and which is also seen as transcending or fulfilling (rescuing?) "rationalist metaphysics" in general. ●f course this will not be merely a matter of overcoming unreflected importation into philosophy of the in turn unreflected name, "God". What's in a name? Essential though to understanding his position regarding Leibniz's and similar systems is especially his view of identity, difference and the ground as set forth just here. His view of Kant and the Kantian Thing-in-itself comes out particularly in the very next section in the *Logic* of the *Encyclopaedia*,

"The **Thing**" (124, 125).⁴ This, after Existence and "The pure... categories of Reflection" (divided into Identity, Difference and Ground), is the third and final section of "Essence as Ground of Existence" (where "Ground" and "Existence" appear at a more basic or higher level of the dialectic). After it we come to **Appearance** and **Actuality** as completing Essence, leading on into the **Notion**.

What is clear now is that the world of existents is not separate from the Ground. In just the same way, in the Augustinian and Platonic doctrine of the Divine Ideas, inseparable from Aquinas's system of thought concerning the Absolute *vis à vis* "the world", each idea, each "ground", is identical with the Essence (of God, although it follows that God is essence as such). Again, God, Aquinas argues, has no knowledge of the individual or of any other finite thing, but only of its idea as found within God as one with him. That is, God has *no relation* with men, who yet are all the same in relation with him. What is this but to say, concurring with Hegel, that "Everything finite is false"? At the same time, though, it is to say that persons *in idea* have a certain infinity, just as known by the Infinite and as one in essence (with it). Further, a question is raised implicitly about the composite "man" which recalls especially Aristotle's *Metaphysics* VII. There it is concluded that it is the ultimate specific difference which stands for and determines the "whole" (which is now, when so viewed, no longer a whole or "composite") as being in no sense a mere part of it (unicity of the "substantial form"; cf. Hegel on form and matter under "The Thing" at *Enc.* 128).⁵ As knowing the Absolute we are or would be each absolute and infinite, since only thought "thinks itself".

⁴ I am of course prescinding, here as in this whole work, from Hegel's introductory chapters on attitudes "of Thought to Objectivity", such as c. IV, II, "The Critical Philosophy".

⁵ Cf. F. Inciarte, "Die Einheit der aristotelischen Metaphysik", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 101 (1994), pp.1-22.

XII

THE THING

The reflection-on-another of the existent is however inseparable from the reflection-on-self: the ground is their unity, from which existence has issued ... The existent is, when so described, a Thing (124).

This Hegel identifies with the "thing-by-itself", the Kantian *Ding-an-sich* shown here "in its genesis". "It is seen to be the abstract reflection-on-self, which is clung to, to the exclusion of reflection-on-other-things and of all predication of difference." The Thing in-itself of Hegel, that is (to which he will come here), is not the abstract Kantian thing-in-itself, which Hegel calls Thing-by-itself. Thus in the "mental" as opposed to the "natural" World the in-itself, by which we are "meant to understand" what objects "strictly and properly are", is not an apprehension of an object "in its truth". It has to become for-itself. As McTaggart saw this, reality consists entirely of persons as the true result of the falsity, in our natural perceptions, of Nature as "alienated from the Idea" so as to appear to consist of specifically finite *things*.

Existence is the immediate unity of reflection- into-self and reflection-into-another. It follows from this that existence is the indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-into-themselves, which at the same time equally throw light upon one another, - which, in short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and of infinite interconnexions between grounds and consequents. The grounds are themselves existences: and the existents in like manner are in many directions grounds as well as consequents, (123)

Thus McTaggart, we may recall, chose to call the final statement of his thought-system, culled from Hegel at every step, *The Nature of Existence*. That nature consisted of persons. So it is this part of the logic that we are now considering that throws light upon this otherwise strange, in some ways Meinongian title of his. Thus we should note that Hegel's wording denies any separation of the idea of existence from that "indefinite

multitude of existents" which is, he argues, this very idea, the idea itself, we recall again from GL, being ultimately "the true Being".

So the existent, which is Existence, seen here as Thing, "includes relativity". Relativity is not attached to it as an afterthought but is a *proprium* rather than an "accidental" property and even more than such. That is, the very conception of a presupposed and therefore distinct substrate, *matter* ultimately, or underlying individual "bearer" must be given up. "The thing-by-itself therefore is the empty *substratum* for these predicates of relation." It is "thing in the abstract", a clinging falsity of the Understanding like predication itself. So, the "thing-by-itself ... must certainly be as unknowable as it is alleged to be", i.e. it has no "concrete character" in which to be comprehended (124, *Zus.*). This judgment refers to what is falsely presumed as implicit to any particular cognition, as "lying behind". It has no concrete character because any such, by the development of thought here outlined, will be relational.

The situation is in fact no different with other categories, such as Quality or Quantity. They are not either finally to be taken in their "abstract immediacy, apart from their development and inward character". So with the Thing as here understood. A reflective judgment upon ordinary discourse is implied. Nothing is "in or by-itself" in this way; this is not its truth, is abstract. Even the child, Hegel now interestingly says in what is not mere illustration, has to "rise out of" this undeveloped and abstract "in itself". The very child as such is abstract, deeply viewed and taking account of the unreality of time and change. For Absolute Mind the child is a Moment in our conceptual process, to be "put away". The child is not a child, is, as it were, set "for the fall and rise of many", but only because he or she is that ideally¹, as subjectively all. Only one, however, would generate the resplendently sin-stained career of an ever triumphant "church", as descriptively governed by Hegel's logic (as applied in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, chapter VII) concerning the necessity of uniquely definite mediation and the difference thereby engendered. The "in itself" (natural being) must become the "for-itself" (personal being), the "free and reasonable" being. On a deeper reading of Hegel, such as McTaggart's, only such are seen to be "beings" at all. Along with the child

¹ I do not here "theologise" but draw rather analogous support from the well-known Gospel text (*Luke*: ch.2) which, for Hegel, belongs to "absolute religion" as possessing, in figurative or "imperfect" mode, the same Content, in its entirety, he would have to say. The contradiction there will lie in the term "absolute religion". But it is a contradiction of the type that "moves" reality and not, therefore, a simple error of Understanding. In this sense Hegel praises, for sure he does, Leibniz's philosophy as "contradiction in its complete development".

as “abstract”, the plants and the animals are finally revealed as the **Outward** that is **Inward**, or part of *our* self-conception in the full unity of the Notion. I anticipate a little, but that is the very method of this text, this thinking, in which each element is a mirror reflecting all the others in self and as self. Indeed, the Notion is the Method, Hegel will say, as God, *nous*, for Aristotle or Aquinas, is “pure Act”. This is the final sense of Augustine’s *non aliquo modo est, sed est, est*, which by some theological yardsticks might well be reckoned as “atheistic”.

So too the state-in-itself, immature, patriarchal, does not yet correspond to its notion, in which alone it is concretely realised, as “the logic of political principles demands”. This applies to all growth from germ-like beginnings or indeed our own process of successive concept-formation. “All things are originally in-themselves, but that is not the end of the matter.” “The thing in general passes beyond” this, “the abstract reflection on self”. As being what it essentially is it manifests itself as a reflection, and that upon “other things” which in turn thus manifest themselves. In this sense “it has properties”, simply because, or in consequence of the fact, that other things are not entirely other. This thing without properties would not be the Kantian *caput mortuum* of total abstraction but the acme of self-consciousness as for-itself alone or absolutely and that to the elimination or absorption of all otherness whatever, infinite, in a word.

The **Thing**, as here spoken of, becomes the “explicit unity” of ground and existence. It is a concrete thing in virtue of its differences from, its reflections on, other such things. These properties are “expressed by the word ‘have’”. This is different though from the having of qualities in “the sphere of being”. The quality there “is directly one with the somewhat” (*Etwas*), which “ceases to be when it loses the quality”. But the Thing “is an identity which is also distinct from the difference”; “also”, i.e. as well as being one with it! These properties or “attributes” share something of the removal from reality, the abstractness, of the Past *qua* Past, which is “absorbed or suspended being”, proper to the mind only as “its reflection-into-self”, since “in the mind only it continues to subsist”. In this sense absolute Mind does not, cannot, re-member. It cannot even forget what is not, though it perfectly perceives and determines us as performing such operations (upon what is not). Hegel does not really take us far afield here. He merely reminds us of the field in its entirety. So, in the Eucharist, he will say, Christ only becomes present when realised *as* present, obviously enough, whether by the faith of the communicant or, in the “objective” Catholic version, by the intention of the priest, this intention in turn being objectified in his having himself been sacramentally ordained, even if at the moment under the sway of contrary influences. In this sense, again,

Mind does not re-member but, so to say, actively members (compare the Platonic *anamnesis*).

Identity is never found without difference. So the properties "are the existent difference in the form of diversity". In "the thing we have a bond which keeps the various properties in union", properties, not qualities. The somewhat, by contrast (*Etwas*), is "directly identical" with its quality, does not merely "have" it, as here:

Somewhat is what it is only by its quality: whereas, though the thing indeed exists only as it has its properties, it is not confined to this or that definite property, and can therefore lose it, without ceasing to be what it is. (125, *Zus.*)

There is no contradiction in saying that. We might wonder if we have returned to, or by a roundabout route arrived at, a sheer Aristotelianism after all. However, as in the Ground still, "the reflection-on-something-else is directly convertible with reflection-on-self" (126). What's yours is mine! The properties, therefore, are "not merely different from each other" but are also self-identical, independent even, not attached to the thing and yet "not themselves things", not "concrete" but "abstract characters" of the thing. They are called **Matters**, Hegel now writes, as distinct from "things". Thus "magnetic and electric matters" are "qualities proper, a reflected being", character as no longer abstract, since they are immediate and existent "entities", these matters, which somehow recall the *Wesen* (essence) which is press, post or revenue as spoken of earlier (112, *Zus.*).

Thus elevating properties to this independent position, of matters "or materials of which it (sc. The Thing) consists", is "based upon the notion of a thing", as in empirical science where we get down to genes and vitamins. But even if colour or smell can be explained as pigments and particles, say, such disintegration of things, of the thing, is not final or permanent. The colour of the chair is not the paint slapped on but belongs to the chair in identity and is not therefore a "part" of it. Things do not have parts. Such thinking belongs properly to inorganic mixtures, not to compounds, organic or such as those including the "acid base" already spoken of, which goes up out of itself into the compound. Electrical or magnetic matters, he now says, "are at the best figments of understanding", apparently contradicting or, better, situating what he said earlier. "Wherever there is organic life" this category, Matters, is obviously inadequate. The way that an animal "consists" of nerves, bones etc. is equivocal with how granite consists of "quartz, feldspar and mica". The elements of granite could subsist without it or them whereas the "members of an organic body... subsist only in their union". A dead hand is not a hand, we recall

from Aristotle. In experience all the same there might be continuous grades of this equivocation, as when failing eyesight starts to turn an eye to a free-standing "vile" or useless "jelly" (*King Lear*). Thus we still honour these dead and equivocal "parts" or relics of the former union where alone they were themselves.

Thus Matter is the mere abstract or indeterminate reflection-into-something-else, or reflection-into-self at the same time as determinate; it is consequently Thinghood which then and there is, - the subsistence of the thing. (127)

Since **Matters**, again, is marked as a category, under which therefore it is finitely possible to think everything, this should not really surprise us. Thus "the thing has on the part of the matters its reflection-into-self (the reverse of §125)". For there the Properties or "characters of the thing", with which Matters are identified (126), "have their reflection-into-self not on their own part, but on the part of the thing." Thus the relation between matters (here properties) and thing is reciprocal and, moreover, essential to each. Neither, that is, is a "thing-in-itself" nor could be. The relativity, "included" in existence, itself includes relation-to-self, reflection-into-self, as superseding abstract thinghood. Matter, in fact, we have just noted, is thinghood, but matter as here relativistically understood. The advance, however, at 127, is that the thing now "subsists not on its own part, but consists of the matters, and is only a superficial association between them" which Hegel here calls "external".

Here we might recall Daniel Kolak's thesis, in his book *I am You*, or McTaggart's, that each person has the unity of all, all "others" and hence all that is, "in" himself. Is it not even, we might ask, on the part of his or her virtues, taken as "characters of the thing", that the thing/person has its reflection-into-self, is itself, though subsisting "not on its own part"? This is a situation well represented in religion ("I live yet not I") but, in all consistency with Hegel's view of absolute spirit and its three forms, to be taken, this too, as capable of elevation into the perfect form of philosophy.

Hegel has turned here, however, somewhat tacitly, to speaking of **Matter** in the singular and hence as a new, distinct category. As "the immediate unity of existence with itself" the Thing, now become Matters or, rather, Matter, "the subsistence of Thinghood", "is also indifferent towards specific character". That is why "the numerous divers matters coalesce into the one Matter or", he adds as equivalent, "into existence under the reflexive characteristic of identity", a kind of characteristic of having no "characters", namely. We might think of those famous bed-socks, remaining the same though repaired or replaced at every part of the

wool, even with cotton perhaps. Examples in philosophy, however, can more distort than they clarify.

These "distinct properties and their external relation which they have to one another in the thing, constitute the **Form**" (new category again). This is "the reflective category of difference, but a difference which exists and is a totality" as, in Aristotle, Form (*morphe*, *forma*) is what makes a thing to be what it is, giving it its entelechy or actuality. *Forma dat esse*. Hegel might seem, again, to be reverting to Aristotle here, but it is an Aristotelianism in line with the most searching interpretations of it in our own day. The form is in a real sense the whole of the thing. Matter, as Aristotle too goes on to analyse, is not some "stuff" with which a composite is thus formed but, rather, possibility itself, the Ground in Hegel, even, taking it more "physically", perishability or mutability, beyond, as the "ground", the particles of physics and their behaviour.

Matter is "featureless", like the original Thing-in-itself but not so much posited as abstract as made into an object for separate consideration merely. For it "implies relation to something else, and in the first place to the Form." We recall that in the "Philosophy of Mind", succeeding upon this "Science of Logic" as Part III of the same work, the *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel speaks of Aristotle's *De anima* ("● on the Soul") as just about the only book still worth reading on the subject. There, incidentally, Aristotle speaks of the soul or mind (which is for him "form" and the final form, become Mind, *nous*, or *psyche*, in what we might see as biology's self-suspension) as "all things", *omnia*. Hence **Form** is here made a category, through which everything can be thought, like **Being** or, finally, as taking up all the other categories from which it results, as does the **Notion**.

...the form does not supervene upon matter from without, but as a totality involves the principle of matter in itself (128, *Zus.*).

This seems to be the verdict of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* VII. It is in any case Hegel's verdict. In Christian theology it corresponds, at least as being implied in it, to the perhaps picturesque doctrine, emerging as termination of a fourteenth century controversy, that the souls of departed saints, even "before" reunion with their bodies at "the last day", enjoy perfect happiness, identified with the *visio beatifica*. The soul is then, one would think, the self, Although Aquinas, even while propounding this thesis concerning the "separated soul" and happiness, insisted that *anima mea non est ego*. What is also implied, though it is the same, in Hegelian mode, is rejection of the Scotistic "bundle" theory of forms in favour of the purer Aristotelian doctrine of the unicity (*unicitas* in Aquinas) of the "substantial" or defining form, subsuming any subjacent *forma corporeitatis*, informing, in

this case, Christ's dead body in the tomb. But these seem more problems of expression than of anything else, as seems also Hegel's view when he finally identifies Matter and Form. "Both are at bottom the same" (129).

Hegel is concerned to dispense with a "mythical... unformed substratum of the existing world", subject to a "world-moulder". According to this we should not think even of evolution as moulding matter, so often the thoughtless assumption of "science". It would rather be formal process as a or the whole, a category for Hegel, however, surely requiring *Aufhebung*. I prescind here, though, for now, from what he says about actual evolutionary hypotheses. "This free and infinite form will hereafter come before us as the notion" (128, *Zus.*).

The various matters of which the thing consists are potentially the same as one another. Thus we get one Matter in general to which the difference is attached externally and as a bare form (128, *Zus.*).

Thus every difference or characterisation of matter is a formal characterisation and this says it all, as we say. Marble, as matter for the form of the statue, has itself form as marble, and not something else, before the sculpture is begun. It "is an abstraction of the understanding which isolates matter into a certain natural formlessness" and certainly today's physicists do not do that. They search rather for the form of matter. But then they do not mean the matter as contrasted with form that is here considered as a category, but some aboriginal stuff merely, pure extension for Descartes, which would return us to Hegelian Quantity. But "no formless matter appears anywhere even in experience as existing".

"Thus the Thing suffers a disruption into Matter and Form. Each of these is the totality of thinghood and subsists for itself." Matter "contains, as an existence, reflection-on-another, every whit as much as it contains self-enclosed being". It is "indeterminate" existence, the Ground, again. This makes it though "the totality of form". Form, however, involves reflection-into-self just as much, thus having "the very function attributed to matter". Hence it was possible for Aquinas, reasoning hylomorphically, to postulate angels, equated with the Aristotelian "separated substances", as existent forms. "Both are at bottom the same", though "no less distinct". The disruption, that is, is dialectical, and so "The Thing, being this totality, is a contradiction."

By this route we will progress from Thing, as category, to **Appearance** (131) or Phenomenon, the second major division of Essence after "Essence as Ground of Existence" and before, finally, "Actuality", leading us into "The Doctrine of the Notion". For the Thing, Hegel concludes, "is an Appearance or Phenomenon" (130) and just, as such, more than the

"mere whim of the Understanding" which the *Ding-an-sich* had represented, though, we might think, less in respect of what it purports to be.

Here Hegel refers us to the then contemporary physical theory of "porosity". By this each of the several "separate" matters or properties (of the Thing) are negated in and by their inter-penetration. This seems to exactly mirror, though not as literally duplicating, his doctrine of a universal relativity of existents. These are in or, indifferently, emerge from the Ground in a universal ideality including even the idea of Existence, needing *qua* category to embrace all, even the non-existent or, in an older terminology, the pure *entia rationis*. The theory falls short of as concealing the final negation of any and every matter in its separateness. The same "imbroglio" occurs, Hegel adds, where we "hypostatise" mental faculties or activities in abstraction from "their living unity". In fact, for him, all is included in this ideal unity. Ultimately, both matter and form as separated from one another are, taken together, "a product of the reflective understanding ... creating a metaphysic, bristling with contradiction of which it is unconscious", while professing merely to record "what is observed". Aristotle, I take it, is here implicitly praised as a conscious metaphysician. Reality, anyhow, is for Hegel always "concrete", as Spirit or Mind, on McTaggart's interpretation supremely, is necessarily differentiated into "persons", subjects. This necessity, though, Hegel will finally stress, is one with the perfect or infinite Freedom of Spirit. This Freedom is the final *non plus ultra*, not properly to be predicated of some other element, even, it would follow, of "Mind" or "Spirit". The defining "thinking itself" therefore goes up beyond any conceivable substantiality or, still less, objecthood into this activity which can therefore no longer be even thus characterised (as "thinking") without being reified or thinged* away from Freedom and thus set within the bounds of this category which we now leave. Conversely, however, there is no final freedom outside of this un-speakable activity.

XIII

APPEARANCE

How do we, and Hegel, get from Matter and Form, as disrupting the Thing, to Appearance? Well, Appearance is the disruption, one as old as it is Aristotelian, where, however, the individual remained as unknown and unknowable as Matter itself. Thus Hegel too says the individual will be "ruined", is rather a ruin, that is to say chimerical. The individual, that is, and this seems to mean he or she, does not belong to the concrete, the non-abstract. I, on the other hand (and not merely the "I"), am not on a par with him or her as individuals. These are, at the level of self-consciousness, of "reflection into self", I as well, not in some fancied "intersubjectivity", a mere regression, but in an identity. Hence, Hegel, in company with Aristotle does not countenance conceptually "the individual mind".

One is able to note, in many respects at least, a coincidence of Hegelianism with the final verdict of Thomistic thought as incarnated in Thomas Aquinas or in an "appearance" of individual mind, this being the meaning of universal mind as "concrete", as the perfect and conceptual (supra-organic) "comm-unity" of all in all as in one and as one as in all, according to "the Doctrine of the Notion" (160f.). Here no component person is in reality delegated to some particular function, there is priesthood, kingship and so on of "all believers" as having become self-conscious in and of such priestly royalty. This is "true humanism" as it is true ecclesiology.

Thus, returning to the immediate topic, when Hegel states that no formless matter appears anywhere as existing this is but to say that matter as such is pure potentiality, even perishability. This is distinguishable, though never separate from, matter as a relativity of superseded to supervening forms. Thus the form of marble as such gives way to, is "absorbed" by the final form of the statue or, equally, the forms of "quartz, feldspar and mica" go up into the form of granite as, in Aristotle, a "secondary" substance (*ousia*). This is the doctrine of the unicity of the substantial form, again. The last form, which will coincide with the specific difference, determines "the thing" to be what it is exclusively, as

in man the intellectual soul determines him to be what he is. It does not, cannot "unite" with some "form of corporeality" to form a genuine composite since it is itself form of the body. Body itself, just therefore, becomes an abstraction, something without independent being or reality. After this first, unique, specifically different form there is just matter, i.e. it informs matter directly without hierarchically intermediate "forms" and this matter is matter understood as pure possibility. That is, to speak with Hegel, it is not matter at all but wholly indeterminate. Rather, matter is just this indeterminacy, i.e. it is not "actually" anything. This, too, founds idealism, which the "vulgar Aristotelianism", assuming the Stagirite to be the opposite of Plato, entirely misses. Aquinas comments that the logician here uses a different language to that of the final categories of the metaphysician.

The unicity also works in the *other* direction, or upwards, however. Thus soul or mind is identified with the Absolute Idea as the Notion is whole in every part (160). It is in consideration of this that form and matter ultimately merge in consequent mutual cancellation. This was effected by consideration of "the Thing", which had suffered or "suffers a disruption into Matter and Form" in the abstractions necessarily made by the Understanding. Each of these, namely, "is the totality of thinghood and subsists for itself", to repeat. Matter "is itself the totality of form". Matter reflects on another just as much as it is self-enclosed. All is one and as such finally, and here the world is denied, absolutely simple. This absoluteness, not being abstract is concretely manifested in and as generative emanation of self from self and back into self as never leaving it. Hegel discerns here a trinal pattern as "the only rational conception" of God, no doubt first suggested to men by and in, he would say, historical Trinitarianism. Combine with Hegel's *other* logical principles, which themselves derive systematically from it, the final doctrine or science can also be seen as sublating popular or immediate conceptions of God, as, however, has ever been recognised, as its own task indeed, by theology.

This principle, though, originally the "unicity of the substantial form" (by which, however, we now see, substance itself is sublating yielding eventually, we see here, the identity of form with matter, of act with potentiality), that the lower is absorbed into the higher rather than the higher being added on, merely, to the lower, no consideration being given to any conceivable factor of before and after as lying "outside the Concept", could elicit suspicion that the metaphysical aspect gets here similarly absorbed into the linguistic. For the problematic appears to be as much a matter of language as it is one of metaphysics, which might suggest that it is not then a problem of metaphysics at all. But of course it

is, since, firstly, this battle “against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” (Wittgenstein, whose identification I here invert without altering it) is *philosophy* and “first philosophy” or metaphysics. Thought requires that we speak in a certain way, and what is correct to say is what does not do violence to thought and does not either fall short of it, or shorter than it has to. The speech of the child may differ from that of the adult, of the poet from that of the philosopher, but the thought may remain the same, in what Hegel calls “the true reason world”, open to everyone as formal philosophy is not. At the same time, and whatever Hegel means here, we must insist that there can be no technical philosophical language, finite and restricted as technical language, just in its concept, is. What philosophy stands by and for is the consistently (or inconsistently) speculative. Yet Hegel insists here too that such language is what we find reflected in ordinary speech exchanges. It is at the level of the first philosophical abstractions that errors and one-sidedness get a foothold, which is why he finds it would be harmful to broadcast philosophical principles too widely or at least hastily, I optimistically qualify, mindful of the promise of being led, surely all eventually, though now confined to parables, “into all truth”. That seems the direction of technological (having as art, *techne*, some kinship with Absolute Spirit) civilisation, of which our finitely false and “vulgar” ideologies, often aspiring to replace spiritual religion, are the (at times deadly) birthpangs.

Meanwhile Hegel concludes that matter as such, as that final conceptual reality not found in experience, “is the mere abstract or indeterminate reflection-into-something-else” (127). So he is clearly not just concerned with language but with ideas, we might want to say, ignoring the fact that this relation is just what is at issue. Anything else, of course, as such or indeed as “thing”, will be determined by form and not itself be matter, be it even the ultimate particles discoverable physically, if there shall ever be any such ultimates. Physics may itself be destined to go up into or be absorbed by meta-physics. Our formalities, after all, are all of them as such finite and therefore, they too, open to disruption. We may say that the correctness of language Hegel elsewhere alludes to as falling short of the truth is none other than the falsity of language itself as necessarily or as such finite, this untruth extending principally, after all, to predication anywhere. There is no true language and so we find Hegel recognising this, of course by language. Language stands in place for truth as cleanliness is next to godliness, they say, but is *not* it, since, again, just conceptually, no other thing communicates in it. So we know most about God when we know we know nothing about him, wrote Thomas Aquinas

in the course of his voluminous writings *de Deo*. Here we can only "try to mean" (analogy) what we say.

Thus matter is reflection-into-self at the same time as determinate; it is consequently thinghood which then and there is, - the subsistence of the thing. (127)

In Scholastic language, it is the principle of individuality, an individuality however, or just therefore, which can neither be thought nor known. This doctrine also is in a way evocative of Kant's *Ding-an-sich*, as open to similar objections, and a real historical continuity might be traced. Hegel brings out how matter thus simultaneously finds things in their individual selfhood, all reality being "concrete", and nonetheless "reduces" them to or reveals them as sheer **Appearance** (131). That is their reality and the reality of the whole creation. It is Appearance or, which is the same thing, temporal. We may recall the Biblical *Letter to the Romans*: "The things which are seen are temporal", that is, changing and perishable. This of course raises a question about Aquinas's angelology where, interpreting Aristotle's "separated" substances, he postulates forms themselves as subsistent, each angel being a subsistent species. Yet this is just what, *mutatis mutandis*, Hegel implies in making matter after all "determinate", i.e. formal. The perishability or mutability of things, their materiality, is itself and has to be a form or property, one of Hegel's **Matters** (126) in fact, and this, the determinative truth about perishability, is imperishable. Conversely, Aquinas enunciates, *immaterialitas est radix cognitionis*, immateriality is the root of cognition. Everything as known, which is just to say everything period, belongs to the realm of ideality inasmuch as negatively free from matter. If any matter were involved in these identities specifying cognition, as when the mind, *nous*, becomes in identity what it knows, then that matter would get in the way as *paremphenomenon*, that which appears beside.¹ It would thus make such an identity impossible as all known things become instead, contradictively, cast to the mould of the then *material* "organ" of knowledge. Yet for Hegel this realm of ideality is the "real" realm, in which existence, like death, is but a provisory moment.

When Hegel says that the thing "subsists not on its own part, but consists of the matters" (127) he refers to this cognitional opacity of an individual "thing" as such. We cannot know it, not because it is final mystery, but because it is as such "disrupted". *Things* are in fact Appearance, singular. Things are "not what they seem". This means in

¹ This is Aristotle's argument in *De anima*.

turn, though, that Appearance (*Erscheinung*) is not mere "Shine" or seeming, but a genuine creation, Hegel declares clearly enough, and the only possible kind of creation. "The Essence must appear" (131), not merely shine but shine forth, in what is manifestation or epiphany. Such is contingency. We have here the philosophical equivalent of Wordsworth's realisation at the Simplon Pass, his sense of "types and shadows". Hegel relates it to "creation out of nothing", consequent upon his deconstruction of matter (128, *Zus.*). Creation is "the World of Appearance". All things cry out *ipse fecit nos*, he made us, i.e. they do this just inasmuch as they are "not in themselves", Augustine had written. Thus far, however, nothing is scientifically predicated as to the nature of this "creative" principle, to be identified by Hegel as Absolute Mind, one with its Idea of itself. Creation itself is here, after all, metaphor taken from human workmanlike activities, reaching up to Art. The act of creation in God, Aquinas will therefore show, involves no change in God. This is but to say that we are not yet seeing it right, are thinking figuratively (i.e. are not thinking) in speaking unreflectedly of a creation. The dogma, however, in its development, like all other dogmas, can take in such reflection. Thus those taking "spiritual things spiritually" (St. Paul) have ever, whether Biblically or in, say, Buddhism or, let's say, Sufism, been distinguished, within religion itself, from those "without" to whom the Content is mediated in parables.

This appearance is genuine enough, however, not deception. The contingent *is*, but precisely as contingent, i.e. as not being what it is. Its shining forth, which is all that it is, is "the suspension and translation of it to immediacy", which is "matter or subsistence", the stone Dr. Johnson kicked. Yet it is also "form, reflection-on-something-else". No such thing is in-itself, or a thing, indeed. Each "sets itself aside". For by this very shining "essence is distinguished from being" and is in fact, along with Appearance itself, a higher category than Being. It is "a very important grade of the logical idea" (131, *Zus.*). We see the "merely phenomenal character" of what "ordinary consciousness... supposes to have a self-subsistent being", as it must, since building upon a supposition of its own real emergence.

"Mere" appearance here, however, may be taken wrongly as implying greater truth in something more immediate. In fact Appearance characterises this very immediate, formerly equated with Being. "Appearance is higher than Being, - a richer category." It "holds in combination the two elements of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another", i.e. of matter and form as analysed above. What we took to be immediate is not immediate. Here too Spirit has taken us to a higher level and thrown the ladder away or,

rather, dissolved it as not having been or, merely, as past where past is thus analysed as not actual. The past as past never was actual. This is the connection of English and Anglo-Saxon "was" with *Wesen*, Essence, *gewesen*, having been, as more complete or perfected than Being itself ("perfect" tense). Here too we might recall Aristotle's characterisation of essence, *essentia*, as, in his Greek, what was to be, *quod erat esse*, *ti een einai*, however we should chance to see it now.

Being, by contrast, "is still mere relationlessness". Here Hegel looks forward to universal correlation (135). Appearance, as definitionally unstable and "divided against itself", will elicit **Actuality** (142), the higher category of Essence. It "is the very nature of the world of immediate objects to be appearance only" (131, *Zus.*). "**Object**" is the new term here and a future category (193), as of something placed in subjectively constituted isolation before the observer, or thrown in front of him. ● Objects, that is to say, resemble obstacles, viewed absolutely.

We have then a world, "The World of Appearance", as Hegel entitles his next section (132). In this "world" the "form embraces ... the matter or subsistence as one of its characteristics." That is, existence too is part of Appearance, the sheen of Being, as we say. This too, is an "idea", is ideal, is, so to say, a possibility, recollecting the Ground as "cancelling" itself to and in all. The Ground, of the phenomenal at least, is thus "no less phenomenal" than the phenomenal itself, is Appearance. Hegel's meaning is difficult to grasp here. There is an endless mediation of subsistence by means of form, whereas we are used to existence, or subsistence, as being just what is immediate. Yet it is subsistence or being that is mediated by form and not existence. *Nihil dat quod non habet* was an old scholastic tag (and maybe still is). So form, which gives being, does not itself have it, has some kind of being, whether subsistent or not. Hegel's thought confirms these classic distinctions by implication at least. A thing can only be by being a certain kind of thing or as determinate. An apparent exception of course is infinite Being, held by some to be therefore impossible. Being, however, may be regarded as itself subsistent; *ipsum esse subsistens* is accordingly equated by Aquinas with the divine nature, which in turn means it is a kind of nature or determination, here self-determination, is not merely or, then, abstractly indeterminate, for as such it would not *be* at all. The essence of the infinite and divine is to be, i.e. its essence is its being. This, that is, is the very *idea* of God. Some would ridicule this (P.T. Geach, "There is a God, that's what God is") by making a sharp distinction between the mere logical copula "is" and the *actus essendi*. A simpler solution, Hegel's, is to see that infinite being cannot be other than an infinite freedom and so, in the immediate sense, not being at

all, it seems. "I will be what I will be", as some Hebraists interpret a famous *Exodus* text. But as long as that purpose holds the infinite is never anything, as if departing from that futuristic will. Hegel, anyhow, will add that this freedom which is not being (as Berdyaev expresses it) is precisely, as the Idea, what Being is, as we read at the penultimate paragraph of the earlier or "greater" *Science of Logic*: "*Die Methode ist der reine Begriff, der sich nur zu sich selbst verhaelt; sie ist daher die einfache Beziehung auf sich, welche Sein ist*" (cf. Suhrkamp Verlag 6, p.572). This is in perfect accord with what he had said at the beginning, equating immediate Being, as the Beginning, and Nothing. In some ways, we see, Hegel stresses the finite character of ex-istence:

The Apparent or Phenomenal exists in such a way that its subsistence is *ipso facto* thrown into abeyance or suspended and is only one stage in the form itself. The form embraces in it the matter or subsistence as one of its characteristics. In this way the phenomenal has its ground in this (form) as its essence, its reflection-into-self in contrast with its immediacy, but, in so doing, has it only in another aspect of the form. This its ground (*Dieser sein Grund*) is no less phenomenal than itself, and the phenomenon accordingly goes on to an endless mediation of subsistence by means of form, and thus equally by non-subsistence. This endless inter-mediation is at the same time a unity of self-relation; and existence is developed into a totality, into a world of phenomena, - of reflected finitude. (132)

"This endless inter-mediation" recalls the Leibnizian monads mirrored forever into one another. Things "both are and are not" (Plato). The forms as it were go up into their relationships. There is an overarching unity "of self-relation" in that, simply, it is a system. Existence is here developed into a world "of reflected finitude". It is, that is, an untrue existence or, rather, existence is itself untrue, is its opposite, where this whole is considered apart from its occurrence as moment in this absolute dialectic, absorbed in the Thought that is a Thinking of self.

*

Appearance, in yielding a world (of phenomena), yields a **Content** which is also its **Form**, is pure or rather entirely Form equally, and that form is "essential subsistence". The ideal here, the touchstone, is the art-work, where form and content are mutually dependent, as we find in Kant. This coincidence is what Hegel calls the **Law of the Phenomenon** (133). Now to say the content is the form is already to be postulating a necessity of the kind to be further and more explicitly developed in the Doctrine of the Notion. The continuity with Leibniz rather than Kant remains paramount.

●r we could say that Hegel's thought synthesises the two in transcending both together.

"●outside one another as the phenomena in this phenomenal world are, they form a totality" (133). This mutual externality has in a way been the target from the ●ne versus the Many and onwards, precisely because these elements "form a totality", are not chaos. Yet "they are wholly contained in their self-relatedness". We can see a double sense here which Hegel might well intend and which we can anyhow think. So, each element is thus wholly contained but, further, the totality and system of them is equally self-contained, self-related wholly, is in fact a whole. It is, in other words, identical with the Absolute as its manifestation, is "in" God, whether some part or the whole itself is viewed. Any part forms a *and the* whole, which means that both these categories are momentary only.. Thus, we noted earlier, each divine idea historically viewed was one with, identical with, the divine essence which, as simple, is never viewed other than as entire. It follows that the whole world indeed is to be seen in "a grain of sand" or what you will, a quantum particle perhaps.

I make no apology for reaching ahead into the Doctrine of the Notion in order to explain what comes earlier, on this or that occasion. What does Hegel now mean when he adds here that "In this way the self-relation of the phenomenon is completely specified, it has the Form in itself"? ●f course, in normal language, the form is what the phenomenon, or anything, essentially is and the form, in Aristotelianism, in fact *gives* being (though as "external" form it does not itself "have" it) or *esse*, since there, or as Aristotle is interpreted in most Scholasticism (apart from Thomism), essence, *essentia*, is simply not distinguished from any "act of being" as such. It is rather, here, that any and every self-related phenomenon has the form of the whole "system" in itself, as we said above. Hence Hegel says "in this way". When he says that it is "in this identity", *sc.* with the whole, the "totality", that it has the Form "as essential subsistence", he means that each part is essential to the whole and, equally, that the whole is constitutive of any and every part, but with necessary existence or, better, "essential subsistence". The conclusion of the "ontological argument" (see especially 5●) as to necessary existence dovetails here with absolute Form as essential subsistence.

So the form is Content as **Law of the Phenomenon** (133). What is this "law" unless indication of a necessity? We shall see more clearly here when we come to deal with **Force** and its **Expression** (*Aeusserung*: 136) in the next section, "Relation or Correlation". Hegel refers here to the "External Form", as when we use the term meaning to abstract from content or, as earlier here, from Matter. It is then "the negative of the

phenomenon" and so also "equivalent to ... the non-independent and changeable", as the *forma totius*, the form as Content (or to which *materia* is presupposed), is not.

Hegel would preserve both "meanings" of Form: "the content is not formless, but has the form in its own self, quite as much as the form is external to it." He takes the "external" as the more usual meaning of form while showing that really it is one with Content as, we saw previously, with Matter (129). Content and matter, however,

are distinguished by this circumstance, that matter, though implicitly not without form, still in its existence manifests a disregard of form, whereas the content, as such, is what it is only because the matured form is included in it.

This is important with respect to the manner in which Religion can have the same content as Philosophy (as he lays down at the end of *Philosophy of Spirit* and elsewhere) while having a different form. It means that "different" should rather be understood as "less perfect" (Hegel's own words in fact), i.e. the same Form manifesting itself (as he says here it does) less perfectly, as also is the case with Art. One moves easily between these three "forms" of Spirit just because they are at bottom one.

As compared though to "the rest of the sciences" it is exclusively in philosophy that the "content is known as moulded from within", form and content thoroughly interpenetrating each other. Hence it is infinite knowledge in truth, whereas the partial sciences are *ipso facto* finite just in that they "derive their content from without". Above all, perhaps, once can see here, or begin to do so, how this standpoint, established by analysis, must bear upon the very concept of revelation as thematising it while freeing it from obscurities and fairy-tale residues. In this way it will emerge all the stronger as what was taken to be most Outside will be found, in accordance with Logic here, deepest Inside (138), where spirit speaks to spirit, in unity of mind, *cor ad cor loquitur*. There can be in fact no other basis for, no other "grammar of assent".

It is thus a mistake to hold that philosophic thought is "a merely formal act", "that logic, which confessedly deals only with thoughts *qua* thoughts, is merely formal". Logic, rather, has content and even *is* it, viz. the whole content. It is within logic, for example, that the contingent finds the truth of its being as one with non-being. For the absolute idealist, as indeed for the contemporary "analytic" philosopher, differently, logic is "ontology" (and not "an" ontology). Finally, "by what is called content an educated mind means nothing but the presence and power of thought", in a book, for example. Thoughts themselves, therefore, are not empty forms but have their own identical content. We can see this in the so-called logical

forms, e.g. of argument. The argument-forms are themselves arguments², if of a more universal sort than those syllogisms etc. brought “under” them. In this way the old *logica docens* or “material logic” kept continual company with *logica utens* as the quasi-mechanical or unthinking application of “logical” truths.

●f Form, then, Hegel says there is a “doubling”:

At one time it is reflected into self; and then it is identical with the content.
At another time it is not reflected into itself, and then is the external existence, which does not at affect the content. (133)

He is not here referring to ambiguity in our language about form merely, but to an ambiguity in our perception of existence itself. It is in habitually abstracting from existence that we make the form external to the content and then think of existence as something separable from things, which we then regard as “contingent”, as if they might or might not have been, indifferently. ●n the other view my Form or “soul” has to be identical, not just with its being as it is, which includes its actuality, but, just as this actuality, identical with Mind or Spirit itself, necessarily thus differentiated, subjectively namely, i.e. according to a subject (“human” or divine indifferently), as not being abstract. “We are here in presence, implicitly, of the absolute correlation of content and form”, understanding the latter as “essential subsistence”. There is a “reciprocal revulsion” here. Indeed, each is nothing but the revulsion of the other into it, as we have seen earlier on how Self and ●ther are necessarily not merely intermingled but identical. More generally, this “mutual revulsion is one of the most important laws of thought.” It applies too, we now see, as “the Law of the Phenomenon”, viz. that “the form is **Content**” (133). This will become yet more explicit when we come to “the Relations of Substance and Causality”.

“But immediate existence”, again (134), “is a character of the subsistence itself as well as of the form” and, he now says, “is consequently external to the character of the content” but in an equal degree “this externality” (and not precisely its *being* external as a kind of extra fact, that it exists), which the content has, intrinsically, “is essential to it”. Thus the phenomenon “is relativity or correlation”. This alternative is retained as title of the next section, B(c). For here, as we have just seen, one and the same thing, content or form, “is seen as the externality and independence of independent existences” and “as their reduction to a relation of identity”

² Cf. Stephen Theron, “Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy”, *Acta Philosophica* (Rome), 1997, pp. 303-311.

and, we might add, of necessity. For in this “identification alone the two things distinguished are what they are”; that is, they are not separate. This is the contradiction constitutive of reality to which Hegel refers throughout. Its proverbial expression, older than Hegel, is simple: “This also is thou; neither is this thou”, said of anything or anyone, or, more strikingly still perhaps, even of some negative entity or absence or, as the hymn has it, “e’en though it be a cross, that raiseth me, Still all my song shall be, Nearer my God to thee...” (stress added). My intention here is to give the essence of Hegel as anticipated in an intermediate form of Absolute Spirit, Art and Religion both.

Does the fish soar to find the ocean,
The eagle plunge to find the air
That we ask of the stars in motion
If they have rumour of thee there?

Not where the wheeling systems darken,
And our benumbed conceiving soars!
The drift of pinions, would we hearken,
Beats at our own clay-shuttered doors.

The angels keep their ancient places; -
Turn but a stone, and start a wing!
‘Tis ye, ‘tis your estranged faces,
That miss the many-splendoured thing.

I quote from Francis Thompson’s *The Kingdom of God*”, again as following Hegelian precedent in terminating chapter (and book) with poetical citation.

XIV

RELATION OR CORRELATION?

We now come to the third and final division of Appearance after "The World of Appearance" and "Content and Form" before passing to "C.-Actuality", which after "A.-Essence as Ground of Existence" and B.-Appearance" is the third and final major division of Essence, itself leading into the Notion as "the truth of Being and Essence". This section, "Relation and Correlation", itself divides into the relations of **Whole** and the **Parts**, of **Force** and its **Expression** (or manifestation) plus, finally, as already mentioned here, that of **Inward** and **Outward**. We begin immediately with **Whole** and the **Parts**, which is itself "the immediate relation" (135 and *Zus.*), Hegel declares. Thus "the question really turns on profounder ties", relevant, therefore, to the study nowadays labelled mereology. For "The content is the whole, and consists of the parts (the form), its counterpart". The fact that the parts, plural, which are the form, singular, can be called the counterpart, singular, of the **Whole**, thus making the **Whole** a part of some other **Whole**, or of the same one over again (?),, cannot be passed over, though one notes that the original has *Entgegengesetztes* rather than, say, *Gegenteil* (lit. "counterpart") at this point. In ordinary life when one person introduces another as his "counterpart" he implies that he himself is not the whole (of the organisation), but we treat here of **Whole** itself, signalling that the final "system" or Notion will not be a composite or whole (but, rather, we shall see, an identity).

That the parts, not mentioned before, are equated here with the form, of the whole (we should not say a given whole or assume that that is what is "really" meant), is but logical, as referred to the *meaning* of "whole", that it consists of parts, namely. Yet the form (*forma dat esse* was the Scholastic formula or "tag") constitutes, makes up, the thing, i.e. actively, although both categories (form or, still more, existence and thing) have now been superseded by the present one. The parts are mutually diverse and possess, *they alone*, "independent being". "It is they that possess independent being." In saying this Hegel appears contradictory of the

Augustinian and Thomist absolute being, although for the moment only, since at the end, of the Greater Logic most explicitly, being is retrieved through “the mediation, namely the sublation of mediation” at the higher level of the Idea as “the true being”, “*erfülltes Sein*”, “the self-comprehending Concept”(GL II, 572: *der sich begreifende Begriff*).

They, the parts, are only parts when “identified by being related to one another”. Again, there is perhaps a play upon the verb “identify”. For according to the traditional theory of predication, to which Hegel in a measure subscribes, a subject is identified, by the copula, with its predicate. Thus here he might be saying that “being related to one another” is what the parts are, what any part is, i.e. that which is related to the others. Yet his meaning might include, or alternate with saying, that in this mutual relation each part becomes the whole composite of parts (by identification) and is thus not a part at all. Part, that is, is conceptually “self-cancelling”. Hegel makes the older but implicit “mystical” identification here logically explicit, as it will anyhow have to be by the very concept of logic operative here, as arrived at, however, by speculative analysis of the same Aristotelian and pre-Fregean formal logic, i.e. by the Concept as not merely first but primal mode of knowing or, rather, “interpretation”, as Aristotle had it and to which Hegel is very much alive, as again the two final paragraphs of the Greater Logic best show.

Meanwhile, the parts are parts “when taken together”, i.e. as a whole, only. So, again, “this ‘Together’ is the counterpart and negation of the part”, singular. It, the part, can never be “taken” on its own. If we take out part of an engine and examine it on its own (and even mere attending to something is a “taking out” or abstracting of it) it becomes, as object, itself a whole or, rather, the whole now being considered. It is precisely as a whole that it was functioning and may again function as a part.

Essential correlation is the specific and completely universal phase in which things appear. Everything that exists stands in correlation, and this correlation is the veritable nature of every existence. The existent thing in this way has no being of its own, but only in something else: in this other, however, it is self-relation; and correlation is the unity of the self-relation and relation-to-others (135, *Zus.*).

We reach here a kind of watershed, of course within the continuity of dialectical principle. It directly parallels, but as underlying, the teaching of love of “neighbour” as *self*, its possibility. This “essential correlation” of all that exists, calling in question even whether there are any single existents as such, should be kept in mind when considering each remaining category in turn of the dialectic. As regards Whole and Part the correlation

is imperfect. That is to say, the relation whole-to-parts and *vice versa* "is untrue to this extent, that the notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony". Why is this? "The notion of the whole is to contain parts", i.e. no whole without parts. But a whole as a whole "at once" ceases to be if it is actually parted from itself or divided. Exemplifications of this relation are just thereby "low and untrue existences", again. Being itself, Parmenides had said, "has no parts". The relation is however immediate, as coming easily to the understanding. The terms are therefore often used loosely or "analogically", as when we speak of parts of the soul. Even parts of the body are only truly parts when the body is dead. In a living organism the whole substance, the form, its very life or subsistence, informs the act of any limb or member. There is a unity of being, life and purpose. If one limb is in pain, the whole organism is in pain. In the mental and spiritual world talk of parts is yet more clumsy or, indeed, untrue, treating the subject "on the analogy of this finite relation". Hegel has argued that "everything finite is false". There are no isolated "powers" of the soul and in thinking the whole being of the person is engaged.

Hegel now prefaces section 136 with an, at first reading, unintelligible paragraph, leading into the next item in the ascending series of correlations, viz. **Force** and its **Expression** ("manifestation" might have been a better term for *Äusserung* here). He at once explains what he means, however. "The relationship of whole and part is the immediate and therefore unintelligent (mechanical) relation." In our machines we have in fact reified it, but it is hardly found in nature, or not until we get down to the apparently discrete particles of physics. However, it may well be that this discreteness is formed upon a subjective mechanical model *of ours*, as we are, with quantum theory, seemingly beginning to be aware. This postulated or "mechanical" relation is "a revulsion of self-identity into mere variety", a "negative self-relation", as he had at first put it, referring to the polarity of positive versus negative as yielding and/or as consequent upon, necessity. We pass from whole to parts, from parts to whole, backwards and forwards. So they are found on further consideration to repel each other, though meanwhile even the excised or abstracted part becomes itself just thereby a whole. One recalls Hume's impressions and ideas. Just by being talked about the impressions become themselves ideas. These are neither parts nor wholes yet the relation, as holding between two conceptually distinct *relatanda*, is similarly untrue.

What is first a part becomes a whole, any part does, when examined *cum praecisione*. There is an alternation, since the whole too is broken down into parts. This he calls "the negative self-relating element in the correlation", i.e. it dissolves or cancels itself *qua* relation. What we have is

a self-identical unity, which is a better name therefore than "whole", as not similarly correlated with parts. What we took, and commonly take, to be a real way of correlating things, a real correlation, is actually a "mediating process" in our thinking, which "supersedes this immanency and gives itself expression" as **Force**. This Force, in turn, is itself the expression of this process, we shall find. The transition, however, is somewhat opaque. We have here expression (*Äusserung*) without some particular act, we have the pure dialectical thinking as suddenly become expression of and in force. ● or what force is being spoken of? Hegel refers to Herder's conceiving of *God* as mainly force and power, which conception he criticises as limited and hence finite, since needing something else either upon which to work or to elicit it, Thus **Force** and its **Expression** go (or come) together, in the first place. Concerning Force, *Kraft*, there are obvious difficulties about translating it as "power", though "force" remains rather odd as denoting concept-formation, for instance. Hegel, though, can accordingly describe the latter as forcing or "pounding" reality (cf. 42 *Zus.* (1)).

Force ... is not yet genuinely identical with the form: not yet is it as a notion and an end; that is to say, it is not intrinsically and actually determinate.
(136)

That is, it is not yet "Design", forcing, rather, what is already designed or "realised". Thus it will itself have to give way, as thinking to knowing, namely, such that in its fulfilment (only) "thinking is letting being be", to borrow an apposite phrase for the occasion from Heidegger. In the Absolute there cannot be a force distinct from thinking and purposing or, rather, willing. There, to will is to effect. So there is no willing as we understand it either, i.e. as some kind of internal correlate merely. Rather, correlation becomes here, absolutely, identity. With force belongs effort, pressing out or ex-pression, a want of harmony. This is its finitude. There is not so much determinateness as determinedness. ● Only in the Absolute, where there is no non-actual or pure possibility, is there absolute determinateness, freedom namely.

If, though, we should compare the relation "between force and its putting forth" with "the immediate relation of whole and parts" we may note an advance in the embodiment of "essential correlation", the "specific and completely universal phase in which things appear". For we are thinking here still within the category of **Appearance**, prior to **Actuality**. The first-mentioned relation, anyhow, that of Force and its Expression, "may be considered infinite" (136(1)). For in it "that identity of the two sides is realised, which in the former relation only existed for the

observer". The whole, that is, "ceases to be a whole when it is divided: whereas force is only shown to be force when it exerts itself, and in its exercise only comes back to itself". Force and its Exertion (a new term), then, is a more perfect correlation than is that of Whole and Parts, since correlation of whole and parts leads to the demise of the non-correlated or independent pseudo-entity within the pair, each in turn. "The exercise is only force once more." Yet "even this relation will appear finite". It cannot be applied immediately to the Absolute, as Herder had done, since there it is absorbed in that Thinking which already has, in its inward or self-thinking, all that ~~Otherness~~, all others, toward which Force strives. As itself Being it "lets being be", again.

Force, then, is finite in virtue of its mediation, that it is only force when it exerts itself, as, by superficial contrast, the relation of whole and parts "is obviously finite in virtue of its immediacy." Thought, by contrast, is itself thinking, "pure act". Running, too, of course is purely act, but is correlated with not-running or walking. Thinking is not thus paired, since it is not conceived in relation to time or occasion. Thinking, Mind, is rather the "place of all forms" (Aquinas) and hence prior to the Being which falls into it (*cadit in mente*). Hence it is its dialectical Result. Thinking, as Hegel puts it at the end of this "Doctrine of Essence", as if winding it up,

means a liberation, which is not the flight of abstraction, but consists in that which is actual having itself not as something else, but as its own being and creation, in the other actuality with which it is bound up by the force of necessity. (159)

Ratio est ad opposita, while Nature is *determinata ad unum*, to cite a Scholastic commonplace. Such a "force" however is nothing other than its own internal, free and properly infinite self-differentiation, necessary to the very Notion as Notion. Thus thinking is called and is I, Spirit, Love, Blessedness, but not **Substance** or Force (cf. 159, end). The thinking here means the "hardness" of "to think necessity" and its "force", which he calls, "as existing in an individual form, this liberation".

*

Mediation and immediacy are themselves, in the end, finite categories (cf. *Enc.* 70). The immediate is, as such, mediated and *vice versa*. This is different from saying that thinking is itself thought, is self-thinking, in infinite reflection. Force, anyhow, is always mediated and elicited by something other than itself, requiring "solicitation" by another exertion of

force. This is a different kind of regress, since each soliciting cannot but be separate or "abstract", the sign of finitude and falsity. It differs from the properly infinite or unbounded depth of all thinking, all consciousness, this having the other in self as other, as such; or, as Hegel puts it, this having of itself *as* the other and conversely. The figurative "in" relation (cp. "I in them and they in me") gives way to identity, of self and not-self. Self itself, like the former opposition of the One and the Many, is effectively superseded and this is the final outcome of self-consciousness, where the particular self has vanished, effectively "the standpoint of science", at its purest, Hegel finds, in speculative thought (*Enc.* 82), of which he finds mysticism to be more an instance than a "branch". Most succinctly, on self-consciousness specifically, we have in the 1817 proto-*Encyclopaedia*, so to call it:

Die Wahrheit des Bewusstseyns ist das Selbstbewusstseyn, und dieses der Grund von jenem, so dass auch alles Bewusstseyn eines andern Gegenstandes zugleich Selbstbewusstseyn ist. Der Ausdruck von diesem ist Ich-Ich. (Encyclopaedia 1817, 344; compare the later, 1830 version at 424 and its continuation to "the passage to universal self-consciousness" at 435)

We have then either infinite repetition of exertion of force or reciprocity of solicitation, here presaging the demise of Cause and Effect. So "we have no absolute beginning of motion", since *motion itself is not absolute, is finite*. It is therefore infinite with respect to a beginning, but this is because Beginning itself is the Infinite as is the End, as we saw when discussing Being.

When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but thought in its merest indeterminateness: for we cannot determine unless there is both one and another; and in the beginning there is yet no other. The indeterminate, as we here have it, is the blank we begin with, not a featurelessness reached by abstraction, not the elimination of all character, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite character and is the very first of all. And this we call Being. ... It is only and merely thought, and as such it forms the beginning. (86, *Zus.*(1))

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Force, of course, belongs to motion as its cause (solicitation). In contrast the Absolute is necessarily changeless, free of the imperfect act which is motion as "the act of something potential (*in potentia*) in so far as it is potential", as Aristotle had put it. Force is not, though, "final cause, inherently self-determining", without extrinsic origin, since this is final

and hence not finite. Force receives its content and is thus itself "blind". "For force is after all a subordinate and finite category". (136, *Zus.*(2))

Such being the case with the nature of force, though we may consent to let the world be called a manifestation of divine forces, we should object to have God Himself viewed as a mere force. For force is after all a subordinate and finite category... The finite forms of understanding certainly fail to fulfil the conditions for a knowledge either of Nature or of the formations in the world of Mind as they truly are. (136, *eodem loco*)

Empirical science has nonetheless the "formal right" to investigate further the various forces which we experience as at work in the world. The question "Why?", however, is common to metaphysics (religion) and science. Why are things as they are, why did God make a world, why does the Absolute thus, as it appears, alienate itself? Or, as Milton has Satan say:

● earth, how like to Heav'n, if not preferred
More justly, seat worthier of gods, as built
With second thoughts, reforming what was old!
For what god after better worse would build?¹

This or these questions are answered here through the supersession of correlations, whole and parts, force and exertion inside and outside, in identity, quite apart from the falsity of placing the finite (too finitely) *after* the infinite. Thus "It is the very essence of force to manifest itself." Again, in the totality of this manifestation, "conceived as a law, we at the same time discover the force itself." This Law, which is the **Law of the Phenomenon** mentioned at 133, is Reason itself, both within, as constituting, and without as intrinsic Ground and Notion. It is also within us as our moral or rational nature and outside of us as ordering phenomena or Appearance as "a whole".

The reason the force in itself is unknowable is that force, again, is finite as a category. It has to be this correlation simply. We "see that the apparently contingent is necessary, by recognising the law that rules it". But then there is something, albeit apparent merely, that is ruled and such a relation to what is outside of a thing or category is essentially finite. The Absolute has no such "real relation" to anything but itself. This law, furthermore, this generalised Force wrongly postulated as divine, splits up into forces and disciplines (laws) without end, "gravity, magnetism,

¹ John Milton: *Paradise Lost*, IX, ll. 108-112. This thought is left hanging in the air, as if a passing reflection of the poet himself.

electricity," etc. So also in empirical psychology we have the forces or "faculties" of "memory, imagination, will," etc. But this multiplicity cannot be traced back to some "common primary" force in the same sense of the term. This would be "empty abstraction", like the "thing-in-itself". Force and manifestation are "reciprocally dependent", i.e. the correlation is "mediated", so a primary force "resting on itself" "contradicts its notion". So God is not force (not *Kraft*). Hegel here brings out implicitly the hidden ambiguities in the idea, the thesis, of the *potentia absoluta Dei*, virtually axiomatic in much fourteenth century theology especially. We should, again, "object to have God himself viewed as a mere force". This is, to repeat, a "subordinate and finite category". But see the later lectures on *The Proofs of the Existence of God* (LPEG) for just how the being, the coming to be, of the contingent is *necessary* to, as suited to rather than compelling, Absolute Being. Contingency has "its due office in the world of objects". (145, *Zus.*)

This means that accounts of empirical reality in terms, as it were absolutely, of forces, productive of Deism or a "god of the gaps", are themselves flawed or finite, not "going to the ground", as is in a sense true of the notion of "empirical reality" itself. Each and all of these forces tend, by the logic of this concept, to "get fixed in their finitude as ultimate". Yet there is no force as such, just as there is no animal as such. These are generic terms, *intrinsically* requiring separate specifications. That is, they are abstractions. Thus the scientists themselves search for a master category, not however to be attained by such finite and less than dialectical methods.

● Of course God will be abstract and "far away" from "this de-infinite world of independent forces and matters". The argument reaches back into all the dualisms considered, matter and form, finite and infinite, here being *first* got to grips with under the banner of correlation, since this latter is intrinsic to each of these categories in a new way. What is essentially correlate *is not* in itself. The presupposed self-and-other is taken away, superseded, *aufgehoben*, put by though remaining (when needed). "The finite forms of understanding fail to fulfil the conditions for a knowledge of Nature or of... Mind as they truly are", even though they have precisely this finite "formal right" to as it were fill out the abstractions. But ultimately they, these finite forms themselves, must coalesce with philosophy, as must, from the other side, religion as taking refuge in "mystery". This would be the gist of Hegel's answer to those reproaching him as not taking evolution, surely a "force" in this eighteenth century sense, as an *absolute* mechanical or bio-chemical explanation. *There can be no such*. Even more foreign to the Infinite, however, would be any idea,

taken literally, of "directing", however "intelligently", outwards. Thus the next correlation of categories to arise is that of **Inward** and **Outward**.

The reflection-into-another of Force, its intrinsic putting forth of itself or pushing itself off from itself, corresponds to the distinction between the **Parts** and the **Whole** (137), considered above. It is "equally a reflection-into self", what it is, since "this out-putting is the way and means by which Force that returns back into itself is as a force".

The very act of out-putting accordingly sets in abeyance the diversity of the two sides which is found in this correlation, and expressly states the identity which virtually constitutes their content.

The truth of Force and utterance therefore is that relation, in which the two sides are distinguished only as **Outward** and **Inward**. (137)

That's it, identity. We should also note the equating, the identification, of exertion or expression of force with "utterance" here, as covering a range from divine manifestation through moral behaviour to (exterior) speech and more, already in the proximately following section.

With Appearance we start again from a putative distinction between essence and manifestation, and overcome it. But unlike in earlier phases, we are now dealing with reality as a totality, and as related totality, and as a totality which is not simply stable coexistence of elements, but undergoes change, development, has inner opposition. So the inner essence is not any longer a thing-like reality, as with the thing in itself. It is rather an inner formula of relatedness. But as inner it is still separated from external reality. It is rather an inner formula of relatedness. But as inner it is still separate from external reality, and hence is an inner formula, not yet the manifestation of essence in the system of reality, which we shall see in *Wirklichkeit* (Actuality, 142f.). We have to overcome this opposition of inner and outer, which will in fact be the last opposition of the section, but everything else builds up to it. (Taylor, op. cit., p. 274, parenthesis added)

Note that the change mentioned is that "logical" or self-negating change of speculation from the false to the true, such as Taylor's paragraph itself indicates, building up to overcoming "the opposition of inner and outer". Actuality is, as **End** (204), realised eternally, as in essence, in *its* essence (which is the same) it "has been" thus realised (212, *Zus.*). It is illusion, one might say, or "of little faith", to see it as "unaccomplished" as, it may be, is our own reading of this book of the Logic. Faith here means sticking to the logic of the argument as against a tenderness for mere appearances. Within this realisation *reading* stops, is absorbed (*aufgehoben*) into Mind as bearing also the meaning of "cancelled". Or, only Thought gives

reading its title. Yet, and as regards mere appearance, Essence as necessity "must come to full manifestation in external reality" (Taylor, p.274) and hence it must be true that "a fool sees not the same tree as a wise man sees", while, as Hegel remarks, Goethe's experience, of appearances, is not that of Tom, Dick or Harry. Implied, that is, that in seeing Nature one will see God, i.e. that the Outside is the Inside and conversely. Meanwhile, however, midway in the dialectic besetting us all, one must choose between the two and here Hegel remarks:

But as things stand the imagination of ordinary men feels a vehement reluctance to surrender its dearest conviction, that this aggregate of finitude, which it calls a world, has actual reality; and to hold that there is no world is a way of thinking they are fain to believe impossible, or at least much less possible than to entertain the idea that there is no God. Human nature, not much to its credit, is more ready to believe that a system denies God, than that it denies the world. A denial of God seems so much more intelligible than a denial of the world. (50)

One seems unmistakeably here to hear the note of a or the "long loneliness", though some, in illustration indeed of what he says here, persist in casting him as a dissembler.

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The Inward (Interior) is the ground, when it stands as the mere form of the one side of the Appearance and the Correlation, - the empty form of reflection-into-self. As a counterpart to it stands the Outward (Exterior), - Existence, also as the form of the other side of the correlation, with the empty characteristic of reflection-into-something-else. (138)

Reflection-into-self, reflection-into-something-else, characterise Inward and Outward less figuratively. In either case the terms name "mere forms" of the sides of the Correlation as Appearance. They succeed to Ground and Existence and find a certain echo in the later discussions of "intensional" and "extensional" language. Yet in Hegel's thinking Inward and Outward are identified simply, as "reciprocally opposed, and that thoroughly" (140). They are, "as stages of the one form, essentially identical" and "their identity is identity brought to fulness in the content". This content is "that unity of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-other which was forced to appear in the movement of force". They are "both the same one totality, and this unity makes them the content". That is, they are "the content", which is, we recall, absolutely correlated with form in "mutual revulsion

"(133). There is no form "imposed" on the content, on that which is or on that which is-finally-thought, the Notion.

What is inwardly is also found outwardly and vice versa. The appearance shows nothing that is not in the essence, and in the essence there is nothing but what is manifested". (139)

Hegel means this literally, as that Essence is Appearance (139). The pair abstractly name the One and the Many, "multiplicity or reality". "Therefore what is only internal is also only external: and what is only external, is so far only at first internal" (140), i.e. both are abstract and self-cancelling into their opposites when taken separately.

"It is the customary mistake of reflection to take the essence to be merely the interior." Hegel wants to emphasise that there is not even a logical priority of the inward. That is why his Logic itself is not an inwardly prior study prefacing his Philosophy of Nature and then of Mind but really *contains* what is later worked out in "alienation". God's creation, we have to say, as a divine idea, is identical with absolute or divine "essence". It is anyhow not outside but we live "in" God as all is at once reflection into self and into other. Self is finally Other and in Otherness or negation and negation over again we have Self. The Notion simply is Absolute Spirit, in all its forms or as Form itself. This is not pantheism since, as we saw above, the world is denied, but is rather a granting of its due to the Absolute Idea as necessarily infinite, in what is a kind of inversion of Anselm. Whereas Anselm in a sense, but only in a sense, cancelled the Absolute Idea towards Existence (the Absolute Idea must exist) Hegel finds Existence, as a finite category (122), to be necessarily absorbed in the Idea as Being Accomplished (*erfülltes Sein*), *das Sein als die konkrete, ebenso schlechthin intensive Totalität*, "Being as the concrete or simply intensive totality" (*Wissenschaft der Logik II*, in *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, vol. 6, Suhrkamp Verlag, p.572) and, it is clear here, the absolutely necessary as being **Necessity** Itself (147f.). Hegel even equates this what he calls the Method (of Logic, his logic), i.e. "the pure Concept, which only relates itself to itself", exactly Aristotle's account of *nous*, Mind, with which he identifies *ho theos* at the end of his argument in the *Metaphysics* from Book IV (establishing the principle of non/contradiction) through Books VII to IX, to Book XII, which Hegel accordingly cites, in the original Greek, as conclusion and climax to his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

Regarding religion there is an illustrative moment in the exegetical controversy concerning the text "The kingdom of Heaven is within you" which some, hoping to avoid the liberty of "mysticism", insist should be

translated "among you". All tend to agree, though, that *both* are somehow involved. This "somehow" gets explained in philosophy. If, indeed, one gives priority to "the interior" (or *a fortiori* to the other), this is in itself a "purely external way" of looking "at it", the essence, in "empty external abstraction". The more spiritual we try to be the less spiritual we become, one might say.

Hegel here (140) transforms some lines of Goethe, actually Haller originally, either through imperfect memory or characteristic punning, I would rather bet. He anyhow agrees with Goethe that it is "philistine" or untrue to view Nature in terms of kernel and rind, since precisely the outward sheen is the inward glory, so to say. Wordsworth's "great Apocalypse" lies there in the very language of the "types and shadows" which are indeed, they themselves, the "thoughts of one mind". Thus a musician strictly contemporary with Wordsworth and Hegel could project what is at one and the same time a passage in music, an inward experience of a storm and an outward theophany, the latter being the most "inward" of all. Our very word "storm" is indeed a metaphor so alive that we call it dead since, as we shall see, the category of Life is itself finite and so finally contradictory. "All thy waves and storms have gone over me." The significance of these well-known things, often passed over without thought, is here systematically worked out.

So, "if the essence of nature is ever described as the inner part, the person who so describes it only knows its outer shell". This is of course Franciscan, where sun, water and death itself (the mark of nature surely) are brother or sister to the consciousness evoking it. True, the notion is "at first" inward, like the reason of a child, a mere "inner possibility", but therefore it is still "something external to Being", itself "a subjective thinking and being, devoid of truth". There is no ground in this "at first" for a giving of priority to this pre-knowledge (by no means proto-) of an alienated Nature, of an awakening but not yet awake Mind.

In Nature, as well as in Mind, so long as the notion, design, or law are at first the inner capacity, mere possibilities, they are first only an external, inorganic nature, the knowledge of a third person, alien force, and the like.
(140)

This "objectified" Nature of our unreflected consciousness is not the truth liberating it in the subject's spiritual perception or knowledge of self in other. Similarly a man's behaviour, his "fruits", give his essence, the essence of the tree, and are not an accidental manifestation of something essentially inward in some restricted sense or other, making the one half of him "as hollow and empty as the other".

This relation "unites" the first two, of whole and parts and of force and expression, ●utward to some extent corresponding to analysis as against synthesis, one might hazard. Not merely so, however, but it "sets in abeyance mere relativity and phenomenality in general" as we pass on to Actuality, the final specification and hence essence of Essence, so to say. Even the differentiation of Nature and Mind as such depends on this abstract and unreflected dichotomy between inner and outer, Hegel says in effect, at least when the difference is "traced back" to that. Certainly nature is "in the gross" external, "even on its own part" and not merely in our conception of it. But this is a misuse of "external", which cannot be thus abstract or absolute, since it is essentially correlated. Rather the Idea, "common content of nature and mind" (as we shall see), "is found in nature as outward only, and for that very reason only inward", i.e. "outward" is as such an inward idea. Nature, that is, as all that is outside is thus inside or, at the least, not outside. ●outside of what, for a start, we might ask.

Hegel points out that nature, for religion, is God's primary revelation, "no less than the spiritual world". Here, uncharacteristically, he speaks of the mind as finite, in order not to suggest priority over nature, as of inward over outward. By the same token, no merely inward essence of nature should be sought behind appearance, making an unnecessary mystery as of an unworthily jealous or envious God, he says. "All that God is, he imparts and reveals" and "at first, in and through nature", i.e. it does not come all at once, all the same. Rather, as he teaches of the dialectic, it is in its fullness final result.

In his identification of Inward and ●utward Hegel goes so far as to say that the penalty meted out to a criminal is "only the manifestation of his own criminal will" (140, *Zus.*). Here we have an indication of his rejection of the classic view that relations between citizens in a State are somehow accidental to man's eternal destiny. The Centre is here too and nothing is accidental. What is rendered to Caesar is *ipso facto* rendered to God, a doctrine by no means excluding a right of rebellion against unjust regimes while more fundamentally, furthermore, it interprets rather than contradicts the evangelical injunction to "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and to God the things which are God's". Everything, namely, is God's as, again, outward is inward and conversely.

The child, again, in becoming adult, in "internalising" the "outward", becomes himself. Here there is a coincidence of Hegelian and "natural law" doctrine in ethics, with its slogan of "Become what you are". Again, even with the adult, "when, in opposition to his true destiny, his intellect and will remain in the bondage of the natural man", the growth process is

not yet complete. One can read elsewhere how Hegel understands this "natural man", viz. as something which "absolute religion", i.e. Christianity, teaches us to deny and transcend. Here he relates this to Inward and Outward, to becoming "spiritual", we might say, as our "true destiny" in "the reason-world" (§2, *Zus.*). There is no side-stepping this side of Hegel's vision. There is a progressive internalisation of the outward which is a realisation of the Outward's Inwardness. This in turn, as total, implies that the Inward is on the (outward) face of things, properly apprehended. There is thus no appeal from the outward to the inward, from lack of fruit to good intention, at least in general. A "man is what he does", what he makes himself and nothing else, he might almost be saying with Sartre, his partial disciple after all. "By their fruits ye shall know them", he quotes. Conversely, it is mere envy to try to play down outward achievements by stress upon motivation, specifically inward dispositions and so on. Here he anticipates what he will say, startlingly, about the wickedness of conscientiousness. Hypocrisy is too often insinuated beyond the bounds of possibility, since men "cannot conceal the whole of their inner self". There is rather, we might wish to say, an unconscious hypocrisy in those who blether on in this style.

This "fallacious separation of the outward from the inward" distorts much historical writing, he thinks, as reflecting a general prejudice against greatness in individual actors on the historical stage. One looks for ever more "secret motives" rather than paying tribute, depressing all "to the level of vulgar mediocrity". Psychology bears much guilt here. So it would be interesting to know how Hegel would react to the findings of Freud. He would surely, first of all, have paid tribute to Freud's own greatness, with whom too he had so much in common. Freud went beyond "the petty knowledge of men". All the same, Hegel wishes to keep apart "substantial" interests "of patriotism, justice, religious truth, and the like" and "subjective" and "formal" interests "of vanity, ambition, avarice, and the like". Without this wish, indeed, we lose not merely in as far as a putative realm of "value" is concerned, we impugn, rather, such appears to be Hegel's mind, the order of reason itself, the "true reason-world", which is to say we lose Being itself, the Good. It is not only the latter or "formal" group of interests that are "really efficient", as built on the contrast between the inward and the outward, again, since These two, again, "have in truth the same content". So much for this "pedantic judiciality", he concludes. Due to this unity, rather, of inward and outward, "great men willed what they did, and did what they willed."

These empty abstractions suspend themselves, he goes on, the one in the other (§141). The content is "nothing but their identity (§138)". So the

inward is not merely mediately “put into existence”. It never left it, since inward and outward are, he intensively winds up, “absolutely identical” Their “difference is distinctly no more than assumed and imposed”. Now “This identity is Actuality”, paragraph 141, and the whole of Section B, “Appearance”, concludes.

XV

ACTUALITY

With the identification of **Inward** and **Outward** a pure or absolute Idealism is reached that is at one and the same time a total Realism with nothing “behind” it. There are no partial views, the Whole is attained and every possibility is as such realised, not in separate “universes” but in one “infinite whole”, though this is actually, it has now emerged, a contradictory expression, or system where, however, composition and hence parts are “put by” (*aufgehoben*) along with the category of the **Whole** and the **Parts** (*Enc.* 135) as being just that, meaning that reality or actuality never was or could be such a composite, any more than was the case with **Being** and **Nothing**, where both, rather, were suspended. This is not as such an endorsement of “simplicity” but rather a positing of multiple identity in infinite differentiation, infinite though inasmuch as *all* the differentiation, however or just because multiplied, is one and perfectly so, “one in us” as the Scripture has it. Again, infinite *potentia* would exclude unrealised or “hidden” potentialities, were not *Kraft*, Force or *power*., an expressly finite category by Hegel’s reasoning, we have seen. The possible, rather, is “sublated”, *aufgehoben*, as irredeemably abstract, not actual. Aquinas came close to this, in what here appears as good illustration or analogy merely, as Aquinas can be shown to have known, though it may be a valid *logical* point all the same, when he declared that in an infinite time whatever can happen does happen. Philosophy, thought, in fact takes place in or as a time-transcendent infinity, there being no other in actuality, in *Wirklichkeit*.

Here, though, we must notice that the Absolute has to be hidden in the sense that we never could so to say catch it unawares. It is fundament and ground of all our being and all our perception or it is chimerical, self-cancelling. It is in this sense that it was affirmed that “no man can see God” or, later, “No one has ever seen God; it is the only Son, who is nearest to the Father’s heart, who has made him known” (*John* 1, 18). This text is exactly equivalent, in religious mode, to Hegel’s philosophy, which in this way of course results from it, as does the **Absolute Idea** from the

dialectic apotheosising method. This multiple identity overcomes also, or in theology as we say, the divorce between the only Son, between the representative exemplar (*ecce homo*, "Behold the man", obviously inserted with this intention, there being no other, by Johannine method) and "the others" as "in" him, the sons by adoption, in Scripture's finite analogy, "in" representing (what else?) identity as "standing for" it. All analogy, hence all verbal communication other than the "one Word", is thus finite, however. It follows that *the word is above its naming*, "above every name", *super omne nomen*, especially its own: i.e. it can't, ultimately, be named as a name, though we, also in Scripture, "try" to do this. This adoption, accordingly, is more than, ultimately other than, an adoption as foreknown from the foundation of the world, as Scripture also makes clear. Nor is this other than the orthodox view of analogy, as is declared at one of the twelfth century ecumenical councils of the Lateran, viz. that analogies, likenesses, of God are more unlike than like him. Meanwhile the trappings of an unreflected realist epistemology incidental to its historic expression can be no essential part of absolute revelation and so we must learn to "understand spiritual things spiritually".

Besides Inward and Outward, however, **Actuality** is primarily the unity of essence with existence, "become immediate". Hegel here says (142). "The utterance", i.e. *Ausserung*, rather, which can be shown to mean the more general "manifestation", rather, of which "utterance", like "word", is a figure, "of the actual is the actual itself". Compare: "In the beginning was the Word... all things were made by him, etc.", i.e. he is and was manifestation, revelation itself. This is what is in depth celebrated by the Feast of the Epiphany or manifestation, viz. "of (his) glory" (*John* 2, 12: Hegel's thoroughgoing if ever discreet fidelity to Scripture, whereby he appears to the unlettered, as unaware of Scripture's method, bearing also upon our understanding of "miracle", to contradict it, is remarkable), or of where he, Word "made flesh", first "let his glory be seen". "In this manifestation (*Ausserung*) it (viz. Actuality) remains just as essential, and only is essential, in so far as it is in immediate external existence." This does not merely parallel but recapitulates Hegel's recent affirmation of the "essence of nature" as not being analogous to some inward part or any part at all but as the manifestation of its own self *mit einem Male*. Actuality here fuses and "puts by" (*aufhebt*) essence and existence as the Notion will fuse and put by **Essence** and **Being**, with their "doctrines". Being and **Existence** are "forms of the immediate". Being is, in general, "unreflected immediacy and transition into another", i.e. transition-into, not identity-with, which succeeds and absorbs transition (111, *Zus.*). "Existence is immediate unity of being and reflection; hence appearance: it comes from

the ground and falls to the ground.” Here we may see the futility of much discussion of “the existence of God”. “In actuality this unity is explicitly put”, becomes immediate (142). “Hence the actual is exempted from transition and its externality”; its externalising, rather, “is its energising”, its token, we might say. It is this manifesting, just in that it manifests nothing other. This is Hegel’s “take” on the unreflectedly presented doctrine of “creation”. Rather, creation itself, the Notion, and not we, imposes itself in just this way. Hence it is from within the Notion, and not within Being or Essence, that the Idea “goes forth as Nature”. So “in that energising it is reflected into itself”, in this act which it, Actuality, is. Its existence is manifestation, as prior in concept, but to and in self, since there is none other. How though, or how then, are we to understand manifestation unless as existence, existence unless as manifestation, “showing off”, “uttering”? This shows, again, the paradox of the “hidden God”, as Being or Essence or in fact the Notion (Idea absolute) rather than or as prior to Existence.. What Moses experienced must in some sense be experienced by all, *qua* centres of consciousness, and the narrative “stands for” or reflects that, if it is to speak to and nourish us. The “burning bush”, a common and lowly plant, as place of epiphany, a place discoverable by everyone, underscores this (thus we might think of a proof, of God, say, as a “burning bush” and contrariwise) while, as Moses manifests himself as leader, so each one, to be at all, must thus lead and manifest himself and, again, not something other or alien. Hegel thus in a sense inverts Anselm: not that infinity must also exist to be itself but that in its infinitude it must sublate also existence, show it to be nothing rather than lack it. The idea of ex-istence, Hegel notes, includes an aspect of derivation. Thought is independent of it, overcomes it. “Whether we live or die we are the Lord’s.”

We must, therefore, renounce as “absurd” the unreflected “hard and fast line of contrast” between Thought and Actuality as “made synonymous with external and sensible existence”, along with such pairs as theory and practice taken absolutely, or truth and “functionality”.

Ideas are not confined to our heads merely, nor is the Idea, upon the whole, so feeble as to leave the question of its actualisation or non-actualisation dependent upon our will. The Idea is rather the absolutely active as well as actual ... So far is actuality, as distinguished from mere appearance, and primarily presenting a unity of inward and outward, from being in contrariety with reason, that it is rather thoroughly reasonable, and everything which is not reasonable must on that very ground cease to be held actual. (142, *Zus.*)

So, Hegel remarks, it is not educated, or it necessarily becomes ironical, to call anyone poet or statesman "who can do nothing really meritorious or reasonable". This remark, including the equation of merit and reason, evokes again the Platonic vision of the superior reality of the forms and so he appends a remark on "the wide-spread prejudice" opposing Aristotle to Plato here, today being called "vulgar Aristotelianism", as popularised by many Catholic apologists, for example, eager to defend their misconceived "ontological discontinuity" of "creation".¹ Aristotle's actuality, he says, "is not the vulgar actuality of what is immediately at hand, but the idea as actuality", precisely the point just made in comparison with Anselm. He goes on to identify his own work, and these sections here in particular, with Aristotle's vision as promoting "the Platonic idea" from "a mere *dynamis*" to "an *energeia*", as he has just remarked, "as the inward which is quite to the fore, or as the unity of inner and outer, or as actuality, in the emphatic sense here given to the word" (*ibid.*, my stress). The opposition he concedes is yet within a larger continuity.

Hegel cannot stress enough the absolute identity of the outward and the inward (141). Actuality "develops" (we would have expected "reduces") "the characteristics aforesaid and their difference", the "correlations", to the point where, "as it (*sc.* the development) has them, they are at the same time plainly understood to be a show" (143, parenthesis added) or seeming, a semblance rather than the Appearance he had been discussing. As such they are "assumed or imposed", by our finitude he surely means. In the *Philosophy of Spirit* (*Enc.* III) he will specify this imposition further, the semiotics of language, the dark pit of memory and so on.

"Viewed as an identity in general, Actuality is first of all **Possibility**", something we have already touched upon. Here, at first, "in contrast with the concrete unity of the actual", actuality, as actual possibility, is "made an abstract and unessential essentiality". "Possibility is what is essential to reality, but in such a way that it is at the same time only a possibility." Note that he does not speak of "possible", of "the possibles" (*possibilia*) still less, but of possibility, an infinite potentiality as, simply as such, "essential to reality" and so actual, the indeed supremely actual *potentia absoluta Dei* which, however, cannot be other than entirely actualised and so actual (and so not merely possible), a power, however, as fully actualised in negation as in affirmation. God, or the Absolute, is not potential in the sense of *in potentia* to what is not freely willed in the first or eternal place. This freedom, too, itself, we shall see, gives the character

¹ Cf. Stephen Theron, "Creation *stricto sensu*", *New Blackfriars*, 2005. See also F. Inciarte: "Wie Aristotelisch ist der Aristotelismus?", in *Theologie und Philosophie* (1979).

of necessity to what is thus “actualised”, so that it can be traced out by Mind or, in principle, by Logic. This is anyhow virtually conceded in probability theory. Thus he gives further body to the dream of Leibniz. Sole possibilities, “only a possibility”, this finite notion is only a moment, in what is “first” thought. He refers back to Kant here, deprecating his treating possibility, necessity and actuality as Modalities, since, says Kant, “these categories do not in the least increase the notion as object, but only express its relation to the faculty of knowledge”. Such a relation is of course not the whole of Modality necessarily, while Hegel thinks rather to abolish all separation of this conception, Modality, from the “matter” of thought in general or, which is the same, to identify thought with it. Possibility is really “the bare abstraction of Reflection-into-self. – what was formerly called the Inward”, i.e. here. But now it is made “the external inward, lifted out of reality and with the being of a mere supposition, and is thus, sure enough, supposed only as a bare modality, an abstraction which ... belongs only to subjective thought.” A certain anger seems to fuel Hegel’s brilliant language of triumphant oxymoron, and not mere wistful paradox, here. He is conscious of saying it as it is.

It is otherwise with Actuality and Necessity. They are anything but a mere sort and mode for something else: in fact the very reverse of that. If they are supposed, it is as the concrete, not merely supposititious, but intrinsically complete. (143)

Even less should Actuality and Necessity be taken as mere modes. “They are anything but a mere sort and mode for something else: in fact the very reverse of that.” It is as if he is frankly disgusted with a certain impiety he finds in Kant, leading to, implicating, stupidity, blindness. These are supposed, yes, but “as the concrete, not merely supposititious, but intrinsically complete”. By “complete” he seems to mean without relation to, say, “subjective thought” in the negative or finite sense.

Since Possibility is properly “the mere form of identity-with-self (as compared with the concrete which is actual) the rule for it is merely that a thing must not be self-contradictory”. “Thus everything is possible” by an “act of abstraction” giving “this form of identity”. For this reason, “Everything ... is as impossible as it is possible” and “Nothing therefore can be more meaningless than to speak of such possibility and impossibility.” For “In every content, - which is and must be concrete, - the speciality of its nature may be viewed as a specialised contrariety and in that way as a contradiction.” So we should not adopt such phraseology as “It is conceivable”, e.g. that a woman give birth to kittens. To every empty or perverse injunction to “Suppose” we should rejoin, “No, we will

not suppose". Distinction is required here, between workmanlike or even imaginative assumptions in the process of demonstration or simply of thinking and the "fantastic ingenuity of suggesting possibilities and lots of possibilities". This is perhaps supremely exemplified in the "what would have happened if", said counterfactually, of what "could have" occurred in other circumstances, spoken of regretfully as of a real loss.

Our picture-thought is at first disposed to see in possibility the richer and more comprehensive, though it is in actuality the poorer and narrower category. Everything, it is said, is possible, but everything which is possible is not on that account actual. In real truth, however, if we deal with them as thoughts, actuality is the more comprehensive, because it is the concrete thought which includes possibility as an abstract element. (143, *Zus.*)

Here we have the ground reason why evolutionary theory, precisely in its opposition of practice, of "survival-value", to theory, to truth, is not on a par with philosophy. Time, the illusion of it, is the reification of abstract possibility (upon which our theory of a finite freedom is constructed) and with evolution this form of time is exposed. Just therefore is it an error to absolutise abstract possibility or evolution as a principle in abstraction from logical method. As form of time it will also be its matter, what is bound to be arrived at within investigation of the phenomenon and hence the final contradiction thereof, knowledge of the impossibility of knowledge (for an ever-evolving brain, so to say), eerily prefigured in Kant's philosophy (of the "eerie"). If we speak of an evolving *consciousness*, however, its perpetual development is less prohibitive, but *such* evolution is no longer biological, since it includes as transcending the category of **Life** (216), this logical category including the biological, after all, as precisely a possibility, which *must*, all the same, be actualised, in what is clearly for Hegel also, as he has explained, "the best of all possible worlds", but as necessary simply, as the category of the contingent is itself necessary. At this point finite science begins to transcend or supersede itself, incidentally exposing the abstractness of the division of men into scientists and philosophers. The recent positing of an "anthropic principle" is a kind of groping towards this, less precise than this expression might suggest, from that side.

The putting by (*Aufhebung*) of the correlation of whole and parts is involved here. No one, no consciousness rather, can be confined to an aspect or part of reality, prescinding absolutely from the rest. The Absolute is rather prescission itself, negating or destroying what it looses itself (*ab-solvere*) from.

That upward spring of the mind signifies, that the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute truth... Unless the being of the world is nullified, the *point d'appui* for the exaltation is lost. In this way the apparent means vanishes, and the process of derivation is cancelled in the very act by which it proceeds. (50)

This observation applies to the dialectic as a whole as characterising its essence. Essential thought “cancels the mediation in the very act of mediating”, cancels mediation, that is to say.

Possibility is often said to consist in a thing's being thinkable. ‘Think’, however, in this use of the word, only means to conceive any content under the form of an abstract identity. Now every content can be brought under this form, since nothing is required except to separate it from the relation in which it stands. Hence any content, however absurd and nonsensical, can be viewed as possible. (143, *Zus.*)

Hence we have the old adage that whatever is actual is also *a fortiori* possible. In fact “there is as good reason for taking everything to be impossible, as to be possible”:

Nothing is so impossible, for instance, as this, that I am: for ‘I’ is at the same time simple self-relation and, as undoubtedly, relation to something else... Whether a thing is possible or impossible, depends altogether on the subject-matter: that is, on the sum total of the elements in actuality, which, as it opens itself out, discloses itself to be necessity. (*Ibid.*)

These, or “everything”, matter, life, law, freedom, God “as the true”, are to be rejected in the same sense as the “abstract ‘Enlightenment’ of Understanding” rejected “the triune God” as “contradictory in thought”. It is to this “empty understanding”, of “these empty forms”, that possibility along with impossibility belongs. Philosophy must show them to be “null and meaningless”. Here we have Hegel's ground for criticising unreflected use of the name “God” in philosophy, as found in the rationalist metaphysicians of early modernity. Only the Absolute, sheer Actuality, escapes these strictures, whereby God himself as it were re-affirms his namelessness, the paradox of the “I am” of *Exodus* made actual and perfect in form in philosophy, and not merely either in “philosophy of religion”. Philosophy is itself the more perfect form of what there receives “worship and service”.

Hegel now says, “But the Actual in its distinction from possibility (which is reflection-into-self) is itself only the outward concrete, the unessential immediate” (144). This is what he had previously said of

Possibility (143). They must, that is, be taken together in the concrete. It is only that the Actual is the outward concrete, taken in this abstract way, abstract since ●outward has been, after all, superseded. As thus distinguished it is not "concrete unity", but understood *cum praecisione*, with something essential to it cut off or abstracted (as when we consider humanity without this flesh, these bones²). It is at once the "merely immediate unity of Inward and ●outward" and an "unessential outward" in the sense that the ●outward is the Inward, i.e. they are identical, as we saw. It is still in some way abstract, as making an abscission from the (merely) possible. Hence, he now adds, "it is itself ... a merely possible". That is, it is necessarily posited as a possibility, even though it happens to be, as contingent. It is "a Contingent or Accidental". Yet, "conversely, possibility is mere Accident itself or **Chance**".

In further explanation of this extremely difficult, densely thought-out *passus*, he says that "Possibility and Contingency are the two factors of Actuality", not as such but when considered through the Inward/●outward polarity, where, always, they are "put as mere forms which constitute the externality of the actual". Really nothing is outward, nothing inward. Yet these forms "have their reflection-into-self on the body of actual fact." They are, that is, the more abstract when consciously posited as immediate and "external". This "content" of "actual fact" is not the true or ultimate content. It has an "intrinsic definiteness", a finiteness indeed, which gives ground for such characterisations. This finitude, of the contingent and the possible, "lies in the distinction of the form-determination from the content". Hegel says we now see this. The content, reality, has no essential relation to spatial ideas, to ideas of space, e.g. of inward and outward. No more does Being. Conversely though, it must depend "on the content" alone whether anything, anything at all, "is contingent and possible".

As possibility is the mere inside of actuality, it is for that reason a mere outside actuality, in other words, contingency. The "**Contingent** or Accidental", roughly speaking, is what has the ground of its being not in itself but in somewhat else. Such is the aspect under which actuality first comes before consciousness, and which is often mistaken for actuality itself, under the rubric of **Chance**.

Hegel here (145, *Zus.*) considers conventional theological and empiricist language under one hat. "Everything has a cause." This means, though, that this "everything" is not entirely the Actual, but only "one side" of it, viz. that of "reflection on somewhat else". "It is the actual, in the signification of something merely possible." This is the *ipse fecit nos* of Augustine, where or in whom, however, unlike eighteenth century deism,

² Cf. Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, comparing *humanitas* and *homo*.

Hegel's real target, these Hegelian resonances, these "mystical" re-statements of reality, are to a great extent pre-empted. "There is one closer to me than I am to myself." *Non aliquo modo est, sed est, est*. Hegel, however, sets out to disentangle the philosophical from the religious form, too close to the pictorial language of everyday, of the **Content** common to him and his predecessors. This, he considers, is by and large only half-heartedly done by Theology:

until Theology is something more than a bare enumeration and compilation of these doctrines *ab extra*, it has no right to the title of science... Genuine theology is thus at the same time a real philosophy of religion, as it was, we may add, in the Middle Ages (36, *Zus.*).

Later theologians have by and large absorbed this lesson; their philosophy of religion, all the same, is not as impressive as Hegel's for the most part, being often journalistic, compromising, needlessly mystifying (as distinct from difficult) or frankly paradoxical positions. Hegelian oxymoron is superior to this, both here and in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, at VIIc and throughout. It is rationality taken to its last consequence, whereas the paradoxical is a *giving up* on just this. Where the theologian will show that there is no contradiction in God becoming man Hegel shows that man is God or, which is the same, that man "is not", but only God, in continuity therefore with St. Catherine's "I am he who is; you are she who is not" or Eckhart's "The eye with which God sees me is the eye with which I see God" and conversely, open though this may seem to Feuerbachian deconstruction. Feuerbach simply applies the "empty forms" of the Understanding, which is why his followers have little claim to be reckoned Hegelians. "This also is thou; neither is this thou." *Such* is Hegel's philosophy of "identity in difference", in deepest continuity with mystical or ascetical theology, as indeed, as I add to avoid misunderstanding, was Aristotle's *Metaphysics* or First Philosophy, called by him, in the Greek, *theologia*.³ In a sense it goes also beyond Anselm as removing the "and" there, sublating rather existence in the Idea as a finite category, thereby showing, as Anselm too wished to show, that God is as nothing else is, the "true" being as he says at the end of the Greater Logic.

Certain aspects of recent "possible worlds" doctrines seem to reflect Hegel's exposure of the complex relations between actual and possible, thereby coming closer to Absolute Idealism or, in short, to Philosophy or

³ The frequently encountered suggestion that Hegel's references to God are a sop to the authorities guaranteeing his professorial chair seems speciously blind to the profundity or, which is the same, profound honesty of his thought.

“the absolute (absolutist, rather) point of view”. Both actual and possible are abstract formalities when not taken and understood together, with the actual as paramount. Sheer possibility is finally relegated to abstraction. God, we might say, never merely supposes. Similarly, in Jungian thought, each (finite) person has his “shadow” contradicting him. He really has it and, Hegel might add, the shadow has him! Hegel returns to these principles, primarily that of the actuality of the contingent, in his posthumous *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, especially the later lectures and the relevant *Appendix*. But there too he refers the reader to the Logic we are here considering for fuller exposition.

We “consider the contingent to be what may or not be” (145, *Zus.*) and it is the problem of science to *overcome* this, showing things as necessarily in their causes. This is the ancient and medieval description of “science”, *scientia*, knowledge or “understanding”, not yet *sapientia*, a distinct “intellectual virtue” (although by Aquinas’s doctrine of these, by analogy at least with the “moral” virtues, you can’t have any virtue truly without having *all* the others), having its root in words signifying both knowing and tasting, *sapor*, compare French *savoir*, savour. This, in fact, is the note of mysticism, that to know is to taste, to touch (in identification) or experience. It has nothing to do with mystification (82, *Zus.*). If thinking is to be called a will to power then this kind of power, knowing as union, is the highest incentive to that will and, as Plato or Boethius showed, profoundly and nobly erotic (159).⁴ “What the spiritual man desires is contact” (from an address by an anonymous Carthusian abbot as found in *They Speak by Silences*: Darton, Longman and Todd, London), to “know even as I am known”. This Pauline formula, it is easily overlooked, is itself Trinitarian, Spirit being what proceeds from both in their entirely mutual knowing, neither being at all without this their constitutive relation (the essence of Essence as it has developed up to this point, as Taylor well points out). Philosophy here demonstrates that what we call, in foolish self-deceit, the Middle Ages, as if we were not continuing them, are right, in that here, namely, philosophy has indeed gone up and been consumed, as Hegel says all present actuality must endure, in Trinitarian theology, which he accordingly demonstrates, in fulfilment of these Middle Ages, is true philosophy as absolute and as it was, in rightful anticipation, all along. He has, so to say, uncovered the new and truer face of Inquisition, namely Freedom. Thus in him “modernity” is consumed and hence fulfilled. The

⁴ *Nobilis*, as used frequently by Aquinas, is transparently linked to *gnobilis*, knowable. On intellectual *vis a vis* moral virtues and their unity see our *Thomas Aquinas on Virtue and Human Flourishing*, Cambridge Scholars Publications, Newcastle-on-Tyne, 2018, chapters 13, 14 and 18 especially,

same will happen, is happening, to the post-modern, to humour these labels, in this perpetual consuming which is the final actuality as Idea. Anyone who thus sees, understands his present actuality, must thus say, with Anton Bruckner, also in the field of Absolute Spirit, "My time will come", as in his case it clearly has and is now already perhaps passing, in that all-consuming fire which as Absolute is eternally self-consuming in active "Trinitarian" relation, it being precisely this esoteric mystery which the Hegelian philosophical moment opens to all who, understanding, believe, it being the consequent faith and nothing else that overcomes, that annihilates, "the world", there being, as he says, no world, though men hold back from believing it as "their dearest conviction". Thus, in its commentators, "the Bible" continues writing itself in circular yet upward spiralling motion.

Similarly, in action, we strive, in our finite measure, to rise above contingency and caprice, as when we might make a principle or necessity of caprice itself. This, though, might be the option of which Hegel complains, that "contingency has been unwarrantably elevated" in his time, in both Nature and Mind. Thus Nature is admired for its "richness and variety", really "the spectacle of a contingency losing itself in vagueness". He couples "the chequered scene presented by the several varieties of animals and plants, conditioned as it is by outward circumstances", with "the complex changes in the figuration and grouping of clouds" as "not to be ranked higher than the equally casual fancies of the mind which surrenders itself to its own caprices". One might wish to remind this comically stem philosopher of his later statement, in harmony with the *Book of Proverbs*, that "the Notion is pure play". These caprices have been, since his time, exhaustively documented and studied. Yet it is in mere agreement with this development that he adds, again comically, that this "most abstract frame of mind", the "wonderment with which such phenomena are welcomed", should motivate "advance to a closer insight into the inner harmony and uniformity of nature". Darwinism, for example, offers us a synthesis between this very capriciousness and the inner harmony and uniformity. To say which, however, is, by Hegelian criteria, not to afford to this synthesis as such, dependent as it is upon Perception, the status of a philosophy (cp. *The Phenomenology of Mind*: Ch. II, 2, also *Enc.* 249). McTaggart might classify it as "cosmology" (see note 6 below). To Charles Taylor, however, Hegel's relegation of evolution and the theory thereof indifferently (as follows from his critique of "explanation") to the merely immediate is "disastrous". Such a judgment, however, can well seem a "giving up" on Taylor's part comparable to that of the theologians mentioned above, recalling indeed

the pronouncements of Wilde's "Lady Bracknell" upon those contemning "society", i.e. only those who "can't get into it". It is what Hegel condemns or at least chides as "worldliness", granted though that he is yet more severe or bad/tempered towards "otherworldliness". Each must choose his ground here, after considering the *pros* and *cons*, as Hegel has done, in fact,

Regarding Mind, Hegel sees this unwarranted elevation of contingency (in regard to Nature) in a certain theory of the Freedom of the Will. Here again he echoes Augustine and Aquinas in locating freedom in rationality, and not in the late medieval *libertas indifferentiae*. Reason itself is *ad opposita* and thus free (of prejudice, as we say). Hegel is thus in line with the Dominican and Franciscan tradition, rejecting the late-medieval nominalist and, in great part, Jesuit tradition culminating in Kantian formalist ethics as a self-dissolving and interested ideology, from whatever side, not philosophical at all. Here freedom is reduced to an inexplicable free *choice*, lacking motive or cause, "standing on the grade of option". This is a contradiction, arising out of this misplaced admiration of contingency. The "matter of choice" is given from outside as a content contradicting this mere "form" of freedom, since the choice is then anyhow determined or cancelled in its freedom by this content as apprehended. This account of freedom is incoherent and freedom becomes effectively denied in shallow doctrines of determinism or, at best, "compatibilism". Freedom then "lies only in the form of choosing", freedom, that is, "only in supposition" or, as they say, as epiphenomenon.

Yet **Contingency**, again, is a genuine category, at this moment of the dialectic. It is "not to be mistaken for actuality itself", yet "it has no less than the rest of the forms of the idea its due office in the world of objects". It is a "form of the Idea", as such coming after or within Actuality as first introduced as Possibility. It is seen first "in Nature", where "Chance ranges unchecked", on the surface at least, though the surface is the whole and the inward, we saw. So it must be recognised, as also "in the world of Mind". Contingent phenomena cannot be *a priori* construed in their contingency. This would be to render the Hegelian project as itself abstract⁵, as not able to recognise its own opposite. One must rather elicit "the necessity concealed under the semblance of contingency". This does not mean that contingency must be "simply set aside" though it will certainly be "put by" in the inclusive sense of being absorbed (*aufgehoben*).

Contingency "is the self-identical", as opposed to the self-in-other pattern of the true, infinite and necessary. It "is actuality in its immediacy ... essentially only as a supposition which is no sooner made than it is

⁵ This is the danger into which Existentialism falls.

revoked" (146). This is the pattern of the inauthentic understanding of free will just described. Contingency is "something pre-supposed, the immediate existence of which is at the same time a possibility". It "has the vocation to be suspended, to be the possibility of something else". This possibility, says Hegel, "is the **Condition**".

What is now added here (146, *Zus.*) can well be read as Hegel's account of the elements of this necessary dialectical category which in Nature, to which the dialectic infallibly leads, appears as Time. Nonetheless Time is not a "logical" but rather a "cosmological" category (in a Hegelian sense⁶) and so he sedulously avoids here all mention of it except as implied in the normal use of tensed verbs. The Contingent, he says, "is at the same time the possibility of somewhat else". This is "no longer... that abstract possibility which we had at first, but the possibility which is". Where is Hegel going? Such a "possible existent is a Condition", surely for something else, as just said. Yet he adds that by it "we mean first, an existent, in short, an immediate", as when perhaps we speak of the condition of an animal or country. Yet the conditionality, for something else, he seems to mean, is here built in, whether we think of it or not. So, secondly, we mean, i.e. is meant, "the vocation of this immediate to be suspended and subserve the actualising of something else". There he catches exactly the nature of Time as the controlling dimension of experience. It is not likely to be a coincidence, but this should be viewed as fitting in as confirming the rightness of the dialectic rather than as suggesting some invalidating "hidden agenda".

"Immediate actuality is in general as such never what it ought to be." As such! This is a profound if daunting statement. The reason though is merely Hegel's ground-insight, or, rather, conclusion, that "everything finite is false". Immediate actuality "is a finite actuality with an inherent

⁶ Cf. J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge University Press, 1901, explains Hegelian cosmology as "the application, to subject-matter empirically known, of *a priori* conclusions derived from the investigation of the nature of pure thought. On the other hand, it is clearly to be distinguished from the empirical conclusions of science and everyday life. These also, it is true, involve an *a priori* element, since no knowledge is possible without the categories, but they do not depend on an explicit affirmation of *a priori* truths" (Preface, first paragraph). One might want to say that "pure thought" actualizes itself in and with "experience", along the lines of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* II 16. The senses deliver to thought what they do not themselves understand and it is in that delivering that consciousness subsists. In that case all that Hegel has to say about the ingratitude of spirit, nullifying "the being of the world" (50), remains doubly relevant. It implies in the end that even that deliverance, taken immediately, is misconceived.

flaw, and its vocation is to be consumed". To be "suspended", he had said in 146. Time indeed both consumes and yet, on account of memory, suspends.

The other aspect of actuality, he now goes on, is its essentiality. That is the inward as opposed to the "outward" aspect, not forgetting that actuality is primarily the "immediate unity" of inward and outward. Thus the inside too, "as a mere possibility is no less destined to be suspended". Why is it a mere possibility? Certainly, as actual, "it is first of all Possibility". Simply, it could be otherwise. Anyhow, possibility, "thus suspended is the issuing of a new actuality, of which the first immediate actuality was the presupposition". If it is fine today it may rain tomorrow. This is the "alternation ... involved in the notion of a condition ... an immediate actuality of this kind includes in it the germ of something else altogether". "New every morning is the light", as they sing in church, though there it means rather that divine things are ageless.

"This new actuality thus issuing is the very inside of the immediate actuality which it uses up", or it all comes out in the wash, as we say. "Thus there comes into being quite an other shape of things, and yet it is not another". The "first actuality is only put as what it in essence was", i.e. at first. This recalls what he had said about the child, that it has, so to say, to become what it is, and hence was (this is the essential, there are no transitions here), even as child. The "conditions.... which fall to the ground and are spent, only unite with themselves in the other actuality". The key word is "only". Although this passage gives the ground rationale of Time and thus takes on a parousial hue this is merely accidental to it as an analysis in Logic. Conversely, the eternity touched upon is not, cannot be seen as, at "the end of time", as if it were itself temporal. Rather, it is at the end of the dialectic that all is not merely united but seen as *ever* one, a unity which each and all have within themselves. Rather, again, self as concept does not belong here (McTaggart notwithstanding), but rather the "constituent functions" Hegel speaks of at 160. McTaggart's discussion of self and its "immortality" belongs to Hegelian or McTaggartian cosmology rather. Each of the "functions", then, "is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it". This conclusion, though necessary, should remain "breath-taking from the "ordinary" and perhaps very or all too ordinary standpoint. The Development or "onward movement" of the Notion Hegel mentions in 161 is thus, and anyhow, not an incitement to some kind of "process theology" but purely logical, in the sense in which logic, thinking, is finally seen to encompass all as being it. It is by analogy with our temporal experience that the culmination of the dialectic is called a Result. Within this didactic (dialectic) and "method",

in the sense of “way to go” (*meta hodon*), which is absolute and *the* Absolute, are encompassed Nature and Spirit. They are truly within it and emerge from it in our finite perception as Nature and Spirit emerge from the Logic, i.e. they add nothing to it ontologically. “In God we live and move and have our being”. This saying, therefore, itself makes an identical type of translation into the imperfect form of the “religious” rendering of the Content: we are one with the Absolute idea, itself infinitely differentiated into the various centres of consciousness, which may be seen indifferently either as many or one, as separate or identified, united. Nothing is lost thereby, since this is the perfect form for the content more “naturally” grasped, in the context of living, in religion or art. “The actual is no mere case of immediate being”, not the mixture as before, “but, as essential Being, a suspension of its own immediacy, and thereby mediating itself with itself.” “We know what we are, but we know not what we shall be” (*I John*); as eschewing the finitude of Time, this implies, however, that we do *not* know what “we” are, except as that motion which we are “in”. Or we “already” are, what we, so to say idiomatically, “shall be”. This is the *obliqueness* of the tenses. This is the condition *for*, but as itself falling under, faith (cf. 212, *Zus.*).

XVI

NECESSITY

We now come to **Necessity**, that which “is so because it is”, as Hegel terminates these difficult three introductory paragraphs (147-149). I will take them as a whole before reading the long *Zusatz* to 147.

We have then “a circle of the two categories of possibility and immediate actuality” (147). All the indications are that Hegel not merely “has time in mind” but that he is guided by the previous unfolding of the dialectic (he explicitly prescind from mere “discussion” and so we may on occasion do the same) to a conceptual representation which clearly shows the necessity, at a certain moment of the dialectic, of a temporal process, without his needing inappropriately to mention it, as I am doing. Time itself, along with Nature and individual Mind as a whole, are moments of the dialectic. In immortality nature and individual are absorbed and thereby uniquely, most properly and without loss activated, i.e. not merely “for the first time” or as it were parousially. There is no “End of Time” if time is not, nor could there be anyhow since the expression, understood temporally, is a straight contradiction. There is much of Hume in Hegel and Hume is thus, so to say, redeemed, if he needs it. He is anyhow absorbed, not needing to be neurotically dismissed, as by the partisans of “restoration”, a word always smelling of death and decay.

This circle, as “externality (of actuality)”, “is what is called Real Possibility”. Called by whom? Here is a hint of concession to the immediate. Yet, as circle, “it is the totality, and thus the content, the actual fact or affair in its all-round definiteness”. We are speaking of Essence as replacing Being, but at the same time of Idea and Manifestation as one, so going a step beyond speaking of Idea *and* its manifestation. A relation of God and Nature transcending contingency is also intimated, though contingency is contained within it as dialectical moment.

This circular unity, again, “realises the concrete totality of the form, the immediate self-translation of inner into outer, and of outer into inner”. The self-translation is immediate, i.e. the unity is this translation, which yet

remains precisely a translation, while “realises” gives the link with “Real Possibility”. “This self-movement of the form is **Activity**”, distinguished now from Actuality. Activity carries into effect “the fact or affair as a real ground which is self-suspended to actuality”. It carries into effect, again, “the contingent actuality, the conditions; i.e. it is their reflection-in-self” and, at the same time, these conditions are self-suspended “to another actuality, the actuality of the actual fact”. Fact and conditions pass into one another and this is necessity, their necessity. “If all the conditions are at hand, the fact (event) must be actual; and the fact itself is one of the conditions.” The fact itself is one of the conditions? Just one, it is surely implied, recalling Hegel’s dialectical placing of Existence earlier. As with Kant previously, a long meditation upon Hume is surely evidenced here. Why does Hume speak of causality as a necessary connection, only distinguishing cause from effect in terms of before and after, these here disappearing in the “circle” of contingency?

But then the fact itself, if it is “one of the conditions”, must be condition for some new fact behind the fact, or is this rather the fact over again? That is, as infinite, as for Hegel it must finally be since each category is such as representing, in its moment, the Absolute, must not the fact ever direct to further recesses, as thought thinking itself thinks itself thinking itself (cf. McTaggart’s scheme of infinite reflexive perception of perception, “determinate correspondence”) or as knowledge includes knowledge of knowledge *ad infinitum*?

The reason Hegel gives for his thus reducing “fact” from its more usual “clinging” role is that “being in the first place only inner, it is at first itself only pre-supposed.” There is, indeed, an ambiguity about “fact”, which may easily strike readers of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. Fact aspires to connect with reality beyond all argument, yet it is squarely based in our language, such as that “It is a fact that...” Facts are irreducibly propositional and hence even relational. Yet they are presented in isolation, the abstractive essence of fact, precisely as demanding to be related. They are not, for example, substances. Fact is indeed pre-supposed, by our system of predication one might well say, but “at first only” only! This, that Hegel calls “developed actuality”, dialectically developed this can only be, is Necessity, viz. this “real Possibility” we have been discussing. As thus presupposed, however, a fact is what “is so because its circumstances are so, and at the same time it is so, unmediated: it is so, because it is”. It is brute, “brute fact”. Thus we naturally regard and speak of what we immediately experience before asking “why” about it. As developed and explained here it forms part, or logical moment rather, of a Necessity not immediate to us.

Hegel will say of Activity, and we note it already now, that it carries into effect, although it is “the movement”, yet “has... an independent existence of its own (as a man, a character)” requiring, he adds, both conditions and fact for its “possibility” (148, c.). This is the subjective “moment”, here shown as not dependent on affirmation of man as man (man or “character”, he seems to say, though man as character equally calls man as man in question) but within dialectical Reason alone. The existence of Activity is a consciousness, a differentiation, since a knowing. If the computer ~~knows~~, it is conscious, whether or not we add “It is not conscious, therefore...” Such “consciousness” however need not be interpreted in the narrowly psychologistic sense. ● On the other hand the notion of “intentional systems” (D. Dennett) would need modification before incorporation into an absolute idealism, where the knowledge is ultimately self-knowledge as including all (the sense of the Delphic response to Socrates, i.e. to philosophy, in Hegel’s interpretation).

There is thus much more to Necessity than a mere “union of possibility and actuality”, which leaves everything open. Necessity “is the notion itself”, in some nearer sense than that in which everything is this. We have to rise beyond “actualities”, the category thereof. These are “forms only, collapsing and transient”, however much they may seem to satisfy us in this mere moment which we have reached. We proceed.

At 148 Hegel refers back to these three elements “in the process of Necessity”, Condition, Fact, and the Activity, conscious, as he has remarked, of the greater difficulty now attending our reading. We may wonder why or how it is a “process”. They “constitute” necessity, he also says.

“The Condition, 1, is (a) what is pre-supposed or ante-stated, i.e. it is not only supposed or stated.” It is not, that is, “only a correlative to the fact but also prior,” even “independent”. It is “a contingent and external circumstance which exists without respect to the fact”. This must be read in the light of his earlier exposition of the **Condition** (146). This “term” though, pre-supposed and “ante-stated”, is equally a (or the?) “complete circle of conditions”, the “external” world as it is, we might say, using Hegel’s term.

These or this (b) “are passive, are used as materials for the fact”, “used up” as he also says repeatedly, “into the content of which they thus enter”, as the manifestation which necessity, the notion, *is*, we might also say (to ourselves), thinking of previous moments in this discourse of the dialectic.

The Fact, now, 2, “is also (a) something pre-supposed or ante-stated”, whether to the Condition or the Activity or both is as yet unclear. A purely reciprocal correlation with the Condition(s) seems denied. Yet it

too, we go on to read, is “prior and independent”. Yet this is called “a process”, even if not as such temporal. Thus “at first” the Fact, as “supposed”, is “only inner and possible, and also, being prior, an independent content by itself”, i.e. it is not, like the Condition, “a contingent and external circumstance”. It is “inner”. Again, (b), by “using up” (they use or use up one another) “the conditions, it receives its external existence”, this Fact which was at first only inner, realising “the determinations¹ of its content”. These do indeed “reciprocally correspond to the conditions”. The fact both “presents itself out of these as the fact” and “also proceeds from them”, i.e. at the same time as it is pre-supposed and ante-stated to them. The mutual identity, beyond reciprocal implication, of Inner and Outer, is here confirmed. These statements can be read as giving the rationale for Hegel’s critique of “explanation”, e.g. by forces or “powers”, as “empty”.

Even, 3, the Activity, or third “element”, “has an independent existence of its own (as a man, a character)”, although “possible only where the conditions are and the fact”, i.e. along with them in what is, we shall see and have seen, necessity. “It is the movement which translates the conditions into fact, and the latter into the former as the side of existence.” It is, again, subjectivity, thought, though Hegel does not yet say this, of particular or universal self indifferently. The movement “educes the fact from the conditions in which it is potentially present”. It “gives existence to the fact”. It does this “by abolishing the existence possessed by the conditions”. This refers, I do not doubt, to the “upward spring of the mind” outlined at 50. In itself it “signifies”, i.e. the actual spring signifies, “that the being which the world has is only a semblance” and that “truth abides in God”, in that in which “we live and move and have our being”, to take a leaf out of the Scripture. The world is the external, the alienated Idea.

“In so far as these three elements stand to each other in the shape of independent existences”, of the world, its being so, the subject, “this process has the aspect of an outward necessity”. It is not, it is implied, the whole story. “Outward necessity has a limited content for its fact. For the fact is this whole, in phase of singleness.” The limitedness, however, is so to say formal rather than material. It arises “logically” “since in its form this whole is external to itself”. It is “self-externalised even in its own self and in its content”. Any such world, as “externalised”, would be limited in virtue of just this externalisation. The one is even the meaning of the other, they are formally or logically one as the polar opposite of Spirit or Mind, which is, again, *not* individual, any more than Nature as whole, as system,

¹ Wallace has “articles”.

is other than it. The externality itself as such "is a limit of its content". This is the inward rationale of contingency within ultimate necessity as the Notion. It is the finite which is "absorbed", once again. It is not, except immediately or "vulgarly", the "empirical" barrier at which ultimate necessity stops, in contradiction of itself, such that "Either man exists or God exists" (Sartre). Necessity *is*, i.e. God knows all things since this knowledge is prior to and not "caused" by them. Hegel simply fills in the Augustinian-Thomist and arguably Aristotelian tradition here. Here, at least, his thought coincides with the teaching of divine creation as necessarily finite, even though he will also speak of it as an entire manifestation, as such infinite. The finite, that is, *is* not, in so far as it is seen or, rather, *taken* ("seeing" is properly a "success word" or verb) as not in the infinite, which is the Idea in its freedom, - insofar, that is, as it is thus *misperceived*, to use McTaggart's term. Here Hegel mirrors the distinct "processions" of Word, as previously theologically put (though can one really say this of Augustine?), i.e. in an exclusively "sacred" sense, internal but also "external" in "incarnation" and of creature generally, dis-covering a foundation of necessity for what in religion is first represented as abstractly contingent, as Aquinas or Augustine stressed with the *felix culpa*. Or did they truly thus misunderstand, not *seeing through* their own locutions? We cannot know, since it is even unknowable, not "conceptual", such a precision, in separation from a putative condemnation, or *reservation*, which we indeed make, of *all* expressed thought, including Hegel's. What the individual ego in its abstract separation *means* is, again, his alone, is neither actual, objective nor conceptual. Thus the further precisions of Duns Scotus, as seemingly against the role of the *felix culpa*, in favour of the transcendental necessity of an incarnational mediation, are not contradictory of the view of God and Nature, and man, as earlier presented as able to be said from the side of the finite. In infinity *culpa* is no different, as separable, as part, from anything else, from infinity as a whole, that is, as necessarily simple or incomposite, this being the plain meaning of Hegel's presentation of "the whole and the parts" as a categorical moment only. Aquinas, *mutatis mutandis*, treats the Idea and Word proceeding, the mutual dependency of cause and effect, in the same way, saying (in his "Tractate on the Trinity") that perfect manifestation *is* itself the whole of what is manifested. Acceptance of a theological teaching put as revelation, manifestation, by the agency of *faith* put as *moment of reason* and not its opposite, is thus one *with* as the occasion or cause of philosophical insight, just as, Hegel says, the child appropriates "the true reason world" in first obeying his parents. In this

sense all must “*become* as little children”. Hegel quotes the Scripture, the Gospel, as “very far from telling us that we must always remain children”.

Childlike innocence no doubt has in it something fascinating and attractive: but only because it reminds us of what the spirit must win for itself. The harmoniousness of childhood is a gift from the hand of nature: the second harmony must spring from the labour and culture of the spirit. (24, *Zus.*)

Again, however, there is adult faith and the faith of the child. Hegel’s philosophical system, seen in this light, from the viewpoint of these premises, is a and hence the outcome of adult faith, not merely or abstractly, however, as his own private property or *proprium*. What comes is always or has been ever present, even before what thus was.

What is brought out here is a necessary connection between *time* and necessity, revealed immediately in the past-present structure. Things, events, by becoming past, are revealed as necessary, “what was to be” (Aristotle’s definition of Essence), though insofar as time is itself sublated to necessity we here leave behind any ontology of *events* as generally represented. It was fated to be, we say, meaning that, as now complete, it not merely cannot but could not, i.e. as complete, be otherwise. Refutations of “fatalism” turn upon just this point. Fatalism, however, in some statements of it, is not yet the sound doctrine of Necessity that is ultimately one with freedom, which it would put as its abstract opposite.

So it is, moreover, with Facts, therefore dependent upon the Condition(s) as described above. The fact is what has become, even where it is an apparently timeless definition such as that man is an animal. We thus suppose a stage of becoming what something is, whether or not such a stage *has occurred*. Thus God exists, completely, i.e. completely, as result, says Hegel. This has to be perceived and that is the Activity, ultimately, of absolute self-perception.

This is in general reflected in Aristotle’s term for essence, just mentioned, coined before the medieval abstract term, namely, that which was to be, *ti en einai*, Latin *quod erat esse*. In so far as time becomes fact, therefore, it is no longer perceptible as time, as condition. The upward spring has been made. The causal relation there becomes reversible exactly as instanced in the relation between Condition and Fact here and this will be further gone into under the category of **Cause** and **Effect**, coming after **Substance**, both being put as “relationships” falling under Necessity (Actuality), these both deriving from as succeeding in thought upon *correlation* as succeeding upon the necessary *polarity* (positive and negative) that thought discerns under merely immediate variety. Time’s arrow, and it was Time that we were discussing, is indeed reversible

(Boltzmann) but then it is no longer that arrow we had been calling time, this negativity being what the reversible arrow itself signifies. "In my beginning is my end".

He thought he saw a bank-clerk descending from a bus,
He looked again and found it was a hippopotamus.

So it is with our perceptions and their interpretation. This indeed, Necessity anyhow, is that true and final Leviathan glimpsed, differently, by the author of *Job* or by Thomas Hobbes, which we see, not *underneath* any and every phenomenon or immediacy, but when we "look again", as the poet-logician (Carroll-Dodgson) here intimates. If Nature is God then God is not "behind" Nature, a saying elevating the latter, thought knowing only itself. We thus have come upon a *unity* that is no longer strictly speaking a whole (as transient category), is the Idea itself, it will be seen. Hegel here concurs with Goethe (140) concerning the openness to view of this as Nature, which "keeps not back the core, nor separates the rind". Otherwise put, this is the Necessity of Nature as she is and of all creation, rind and core in fact (necessarily?) mirroring the identity of necessity and freedom. There is a possible echo, or a sublime ignorance, of this in Francis Thompson's pathetic "The pulp so bitter, how shall taste the rind?" The meaning, however, is that there is no duality of core and rind. We get behind Nature without going behind it, since there is no before and behind, core and rind, a truth known to absolute spirit most immediately under the form of art such as, say, Monet's. Or why not just take a walk?

*

Hegel sums up (149). Necessity is in itself (*an sich*) "the one essence... but now full of content, in the reflected light of which its distinctions take the form of independent realities." Distinctions now are logical as "independent realities" are not, i.e. that is the distinction, the separation rather, we normally make. Here, in absolute idealism, in the dialectic which issues in absolute idealism (it is not anteriorly presupposed), they come together, are revealed as being one and the same. Necessity is "self-same" or same all the way through, we might first interpret. Thus it both has "the form of independent realities" and is "absolute form", essence. As such it is activity, "the activity which reduces into dependency (e.g. the conditions) and mediates into immediacy" (parenthesis added)..

"Whatever is necessary is through another." In this light, that of causality, Hume identified and questioned it, giving reasons *malgré lui*, as he admits, since reasons remain themselves causes, the inner the outer and

vice versa. “What is the world without reason?” (var. “the reason”) Gottlob Frege would later ask.² This other, anyhow, before a trio of constituents and now “through” them (it is the same), is a “breaking up” into Fact, Activity and Condition, is “an intermediate actuality or accidental circumstance”. We may call it either. So, being thus “through”, the necessary “is not in and for itself”, just yet, but hypothetical, he says, “a mere result of assumption” (of a “necessary connection”), of which time, on this post-Humean view of causality, is at least the figure, no less or more than such causality is the figure of time, both, so to say, falling into the ditch together. “But this intermediation is just as immediately however the abrogation of itself”. It, the fact, closes with itself, somewhat as we indicated above, when discussing the necessary contingency of the Outward. This “contingent condition”, as ground, translates into immediacy, i.e. immediate necessity, lifting up the dependency upon the other two constituents of “the process”, into actuality, our present larger concern (142).

“In this return to itself the necessary simply and positively is, as unconditioned actuality”. Hegel, we may or might think, is simply asking or compelling us to recognise what stands close before us but needs to be seen in the mirror which is reflection, like the nose on our faces. Mediated through circumstances, necessity is yet unmediated, “closer than I am to myself” if one thinks of the activity (147) particularly, bringing condition to fact. This will become clearer. Again, it is the undeniable, not such or merely that or as if Hegel foists upon us now a maybe unwelcome positive thesis in “cosmology”, but the undeniable *as* the undeniable, viz. Necessity, from which all thought has to start. And thus it is thought itself that has brought us to this and not, except in second place, some individual philosopher. Thus we are engaged with a text, its import for us, and not with a man or individual, ruined, like all of us, in essence.

*

The *Zusatz* to 147 provides us with some final, indeed more “cosmological” considerations upon Necessity:

When anything is said to be necessary, the first question we ask is, why? Anything necessary accordingly comes before us as something due to a supposition, the result of certain antecedents. If we go no further than mere

² Frege is frequently supposed in the Anglo-American camp to have been an anti-idealist or realist. Writings of Hans Sluga and others, this citation from *The Foundations of Arithmetic* apart, seem to me to well document the contrary.

derivation from antecedents however, we have not gained a complete notion of what necessity means.

This would be his criticism of Hume, as regards the *meaning* of causality, its concept.

What is merely derivative is what it is, not through itself, but through something else; and in this way too it is merely contingent. What is necessary, on the other hand, would have to be what it is through itself; and thus, although derivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence it is derived as a vanishing element in itself. Thus it *is* as a result but even, finally, as *its own result*, this Hegelian phrase effectively cancelling the very notion of a result in accord with necessity as absolute and *the* absolute. For the absolute is not absolute unless it is *the* absolute, as we find Aquinas saying, in *De ente et essentia*, that “only wholes are predicated of wholes”, predicated or predicable or both, that is. For one can predicate an abstraction or part (non-whole) of anything, say a whole, as in “Socrates is humanity”, which just for that reason is false, while, conversely, if “humanity” be predicated as subject it will itself then be a whole, in the requisite sense, so that we can then say with truth “Humanity is humanity” (or happiness or misery) or even “Humanity is Socrates”. The Aquinate thesis, that is, concerns the necessary identity which is predication, while obliquely taking in the formal truth that from a false statement, as in this case an isolated abstraction posited as subject rather than a statement, anything, including any predication, truly or validly follows. What the thesis misses, or ignores by design, as sublating or sabotaging it, though it still stands as moment (but what does not?), is that the whole *is* the part, the subject the predicate, as Hegel has shown.

But how is the contained antecedent mentioned above “vanishing”, if the necessary, which is to say Necessity, is itself necessary “through” this, as through itself, and even thus “through itself”, unless the “vanishing element” is also itself necessary, and that not merely as *Means* or a means? Means, in fact, although introduced later as correlate with *the category of End* or “Design” or “final cause” even (204), does not itself appear to be a category, strictly speaking, if one supposed, without making a mere supposition, that one could speak strictly, *cum praecisione*, on this issue generally. Yet it is strictly so that the “final cause” (there is finally only one) could not, finally again, be correlate with any means except insofar as means becomes identified with end, as it does in Hegel just as here already the contingent or “immediate actuality” is found to be necessary and, again, the “concretely” necessary. It, as “vanishing element in itself”, is absorbed, in or by the “ingratitude” of Spirit, in the Activity which is itself actively constituent of Necessity. ●f this “It is”, we say. “We thus hold it

to be simple self-relation, in which all dependence on something else is removed", as the cause, speaking generally, goes up into the effect, as when I become a man I "put away childish things", to the ruin of empirical psychology, for example, itself thus put away. Nor is there, therefore, some *further end*, as we saw in discussing the core and rind of Nature, here again though insofar as Activity, or having "an independent existence of its own (as a man, a character)" (148), is involved. There are thus two ways of seeing this now "doubled" Content, namely as "final realised fact" or as these scattered circumstances "positively" or positivistically viewed, though this "is nought", is "inverted into its negative, thus becoming content of the realised fact". The dialectical striving towards result is at work here, how we *think* it duplicating or identified with how it is brought about. Implied, in contemporary terms, is a reconciliation of the mechanistic and the teleological accounts of reality. The mechanical is itself to be explained teleologically, although it is the former only which is "absorbed". The immediate circumstances become "conditions" in the *reciprocal* sense outlined above, being "retained as content of the ultimate reality". This latter, McTaggart will claim, is timeless immortality, without beginning or end, necessity in fact, which can however only apply to or be born by persons, thus shown to be non-finite or each the whole inasmuch as the whole is each, together in a perfect unity transcending the organic unity of individuals in a "body". All else, unable to be a condition in this sense, is "misperception" (or outside which is inside, we might rather say). Hegel, however, still speaks of "circumstances *and* conditions" (my stress) here, still giving the contingent its due, that is to say. So does McTaggart advance further here, we might want to ask.

Yet, in "teleological action, we have in the end of action a content which is already fore-known", "not blind but seeing". This he identifies as rule by Providence (147, *Zus.*), where "absolutely pre-determined" design "is the active principle", "fore-known and fore-willed". The priority, we know, is logical rather than temporal.

Necessity and providence, he goes on, "are not mutually excluding" but have the same "intellectual principle", viz. the notion, "the truth of necessity". Yet necessity itself "is the notion implicit". It is no "blind fatalism" to be seeking here to "understand the necessity of every event". So he refers to the philosophy of history as a Theodicy just inasmuch as investigating such necessity. Nothing, that is, escapes this Logic as "empirical" or "contingent". Will and accomplishment are absolutely identical. Man, "in his difference from God", is not absolute. Here we see the folly of speaking of Hegel's "pantheism". We have to transcend ourselves, actively, inasmuch as we *are*, necessarily, transcended. This

Hegelian account is thus in substance exactly that of Aquinas, for whom necessity, just as divine or absolute, has no relation unless with itself, what is other being thus and thereby consumed, along with its own web of relation, including its relation, real enough *from its side*, to that same absolute. Each, however, consuming and consumed, are thus one, neither therefore, neither Being nor Nothing, *knowing* the other as other, since it is thus eliminated as in itself, *cum praecisione*, unknowable. Hence Derrida's fascination with Augustine's question: "What do I love when I love my God?" Hegel indeed is explicit on this point, the "difficulty people find" in identifying the same and the different, a principle he establishes in a variety of ways throughout his main texts. Thus we have the theological-mystical text, "Now you are the body of Christ". Do you, i.e. we, disappear or does this Body, the Church, disappear? The dilemma, it now appears, was but a moment. In going up into this out of ourselves it is we who "become what we are", abolishing at the same time all abstract or less than philosophical religion, *a fortiori* absorbing and thus fulfilling all the world's Art down the ages. The Apostle expressed this simply as God becoming "all in all", while simultaneously in just this delivery all, inclusive of the contingent, finds its truth in all. "This also is thou, neither is this thou". All of which is but to say that the God who reveals himself as knowable, as Hegel stresses, is thereby revealed or known precisely as unknowable. As Aquinas put it, we know most about God when we know that we know nothing about him or, therefore, about the "love" which he is, as it is said. Hence we do not and cannot know if we have it, or faith, or not. Or again. "Lord I believe, help thou mine unbelief". As regards this, "there is nothing new under the sun". Thus, the moment of atheism having arrived, it must be respected as a religious and even artistic variant, one denying all representations. It is only this, however, when it has contained and absorbed as fulfilling all the moments of thought, including the historical as sublated and absorbed within and as the logical and the latter too as gone up into, as assumed by, the Idea. We seek, that is, as already having found, treading the path of self, *semper idem* (motto of a one/time hyper-conservative cardinal, Ottaviani). But, or so, anyone condemning this as religious indifference has not understood (it), has not absorbed Hegel in particular nor any of his predecessors in the philosophical gallery he mentions.

What, to be clear, does not form part of this picture, is the nihilism of the street, or wherever it is found. There is no place in Hegel, namely, for "religious indifference", any more than for anti-artistic philistinism. Yet, there too, such anti-art is "redeemed" by being taken up into art, the last being made, as becoming it, first. As it is said, Christ was "made sin" for

us. All and any expression, that is, to succeed must express the all in a total *interplay*. Such play, we are thus saying, is wisdom, where every note must be sounded as every symphony must be *the* symphony, absolutely. The hearer seeks just this, the Word, as in an ever-circular set of variations, fulfilling drama in its transcendence, never leaving the beginning as standing already at the end, not merely the idea, then, of true being but the true being which *is* the Idea.

*

In speaking here of Man as something yet actual “in his difference from God”, although not absolutely so, however, Hegel touches upon the question of an Analogy of Being. More usually he eschews or avoids this approach or way of speaking in his texts, his basic axiom, or one of them, being rather that “Everything finite is false”, in line here with the mystical tradition or, rather, the concurrence of mystical and philosophical writers on this point, particularly of the Platonic school. Within this school, however, Aristotle, remarking that Being “is said in many ways”, prepared the way for the medieval division on this point, even though Aristotle arrives at the end of the *Metaphysics* at the position we find, *mutatis mutandis*, in Hegel concerning the relation, which is non-relation, of the Absolute to things finite.

So Thomas Aquinas takes up Aristotle’s explanation of this *analogia* in terms of the different proportion (*ratio*) of God to God’s act of being, from which his essence or conception is not separate, and of finite things to their acts of being (*actus essendi*). Duns Scotus, in the next generation, says he knows nothing of (*nescio*) or does not know any such “act”, as distinct from the act which is essence or what a (given) thing is (*essentia*). There are many variants upon this, for example in the interpretation of Cajetan’s (sixteenth century) commentaries, deeply affected by the terminology at least of the by then far more numerous and influential Scotist school, upon Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae*, and more especially of his treatise “On the Analogy of Names” (*De analogia nominum*).³

³ This title seems to imply that analogy is a logical doctrine *rather than* a metaphysical theory of being. Thus the late Ralph McInerny interpreted it, arguing from Thomas’s and other texts. Viewed thus though it has a continuity with the practice in theology of determining what it is correct to say merely, thus reducing the doctrine’s interest for any thorough-going philosophy such as Hegel’s. The point, however, for Thomas was that he felt that one could not *say* anything correctly about God (a point criticised by Hegel, at least regarding some uses made

For Scotus the concept of being is necessarily univocal, not analogical. Indeed the controversy extends to asking whether analogy applies to words or concepts or both. It is generally applied to concepts and there the dispute becomes whether it is only a logical or also a metaphysical doctrine. In this latter sense there is, nowadays, an increasingly insistent claim that there is "ontological discontinuity" between the being of God and the being of creatures, which are nonetheless both real. This, though, is little more than a refusal to engage in just those thought-processes which Hegel works through in his *Logic* and elsewhere. It is a general abdication or a plea to be allowed to take philosophy, which, like being, "has no parts" (Parmenides), piecemeal, usually appealing to "mystery". Mystery, however, is just what such religious rationalism, in the negative sense, refuses to acknowledge or live with, namely, that in the face of the absolute or except as identified with it we "both are and are not", are one with our other or not-self.

Kant had already pointed away from this impotence of analogy in speaking not of man but of "the rational creature". Hume, after all, had already relativised language about the finite Self. Thus far, though sceptical as to an Absolute, he is in line with Catherine of Siena's report of God as saying: "I am he who is, you are she who is not." In this discussion of Hegel's the matter is touched upon while treating of a determining divine or absolute knowledge. This too, *mutatis mutandis*, is a theme of Aquinas concerning necessarily absolute omniscience; uneasiness about it, in relation to human freedom, lay behind much later theological disagreement, Calvinists finding comfort in the Dominican position that God necessarily makes our actions free and as such "pre"-determines them. Against this were pitted the Jesuit and related doctrines of Molinism, *scientia media* and so on, concerning which, to repeat, the Pope of the day refused, in the early seventeenth century, to make a decision in so far as it affected confessional theology. No one knows if the Jesuits would have listened anyway and it is this school of "humanistic" thought, embodied in Suarez, which came to Kant *via* Wolff and others. It includes, as part of its indifferentist notion of freedom, the idea of a *libertas indifferentiae* as essential to our free choice which is therefore independent even of God, this being thought necessary by a section of the pious for God to "judge" us. In effect, God is reduced to one among a plurality of actors and thus the way is prepared for formal atheism. This is the background to Hegel's distinctive remarks on ethical matters, at which many have professed to be scandalised or at least puzzled. It is quite clear

of such negative theology) and hence pleaded for analogy. God posits himself analogically then, Hegel might interpret, though this would only be "for us".

that Hegel is in line with the Dominican and Thomist school on these matters. Whether this is through having studied them or independently or both is a question for the historians of thought. He is certainly well versed in earlier texts as common patrimony of all the parties.

Regarding determining absolute knowledge, Hegel claims to show the identity of freedom and Destiny or Fate, as this was anciently understood. Against this background he criticises as less noble the “modern” insistence, which he effectively finds neurotic, on renouncing “only in prospect of compensation”. Destiny “leaves no room for consolation” and consolation is his subject here. We need have no “sense of bondage” to Destiny. This modern point of view, “that of Consolation”, nonetheless derives from Christianity and is a viewpoint which, he will show, when rightly understood is superior. No room, it can seem, is left for consolation and yet, *via* the revelation of divine or absolute Subjectivity, the Christian religion is one of “absolute Consolation”. He cites the text “God wills that all men be saved” which troubled Augustine so much, but he does not follow Augustine’s talk of an antecedent and a consequent will. What God wills not merely is accomplished but is and is what is. “That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite value”, for it is what such an all-embracing and yet particularised will expresses, for each subject. Each then must learn the truth of the saying: “I am from above, you are from below... without me you can do nothing”. It is each individual subject that has this infinite value, “known from before the foundation of the world”, as is not the case with this butterfly, sparrow or gnat, but only because these appearances, which we mistakenly reify, are as such not thus knowable. Insofar as they might be so they must themselves be or become spirit (*Geist*). For where they are seen in God not they but God is seen, utterly, since the rind is the core, the outside inside, nothing being.

So Hegel both eschews consolation and declares that the Christian consolation is absolute. He is in striking accord with Thérèse Martin, known as the saint of Lisieux, who declared “My only consolation is to have none”, the classical mystical doctrine of the “Dark Night of the Soul” (title of a work by John of the Cross, a Spanish Carmelite friar).⁴ He thus overcomes the unreflected antithesis between pagan resignation and Christian consolation. Some people are surprised at his deigning to treat at all of the “soft” subject of consolation. It forms the necessary pendant, however, to his superficially “hard” doctrine of necessity. He claims to present the consolations of necessity itself as he establishes it here.

⁴ It is by the way striking that Hegel somewhere mentions “Spanish poetry” as a possible distraction from the “task” of philosophy. John’s work consists in a commentary on his own profound poems.

Any "sense of bondage" to Destiny "springs from inability to surmount the antithesis", from seeing what is as contrary to what ought to be. We may again surmise a Humean background here. In fact, if one says God is implied in there being any world at all, i.e. not *via* a demonstration of a particular design, then this "abstract" ought is already overthrown. In this same sense Aquinas places the absolute good of God and the happiness (beatitude) that God is, as *finis ultimus* of all, above the purely ethical or "honourable" good (*bonum honestum*) which only derives its absoluteness from its being needed in the form of virtues necessary for this other and final end. This, as an intrinsic necessity, is not understood in the Utilitarian way. Happiness, rather, is itself *höchste Entfaltung der Sittlichkeit* (Martin Grabmann) and happiness, it is argued, just is in itself transcendent. All things in fact participate in this end, ourselves interpreting participation, however, as the absorption and negation Hegel describes.⁵

Because it is, it ought to be, Hegel thus argues. "All shall be well and all manner of thing", one might recall from a third lady thinker (Julian of Norwich), keeping in the background Boethius' assertions of, specifically, the consolations of "the lady Philosophy". In face of reality there is, finally, "no contrast, no bondage, no pain, no sorrow", and this attitude, it is true, is "void of consolation". But, again, "it is a frame of mind which does not need consolation". That's the consolation of it.

*

Hegel speaks now of Subjectivity. It is "personal subjectivity" as having "acquired its infinite significance" which gives rise to what we might call these hang-ups of "the Christian world". Christian or not, we live in a Christian or "post-Christian" world, whether we talk about the French Revolution or the United Nations. It is also a Greco-Roman and Jewish world. It is also an increasingly Chinese world. Hegel speaks first of natural and finite Subjectivity as having contingent and arbitrary private interests. This is "all that we call person" and not "thing" or the non-personal. In contrast to this obstinate pursuit of subjective aims, he says, one cannot but admire "the tranquil resignation of the ancients to destiny". It seems "higher and worthier", more "religious", we might almost say.

"But the term subjectivity is not to be confined merely to the bad and finite kind of it which is contrasted with the thing (fact)" (147, *Zus.*). Really it is "immanent in the fact", as we have seen above in the treatment of Activity. Thus infinite it "is the very truth of the fact". Here Hegel's reasoning coincides in its conclusion with his picture of the Christian God

⁵ Cf. Especially 142 *Zus.*, final paragraph.

as Absolute, but that is a circumstance not intrinsic to the reasoning itself so is no objection to it, prejudices apart. The doctrine of consolation, anyway, here “receives a newer and a higher significance”, according to which, again, “the Christian religion is to be regarded as the religion of consolation and even of absolute consolation.” Here he cites the Pauline “universalist” text from the first *Letter to Timothy*, who was first-century *episkopos* or overseer of a community of Christians. This text was later made canonical and so Hegel claims that Christianity “teaches” what it declares, “that subjectivity has an infinite value”. This “consoling power of Christianity just lies in the fact that God Himself is in it known as the absolute subjectivity”, as self of myself he might have said, echoing Augustine. For “inasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particularity”, of differentiation, no doubt itself infinite if it characterises “God”, or the Infinite and Absolute, “our particular personality too is recognised not merely as something to be solely and simply nullified, but as at the same time as something to be preserved”. This says, in effect, that it is nullified, yet it is preserved. He does not and need not say how.

By contrast the ancient gods, he says, “do not know themselves, are only known” as personifications. So they themselves are powerless before destiny, thus seen as after all blind. But the Christian God “is also self-knowing”, “absolutely actual” therefore. As so often in Hegel, we suddenly feel that he is but uncovering the obvious. Each man, however, he goes on, is “the architect of his own fortune”, as we can see once we shake off the miasma of a blind necessity, as opposed to the all-seeing, omniscient necessity of Providence. All comes from the self. Hence the oracular advice, “Know thyself”, was not restrictive or constraining in the sense of restraining, but all-sufficient, opening up more deeply reflected vistas, moreover. To blame circumstances is “unfreedom”. Whatever happens to a man “is only the outcome of himself”. “No doubt too there is a great deal of chance in what befalls us” but this chance, Hegel declares, “has its ‘root’ in the natural man”. We might take this as a variant upon the idea that pure chance is only real at the phenomenal level, actually finding a strict causal explanation among things “not intended” (the view offered in Aristotle’s *Physics*). Yet Hegel seems to be offering a more anthropological view, in the sense of concern with the subject, borrowing from or almost hijacking the theological perspectives of natural and “supernatural” in order to press home the absolute requirement of self-transcendence in order for man to be man, as knowing himself identified with “absolute” perspectives, self in other, in Otherness itself, the truth of knowledge. Thus he concludes by saying that our “view of necessity”

determines our destiny itself. It is “at the root of the content and discontent of men”.

XVII

SUBSTANCE

The necessary, Hegel now says, “is in itself an absolute correlation of elements” (*Enc.*150), i.e. as in the threefold process of condition, fact and activity just developed. Yet in this process “the correlation also suspends itself to absolute identity”. This, i.e. the actual transition, “is the identity of substance, regarded as form-activity”. This, that is, is the sense given here to what Hegel has chosen to call **Substance**, a term by no means just “lifted” from Spinoza, however, where it has in some respects a different sense. The expression “form-activity”, as “absolute identity”, refers here to that which is itself and nothing other, neither passing, by activity, into anything other since it is its own activity. In that way Substance is “the totality of the **Accidents**” (151). This term does not get a definition, in *EL*, here or, hardly, a description, apart from its being referred to, implicitly at least, as an “outward thing”, to which the relatedness of Substance, in “absolute identity” gives the negative, as it also does, however, “to this form of inwardness”. Inward and Outward, we recall, were identified immediately previous to Actuality. Hegel speaks of “an absolute revulsion of form and content into one another”, which may recall our remarks in the previous chapter concerning theism and atheism. Here the expression “revulsion *into*” is as crucial as the idea of a mutual revulsion *into* as this notion is expressive of an extremity of fusion, of love, as one might hazard, in its erotic (the adjective formed from *Eros*, the relevant divinity) essence. This can be applied to God and Nature as much as to Substance and Accidents in Hegel’s thought.

The bottom line, here (though we are really saying there is no “bottom”, no Inward distinct from Outward) is that the revelation which is “the totality of the Accidents” is at one and the same time, in one and the same “act”, itself revealed as a or the revealing. The accidents in their totality are revealed as Substance, which is “their absolute negativity”. They are nothing apart from Substance, at least analogously to the world and God or, *equivalently*, the Idea thereof: analogously, since natural things are not God’s accidents, but rather his several representations. The relation,

therefore, of accident to representation requires, will require, further clarification. For the moment, anyhow, we cannot speak of "this" substance because for Hegel, as for Spinoza, *mutatis mutandis*, there is and can be just one substance. Substance is Unity and Identity and absolutely so.

Though an essential stage in the evolution of the idea, substance is not the same with absolute Idea, but the idea under the still limited form of necessity. It is true that God is necessity, or, as we may also put it, that He is the absolute Thing: He is however no less the absolute Person. That He is the absolute Person however is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never reached: and on this side it falls short of the true notion of God which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity. Spinoza was by descent a Jew; and it is upon the whole the Oriental way of seeing things, according to which the nature of the finite world seems frail and transient, that has found its intellectual expression in his system. This Oriental view of the unity of substance certainly gives the basis for all real further development. Still it is not the final idea. It is marked by the absence of the principle of the Western World, the principle of individuality, which first appeared under a philosophic shape, contemporaneously with Spinoza, in the Monadology of Leibniz. (151, *Zus.* Cf. 194)

That is to say, again, this "absolutely so", that the "content" of this revelation "is nothing but that very revelation", that very revealing. It is not a revelation of anything else. It is, we saw already, only the Content's self-externalisation as such, to the "outward", which gives or creates this impression of an alien and "limited content". It is not this absolutely or even abstractly. It is not, in its self-externalisation, truthfully abstracted from this inward necessity or, rather, as we are now told, Substance. Substance and necessity are one and the same; however we rate the choice of just this *term* here as signifying whatever proximate development from the idea of Necessity Hegel might be envisaging.

From this it follows that Substance (and Accidents as identical *in toto* with it as also, it follows, with *accidence*) is actually derived from **Inward** and **Outward** (138), not from Necessity, which is not really, nor ought to be made to be, a category *there* as yet, but at 147. The treatment, namely, of Possibility, Contingency (Chance) and Necessity in the *Encyclopaedia* here, using Greek lettering for subdivisions, is in point of form an *excursus* or "a study of modal terms" appended to the first presentation of Actuality as "destined to vindicate for actuality the status of manifested necessity, and also at the same time to explicate the relation of necessity to contingency". (Taylor, *ibid.* p. 279-280)

In maintaining this one should note that Hegel nonetheless criticises Kant for making of possibility a modality, "along with" or in the same

sense as necessity and “actuality”, however (143). Through this study we “come to grips here with the notion of necessity which has been underlying Essence all along” (Taylor). **Substance** is the first division of this, to be followed by **Causality** and **Reciprocity**, leading into the **Notion** (143 to 149). This latter is the position of McTaggart, who criticises Hegel for not making clear that those three, viz. possibility, chance and necessity, are, he claims, outside the chain of categories, as they must be, his reason being that Necessity is actually nothing other than Causality, which cannot imply Substance if it is then itself immediately deduced *from* it. The fact remains that these, or similar intermediary categories, such as “the Absolute”, are developed in the earlier *The Science of Logic*, called “greater” (GL: what we have been calling WL). Hegel’s true and final schema, however, McTaggart argues, is one where Substance or, rather, Substantiality (as a relation of absolute identity between Substance and Accidents) is derived immediately from (the identity of) Inward and Outward. Yet, one might reply, that it is or may be identical, as a relation, with these two, with that relation, is only to be expected as we approach to the Notion. For there *all* lesser concepts are identified, the **Notion** (or Concept) being the Concept, which is Thought, as such thinking no other thought than itself, the same structure we find in this revelation or manifestation, which is manifestation itself (of itself exclusively or totally, rather), as we noted Hegel saying above, as itself revealing, which is Substance, i.e. for which he uses this term. Given that identity, an “of” would have no place. The identity of B with A means that there is no B other than A. It is, that is, a “relation of reason” only, in Scholastic terms. Yet here, differently from most Scholastic thought, the relation of reason overarches, contains and is finally identical with all of the so-called real relations which, as these are finite, it absorbs. One consequence of this, to the gist of which McTaggart was especially sensitive, is that Hegel’s saying that Substance “is the totality of the Accidents” is not to be taken as any finite or reductive identity since it includes or subtends the meaning, context shows, that any accident, in turn, is no part merely but the whole of substance, which, McTaggart argues, can only, as ontological counterpart, be referred to *persons* as suitably defined. The universe, which is spirit, consists of spirits, each of which is itself the “perfect unity” in which all concur, this being as much “contradiction in its complete development” as Hegel later (194) discerns in Leibniz. One should see also, in this development, exposition of the original Kantian thesis of the “Kingdom of Ends” where *each*, namely, as one has to conclude, is *the* end, since otherwise it cannot be an end at all. The development, we could say, is of an earlier Utilitarianism only inasmuch

as being the *reversal* of the latter's maxim, which now would read: "Each to count for all and none for less than all" since each is all and none other than all, the finite figure of vine and branches being there transcended, in accordance though, it can be sustained, with religion's own development of this idea, where you "are all members of one another", following upon, as implicitly one with, the Dominical saying - "I in them and they in me" - since *you*, it is said also, "are the body of Christ", who was, it is further said, "made sin for us", that is to say, in terms of the Hegelian and associated analysis, made finite (for us). We have here the birth of what might, if anything might, be called Humanism, in a unity transcending the Pauline organic metaphor for it but while not, I maintain, transgressing the Pauline intention, his "I live yet not I, but Christ lives in me", i.e. the whole body just spoken of thus lives, it has to mean ("I in them and they in me"), upon which one may accord "full marks", in this respect at least, to McTaggart. Here again we have a species, however exalted, of the unity in identity of Substance and Accidents (and therefore accidentence). Hegel shows these to be, ultimately, *logical* truths, thus confirming the absoluteness or divinity of *logos*. Compare here the claim of Erwin Schroedinger cited in conclusion of my *Hegel's Philosophy of Universal Reconciliation* (Cambridge Scholars, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2013, p.396):

It is not possible that this unity of knowledge, feeling and choice which you call your own should have sprung into being from nothingness at a given moment not so long ago; rather this knowledge, feeling and choice are essentially eternal and unchangeable and numerically one in all men, nay in all sensitive beings. But not in this sense that you are a part, a piece, of an eternal, infinite being, an aspect or modification of it, as in Spinoza's pantheism. For we should have the same baffling question: which part, which aspect are you? What, objectively, differentiates it from the others? No, but inconceivable as it seems to ordinary reason, you and all other conscious beings as such are all in all. Hence this life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of the entire existence, but is in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance.

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Hegel speaks now of "the form which passes away in the power of substance" (151). The inevitable "character" of the Content as "outward" or, less metaphorically, "external to itself", even "self-externalised" (148), this "aspect" of limitedness, is "only a passing stage". The metaphor, again, of core and rind is transcended, along with all such "correlation" (135) not yet **Reciprocity** (154). *Substance* expresses Form. Absolute

negativity, of the **●**Outward, the **Accidents** (which it, the absolute, yet is), reveals "absolute power", which just is, in turn, this Act, revealing. "I am myself", seen from the point now of absolute Subjectivity, which Substance is (147, *Zus.*). "Substantiality is the absolute form-activity" (151), not devoid of content but identical with content, in what is negativity of negativity and hence absolute positivity. This, however, may just as well be named negativity, excluding nothing, i.e. what it does exclude is effectively Nothing with a capital N, the Nothing of limits absolutely considered as not absorbed in, ultimately, the Notion. **●**On Hegel's premises, McTaggart remarks, "no mind working in time could ever completely explain anything", on account of the finitude or falsity of time rather than of mind. We have remarked on this above, when discussing causality in relation to Necessity.

At this stage necessity "is a correlation". "This is the correlation of Causality" (152). What is being called Substance is "the self-relating power (itself a merely inner possibility)" determining itself to accidentance as external and so "distinguished" from it. McTaggart's criticisms, which are yet simultaneously clarifications, of Hegel's dialectical passage through these parts of the "Doctrine of Essence", merit consideration here. He bases himself upon *The Science of Logic* (GL) before comparing this text with the account given in the *Encyclopaedia*, which he regards as by and large an improvement on the earlier text.

McTaggart is critical, for instance, of the categorial interpolation of Necessity between Inward-and-**●**Outward on the one hand and Substance on the other. He thus interprets its presentation in the *Encyclopaedia*, along with Possibility and Contingency, as an *excursus*. The finite, Hegel had written, "is a medium which is absorbed by that which shines through it" (GL ii, 188). Yet, McTaggart points out when criticising the making of the Absolute to be a category in GL, "in order to disappear the finite must have some reality". Even its being there so as to be destroyed "is incompatible with the supremacy of the Absolute". For then, as a pure unity, the latter could not be the whole of reality, could not be absolute. It would be "the Absolute of an external reflection. It is therefore not the Absolute-Absolute, but the Absolute in a determination, or it is an Attribute" (cf. WL ii, 189):

If we were to take the unity of the Absolute no longer as a pure unity but as a unity which contained multiplicity and was more of a unity because it did

so, we should certainly have transcended the difficulty, but I cannot find so advanced a conception in Hegel's words.¹

It, the conception, is "not reached at this point". The category of Substance, McTaggart continues here, "should have been reached directly from Inner and Outer", without this premature introduction of the Absolute:

In the first place it can be reached from Inner and Outer. For it is simply the restatement of that category, as a new Thesis should be of the previous Synthesis. All that we have said (in 166) of Substance and Accident is equally true of Inner and Outer.²

Further: "of Inner and Outer... we must say, as of its predecessor Whole and Part, that with such a conception all existents can be grouped in a single unity" (McTaggart 166). This refers us back to McTaggart's mention, cited above, of a unity containing multiplicity. "There is then only one substance", McTaggart writes. Yet for Spinoza the Accidents, as finite, are unreal while for Hegel they are "as real as the Substance" (*Ibid.* 168). So McTaggart finds Hegel's remarks on Spinoza here in GL "inappropriate". He adds that "Hegel never regarded personality or consciousness as essentially characteristics of God". By "God" Hegel means, he claims, "the Absolute Reality, whatever that reality might be" or "Absolute Reality conceived as a unity".³

McTaggart asserts that "the transition... from Absolute Necessity (*sc.* to Substance) is intrinsically invalid. For ... Necessity is really that of Causality", which is later itself "derived from Substance". Such a reciprocity of entailment in the dialectic's structure (as opposed to the material it considers) would contradict the whole premise of dialectical advance, he asserts. This is surprising, since he also stressed (in 1897, see below) that the order of dialectical derivation is not thus strict, even though he thinks Hegel writes, erroneously, as if he believed this were so to say categorically the case, despite apparent counter-examples in his text.

¹ J.M.E. McTaggart: *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, CUP Cambridge, 1910, 160. For an outline of "the more advanced conception" see McTaggart's own *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*, CUP 1903, Chapter Two: "Immortality".

² Cf. Hegel, *Enc.* 151.

³ But cp. *Enc.* 147, *Zus.* or, still more, 151, *Zus.*: "It is true that God is Necessity, or, we may also put it that He is the Absolute Thing: He is however no less the absolute Person. That he is the absolute Person however is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never reached: and on that side it falls short of the true notion of God which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity."

His whole approach here seems to ignore the dialectic's defining capacity of exhibiting *through* the premises of an argument the incoherence or true falsity, so to say, of these constitutive premises, what Hegel calls "the ungratefulness of spirit".

That "Substance, relative to Accident, is to be conceived as power" implies Causality. Substance, that is, determines the Accidents, now in and for themselves, - themselves Substantial (*sic* McTaggart, *op. cit.* 169). The Substance-Accidents relation itself implies a relation between two substances, implies Causality. One may be reminded here of the scholastic doctrine that the premises themselves "cause" the conclusion, a stance much deprecated in Analytical Philosophy among those there at least who know of it.⁴ In the *Encyclopaedia* "Hegel omits all the categories of the Absolute" in so far as these include the conceptions "within Actuality in the narrower sense" (as introduced in GL exclusively), writes McTaggart. The dialectic, anyhow, certainly exhibits the premises as *causing* the now contradictory conclusion, while, however, at least superficially unlike the Scholastic thesis, including in as deriving from this the eventual finitude and hence falsity of the causal relation itself.

So McTaggart finds himself, he says, "able to accept very little of the treatment of the subject (of Causality? of Essence?) in the GL" (181). He is "in closer agreement with the *Encyclopaedia*", where "Hegel omits all the categories of the Absolute". As for the conceptions, treated in GL "within Actuality in the narrower sense" (as distinguished in GL exclusively), he "treats of them indeed" (at *Enc.* 143-149), "but only in a preliminary discussion", i.e. before a), b) and c), viz. Substance, Causality, Reciprocity. He treats of them, that is, "before... development of the categories" into these three immediate divisions, as they here become, "instead of subdivisions of its (Actuality's) final division". They are thus, says McTaggart, of his third rather than of his fourth order of categories, on McTaggart's scheme. His analysis here in fact supports the point he makes in *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, of 1897, that the validity of Hegel's dialectical philosophy does not depend upon an absolute correctness of the deriving and placing of each and every category. For no such absolute (in the sense of either/or) place exists. One should take the

⁴ Analytical philosophy itself arose largely in reaction to McTaggart's work, in the person of his one-time admirer Bertrand Russell and the use he was later to make, along with his colleague G.E. Moore, of Wittgenstein's early work. This latter had roots in Schopenhauer rather than in Hegel (whom Schopenhauer had frankly professed himself unable to read). Russell was not much open to this side of Wittgenstein, who complained to him that "you have never understood me".

categories in accord with the superior inclusive power of Reason over Understanding disclosed by their own development.

Possibility, Contingency and Necessity, then, would be justifiably treated in an *excursus* but not as "categories of the dialectical process". For "necessity and causality are the same conception", nor is the relation of Possibility and Contingency to Necessity and Causality "required" to reach necessity "or to transcend it".

Yet the *Encyclopaedia* inconsistently (*sic* McTaggart, taking necessity, possibility and contingency as belonging, again, to an *excursus* under Actuality) makes the transition to Substantiality from Necessity. Since these three notions "are not a triad in the chain of categories" Substance, if in truth derived therefrom, "would thus have no connexion with the earlier part of the chain", which would then be "hopelessly broken". Yet the category immediately before Substance is "Inner and Outer" and from this it "must be deduced", as is "easily done". McTaggart thus distinguishes implicitly between Hegel's text as imperfectly reporting or "embodying" a mental or spiritual reality and that reality itself of which the (imperfect) text makes us aware. The general distinction is correct, as follows from Hegel's critique of language as essentially predicative, though not thereby susceptible to what thus becomes exclusively a particular critique of its own application by Hegel such as McTaggart so to say *chooses* to make just here. Derivation can in fact be mutual, in terms of the very category, Reciprocity, or the earlier Correlation, under discussion here. In this sense, anyhow, the accomplishment transcends the text, always and everywhere, as an "activity" of thought anteriorly achieved, to which the text bears finite witness only, as in a sense do *all* texts, and in which all readers may participate. It is in this sense that it was complained that such a view, stigmatised as "liberal", "overthrows the nature of an opinion" (Pope Gregory XVI, *Mirari vos*, 1831). Well in fact it does, as giving the why and wherefore of the falsity of opinion (*doxa*) as such as discerned by Plato, for example). Reading, that is, is "intentional" and not a mere skimming of the eye over words. It is the ideas which are purely themselves and hence not intentional. They are, that is, not identifiable with the *verba cordis* of realist scholastic logic, the concepts as "intentional species"⁵, but rather with absolute mind itself, the Concept in which they "result". This is merely the Hegelian "Ontologism" (Gioberti) in which, for a time at least, the now canonised Antonio Rosmini concurred, sixteen or more theses from his writings being condemned for just that concurrence in the 1880s by the Roman Holy Office. Yet in his long review of my *The Orthodox Hegel* (CSP, Newcastle, 2014) Giacomo

⁵ Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia, 85, 2.

Rinaldi nonetheless refers to my "deplorable ignorance" in speaking of Rosmini's ontologism (*Magazzino di filosofia*, 2017, C10, "*Hegelismo e misticismo*", pp. 144-179).

In making the above distinction between concepts and Concept, we will see later on, Hegel all the same or just therefore finds place in reality for the so-called "subjective concept", the *id quo* or that through which, as "intentional", the *res* is known. The *res*, however, the reality, is itself concept or idea and finally the Concept, in which all are contained or to which all are indifferently material in identity, part and whole being together or *qua* relation eclipsed. It is not intentional unless of itself, inasmuch as we refer to it as itself, thought, thinking.

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McTaggart continues his criticism, finding that in both texts there is an equal "failure with the category of causality", in that it has "no subdivisions", even though the transition to it is "through the conception of the Substance as the cause of its Accidents". "Substance is **Cause**" and this causality, "though so far assumed only as a sequence, is... at the same time necessary" (*Enc.*153), i.e. the **Effect** is necessary. This is the same transition as in GL, but since it omits mention of Formal Causality specifically McTaggart judges it yet more "obscure" (McTaggart 176). But of course one need not take Hegel as implying (temporal) succession in his mention of "sequence", whatever one finds in Hume.

The *Encyclopaedia* maintains an identity of Cause and Effect, just as in GL. The possibility is also allowed, as not contradictory, of an Infinite series of Cause and Effect. This contrasts with the Infinite Qualitative Series of the *Encyclopaedia*, where "each term was found in its other, and not in itself." A, say, has "its nature" always in its other and this in its other and so on and so on. Thus it has it nowhere. Yet it is "already established", writes McTaggart at 177, that A "has a nature".

So he is in agreement with Aquinas that no first temporal cause is necessary. By his distinction against the text from the Doctrine of Being just cited he would seem to be taking Hegel after all as considering causality in Humean fashion, viz. as a relation of temporal causality. For Aquinas all such temporal causality is accidental. Even the father could be considered as more "substantially" cause of his son (though this would be erroneous in point of fact) than the accidental connection of the father's engendering activity at some time previously. There may of course be incoherence here. As "first" cause Aquinas posits God (or Absolute Mind) *here and now*, along with such things as the sun or the earth's atmosphere.

The more primitive viewing of persons as *in* the one chain or network of ancestors ("as in Adam" etc.) is a variant upon this, denying time in the act of assimilating it, as we find with *music* considered generally.

McTaggart adds here, again, the remark that "no mind working in time could ever completely explain anything." So he is, as himself denying time, really committed to taking Hegel's "sequence" as a supra-temporal conception. The endless succession is no contradiction but it is a "False Infinite" (*schlechte Unendliche*). We have "endless succession (as distinguished from the True Infinity of self-determination)". It is bad whether contradictory or not and this situation arises, of course, *from the finitude of causality as a category*. It will be transcended and "absorbed". The transition, anyhow, to be made from Causality to **Action and Reaction** (*Enc.* 155) "does not depend on any contradiction being found in the infinite series".

Yet, McTaggart now asks (178): "If A produces different effects in different things, what becomes of the identity of cause and effect?" This difficulty, however, only seems to have effect for the Understanding (and not, that is, for the Reason) as holding that "Everything is itself and not another thing." This is a position one may suspect McTaggart, from the Hegelian point of view, of never having surmounted as he might have done, largely perhaps on account of the strong commitment he exhibits to the separate identity of persons.

Substance, he says, transcends the Essence relation of *Substratum* and Surface (in GL). We are, after all, "near the end" of the Doctrine of Essence (McTaggart 166). Substance is Whole, Force, Inner (the "*substratum*"), if we refer to the immediately preceding categories. Accidents then are Parts, Manifestation, Outer (Surfaces). Nature, we remember, had no surface and *substratum* dichotomy. There is, again, only one Substance, in Hegel's sense of Absolute Necessity which "connects the whole universe in one". Following on from Inner and Outer, as from Whole and Parts, "all existents can be grouped in a single unity". This is the insight of Parmenides that "Being has no parts". Substance, again (McTaggart 167), "should have been reached directly from Inner and Outer", for "it is simply the restatement of that category, as a new Thesis should be of the previous Synthesis" (cp. McTaggart 151). So Hegel was "wrong" to insert two triads in between without any advance. Yet we might ask whether *every* category is not a "restatement" of the very first one, therefore, while "advance" remains an evaluation. Still, we clearly do not "advance" where we derive concepts in vicious circularity as distinct from **Reciprocity** (a distinction not always easy to identify in the reality represented by or identified with the dialectic).

The transition from Necessity is invalid, claims McTaggart, because Necessity, again, "is really causality". But suppose I were to say that Being "is really" the Absolute Idea, thinking itself? This would not make the whole dialectic from the one to the other invalid but it would force us to refine our notion of a "transition". Necessity thus means much more than "that reality is certainly determined". It is more specific than that. Otherwise "we should have had Necessity early among the categories of Being, and the relation between Surface and *Substratum* ... would have been Necessity throughout." For Hegel, McTaggart continues, "Necessity ... involves two characteristics." The first is that what it necessitates "must be a Thing (cf. *Enc.* 125) - not the mere Somethings of the earlier categories". Secondly, what determines it, the Thing, "must not be its own *Substratum* - its Ground, Matter, Law or Force - but some other Thing". We recognise the features of ordinary causality, yet here in Hegel's system, one may object to McTaggart, there must be nuances to any such use of "other". Is God "other"? Is Non-Being other than Being?

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In any case McTaggart appears incorrect on the matter of fact. Thus Hegel refers, at 153, when he comes to **Cause** as the next category, to understanding's "readiness to use the relation of cause and effect". He explicitly contrasts this with how it "bristles up against the idea of substance". Is McTaggart, in commenting, too much on the side of analytical reason, not allowing sufficient rope to synthetic Reason? Thus

Whenever it is proposed to view any sum of fact as necessary, it is especially the relation of causality to which the reflective understanding makes a point of tracing it back. (Hegel 153, *Zus.*)

This "relation does undoubtedly belong to necessity", yet "it forms only one aspect in the process of that category", Hegel continues here where, contrary to McTaggart, he denominates **Necessity** as a category, and just here, retaining simultaneously his emphasis upon it as a process. The category itself, apart from our naming of it, both is and has a process. In fact this is true of every category insofar as it emerges and disappears in a continuum, which yet does not imply denial or suppression of the discreteness of concepts (cf. *Enc.* 100(1)). That process equally requires the suspension of the mediation involved in causality and the exhibition of it as simple self-relation. This, after all, is Hegel's critique of explanation. If we stick to causality as such, we have it not in its truth. Such a causality

is merely finite, and its finitude lies in retaining the distinction between cause and effect unassimilated.

It looks as if McTaggart should rather have said that Causality is Necessity, when truly viewed, and not, if genuinely interpreting, have reduced the latter to the former. The distinction is only thus far or finitely valid while "these two terms, if they are distinct, are also identical" (153, *Zus.*). But this is to anticipate. Yet in a similar way Necessity unfolds the contours of the originally posited Being. The Causality which Necessity later emerges as is a causality more profoundly understood through being thus derived. So it is not only the final category of the dialectic which, then inexplicably, is essentially Result. This applies to every step of it as Advance (239(b)) from the Beginning (238(a)). These are stages of the Speculative or Synthetic Method in process of becoming identical with the Speculative or Absolute Idea. This category of **Method** (*Enc.* 227f.), the "reception of the object into the forms of this notion" which is the Notion, is a subdivision of "Cognition proper". This, in turn, along with Volition, forms part of "Cognition in General". This, again, differentiates the category of **Life**, as formally its antithesis, so as to form the final synthesis of **The Absolute Idea**. This, in turn, is the perfection of the category of **THE IDEA**, the final one at top level, so to say,, after **THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION** and **THE OBJECT**. These are the three categories making up the "Doctrine of the Notion", which succeeds this of Essence. As final the Idea, essentially *ab-soluta*, is no longer confined to the specifications for a category and so of necessity (cf. 157) will go forth in free self-alienation as what we call Nature (244). That very going forth, however, is one with as essentially prefacing a more complete Return (the "parousial" moment) to a self-interiority, which is not a mere interiorisation, including all in unity. This is Hegel's interpretation of the Delphic advice to Socrates to "know thyself". This could not possibly be taken as a call for self-limitation, hostile to the very essence of philosophy as perfecting, again, (the form of) religion, which it may yet unconditionally respect as "the highest praxis" (liturgy, *leitourgia*, service) and not, as sometimes is asserted, as "handmaid" (*ancilla*) to it. A handmaid does not formally perfect the lady or, here, represent the Content more perfectly than the latter. Philosophy, rather, is the Lady and supreme *consolatrix*, as we find in the martyr-theologian Boethius. As such she, philosophy, *sophia*, never less than *sancta*, is the object or aim of religion as, in the Dominican theological tradition especially, contemplation is the perfection and aim of Christian life. To have contrasted contemplation against love, as more "active" (as von Balthasar did in his study of the saint of Lisieux), does not "go to the ground" at all.

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The import of these categories of Substance and hence of Causality is that the formal Actuality and Possibility (of the Thing in isolation, *praeclisio*) implies the real Actuality and Possibility of the thing as connected with others.⁶ This is just Causality and there is indeed a circle, as we move from Causality to Substance and back again, whether or not Hegel may legitimately reflect it in the dialectic without invalidating it.

McTaggart, anyhow, asserts (*Commentary* 157-161) that the Absolute, as a category of the GL exclusively, is "not properly deduced" from Imer and Outer, "nor is Contingency properly deduced from the Modus of the Absolute". It would have been better, he thinks, to leave out the Absolute and (narrow) Actuality as found in the GL. Thus in the *Encyclopaedia* we have a valid transition from Imer and Outer (to Substance). This, however, makes the remarks on Spinoza less appropriate in the *Encyclopaedia* here under Substance (than in GL under Absolute, but cf. *Enc.* 151, *Zus.*) in view again of the different senses of Substance for the two thinkers. For Hegel its whole nature is in the Accidents, which for Spinoza are unreal.

If necessity is causality, anyhow, then Substance has itself to be cause, has to "cause itself" even. Causality is categorical to **Actuality** and so to its own actuality. Yet the "accidents" which thus proceed are indeed accidents. They are contingent, that is to say, with a contingency necessarily determined to be such within necessity as the actual, that which manifests itself as nought other than Manifestation and Revelation itself or as such, as "show", to borrow and maybe analogically transform an earlier term. We know from Hegel's philosophy of religion, inclusive of religion's treatment in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, that there is continuity here with the main positive tenets of what he calls, accordingly, "the absolute religion". The hypostatic union of Absolute Mind with an individual human nature, in which it takes death to itself or rather, again,

⁶ We may think here, as an example and maybe more than that (if McTaggart the atheist is right in deducing that only persons exist), of the concept of the Mystical Body of Christ. There, as in *Christo*, where one receives (communion) "all or a thousand receive" it (*sumit unus sumunt mille*), the common life, its substance. This is striking confirmation of Hegel's doctrine that the content of religion and of philosophy is the same, under a different form (as it is, thirdly, the content of Art). A reading of the book called *Self-Abandonment to Divine Providence* (J.-P. de Caussade) reinforces the impression, as do other correspondences I have cited here. One may also consult the physicist-philosopher Douglas Hofstadter's *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, Basic Books, Inc. 1979, in regard to philosophy and art on this matter of a common Content.

manifests that death too is not outside of it (nothing is nor could be this), runs through the whole of rational humanity. That is to say, one misunderstands if one racks the sources to determine whether or not that one is *the* One. All are in all. Each, as identical with absolute subjectivity, is the One, having the unity of all within itself, herself, himself. The one chosen, the one sent, these are *religious* categories of imperfect form, taken from a religious or prophetic culture only implicitly philosophical. Thus the ancient Jews especially, as taking this implication as far as it could go while staying within its own religious limits, could be called "a nation of philosophers", as Porphyry perceived them. As chosen therefore they at the same time chose themselves as, differently, Eckhart, whom Hegel quotes, was later to say that "the eye with which God sees me is the eye with which I see God". This, again, was a perception within absolute religion laying the ground for absolute idealism within or as philosophy, perfect as to form. One should not see this as a denial of the dogmatic *on the level with* the dogmatic or religious sphere where it belongs, since it is precisely the *transcendence*, as to form, of that sphere. In just such a way Hegel explains without denying the Fall of Man or that God created the world or that God as believed in as existing did so, i.e. this is equivalent to thought thinking itself alone and *thus* brooking no denial. Themes, like those of election or mission, are themselves here "thematized" and thus find their fulfilment. Mystery, like the Contingent, is integrated into Necessity.

So to be dogmatic about this transcendence of dogma would be straight contradiction. Therefore the Content itself must be brought under the rubric of Freedom. This will not be to reduce it to the aesthetic mode but to save or finally reunite the aesthetic with the ethical and, here, with transcendental religious claims. In this sense it was said, "Believe me for the very work's sake", not, that is, by a mere causal inference but as seeing the personal, absolute personality indeed, in the "work" as beautiful or "glorious". To behold "the glory of the Lord" is to step beyond argument, beyond the piecemeal assembling of what has no parts, since it is perfectly whole. Faith, it was said, is "the substance of things hoped for", not a remedy for subjective uncertainty.

Substance anyhow, Hegel reminds us, is met with "as the principle of Spinoza's system" (151, *Zus.*), as, in Aristotle too, Being is Substance (*ousia* as transcending *hypokeimenon* or *sub-stratum*). McTaggart really has no good reason not to accept the choice to comment just here upon a monistic predecessor. Thus Hegel himself emphasises the great differences between Spinoza's system and his own, as touching Substance particularly and the place which it "takes in the system of the logical idea", property of

no or, rather, of every philosopher. It is "an essential stage in the evolution of the idea" though "not the same with absolute Idea". It is, again, the idea "under the still limited form of necessity". This may make one wonder again if McTaggart has rightly denied (limited) necessity to be a category within the "chain" of categories, despite the appearance of circularity with respect to causality. This is only a circle, after all, if Necessity and Causality, as named in the dialectic, are strictly identified. Yet such "empty" or "formal" identifications are specifically excluded and transcended in the very method which is dialectic itself, which discovers "identity in difference", rather, or actual contradiction, demanding a negation, at every step.

So "it is true that God is necessity" or even "the absolute Thing". Yet, and beyond such genuine identifications, God is "no less the absolute Person"; for Hegel, in view of his Trinitarian philosophy (of religion), the same as absolute Personality. "That he is the absolute Person however is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never reached" as it is implied that Hegel, following upon Leibniz, does. So it falls short of the true notion of God which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity.

As forming the true notion (of God) this religious consciousness is implicitly itself philosophical. Only thus can Hegel consistently encapsulate this assertion within his philosophy, as there is no doubt that he does. The "ecumenical" difficulties this may present are extrinsic to the matter in hand and so may not legitimately deflect our gaze. Yet we may note that Hegel does not explicitly deny that this true notion is found in "religious consciousness" as such, where worthy of the name. Implicit here, anyhow, would be the judgement that a philosopher, in his particular apprehension of the content in his religious consciousness, which as human he ought to have, it is surely implied, apprehends precisely this one and only Content. This will hold good whatever the imperfections or perfections inherent in the form of his religious formation and consciousness.

It may surprise that Hegel finds limitation in "the Oriental" or even "Jewish" view of the frailty and transience of "the finite world". He himself, after all, repeatedly affirms of it not merely frailty and transience but actual falsity, where seen, that is, in abstraction from the Absolute (taking shape now from Substance to the Idea). The illusion or *maya*, that is, is itself illusion, to be literally "seen through". This is Hegel's position as stated at the end of the "Philosophy of Spirit" (*Enc.* III), in explicit dialogue with Oriental tradition as he knew it. The finite is, again, a kind of *signum formale*, not perceivable as such, i.e. intrinsically, since not itself having being. This is the essence of absolute sign, that it is negatively absolute. In the end it is nothing other than the relation not of

sign but of that to which the signification is made, viz. a consciousness, to what is signified, the *res*, in this case the Infinite or Absolute. Nor is it implied that such an Absolute must have the reciprocal relation to the particular consciousness relating to it. Such a denial, however, may provoke denial of the reality of such a finite consciousness or subject considered on its own or abstractly, *cum praecisione*, as is implicit in the saying of Eckhart's above and, arguably, in the whole philosophic and religious tradition of the one *intimior me mihi*, closer to me than I am to myself (St. Augustine).

Yet this "Oriental view of the unity of substance certainly gives the basis for all real further development". It is, however, "marked by the absence of the principle of the Western world, the principle of individuality". This, he says, to repeat from a previous chapter, first "appeared under a philosophic shape, contemporaneously with Spinoza, in the Monadology of Leibniz." He could hardly be more "ecumenical". What he is thinking of, under Leibniz, is surely the theory that each monad contains or gives a window upon all the others, has the unity of all within itself as McTaggart will later express the same insight without just there referring to Leibniz. Leibniz thus "thematizes" the dignity of personality proclaimed in the Christian (and yet Judaic) Gospel as "what you do to the least of these you do to me" and later universalised by the man Paul ("Who suffers and I do not suffer?"). This process is later completed in Kant's characterisation of the person (*persona*) as an End in herself, "masking" all that is particular, contingent or perishable.

From all these points of view Hegel can make short work of the malicious and/or stupid charge of atheism brought against Spinoza. Rather, theism itself modulates into "atheism" intrinsically (in a sense analogous to that in which the ancient Israelites were reckoned atheists by the surrounding idolaters). God becomes man as man is seen to be God, the one enabling the other as a famous liturgical prayer expresses it when the wine and the water are mingled or "exchanged", as at the wedding at Cana in Galilee, according to the story. It is unworthy of a philosopher not to think of these things, these associations and resonances. He will be pretending.

So what Spinoza is saying is that God "alone really is", a strange form of atheism maybe. Here Hegel urges that "the true God" is known, truly if imperfectly, outside the bounds of Christendom, just as many Christians know him equally imperfectly and so "are as much atheists as Spinoza". All this was distasteful to McTaggart no doubt as calling in question his own (professed) atheism, but it is essential to Hegel all the same. There is no invitation or call to "skip a line" where God is mentioned, if it is Hegel

we profess to expound and study. Still, Spinoza "defrauds the principle of difference or finitude of its due". His system "holds that there is properly speaking no world" and "should rather be styled Acosmism". Hegel then appears to say, in the next few lines, that Spinoza is free of "the crime of Pantheism" but that "the philosophy which is Acosmism" (Spinoza's) "is for that reason certainly pantheistic". He seems to mean, if we prescind from a possible "tongue in cheek" mood, that for Spinoza, or himself surely, God is, *qua* God, everything, all (*panta*). This would indeed be pan-theism or, we might say, *omnitheism*, which would be but the essence of normal Judaeo-Christian piety, as mystical as the highest ecstasies going by that name. Pantheism, however, as meaning that "finite things in their finitude" and "in the complex of them" just are as such God, is too absurd ever to have been believed by anyone.

He ends by deprecating Spinoza's putting substance "at the head of" his system as "a shortcoming in respect of form". "The defect of the content here is that the form is not known as immanent in it", but is, rather, "geometrical". Thus Substance in Spinoza, only approached by this "outer and subjective" form, remains "a dark shapeless abyss which engulfs all definite content" and "produces from itself nothing", since creation is "radically null", i.e. not (self-)manifestation, as in Hegel. Still, Spinoza too would have recited the Psalm declaring that "the heavens declare the glory of God... his handiwork", would he not? Substance, "intuitively accepted by Spinoza", requires all the same "a previous mediation by dialectic", such as it finds here in Hegel.

XVIII

CAUSALITY

"Substance is **Cause**", Hegel writes, "in so far as substance reflects into self as against its passage into accidentality..." (153). Here he sets the profound tone for this passage. Causality, he implies, is a kind of abstraction from full reality. It is only if we consider Substance apart from its necessary relation to accidents, as Inner to Outer, as Whole to parts, as Force to its exertion, that we can characterise it as a cause. By Substance, it is perfectly clear, Hegel is thinking in the first place of Mind, of the Notion itself as candidate for Cause. He is thinking, that is, of God. Hence the paragraph contains an implicit critique of the kind of "natural theology" that considers its work done after demonstrating that the world needs a "First Cause", called God.

Mind, Substance, is cause, however, only "in so far", only as abstract. The deeper truth is that any thought (divine idea) whatever is identical with the Essence, with Mind as such. That the mind becomes what it knows is an ancient philosophical axiom, as saying what knowledge has to be. As for causing Being specifically, absolute idealism answers that Being is *an* idea, a category, like any other, with which, however it at or in the end identifies the *Absolute* Idea as itself the true being:

Die Methode ist der reine Begriff, der sich nur zu sich selbst verhaelt: sie ist daher die einfache Beziehung auf sich, welche Sein ist. Aber es ist nun auch erfuelltes Sein, der sich begreifende Begriff, das Sein als die Konkrete, ebenso schlechthin intensive Totalität. (GL II, p.572: the remaining page and a half bears directly upon this, q.v.)

The "passage" (into accidentality) is the relation outside of which substance is not to be thought at all, i.e. it is the *Relationship of Substantiality* (150), which is subsection (a) of the third part C. – ACTUALITY, of the Doctrine of Essence, preceding now subsection (b) *Relationship of Causality* before we come, thirdly, to (c) *Reciprocity of Action and Reaction*, leading into "The Doctrine of the Notion" (all as is presented in William Wallace's translation).

Although, then, Substance "stands as the primary fact" (i.e. with "primary" used to indicate a kind of, logical priority, going deeper to the Ground of things than if we signalled a merely unreflected causal priority), yet it "suspends this reflection-into-self". It "suspends" this "bare possibility" (of God before creation), and, inseparably from its very being, what it is, "lays itself down as the negative of itself". *Thus* it "produces an Effect", it causes an effect as a cause must. Rather, in being essentially productive of an effect (or we might rather say, neologically, it is intrinsically elicitive of it) it *becomes* cause, causes itself to be a cause. This is an actuality, "though so far only assumed as a sequence" or as if it came after, which it does not. There is no "before" creation, as there can be no "before" time. But one is not applying "universal" logic to a concrete case here, but rather supplying the rationale of these categories in terms of categories already established, in the first place Substance. This actuality "is through the process that effectuates it at the same time necessary", as necessary as Necessity itself. The process, that is, is not literally a sequence¹ (153).

A very deep unravelling of our common-sense view of reality is taking place here. We need to remember that not only is the Inside the Outside but that, even more, the Outside is the Inside, as Substance is the primary fact. Despite, then, Hegel's distancing himself from Spinoza's "acosmism" (151, *Zus.*), he is more profoundly at one with him. The Accidents are indeed real in their way, but this "way" is a way of being in the Substance, in the Cause, even though made cause by this very effect (of there being a unitary system of accidents). Hence this effect *qua* effect is in the cause and is finally identical with it as not merely denominating one and the same indivisible reality but as itself one and the same Actuality and Necessity. This too is the final upshot of Aristotelian "realism", the conclusion of his metaphysics. Concerning Plato this has always been clear. So Thomas Aquinas considers that while finite things are essentially related to God yet God, as "absolute" or infinite, has no real relation to things but "only" to the idea of them within himself, with each and any of which divine or absolute essence has to be identical. This "only" indicates the contradiction within such realism.² To save or buttress the latter

¹ In the same way the "processions" (*processiones*) in Aquinas's Trinitarian theology are not at all "processes" (*processus*), give no embryonic licence for a "process-theology".

² Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia, 14, 5: "God sees things other than himself not in themselves, but in himself (*non in ipsis sed in se ipso*), inasmuch as his essence contains the likeness of things other than himself." Cf. 15, 1 ad 3: *idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia*, i.e., it would follow, as *modus*, not as "part". Such a

Aquinas points out that being caused, as created things are caused by God, does not belong to the essence of the thing caused. His analogy is that a man cannot but be capable of laughter, although this is no part of the human essence (*sic*):

Although being caused does not enter into the definition of the caused being, nevertheless it is consequent upon those things which are essential to it, since from the fact that something is being by participation it follows that it is caused by another.³

In speaking of "being by participation" Aquinas too introduces categories prior to causality or more primary, involving less of a separation of, in this case, creator and creation. Thus he speaks in his title for this *Tractatus* on Creation (though possibly these titular divisions do not go back to Aquinas himself in the form in which we have them) of "the procession of creatures from God". He distinguishes here, i.e. in the text following, a *processio ad extra* from a *processio ad intra*, i.e. the Trinitarian "processions". Yet the very fact of bringing *extra* and *intra* equally under *processio* anticipates Hegel's identification in a very good sense of "anticipates". Thus, having spoken first of creation, making to be, in the manner of an essentially Biblical theologian, Aquinas heads his next *quaestio* or topic, literally a seeking or "in-quisition" (searching out heresy after all, if not the heretics: what else does philosophy do?), *De modo emanationis rerum a primo*

term, however, strictly, defined and redefined, would never become *stricto sensu* "technical" or "professional", precisely because it is philosophical or concerned with the infinite or absolute. Thus, in a measure, to "profess" oneself religious is inevitably to fail to be it. This is the finitude of the specifically religious *form* of absolute spirit (*Enc.* 553f.). One seeks there to *become* a philosopher, as of course do the philosophers themselves. They seek *sophia*. That some mystics understand themselves better than do others, however, necessarily cuts right across this *a priori* division as imperfectly exemplifying it. Thus Hegel defines Christianity as "the religion of consolation", to which the modern Carmelite saint of Lisieux implicitly replies, with Hegelian ring: "my only consolation is to have none". One spoke of "the obscuration of her faith", precisely what she called her sole consolation, the way to go, in a word. In this tradition, with some variation, stand also the words cited by Chesterton of his grandfather: "I believe that I would thank God for my creation even if I knew I were a damned soul". The Nietzschean eternal return of time, as dialectically implying time's dialectical destruction, stands in this same development.

³ *Licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem eius, quod est causatum, tamen consequitur ad ea quae sunt de eius ratione; quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participatione est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio.* Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, Ia 44, 1 ad 1.

principio, as bringing the particular Biblical conception under a more general or basic philosophical one, emanation, as Hegel too will root himself in Plato and Platonism. This final allegiance of Aquinas's thought is increasingly recognised by contemporary Thomists such as David Burrell.⁴

In Hegel's text, quite logically, causality is examined under the (implicit) rubric of a First Cause, causing itself to be cause and in that sense, often missed, *causa sui*. "The cause consequently is in its full truth *causa sui*... the absolute truth of the cause" and not "a mere formalism", as stated, Hegel says, in Jacobi's *Letters on Spinoza*. In this sense Hegel deprecates, again, defining God "essentially as cause" and not as "the ground of things". "Cause" is just not worthily or consistently predicated of the Infinite.

Even in the finite cause... we can see this identity between cause and effect in point of content. The rain (the cause) and the wet (the effect) are the self-same existing water. In point of form the cause (rain) is dissipated or lost in the effect (wet): but in that case the result can no longer be described as effect; for without the cause it is nothing, and we should have only the unrelated wet left (153).⁵

McTaggart dismisses such examples as all too particular, but it is not Hegel's habit to rest his proofs upon examples, as it were inductively. He rather takes the illustration which might help his purpose. His point is that the "identity in fact" of cause and effect, as we speak of them, "is the absolute content itself". Here he again moves back to or merely recalls the

⁴ Cf. David Burrell, "Aquinas's Appropriation of *Liber de causis* to Articulate the Creator as Cause-of-Being", in *Contemplating Aquinas* (ed. Fergus Kerr, O.P.), SCM 2003, London. Another paper in this collection of conference papers, by Philip L. Reynolds, "Philosophy as the Handmaid of Theology: Aquinas on Christ's Causality", points in the same direction, viz. of a reduction or deconstruction of causality. Reynolds finds that there is no final coherence in Aquinas's account of how Christ's life or actions or indeed humanity *cause* all grace and salvation efficiently or instrumentally, as he nonetheless asserts. There is a certain amount of "analogical reasoning" but "no way to determine what it adds". That's the beauty of it, some might say, and indeed, as we have suggested of Hegel's thought, the final upshot or category might well be of the aesthetic, not at all to be viewed as reductive however, since it is the essence of causality itself which is here "deconstructed" or, better, "reconstructed". Therefore no denial of causality *on its own terms* is at issue. The terms themselves are subverted, as was already implicit in Hume.

⁵ It is interesting that in Finnish one does not say that it is raining or, presumably, that wet has been caused. One says simply "There is water".

determining context of the first and constitutive example, that of God and world, Substance and (in his defined sense) Accidents.

When we speak of cause it "is qualified as having absolute independence and a subsistence maintained in face of the effect." This though is abstract separation, combated even by the earlier teaching that any divine idea, through which alone finite things are knowable absolutely (or to God), is one with the divine essence. In knowing his essence perfectly God knows it in every way (*modus*) that it is knowable.⁶ This "essence", that is, causes itself and nothing else. That is, it causes itself to be cause. That is, it in no sense is passive or caused or contingents or, least of all, a mere "brute fact" of Being.

But the identity that is the content is "no less also the form-characteristic". The content is itself formal, not some kind of material collection. Hegel emphasises this by saying that the cause both "makes itself a dependent being" (as not conceivable without the effect) and yet "does not for that reason vanish and leave the effect alone to be actual." We have to see through the effect to the cause. The effect has no other reality than to be this *signum formale* of absolute knowing, as we mentioned earlier. The dependency of the cause upon an (any) effect is itself "the reflection of the cause in itself, its primariness: in short, it is in the effect that the cause first becomes actual and a cause." All the earlier reasoning concerning the identity of self and other is re-confirmed here. The or a model for this would be the Trinitarian Father and Son.

We generally speak of cause in contexts of finitude and there, as Kant and others are right to point out, it really belongs. Yet cause and effect can be seen as "two separate existences... only when we leave the causal relation out of sight" although we then prolong it to an infinity of the "bad" kind, thus intimating its unreality in fact. Behind causality lies Necessity, something Absolute. Yet the Absolute cannot be something, some particular, but its whole content has to be formal. Thus it does not determine itself to be a cause, but to be Cause and hence to be Substance and Notion, if we look both backwards and forwards in the dialectic, in the Method which is Absolute Knowledge. In this sense it was said that *Thought thinks itself* and, indeed, thinks itself thinking as pure and entire

⁶ Cf. Aquinas, *Ibid.* Ia, 15, 2, basing himself upon Augustine, who says that the Ideas neither arise nor are destroyed and that anything thus mutable is "formed according to them" (*sed contra*, same article). What Aquinas adds or, at least, stresses is that God does not know these finite things as such, does not use finite categories, as later philosophy (Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, McTaggart) will express this.

Subject, having no object apart from itself infinitely and necessarily reflected⁷ or rather reflecting.

The element of representation involved in the dogma of creation as stated is that of conceiving the relationship between God and the natural universe through the inadequate category of causality, and consequently of setting the creator's self-identity, as the Cause, against that of the creatures as its effect, thus showing a lack of understanding of what, in truth, they are, namely, the inseparable moments of a unique, necessary, eternal, self-creative purpose, which is rather to be explained by the category of Imer Teleology. This means that God, by alienating himself into nature, in truth brings about only himself. If then, the proposition laid down by that dogma, that there is no Universe without God, is true, then no less true is the inverse proposition, omitted by the dogma, that there is no God without Universe.⁸ Both freedom and necessity are in a categorial sense destroyed here as being, in this sense, as it were too "personal" in the way in which we finitely first think persons or personality. They are, necessarily, in highest freedom, *more than* or beyond the personal, not, however, necessarily, less than personal. Personality is itself destined for, set towards, the trans-personal or, one might say with Heidegger, towards death, the latter defined by Hegel, however, perhaps wishing to recall St. Paul ("Death, where is thy sting; where, grave, thy victory?"), as "entry into spirit".

The dogma of course does not conceive. Only those who formulate it in their time do that. Dogma is thus open, like Scripture and texts generally, to endless hermeneutic amplification. It remains true that the inadequacy of a category, here causality, is identical with an inadequacy of understanding insofar as it is retained as a basic or ultimate category of thought. This inadequacy extends for Hegel to the form of predication itself or of judgment, without however involving him in self-refutation. God after all makes no judgements, since God is understood as Truth itself, the Good etc.

⁷ Thus and similarly Hegel says, in the *Phenomenology of Mind* and elsewhere, that divine revelation, as absolute, is and can only be revelation of this very principle, manifestation (epiphany, theophany) itself, and not of something else. In this sense John of the Cross said that God has spoken, speaks, "only one Word", which is himself. Trinitarianism, that is to say, anticipates the more perfect form of philosophy which thus interprets it, it may be, as dialectical triad for all religion can say. Thus spiritual things get "interpreted spiritually". Why though, unless because Spirit, *Geist*, is final reality, in which capacity alone surely it is called "holy", as "first and last"?

⁸ Cf. G. Rinaldi's article, "Religion, Absolute Knowing in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*".

Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content: and the distinction between them is primarily only that one lays down, and the other is laid down. This formal difference however again suspends itself, because the cause is not only a cause of something else, but also an effect of itself (153, *Zus.*).

Here we see that the so-called First or only cause is ultimately what is meant, Substance that is cause and *causa sui*. Anything else is, *qua* cause, even if in itself or abstractly finite, assimilated to this.

The finitude of things consists accordingly in this. While cause and effect are in their notion identical, the two forms present themselves severed so that, though the cause is also an effect, and the effect also a cause, the cause is not an effect in the same connexion as it is a cause, nor the effect a cause in the same connexion as it is an effect. (*Ibid.*)

It is impossible to understand this as mere lame reversal to the empirically plural series of causes and effects. Rather, what we see as a connexion of that kind is merely that "the two forms present themselves severed", that "things" are not in themselves, but rather in idea, modes of the Absolute Idea. This conception of severed presentation runs right through Hegel's thought. It is the original abstraction demanding reintegration in the identity of judgment, which however as a unity existing eternally and infinitely is not a mere *reuniting*. It is thus inadequately and hence falsely represented in the finite *semiotic* composition of subject and predicate.

XIX

RECIPROCITY

The effect, and Hegel speaks of the **Effect** here and even of effect *qua* effect (what we call the world or nature viewed formally), "as such has a being dependent on" the cause and is thus "different from" it (154). Equally, however, "such a dependence ... is reflection-into-self and immediacy". Not only, negatively, is it not part of the effect's definition or inner being to be an effect, as Aquinas saw but without apparently concluding thereupon to causality's abstractness as such, but the effect is not in truth dependent in the normal sense of dependence. That is, it reacts back upon its cause, as it were actively, though of course conceptually only, the whole point being that both effect and cause are abstract and finite notions. In thus constituting the effect the cause "is at the same time the pre-constitution of the effect", i.e. *the cause* is this. It is this, i.e. *qua* cause or "so long as the effect is kept separate from the cause". In looking beyond this separation Hegel does not commit himself to "pantheism" but rather reminds us that cause and effect have been found to be finite and hence untrue categories. "In God we live and move and have our being", the author of *Acts of the Apostles* reports them as proclaiming of the transcendent God they preached, even if here by means of a citation from "gentile" poetry.. The effect on its own, i.e. nature, is thus nothing, which is the polar opposite of pantheism, which identifies it with God, though, we are bound to add, just this on its own, *we saw*, makes it nothing. So not merely the different but the opposite is the same, i.e. both "are abstract and finite notions". Thus pantheism and theism, going one step further (or sideways), absorb one another, which is not pantheism in its usual meaning. So that it is not that the universe "has no grain" (the realist's querulous rejoinder) but that as being nothing its "grain" is God or the Absolute Idea, necessarily thus manifested. "Panentheism" is one name for this view.

There is a sense, here, in which Hegel, in "dethroning" cause, makes common cause, as we say, with Hume and Kant, unlike the later Neo-Scholastics whom he anticipates in so much. To this, though, one can add that he also, in a sense redeems those pillars of the Enlightenment, should they need such a redemption, taking philosophy one step further towards its consummation or to that state where, some might want to say, philosophy (or again, some might want to say, Christianity or religion or, for that matter, art, absolute spirit in a word) without God or "First Cause" becomes, as transcending the category of the **Object** (193), a step nearer to philosophy *within* God or *sancta sophia* herself as wholly "self-contained" in the sense already spelled out here.

The cause as cause is the effect's pre-constitution. That is, the effect is to be found constituted "in" the cause in idea, i.e. really. Notwithstanding, "There is thus already in existence another substance on which the effect takes place". It is "immediate", as following immediately upon this conception of effecting something in something (else), and thus "passive", yet "it is a substance, and it is therefore active also". Hegel says also (156, *Zus.*) that "the two sides" acting and reacting, the cause and the effect, should be "recognised for factors of a third and higher, which is the notion and nothing else". So we might think that the notion is already what is referred to in the earlier passage as passive. This is not the case though and the latter is rather "the substrate" so extensively discussed or rather expounded in his earlier Greater Logic. These successive categories of relation, from Inward and Outward through Substance and Accidents to Causality are not so much instances as aspects of the Absolute Relation which necessarily, as absolute, does not relate anything else existing independently and separately from itself as, again, *infinite self-relation* (157). Abstraction begins, rather, in taking it apart. This is why Hegel is so variously interpreted as theist or atheist, like Spinoza before him, though differently. He is, however, in direct line with Augustine and Aquinas (and therefore with the Judaic explosion represented in the collection we call the *New Testament*), for whom *ipsae relationes sunt personae* and conversely, so that the infinite self-relation, the unity in divine simplicity, would there be triadic, an apparent contradiction Aquinas does his best to reconcile. But nor can we say that Hegel's is a simple case of abstracting from this positive or concrete theological context, which he rather interprets, as he had made explicit in *The Phenomenology of Mind*. That the *Logic* does not make it "explicit" is not because it is merely implicit there but rather that it is the *Logic's* whole meaning and, especially, outcome. Hegel, that is, must be seen as a Trinitarian philosopher, with all

that that might imply for the relation between *theologia* and *philosophia*, to use Aristotle's terms now.

Necessity is being that is because it is [cf. WL, Suhrkamp 6 p.215f.]: it is the unity of being with itself, where being has itself as its ground; but the reverse is also true, that because it has a ground, it is not being, but simply shine, relationship, or mediation. Causality is this posited going-over of origina~~tive~~ being, the cause, into shine or mere positedness, and conversely of positedness into origina~~tive~~ness.¹

Necessity, Hegel also says here, is "absolute Negativity". This recalls Augustine's *non aliquo modo est, sed est, est*, said of God. Now why does Hegel dismiss this characterisation of God, repeatedly, as leaving us with empty abstraction, whereas he appears to see absolute Negativity as the badge of the absolutely concrete, of the Notion and, finally, of Thought? I wish I could answer these questions better than I do. Being, one might wish to say, can only be limited by being. Being is therefore infinite, unlimited, i.e. it has no essence, since essence is the principle of limitation making a thing to be this and not that. It is thus also the principle of negativity in "nature", of negation in logic. Anything in and by its essence negates every other thing, since also individuals have their essence (apart, that is, from the abstract Scotistic essence of in general being an individual) though, says Aquinas, we cannot know it. Thus in "This rose is red" the predicate, "red", stands for (*supponit pro*) just this rose that is being spoken about, whichever it is. There is no other way to account for the copula as identifying subject and predicate, as Hegel insists that it does. That is why he, for his part, finds predication false. If one denies this *suppositio* of the predicate as standing for the subject over again, like Frege, who makes of it a "concept" "predicated of" the subject in infinite regress (the predicate is predicated "of" and in this that I say now the predicate is thus predicated of "the predicate" and so on), then one has also to deny any function to "the bare copula". Yet the copula actually expresses identity, whether in thought or in being, at the same time as it, this word *est*, asserts and names being itself (as in Augustine's phrase above). That is, the two senses of *actus essendi* and *veritas propositionis*, later distinguished by Aquinas, are the same in their difference, as Hegel would say. That is, they are not absolutely or abstractly different, any

¹ Hegel, *Science of Logic*, original text at WL 6, p.239 (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1969), as quoted in English translation in Robert M. Wallace, *Hegel's Theory of Freedom*, 4.17. For "shine" one might read "Appearance" (EL 131) or seeming (*Erscheinung*).

more than are being and truth, which is being “in the mind” or in the mind only, a distinction that disappears or is no distinction in Hegel, nor is it, one might claim, in Aristotle, since mind or thought, *nous*, is itself absolute and *the* absolute, is spirit, *Geist*. The question of *tense* Aquinas introduces when thus discussing the *copula* (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, no. 22) is a finite aspect of human language as pertaining to nature, not logic, and is hence a question not of truth but of “correctness” (*Enc.* 172).

The predicate, then, stands for the same as does the subject, but in the manner of the predicate, i.e. as *connoting* the “denoted” subject (see our “The Supposition of the Predicate” in *The Modern Schoolman* LXXVIII, November 1999, pp.73-78). Thus “is a member of class C” cannot itself be read as “is a member of the class of things which are members of class C” and so on. Individuals, that is, have their essence, as do individual concepts, and this is a basis for Hegel’s resolution of negativity in and into the Notion. Thus in itself this, today, calls for a new effort within the Fregean school to save itself from being a mere product of Understanding (*Verstand*) and no more.

What is said here though, it seems clear, is that being is not the true being, abstractly, and yet it is, but *concretely*, as thought. Abstractly, it is absolute negativity, unless, as Hegel’s whole thought implies but does not say, it is absolutely analogous *in itself*, such that Augustine’s *non aliquo modo* says the same as *in omni modo*, every idea being identical with the Absolute, with “the divine essence” (Aquinas, ST, Ia Q15). Being, that is, is rather relationship, something at least presaged, again, in Trinitarian theology, where person and relation are not merely equated but are identified in what is *the* logical relation, viz. identity, a non-relation “really”. Yet being, necessity, is also mediation, which is, of course, thinking, again. This is the basic idealist stance. Thinking, furthermore, is subjective, not in the sense of limitation but absolutely, as we say that the thinker legislates for the universe, despite “liberalist” protests to the contrary. Nothing is “only” my opinion. Rather, “my” is taken from “I”, the universal of universals. Only and eternally I am. Therefore, we beget one another, again eternally and at every moment, as Hume darkly envisaged. The mutual solipsism is no longer vicious. Whatever one identifies as the external or “objective” marks of the I, of any person, of me, could equally be said of someone else as if that first person had never been, said then, in the last resort, of a *Doppelgänger* as second or third person. Hence, it can be argued, I am you (“Whoever hears you hears me”, taken unrestrictedly) or I am he or she (“Whatever you do to her you do to me”). This corresponds to all that Hegel says about thinking and knowledge as it does also to all that we can mean by love, as volition

belongs to "Cognition in general" (223, 233; cp. 159). It is not said, however, nor even suggested, that the Incarnation of *The Creed* is no more than the supreme *illustration* of a common relation in the collectivity but that there is ultimately no such collectivity; persons as such, or as realised in their truth, are *in Christo* or, to use the true form for this content, one with their exemplar as itself their true and most perfect unity. I, *qua* I, can never merely "mean" (*meinen*), opine, try as I might. This is philosophy as *hoechste Gottesdienst*, concerned with "religion and nothing but religion". This is the essential answer to the recent objection to Hegel, in the form of a question, from the side of orthodoxy by Fr. Daniel P. Jamros in his article "Hegel on the Incarnation: Unique or Universal?" in *Theology and Philosophy* 56 (1995). The truly unique is the individual as universal. Philosophically, thought thinks only, i.e. uniquely, itself. *Ecce homo*, a term deriving from Greek *homos*, the same, as is also the Latin *humus*, ground(!), from which again comes *homoios*, like, which could etymologically support the Hegelian parsing of not merely "like" but "different" as "the same" or both as "sameness in difference", What is like to us is the same as us, in that case (compare German *Leiche*, corpse, while also perhaps *gleich*, the same). Nothing, that is, further, is "only" or univocally an analogy, Hegel's Heracleitian point, as one might say.

But we are by no means out of the wood yet, of this demanding transition from Essence to the Notion, in Hegel's terms. The Notion! The word "Testament", mentioned above, means covenant, as between two or more. Use of this term here instances the figurative imperfection of the religious representation of the Content, such as the Judaic culture of that time was most at home with. God sent his emissaries to and concluded treaties with men. In philosophy, though, there is no longer two but one, as in the aphorism "I am that". This is here worked out in Logic itself, in the form of its forms (*forma formarum*), especially in the section headed "The Subjective Notion", which we shall shortly come to. So although Logic is prolonged into Nature and Spirit it is Logic itself which elicits them, thus in a manner containing them as the part which stands for or "accomplishes" the whole as, in the developed "Concept" (notion), every part thus stands for the whole (160). Thereby, however, both part and whole are abolished in their, as in this, very notion. The only notion left standing is the notion of the Notion or, rather, the self-thinking Notion itself as Truth, all finite notions being false. That's where we are going here, while the *idea* of nature here, even or especially in its going forth, is not precisely that same nature as abstracted from logic as we tend to find it, for an obvious reason, in Heidegger's discussion of and in *Being and Time*.

"Spirit" does not first fall into time, but exists as the primordial temporalizing as temporality. Temporality temporalizes world time, in whose horizon "history can "appear" as an occurrence within time. Spirit does not fall into time but factual existence "falls," in falling prey, out of primordial, authentic temporality. This "falling", however, itself has its existential possibility in a mode of temporalizing that belongs in temporality. (M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, transl. Joan Stambaugh, SUNY series, NY 1996, paragraph 436)

This concluding section to Heidegger's unfinished *magnum opus*, together with other scattered indications, shows how his whole thinking took place, quite properly indeed, as a kind of effort of response to Hegel. One might even regard it, as many do, as the Catholic or "realist" response to the latter's "absolute idealism", to which Heidegger refers in these pages with respect for Hegel's labours, his "arduous struggle". Hegel haunts his book throughout, which is one good reason why he does not advert explicitly to him more often, reserving extended comment to this final (penultimate, strictly speaking) extended section.

Meanwhile, we have to "assimilate" the distinction between cause and effect (153, *Zus.*), terms distinct but identical (in their reference). They are "one and the same content". It is laughable how some commentators "bristle up" against this assertion, as if convicting Hegel of a crass error indeed. Yet an endless series of causes is equally an endless series of effects, since even the very first cause causes itself to be a cause, while even the very last effect is also "an effect of itself", since it, "in its identity with the cause, is itself defined as a cause, and at the same time as another cause,... and so on for ever."

The effect is only posited as effect with reference to the cause. It is, immediately, reflected into self. Causality passes into **Action and Reaction**, or **Reciprocity**. Thus the progress *ad infinitum* of causes and effects is "really and truly suspended", though we are only halfway to the alternative. We have now a "self-contained relationship", "one and the same thing" in Reciprocity, but this "only distinguishes turn and turn about", retaining the other even if only as "equally supposed" in the other of its other, effect in cause and cause in effect. The aim, it is clear, is to yield the field of vision to relation as such, in a unity no longer eliciting a destructive abstraction.

We might try here to think abstraction concretely, non-abstractly, that is to say. A certain concession to the finite historical mode might be advisable. Abstraction has been a central topic of philosophical thinking, distinguishing man from the animals in the dawning of his intelligence. Due to dialectic in its cyclical aspect reflection, not only our own reflection here, returns upon the Greek clarity concerning the open secret that in speech we identify what our thought has first separated, such as the rose and its redness. This is a logical doctrine about predication as such and so has nothing to do with the intent and psychological character of sentences, such as whether they are speculative or practical, defining or contingently descriptive. Even hesitation between indicative and imperative mood makes much less difference than has been supposed.

Thus from the point of view of logic the rose's being red or the wet weather's being a good thing from the farmers' point of view (J. O. Urmson's example in "On Grading", *Mind* 1950) fall under the same net. Here we can see how the whole scientific project lies under the sign of abstraction, the whole creation of language rather. Just to name or to form the idea of weather is to separate it from any effects it is here and now having upon us or upon the animals. It becomes an object for thought and study.

Language was surely devised as a remedy for the fate that fell upon us of habitual and continual concept-formation, a "sea-change" in our being. For we were and are able to entertain just one concept at a time. So thought itself hides from us the simple unity of the world and existence, where all is a continuum, the category of "thing" not yet having been invented. From this we pluck out, abstract, both the rose and the red rose indifferently. The emergence of language might be dramatised as the frenzied effort of our young species, bewildered by the paralysis, the morbid excrescence of continual obsessive abstraction that had fallen upon it, to restore things to how they were, like the wish to be rid of an imagined gift of X-ray vision, to see again the fresh surfaces of "things". But, as is the way of the dialectic, they could only be restored with a difference, the difference that is poetry.

The project of language itself may conceivably be one day renounced in a return to a symbolic and intuitive existence foreshadowed now in the work of artists. Or there might be just one word, substantive and no longer a mere name, in which all the secrets of the world are unlocked or, that would be to say simultaneously, locked. But who would speak it? Or is it, as in theology, being eternally spoken in an eternally actual utterance inseparable, even if really distinct, from its speaker. A commitment to dialectic has to open us to these perspectives, since as a total shift in truth-

theory it leaves nothing untouched. It might seem to make our cognitive claims more modest although it is actually widening our scope with a view to a surer grasp upon and identity with a much greater and truer reality than rationalism was prepared to envisage.

At first then one thinks of abstraction as the dawning of intelligence, of intelligibility rather if we suppose a dormant potentiality in the creature becoming man. It is a light, all the same, the *intellectus agens* of later philosophy, which whether the subject will or not streams out from him upon all he sees. We imagine him picking out substance, general natures, of a mammoth maybe, eventually of himself as subject. But our own principle of dialectic, stimulated indeed by our imagination which makes all things real, forces us over into the opposite notion. It came slowly, abstraction, something started to go wrong in the prehistoric consciousness, things really began to fall apart and become indeed "things", first then. Would the centre hold? He, and she, didn't know. The very sky seemed to be tearing apart, clouds drew away from their background, that unitary and so beautiful picture later caught by the Impressionists, or any painters at all. Birds appeared in the mind without their song, husbands without their wives. He saw women prior to their characteristics, with faces that might have been men's faces; in his mind snow drew away from its whiteness, helping him to feel the beginnings of gratitude for its brilliant colour, tempering the winter darkness.

But mostly he suffered violent disorientation. During the millennia in which it lasted disquiet grew to thunder, neuroses abounded, violence and fear. Nothing was given any more, everything mocked him with its converse possibility. When the sun came out he thought it might have rained, when he embraced his wife he knew he could throttle her instead. He might even eat his children if he felt like it, or sacrifice them to some god. Cries, shouts, fierce gestures, sometimes group conflicts with little rhyme or reason, became the order of the day. He could not ask himself why all this had happened, but only feel it, like a dog faced with an inexplicable personality change, seemingly for the worse, in its master.

But over the centuries, in his rough throat, a pattern began to develop, as he strove to piece together again what the new light inside him was tearing apart. He had begun to feel heat as separate from the fire causing it; he needed to make it clear again to himself and others that it was the fire that was hot. At first he gestured, then there were typical, even representative sounds as he strove to reunite, to identify, the fire and its heat. As he made the same sounds over and over again, like a bird singing but with more purpose, more intent, even refining the song to greater clarity, so as to be better understood, so his throat and its organs began to adapt, generation

by generation, to his needs. Thus speech, as a truly desperate remedy, might have been born. It is of course a picture, and not merely that but a picture of a picture, that of temporality or temporal process. By that I would imply that the McTaggartian temporal B/series is, as follows from his own position, not temporal at all but known divinely or absolutely all at once or, rather, in one and hence immutable act, such as we call and aspire to as "logical method", as contemplation, itself that one act, so entirely one that it "acts itself" only.

Rudolf Steiner speculated that before the advent of language man must have possessed a gift of general clairvoyance, all reading one another's minds. But if one suspends our imagined dawning of abstraction there will have been nothing there to read but the identical reflection of "the world" in each and every case. But that is impossible, as rendering otiose man as such. Therefore what was perceived in clairvoyance was, always and everywhere, this other, in every case, or, it seems clear, "sameness in difference" and *nothing else*, I and its other, *its* other, note, by the principle of polarity Hegel has here established. Furthermore, however, it seems clear that without abstraction, of moment from moment, there was no time. That illusion, or representation, had yet to be born. "Yet", of course, implies time, which means we are ourselves presenting a picture here. Rather, we have to say that mind was at the end of the logical process, but at the end as contained in the beginning. This is precisely the truth, directly apprehended, by the laborious process called here Logical Method. In other words the mind as thus known, of the community, is Absolute Mind, precisely the position, in this respect at least, of McTaggart. In protest against it we have only the one possible trump card. McTaggart has to show, namely, that this perfect union of particular minds such that every part is the whole, and the whole every part, is the very constitution of infinity. Can he do this? Could this be infinity? If we say, unhesitatingly, no, can he simply reply "Why not?" What more is it that you know? Or why can a surely determinate threefold being be infinity, according to you, and this not? There, for the moment, this matter must rest, until we approach the completion of this our examination of Logical Method.

At least one reason for our hesitation is that by the Christian theology, which we find Hegel embracing as the only rational account, one God has made all "things" by his one Word and he and that Word are one divine nature in their difference. Thus when Hegel speaks of the divine nature in its full truth being logically (not temporally) first revealed in its truth in incarnation this latter can finally be found to be just this supra-organic unity of all spirits as spirit, while if it is not, if we must stay with the more

literal representation of this as accomplished fully in just the one mediator in whom all are reborn in unity, again, then there can be no objection brought *from that side* against this alternative specification or determination of infinity, necessarily though a determination within the freedom of indetermination, of thought thinking itself alone. If the infinite is determinable for thought at all then all determinations, it begins at least to seem, must equally serve. Now this, indeed, is the indeterminism constituting the divinity of Nature. It is equivalent to there just being a world, any world whatever, as the pledge of creative divinity. Here we need not depend on thoughts of time, ever-shifting determinations, as of a dance returning *ever* upon itself, Dante's picture of Paradise and just therefore, i.e. as determinate, a picture, one among many possible ones.. Nature is then God's word, but by God's decree, as the theologians say. By this phrase, however, is intended the first establishment of Necessity by and in absolute freedom, as being otherwise inexplicable. The divine relations themselves, by contrast, are not and cannot be established thus in necessity save as this yields place to the eternally free generative procession, from which, however, there is no good reason to distance *within* that Word as substance some unspecified world as nought other than that Word's manifestation or "shine", speaking now in explicit Christian terms but as rediscovered in philosophy, pushed on by what was once suggested to it, as nothing can forbid. Some suggestions, e.g. the roundness of the world, have that effect. It follows also, as it may seem somewhat enthymematically, however, as the philosopher saw, I mean Leibniz, that this that appears is necessarily the best. Add to this also that mind alone is mind's object-in-subject everywhere and we see the truth, by this logical method here, of Eckhart's statement that the eye with which I see God is the eye with which God sees me and conversely.

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Speech, though, language, is as a remedy incomplete, like most desperate measures. This is why Hegel says that all judgments are false, only seeming thereby to refute himself. In judgment the subject and predicate, namely, are identified while remaining different, identified, that is, in their difference. A variant upon this, of course, in the end stands for the truth of his whole philosophy and not for falsity. Here though, in language, as analysed in "formal logic" by the Understanding (*Verstand*), he sees falsity. The copula signifies identity between the rose and its redness, which yet remain distinct, like the two parties in Action and Reaction

reciprocally. It is as if one initially assumes that there could be a rose without colour or this rose even without this particular colour.

This, in general, is why the truth will be the Notion, the unitary continuum and not the discrete continuum. This unity is more absolute by far than any organic union, than life. All is in each, each in all, as is finally made explicit at just this point in the dialectic, in the *Encyclopaedia* rather, on the threshold of the Notion. The Notion, however, is not an exterior word, it could not be this. It is, therefore, the point at which language is transcended as no longer serving, though we are forced to use language to express this self-negation. Language thus stops precisely at this category of Action and Reaction, where causality is transcended and one identifies two things or more, as in the syllogism, in their very separateness of conception, such as cause and effect.

The remedy for abstraction has, all the same, to pass through language, as, Christians say, the New Testament requires the Old in order itself to fulfil it. A careful preparation is needed and it is indeed the promise of abstraction, as of *Verstand*, that is fulfilled in dialectical *Vernunft*, Reason, the remedy being one suited to incompleteness merely, not to disease. Such a remedy, however, we are indicating, passes properly beyond language, as the Notion is no longer bound to time and space. In the traditional terms, the *vita contemplativa*, which Aristotle had identified with study simply, *theoria*, does not belong to this life but to eternity. This makes of the scholar or "recluse", as *monachos*, an "eschatalogical icon". In Hegel's conception, however, it is Mind itself which makes this journey, returning to where it had ever abided, itself the path as the Orientals say, or, he says, as a variant upon this simply, "Death is the entry into spirit", death, of course, "ungratefully" casting away the life making her conceptually possible. All subjecthood, anyhow, is thus absolute and the principle of universality itself is personality and contrariwise. All this is the concern of these final pages of the "Doctrine of Essence".

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On this progressive relation to or rather disentangling of the dialectic from language we can, I think, usefully consider some positions taken by McTaggart in the course of his *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* of 1897, where he as it were takes issue with himself in true dialectical fashion. Thus he says that Hegel "uses so many terms as names of particular categories that none are left to be used more generally". These last two words beg some questions. But he goes on, "For example, to what does the

whole dialectic process apply? ... Being or Reality ... Existence (another view)? But Hegel has already appropriated these names".

Here one might ask, why not just say with Hegel that "Logic is the science of the pure Idea", i.e. of the whole or Absolute in as far as not alienated into nature, and not of Being, Reality or Existence? These are indeed, when correctly viewed, categories within the Logic and not names (mis)appropriated from their more normal (correct) use. That alone explains how Hegel can dismiss "those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea" (McTaggart, 232). Hegel's presentation of Existence, that is, is just how he understands existence. This might seem more difficult to sustain in the case of **Mechanism** or **Chemism** (but whoever heard of chemism anyway? Hegel says it is "a category ... generally put under the head of mechanism", though it is listed with Mechanism and Teleology as one of the three forms of **Objectivity**: 194, *Zus.*), say, while **Life**, the category, we may take as Hegel's view of what life is, and why it cannot stand for the pure Idea or Absolute, either in reality or as name.

McTaggart, that is, deviates interestingly from Hegel. Thus he criticises him in the opposite sense over Being. For he seems to imply that Hegel had indeed here just taken the common notion of Being, without "appropriating" it for any idea of his own (as he says of other categories), and then made it more "comprehensive" than he had a "right" to do. A third possibility, the true one, is that Hegel gives a deeper and original sense to Being thus abstracted, which he regards as correct as against ordinary usage. This is not the same as a stipulative appropriation. Thus he points out that Being simply is, is one with, the beginning of thinking. He does not make some "mediated" being philosophy's starting-point, as McTaggart charges (cf. *Enc.* 86).

● Of course there can only be *a priori* names for things in this way if there is Absolute Mind, Absolute Knowledge. Perhaps McTaggart did not finally think this, but rather regarded nature, sense, the immediate, as intrinsic to thought's intelligibility, even though he finally denied reality to nature and sense, thus implying that thought too (at least as judgement) was "misperception". In the Absolute theory and praxis, like cognition and will, are fused. We may, that is, correct McTaggart as he wished to correct Hegel, though wishing also to maintain, in 1910, that "no other philosopher has penetrated so deeply into reality". It would be interesting here to investigate McTaggart's notion of "cosmology", as in his *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology* (1901). Is Hegel being "cosmological" if, as we assert here, he ventures to say, in his Logic (either version of it) what **Life**

is, thereby claiming to judge, or supersede, accounts in biology? What about analogy? On our view he is saying what life and causality *really* are or are "ideally" and hence, scientifically (*wissenschaftlich*), must be seen as. These two, he claims, being and the scientific "must", as meaning, in its entirety returning ever to the beginning, to identify how being ought to *be* seen as being precisely, are the same. This is the most radical response to Hume imaginable, though it is equally a concurrence in development. It is equally the procedure, the principle of religion and guides also the procedure of art as criterion for identifying its own presence. The supreme example of this is "I", where we cannot say what we would say or mean individually in defiance of this most universal term, thus identifying the reason why it was said, universally, that there can be no science of the individual, a principle not absent from Hegel's offering a philosophy of historical science. He is not then creating unique categories as steps in a *pre-creational* dialectic up to absolute self-knowledge, since the creation, in its actuality as *formal* necessity, is included as absorbed and thus "put by" (*aufgehoben*), as envisaged by the Apostle, though content to leave it in a future tense, "when God shall be all in all", just as Hegel *speaks*, at one point, of logic as God or absolute mind "before" creation, assuming, surely, that we understand that there is no time before time. This, perhaps, is what McTaggart thought the Logic *should* be, even though language *per se* seeks to enmesh it in the *Kosmos* and away from Necessity, to which we now return.

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When Hegel speaks of "another substance on which the effect takes place" (154) he is not merely referring to the convenient, as it were two-dimensional notion of a Substrate, the so to say pre-existent matter or unformed chaos of earlier thought. The "dark materials" are truly "his" (God's, the Idea's), in Milton's fine phrase (also finely appropriated by Philip Pullman) yet here belonging to the Notion itself. They belong entirely to the cause. At the same time their "existence", their independence, "so long as effect is kept separate from cause", shows the nullity or finitude of the causal relation along, therefore, with the idea of caused being. The immediacy of this is suspended. The effect, again, is necessarily pre-constituted, i.e. before or anterior to any real constitution of an effect, in that action of the cause in which cause as cause is anything at all (154). Action supplants being as ultimate or absolute relation, "one and the same on both sides" (155): "The cause assumed to be first is on account of its immediacy passive, a dependent being, and an effect."

We should not miss that when Hegel speaks of a first cause he will not here be abstracting from a representation of the First Cause, since this above all is the notion that he here deconstructs. Hegel goes much deeper than Kant, who stopped with the contradiction of the constitution of intellect objectively causing our formation of a purely subjective or less than valid notion of such causing. This was to fail to take Hume seriously (so Kant might just as well have slumbered on, thus far). Hegel does take Hume seriously, however, as a call to delving deeper beyond the immediate than had hitherto been achieved. Thus when Einstein, in turn, objected that "God does not play dice" he missed this profundity, as represented implicitly in quantum thinking in physics (let us not fool ourselves that it belongs to some particular "interpretation"). He missed that his alternative of dice-playing, of hazard, is conceived on the same "two-dimensional" level, again, as causality itself, since it is enunciated as an intrinsic if negative relation *to it*. In a word, there is no (further) "what happens".

For with causality is bound up also the notion of two "sides" as "pre-supposed", God and the world as we say. But the world is a superstition, an unreflected immediacy, which thus makes the cause itself a dependent being, which is a contradiction not to be got rid of as long as causality, the category, is retained. Distinction between any two causes, such as between cause and effect become cause, "is accordingly void" (155). The then unique cause, thus become substance as suspending itself in its effect, is thus cause "in this operation only" of self-suspension, and therefore never was as cause. Spinoza is taken as seriously as Hume, and therefore equally supplemented and corrected. Substance too "never was", is not the final reality or, alternatively, he will say, substance is subjectivity.

This "unity of the double cause is also actual". It is the actual relation where the doubleness is overcome, the relation itself being the "substance" and so not "between" any two anterior "things". Properly we have "the cause in act of constituting itself". In such constituting a better term than "constitution" as Wallace has it (156), "lies its being", which is being rather as freedom, we shall see, "to be or not to be".

Reciprocal action just means that each characteristic we impose is also to be suspended and inverted into its opposite, and that in this way the essential nullity of the 'moments' is explicitly stated. (156).

Reciprocity, as we have said, is the moment where the nullity of the moments, of the dialectic as it develops to its final and enduring Result, becomes explicit. "An effect is introduced into the primariness; in other

words, the primariness (of the cause) is abolished" (*Ibid*, parenthesis added).

People "take shelter" merely in the reciprocal relation when they realise that "things can no longer be studied satisfactorily from a causal point of view" (156, *Zus.*). This, in our society, is jocularly discussed, or rather dismissed, as the "chicken and the egg" problem. Are feathers developed in order to fly or does flight foster feathers? Reciprocity, rather, is "the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect and stands, so to say, on the threshold of the notion". But "we should not rest content with applying this relation", "on that very ground". It does not give us "a thoroughly comprehensive idea". Where A and B mutually cause one another, as it were impossibly, they should be recognised as "factors of ... the notion and nothing else". They must, to put an end to the mere "turn and turn about", be "seen to be founded in this notion". Now what is meant here?

"This pure self-reciprocation is therefore Necessity unveiled or realised." Therefore! The link is "the identity of what are esteemed actual things", which they are not. Their very self-subsistence, their separateness in being, "is the infinite negative self-relation" and "bound to be necessity" as finally liberating from this apparent condition. This is what "the circulation of substance through causality and reciprocity... only expressly makes out or states", as we discover in the breakdown of these categories. To be self-subsistent would be not to be anything else, not finally even oneself. Reality, though, is relational; all that is within is without, just as all that is without is within. This negative relation is infinite self-relation, viewed as a kind of nothingness, infinitely negating all otherness. In fact the independence of all things lies and only lies in their identity with one another. I am I because I am one with you, finding the universal in myself.

This truth of necessity, therefore, is *Freedom*: and the truth of substance is the *Notion*, - an independence which, though self-repulsive into distinct elements, yet in that repulsion is self-identical, and in the movement of reciprocity still at home and conversant only with itself. (158)

Infinity, that is, is necessarily differentiated, but, necessarily, infinitely so, a truth cancelling the differentiation, which must yet remain, difference as sameness. Ultimately, since we are speaking of *Freedom*, this will be an affair of persons, in whatever form. Persons, though, are not then substances in the usual sense, but rather relations, while the relations are themselves persons. These relations are absolute, linking nothing, we said already, that can be more fundamental. This is also why Aquinas had thought that the soul is only known in its knowing of something, more properly someone, else, since there the knowledge is reciprocal, not veiled

by objectification in the very act of a necessarily failed perceiving. Man "is most independent when he knows himself to be determined by the absolute idea throughout" (158, *Zus.*), by moral or theoretical conviction or insight. Hegel indicates here, again, that it is Spinoza (and therefore Leibniz) upon whom he leans, rather than Kant. In the other, one meets with one's self. Thinking means this, and to think is to think necessity. This is liberation, from the infinitely negative self-relation, at the same time as one confirms its negativity by going out from it, which is really an entering within. It is not a case of having one's self as something (or someone) else, ultimately (and *pace* Aquinas), but of having one's own being truly and fully in the other(s), "with which it is bound up by the force of necessity". This is "liberation", what "is called I", free Spirit, Love, Blessedness. It completes or realises "the great vision of substance in Spinoza" (159).

Thinking, ultimately, for Hegel, makes things to be what they *are* ultimately, that is, not "things" at all, nor even "moments" in Thought's process, since we have acknowledged "the essential nullity of the 'moments'". Thought, rather, is infinitely differentiated into the most perfect unity imaginable, Absolute Unity indeed or the polar opposite of abstract simplicity. As "self-repulsive" it is self-identical "in that repulsion", finding itself in otherness itself which thus finds itself in the Notion. Such otherness is beyond the divide of **One** or **Many**, a realised identity of elements whose "independence only lies in their identity" (157). Having come so far we are entitled to write this "whose", the truth of Necessity being, after all, Freedom, as "the truth of substance is the Notion" and not something impersonal. "It is evident that it is this man who thinks" (Aquinas). Indeed, but at many levels. Subjectivity, that is, is absolute, as "I" is the universal of universals. This philosophy is all of a piece, benignly circular, with neither beginning nor end, with no point of entry that will not later suspend or cancel itself. This indeed is its only possible badge of authenticity as a transcendence of finitude and falsity. In this reciprocal repulsion, as we have traced it, it, the Notion, is "still at home and conversant only with itself". The **Oracle**, in commanding philosophy, in its prime subject Socrates, to be exclusively busy with self-knowledge, thus imposed no restriction or limit, moralistic or otherwise. It rather declared the prime truth, that of absolute subjectivity, of I AM. Thus indeed, to come down for a moment from the mountain of philosophical transfiguration, which is transfiguration into the perfect form beyond all figure even of Philosophy, *consolatrix*, we *beget one another*, continuously in the sense of self-constitutively. We do that in this ever-present action or activity we have been talking about (156), passive

cognition giving way to as being absorbed into active **Volition** (the *succeeding* category) on the threshold of the Absolute Idea. This, in turn, nullifies all such previous and finite moments, sharing nothing with them. They are forgotten or drowned in that absolute drinking, as of Lethe, alternatively styled as "thought thinking itself".

XX

HEGEL'S SUBJECTIVE NOTION AS NOTION (EL 160-165)

The first division of the subjective logic is called "Subjectivity", and its aim is to lead us through the concept considered as subjective grasp of things to the notion of a self-articulated world. Rather, we are already there, for we have achieved this notion through the development out of Essence. But we are going to show that we get to the same spot by going in the other direction, and starting with the concept by which we know things, as we did starting with the being known. (Charles Taylor, *op. cit.* p. 302)

The last two words form an ambiguous phrase. I take "being" there as substantival. History has shown that there are many ways of reading Hegel. But as with Taylor, only one will be right. This plurality of readings, though, might all the same reflect a certain plurality in Hegel's self-understanding, as belong to mind's own nature as he uncovers it. The mind after all does not abandon dialectic once it has reached its final and absolute term. It rather sports back and forth within it in ceaseless play, thereby exemplifying the Notion itself, "pure play" says Hegel, at which it has arrived. One aim of the present "reading", however, is to show that one of these possibly many ways Hegel had of understanding himself cannot have been that of a total abstraction from the religious consciousness, in himself or in others indifferently. For he does not write of himself in that abstract and separatist sense. The dialectic rather puts this aside (*aufhebt*) in making "I" the "universal of universals". Another is to show that religion for him, and indeed as such, reflects a consciousness of the same Content that philosophy, i.e. Wisdom, embodies in more perfect Form. This would be to vindicate Hegel's final claim at the end of the *Encyclopaedia* concerning Religion and also Art, of which I have not said much here. Art, as coming first in the triad, might be seen as *eliciting* both religion and philosophy, just as the Logic elicits the free *exitus* of "the Idea" (which is the Absolute) as Nature and *reditus* as Spirit. Logic, that is to say, actively forms the world, an activity, however, transcending the

notion of force or *Kraft*, but as highest exemplar of the same. In this sense one might accept the claim that art "is a greater revelation than the whole of religion and philosophy" (Beethoven on music specifically), as *founding* the rest, somewhat as Noah's rainbow in Biblical discourse founds the idea of covenant itself as its first exemplar. This would in turn draw attention to a not always noticed figurative element, proper to religious consciousness, in the unexamined notion of divine revelation. Demythologising is then here disclosed as quite the reverse of a reduction, but rather a case of the Pauline "understanding spiritual things spiritually". Theology here must take its directions from philosophy, the only science that "thinks itself", and that exclusively, itself being firstly the *theologia* of Aristotle, from which the name is taken, the study of divine or absolute *realia*. But for further examination or "thematisation" of the notion of divine revelation see our *Hegel's Theology or Revelation Thematised* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, 2018).

I. The Notion

Hegel equates "the passage... from actuality into the notion" with that "from necessity to freedom" (159). This passage is a matter of thinking. But thinking thinks "the true", thinks itself. For Hegel this is as much as to say that it is true to itself, as against the realist "correspondence" theory. What rather "corresponds" to the Notion is that Notion's very embodiment (172) in the Idea, "truth in itself and for itself". Here, at 213, Hegel "declares the Absolute to be the Idea". This "definition... is itself absolute." Here we see how the Logic, this Logic, elicits Nature and Spirit and is not merely preliminary to them, as Absolute Mind contains and "overlaps" any supposed other, on pain of not being infinite, which contradicts absoluteness. "The Idea is the Truth", not the truth of anything else but the Truth, by implication now placed prior to Being. In other terms, other philosophies, it is identified with ultimate Being, so that for Aquinas truth is nothing other than being itself, or reality taken whole in all or any of its supposed parts but *qua* present to Mind or to any and every mind. Truth, that is, in contrast to being, is a mere *ens rationis* (QD *De potentia* VII). Here this is reversed without being denied. The negation rather resides in the conception itself, as always.

The correspondence theory refers only to

the correspondence of external things with my conceptions ... these are only correct conceptions held by me, the individual person. In the Idea we have nothing to do with the individual, nor with figurate conceptions, nor with external things" (213).

He means they are denied. "Everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea... Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea". But it "is only in them altogether and in their relation that the notion is realised." But this is a relation of Identity. The individual by itself, herself, himself, is untrue, ruined *in radice*, in a word finite, finished as never having begun.

Yet the Idea is not "of something or other", as the Notion (of it) is not "specific" but Notion as such, or the thought of thinking, what it is and what it implies. The Absolute, which the Idea is, "by an act of 'judgment', particularises itself to the system of specific ideas". This should not surprise; as absolute it must be capable of such action, must be, *inter alia*, Activity itself, unlike our finite thoughts and "intentions". Even for us, after all, the intention is the act of intending. Yet such intention, though an act, is not yet the act, good or bad, intended. If it were then there would be neither need nor place for this material world and we ourselves would be other than we are.

Yet Hegel says "the passage" we began by mentioning "proposes that actuality shall be thought as having all its substantiality in the passing over and identity with the other independent actuality" (159). The notion, indeed, "is itself just this very identity", of God and world, Logic and Nature, it seems plain. Thus Hegel writes of the other independent actuality, as if we have a straight one to one opposition of two "universes". Thus the Idea naturally, yet freely, as it were of itself, "goes forth freely as Nature", in passage. Substance is this passage, one and universal, and just as such, "in its developed and genuine actuality", is subject and hence Mind (213).

Whatever is thoroughly bad or contrary to the notion, is for that very reason on the way to min. It is by the notion alone that the things in the world have their subsistence; or as it is expressed in the language of religious conception, things are what they are, only in virtue of the divine and thereby creative thought which dwells within them. (213, *Zus.*)

One cannot miss the warmth or "at-homeness" with which Hegel repeatedly cites received religious teaching. He might seem, in his repeated mention of God, to be untrue to his own demand that philosophy avoid "figurate" conceptions. However, as is quite plain from his semiological section in "The Philosophy of Spirit", he recognised that all speech is based upon a selection of figure and (eventually dead) metaphor. He must have thought, then, that whatever figurateness is entailed in the idea, in the word, rather, in "God", against which he himself warns us, is not unambiguously more than is found even in "scientific" language taken on the whole. To that

extent he implicitly aligns himself with the Aristotelian logical doctrine of analogy, whereby "being is said in many ways", though he never consents to rest in it, agreeing with Wittgenstein that philosophy has to be a "battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language".

So "the actual substance as such", the Idea, "which in its exclusiveness resists all invasion" (is "what we call God" in other words), is *ipso facto* "subjected" to a necessary "passing into dependency" (159), i.e. this belongs to Infinity intrinsically. Without it Infinity would be "only abstract", not concretely thought or therefore, as self-thought, active. God and world are not two parts of some greater reality, as in eighteenth century Deism, since the Absolute as such is and has to be Greatness itself. We have to see it in terms of the necessity which is infinite freedom and not, therefore, imposed, not even self-imposed, as many theologians persist in imagining (under the rubric or mantle of *kenosis*). This passage is rather what the Absolute is, precisely or, rather, concretely, as Hegel says. This applies to the reality, as moment, of the world of sense and of sense-perception. "This also is thou", the "also" being absorbed in the "this", thus eliciting the negative contrary, "Neither is this thou", where it is rather the "this" that is absorbed. We are returned thus to the Augustinian "is" but *non aliquo modo*, not in some or any way of free personality only, of "thou".

Seeing the Absolute thus in terms of necessity means thinking necessity as being *the* exercise of it. It comes back to thought and what thought is, viz. the meeting with oneself in the other actuality, necessarily "bound" to one because one is in essence this passage, this contradiction of the immediate or abstract conception, a mutual inherence even. This is nothing other than the necessity of Substance to be what it is, namely or ultimately, Subject free from all limit, restriction or particularity. This "is called I; ... is free Spirit; ... is Love; and as enjoyment, it is Blessedness" (159). The notion, Hegel adds, is "pure play", as contemplation superseding all work and active involvement, is yet, or just therefore, "the highest praxis" (Aristotle, *Ethics*). This Notion is "the truth of Being and Essence", as thinking is truth as true to itself or, as Cicero put it in *De legibus*, reason is divine (*sc.* absolute) and therefore law, i.e. and only therefore. Play is law, law is play, an at first challenging equivalence. On the divinity of reason as alone entailing its legality see our *Morals as Founded on Natural Law*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt 1987-1988, section V, i to iv and following.

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So now, the "Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realised":

It is a systematic whole, in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it. (160)

That is the system, under or according to which the Absolute Idea will be seen, along with the Absolute itself which it is (213), to contain everything. Of this, of each "constituent", we can say: "This also is thou; neither is this thou". If we agree with McTaggart that only persons can be such constituents¹ then we have here, *mutatis mutandis*, the Kantian "Kingdom of Ends". This is then one in content with, in Christian religion, religion, the *corpus mysticum* (of Christ, all men as or "in" one man mediating this eventual identity of *Dasein* with *Sein*). Heidegger, in his own way, will take up this clue to eventual meaning. The same Content is expressed or comes out in the all-embracing joy or "blessedness" (159) to which the last symphony of Hegel's exact contemporary, Beethoven, or Dante's main poem or, maybe, the Parthenon or Rembrandt's portrait of Homer laughing beside frowning Aristotle or any number of other works is dedicated. The examples are mine, the assertion is Hegel's. But we may note the "is put" (160, cited above)? Put by what, namely, or by whom? We can only refer back to the text of Eckhart Hegel liked to quote, one of several such:

The eye with which God sees me, is the eye with which I see Him, my eye and His eye are one... If God were not, I should not be, and if I were not, He too would not be. (cited in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, I: 228)

Such depths are by no means "equivocal", as J.N. Findlay qualifies them, but, the finest distillation of philosophic and dialectical Reason, analogical rather, given, though, that analogy is indeed itself accounted scholastically as a species of equivocation. Thus, accepting its application to divine, i.e. spiritual, things one of the medieval Lateran Church Councils asserts that in or by such analogies God remains more unlike than like any finite things or, more nearly, verbal applications. The depths, anyhow, are perfectly reflected, again, in the "atheistic" system of McTaggart. Here each "has the unity" of all in each again (the infinitude of "determinate correspondence", *sic* McTaggart) and the all is thus only realised concretely in each of these supremely necessary persons, only born and dying under the "figure" of time. McTaggart argues with rock-like consistency for this his reading of Hegel, at the same time as he severely (too severely?) criticises him, rising thus continually above the so-called

¹ Cf. J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge University Press 1901, Chapter 2.

"British idealists" surrounding him, as Aquinas rose above the schoolmen, Hegel above the "Romantics".

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If my eye is God's eye, anyhow, then I am at liberty to arrange things as I wish, am I not, as volition, consequently, succeeds upon cognition, at 233? Here, though, comes in Necessity as the Freedom which is Infinity, both God and I, as here, identified with God. "Myself and God" said Newman, existentially, of the. for him, "only two real beings", without further analysis of the I or anything else, eschewing therefore a properly systematic theology as if remaining by choice at the Patristic level of Scriptural commentary. The much maligned "argument from natural desire", however, upon which Newman touches here, never found more coherent expression than in Hegel, but as it were surpassing itself, since this is the desire, i.e. the desiring, exercised by that which is desired, by Thought-thinking-itself. "The position taken up by the notion", i.e. not merely by our account of the notion, "is that of absolute idealism" (160, *Zus.*), of truth as true to itself (*veritas est in mente*), of philosophy. "How deep and refined is the true Christian Spirit! – how difficult to enter into, how vast to embrace, how impossible to exhaust!" (Newman, in *The Heart of Newman*, subtitled "A Synthesis arranged by Erich Przywara", Burns & Oates, London 1930, 1963, p. 340)

Philosophy ... sees that what on other grades of consciousness is taken to have Being, and to be naturally or immediately independent, is but a constituent stage in the Idea ... The contrast between form and content ... has, like all the other contrasts upheld by reflection, been already left behind and overcome dialectically or through itself. The notion, in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it. It certainly is a form, which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the fulness of all content ... the Absolute is the Notion. That necessitates a higher estimate of the notion (the Concept) than is found in formal conceptualist Logic ... But if Speculative Logic... tracing back these material details to the notion ... no mere form without a content of its own... (160, *Zus.*, parenthesis added)

This "naturally or immediately" applies, clearly, also to Nature and History as a whole or as such, "these material details", as the natural and the immediate. They are rather the passing moments of an Absolute dialectic, terminating in the Absolute which, *qua* Absolute, "in its exclusiveness resists all invasion". "Everything finite is false", in other

words of Hegel. Moments are momentary, evanescent, passing over into their other and contrary.

The Idea, Hegel accordingly notes, "is frequently treated as a mere logical form" (213):

Such a view must be abandoned to those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. (213, cp. 162, final paragraph)

That is, they ascribe reality to the moments. It is clear that this is a critique, a marking of the finitude of existence as a notion, of the *category* of **Existence** (122, again). The Idea "has no Existence for starting-point". Its principle, which is the notion, should be taken "as the subjectivity which it really is". The subject, as thinking, does not particularly need to ex-ist, specifically. This is the deeper meaning of the Cartesian *cogito*. "In the logic of understanding the notion is generally reckoned a mere form of thought", we noted. Yes, it is this same notion or concept, *conceptus*, that we are talking about here, and not some other *conceptio* to which we have merely appropriated the name (a distinction made by E. Gilson). That is, rather than Existence, the Cartesian *sum* denotes **Being**, also of course a category, but uniquely as the Beginning whose nature is disclosed at the end, the **Absolute Idea**, logic's final category which thus, in turn, is equally "the Beginning" (88), itself not a category though, like **Becoming**, exemplifying the unity, the identity, of Being and Nothing, the supreme form of which "as a separate principle", is Freedom, both negativity and, just therefore, "absolute affirmation" (87). The above distinction refers equally, as clarifying, to the argument of Anselm Hegel cites.

2. Development

"The position taken up by the notion is that of absolute idealism" (160 *Zus.*). Hegel does not say that it is the position taken up by us here but that it is "taken up by the notion". It is taken up, that is, by thinking as thinking itself. This is also the core-position assumed, thus far, to G. Frege's essay "*Der Gedanke*". Nonetheless many Frege scholars praise his realism, his supposed break with idealism, precisely on this ground.² This says

² But cp. Hans Sluga, "Frege and the Rise of Analytic Philosophy", *Inquiry* 18, 1975, "Frege's Alleged Realism", *Inquiry* 20, 1977, as against Michael Dummett as authoring, for example (Sluga's), the article "Frege" in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*: ed. Paul Edwards, New York 1967, Vol. 3, p.225.

something about absolute idealism, such as that it is indeed absolute. It is cut loose from the problematic self as substance, as examined by Hume. Self has become subject and the subject merges into absolute subjectivity. Our thinking does not become absolute by some quasi-political allegiance to the principle of non-contradiction. *We have to see this and generate it for ourselves.*³ This principle is the very birth in act of thinking itself, within or without us indifferently. "I am you"⁴ or might just as well be. "I" is the universal of universals. Rather, I am and have to be this super-universal, before (in the sense of "prior to") Abraham or "any other name", as a name which is "above every name" and not just all *other* names (*supra omne nomen*). "I" is not itself a name or *nomen*, while the sense in which it is a *pronomen* is just this negative, that it stands instead of (*pro*) a noun or, here, name, rather than standing *for* it. Thus what stands *instead of* does normally stand *for* something else, itself in the first instance (*suppositio materialis*) but not when signifying not in material but in purely spiritual or negative *suppositio*, again, itself as still name while yet "above all names", even itself. Here representation and absolute form intersect, in continuity, in absolute pictorial or, rather, aural idea, finally as self-consciousness not conscious of itself as object but as all, Word indeed. An indication of this aspect of naming may be found in the etymological correlation of *nomen* with *numen* as meaning a form of spirit (*Geist*). This, however, does not "reduce" thought to subjectivity but rather exalts the latter. In the absolute subjectivity of thought self is no longer either considered or presupposed, as we also found true in a way of "God". This is "the position" of the notion and of philosophy indifferently.

Philosophy is a knowledge through notions because it sees that what on other grades of consciousness is taken to have Being, and to be naturally and immediately independent, is but a constituent stage in the Idea.

When Hegel puts these consideration concerning "I" in what language forces us to say he is, context shows, using this as evidence of their truth and not as reduction thereof, as with some later theorists, what I say as against what I may merely "mean" (*meinen*, this word itself not merely a pun: *Enc.* 20). We have left Being and especially beings behind, having found that Being and Nothing, like good and evil indeed, cannot be kept

³ See our "Classificatory Expressions and Matters of Moral Substance", *Philosophical Papers* (Rhodes University, South Africa), May 1984, discussing R.M. Hare, also revised as a section in our *Philosophy or Dialectic*: Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1994, pp. 89-105.

⁴ Cf. Daniel Kolac, *I am You*, Verlag Springer, 2004.

apart. So with Quality and right up through Essence any determinate something has some or, more probably, all of the others as counterweight, as foil. "A Something is implicitly the other of itself" (92, *Zus.*) and on this is grounded our perception of change. Our notion of self is the mere abstract generalisation of this, is its contrast with all others, misread for individual subjecthood. It is rather the act, inclusive of both actuality and activity, since they are one, which is Reason. Now Reason, since it is what alone is (the) Infinite (it is infinitude absolutely considered *and hence only as considering itself*, beyond all possibility of finite objectification), is necessarily differentiated and infinitely so. Reason is thus Freedom, not limited to this or that or to any number. This is not, however, the freedom of this or that individual person. Hence Hegel states that "the principle of personality is universality". In this sense freedom is inalienably personal. Yet in becoming conscious of my freedom I become conscious of my identity with all "others". Love names or can name the impossibility of freedom's stopping short of this or of stopping short at all:

This liberation is called I: as developed to its totality, it is free Spirit; as feeling, it is Love; and as enjoyment, it is Blessedness. (159)

The text further implies that it is not essential to this liberation which is thinking that it be found "existing in an individual form", since this is added as a qualification (unless indeed it would be a *proprium*). Thinking means, after all, that *in* the other "one meets with one's self", now become the other. What other force can "in" have here? So the self is truly spoken of as losing itself, though we can hardly avoid speaking of thereby finding oneself more truly. The soul is only known in knowing the other, wrote Aquinas.⁵ One who looks at himself does not shine, runs a Chinese proverb. But we have here the nature of the Notion as such, one with each of its constituents, and not some ethical afterthought.

This freedom, again, is not that of an individual, ruined in essence from the start, simply because he or she never was. "He" or "she", rather, like "I" and all the pro-nouns, name the Notion, neither one nor many. Here belongs Hegel's mysterious reference to "articulated groups of spirits" in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, to spirits joined or jointed (Baillie, p. 452). Thus the illiterate *doctor ecclesiae* as it were hears, or thinks (i.e. she does not merely think she hears), the Notion as saying, since it is active: "I am He who is; you are she who is not." Catherine of Siena here, in her

⁵ Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia, 87, 1.

dictated *Dialogues*, was contemporary with Hegel's source, Eckhart. Both were Dominicans, moreover. We may reasonably note such pointers.⁶

I, then, am universal of universals, having the unity of all within myself and hence as necessary to this universal unity as this is to me. Time, and therefore birth and death, along with all contingency, are here excluded. This is why the state of Nature, to which the Notion implacably proceeds, is a self-alienation, i.e. of and by "self" as applied now to the Notion itself (*selbst*). We will investigate this implacability in its proper place. It does not mean that God needed to create the world but that he is inconceivable without it, a quite different relation, one of reason alone like all logical relations. The world is logical or necessary, which is not to say that it is so in all its details. Yet the other which the Notion sets up "is in reality not an other", since it is nothing other at all, and so "to be looked upon merely as play". Here Hegel adds a frankly theological passage relaying the Christian teaching that the world is "merely" an analogical reflection of the internal, which is to say real, "begetting" of "a Son, in whom he, a Spirit, is at home with himself" (161, *Zus.*). This too, however, is not excluded from the province of notional play, as applying to all of its "movement". The Son too is "in reality not an other" (but not therefore a mere apparition of that with which it is in identity) and we indeed read in received Scripture that "I and the Father are one", even if Trinitarian relations should imply a certain opposition. Thus Aquinas will say, citing Augustine, that the Son is *alius* (masculine) than the Father, another Person, as being relation⁷, but not *aliud* (neuter), not something else (*Summa theol.* Ia 31, 2). This in fact is exactly what we have been saying about the relation of the Notion to its constituents, setting up an other which is not an other and thus becoming other to itself. Thus Hegel makes

⁶ Hegel in fact may be seen as reinstating the Dominican and Augustinian tradition, whether by coincidence or design, as against the *ad hoc* compromises of Jesuit humanism leading from Suarez to Wolff and Kant. In fact Kant's domestication of Hume is analogous to the original Molinist ploy, of a *scientia media* indeed (between God and ourselves), neither fish nor fowl, mediating nothing (like the "thing in itself" in this). So Hegel returns to the original *via dolorosa* of Scottish or French atheism, "Golgotha of the Spirit", and tries again, truly, after all, "leading captivity captive" in this time a *freeing* of the Reason. (cp. *Enc.* 82, *Zus.*)

⁷ The persons are themselves relations, the relations persons, says Aquinas, at first bewilderingly. Yet in English we call at least some persons our relations (or relatives) and not merely ones related to us or *Verwandte*. In the case of some twins they were for some time "consubstantial" with each other (as all with us), which might seem precisely as baffling or "mysterious" as the Trinitarian postulates. Here in the Notion, however, identity is reaffirmed as rediscovered, like the recovery from abstraction in general.

good his claim that philosophy gives more perfect form to the same content as is offered with external grounding only in religion. Nor does this make of Hegel's philosophy a mere exercise in apologetics, precisely because it is placed as prior to and more fundamental than religion. It is put as the very thinking of Thought itself, of *nous*, of the Notion, as we find it stated in a well-known fragment of Anaxagoras ("Mind has set all in order.").

Such thinking, therefore, is "the principle of all life" and thus, it follows, thoroughly concrete, not abstract merely. It has to be more concrete than the concretions issuing from it, though they must be identical with it when not themselves abstractions, abstracted from it. The Notion, again,

is a systematic whole, in which each of its constituent functions is the very total (sc. whole) which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it (160, parenthesis added).

The Fregean notion, again, of the predicate as a function of its subject (always) is not alien to the thought here, where every "constituent" is "but a constituent stage in the Idea", a "moment". True, functions are not left behind, as are moments, and so for Frege the individual that is a fish "fish-ises" forever, i.e. it is not the Idea unbound. Thus, for Frege, while an unbound variable remains a mere unbound variable, both nothing and Ground, *in his logic* a fish cannot become a non-fish, as it can in physics or biology rather.⁸

The Idea, that is, is a state of universal identity posited in act as Judgment, *the* Judgment, which actually overthrows all particular judgements whatever. A syllogism, therefore, as judgment upon judgment (two things identical with a third are identical with one another) can only have circular form, as having no outside point of entry. Yet we have found already, in Essence, that the Outside is the Inside, that this relation was "but a constituent stage in the Idea" (which is the Absolute), as, we shall see, in "The Philosophy of Spirit" (*Enc. III*), is language itself.

The notion contains or, rather,

is what contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it. It certainly is a form, but an infinite and creative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the fulness of all content (160, *Zus.*).

⁸ In Frege's *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (Breslau 1884, tr. J.L. Austin, 1950) Leibniz and Kant are frequently mentioned, Hegel not at all.

Here, in Logic itself already or in principle, we make the *reditus* from Nature to Spirit, which "includes but at the same time", *ipso facto*, he might rather say, "releases from itself ... all content". It releases as including "the fulness", not, therefore, as "box-within-box" (cf. 161, *Zus.*). This is what was pointed to by the impossibility of separate finite substance, whether individual or specific, primary or secondary in Aristotle's terms, or by the impossibility of discretely distinct qualities or of separable components to any relation thus made particular and finite. The form, form as such and no longer as constituent, is the content and the "matter", once again. This, these modulations, is how thought finds itself face to face with itself only, in that infinite and eternal manifestation of thinking or "thought-ising" itself (and hence all) as, in the particular case, the Fregean fish "fish-ises". The subject, as absolute, is necessarily its own function, *actus purus*. Thus it is absolute freedom. "I will be what I will be". This truth was glimpsed anew in pre-contemporary "existentialism", but too often abstractly merely, abstracting abstraction's very denial⁹. Similarly democracy or rule by the people becomes, in the hands of abstracting ideologists restricting themselves to *Verstand*, the most absolute rule of or over the people yet seen, whether social ostracism (Tocqueville) or the guillotine be the persuasion thereto.

So we may style the Notion "abstract", in a merely insensitive choice of terms. It is, however, concrete, involving "the total wealth" of Being and Essence, "merged in the unity of thought". It "involves" them to the point where the thought of each and any item is identical with that activity which is the Notion as a whole, once called the "divine essence" as that with which all the (divine) ideas are identical.¹⁰ Here "this also is thou; neither is this thou", i.e. all self and particularity is overthrown, precisely in and by absorption, as moment, existing, rather, only as whole, as Absolute Idea or I. Only thus is anything particular enjoyed. Phenomenologically it is the source of laughter. Meanwhile I point out that what is called "infinite and creative" cannot be reckoned created, not even a created formality. That is what we are dealing with here as what alone, in Hegel's clear estimation, "the Fact", or Necessity itself, could be. It means further, however, as it were in the opposite direction, that no created instance can be external to this form as infinity. Creation, that is, is indeed "out of nothing" and thus remains nothing as coinciding with everything, remaining "in an alienated state" (Hegel) only until this is perceived, or, rather, this perception, this knowing, is the "lifting" or suspension of this

⁹ On this point cf. E. Gilson, *On Being and some Philosophers*, PIMS Toronto, 1952.

¹⁰ Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia Q15.

alienation, the opening generally to poetry, the arts and religion in their progressive *reditus* as mentioned.

Our definition of the Absolute now, succeeding to the earlier ones, is that "the Absolute is the Notion". Is this but a new use of an old term? By no means: nor is the same word "employed in two contrary acceptations".¹¹ Hegel does not wish, he says, to give occasion "for confusion and misconception". Rather, "the speculative notion and the notion of Formal Logic" are closer in meaning than at first appears. Thus we deduce content from notions, e.g. from the notion of property in law (160, *Zus.*). What else could provisions for the protection of property be based upon? This notion then, "infinite and creative", is not mere form without original content and thus Hegel derives all content from the proto-notion as Absolute, which is to say infinite.

The onward movement of the Notion, thus shown to be active, is **Development** (161), of itself from within. Each element of it "is a free being of the whole notion". Here the elements we distinguish "are identical with one another and with the whole", as soul and body, we might think, for there is no such thing as a body thus distinguished.¹² Nor does the hand survive for one second in separation from the arm, even though truly distinguished. The point is thus far Aristotelian merely. Such development, however, is, so to say, development in its perfect development, free of all incompleteness in other words. Thus the notion, as itself end, is "end as realised", its seeming unaccomplished is illusion. It is indeed "final" cause (212, *Zus.*).

What then develops? Well, within Being we descried transition into something else as "the dialectical process", says Hegel here. In Essence we had reflection still bringing something else into light. Here the movement, in and of dialectic, is development, "by which only that is explicit which is already implicitly present". Nothing else, that is, comes in as from outside. We might refer this to Newman's 1845 essay on the "development of Christian doctrine", only noting that he there presents a doctrine of development itself, and this was a development, which he did not himself further develop. The spadework for this had in fact been done by Hegel a generation or so earlier. That is basically my claim here.

For this reason, these reasons, Hegel parallels development to the growth of a plant. "In the world of nature it is organic life that corresponds

¹¹ Use of a term translated here as "acceptation" might suggest that Hegel was acquainted with medieval "term logic" (*proprietas terminorum*) and "speculative grammar"?

¹² Aquinas remarks somewhere that this holds in metaphysics but not in logic. *Logicus enim non considerat existentiam rei.*

to the grade of the notion." The development is of the plant's or notion's own self. The content remains unchanged as it passes through and sheds the various forms. It is no doubt nudged on in this by what may be outside of it, soil and so on, but it does not take therefrom in the sense of mixing with it. It rather absorbs it into itself in identification as in an action intrinsic to its own being, though here the example falls short of the original. For the notion is entirely self-contained beyond possibility of uprooting, is such that the "world" is within it or truly nothing apart from it, as Absolute. This indeed is what is developing here. It is contrasted with "box-within-box" theories or that of "innate ideas", as if the "germ" of the plant were already a perfected exemplar in miniature, like the fictitious *homunculus*. Development means, however, that "that only is explicit which is already implicitly present" (161 *Zus.*). That is why, in our reading of the dialectic and especially of this third division of it, we naturally pass back and forth in the way that we do.

3. The Subjective Notion as Notion

After explaining how the Notion develops out of its own germ, differently from the transitions and contrasts found in Being and Essence, Hegel states that

The doctrine of the notion is divided into three parts. (1) The first is the doctrine of the subjective or Formal Notion. (2) The second is the doctrine of the notion invested with the character of immediacy, or of objectivity. (3) The third is the doctrine of the Idea, the subject-object, the unity of notion and objectivity, the absolute truth. (162)

The equation in (1) of "subjective" with "Formal" shows that for Hegel that term does not mean pertaining restrictedly to the *individual* mind. It means contingent, rather, less than entire or than necessary, and this is precisely the situation of "formal logic", from which the names for the next categories will accordingly be taken. Thus in formal logic there is no concern about the *matter* of the propositions and this fact is even seen as a virtue, a sharpening of a defined focus. Sometimes however this situation is misconstrued to the point of saying that the logical forms are without any content at all.¹³ They are forms in the sense of mere *schemata*. Thus

¹³ Cf. Henry B. Veatch, "Concerning the Ontological Status of Logical Forms", *Review of Metaphysics*, December 1948, pp. 40-64, and our own "Does Realism Make a Difference to Logic", *The Monist*, April 1986, Vol. 69, Number 2, pp. 281-

argument forms are not arguments, it would follow, but that by which the validity of (other) arguments are judged.¹⁴ This however leaves entirely in the dark how we are to think of the (analogous?) validity of these forms or how anyone is ever to judge concerning *their* validity, even in terms of making them "immediate inferences" in the sense of an immediate combination of two premises or more.

But how do these logical forms come to be considered as categories at all? For we can be quite sure that it is not just a matter here of "taking" the names from formal logic, as we take the name of an animal for some human having such and such characteristics. Rather, formal logic itself is here placed where Hegel considers that it belongs, so to say meta-logically, within the dialectic. Some commentators seem to think that it does not rightfully belong there at all, as if Hegel merely included it because he could think of no better way to exhibit the relation of his Logic to traditional formal logic. Doubtless, indeed, he could not and this of itself might mean both that there *is* no better way and that formal logical categories indeed belong at this point, just as earlier philosophers subordinated logic to metaphysics, in *logica docens* (as contrasted with *logica utens*) and not conversely.

Hegel tells us that just as the Absolute was earlier seen as Being, or as Variety, or as Inward and Outward, so everything or the Absolute, that is to say, is at a certain "moment" seen as (but he says merely "is") a **Judgment** (166), the ultimate judgment overlapping all finite judgments. The word "absolute" is of course preserved for the final "category" which transcends the categories, viz. the Idea, so as not to repeat the *definiendum* in the *definiens*, even here where we are characterising the Unlimited or, therefore, indefinable. The Absolute is seen at a certain point as a Judgment and then, a little later, as a **Syllogism** (181), passing from the second to the third operation of reason as in Aristotle's threefold scheme in his *On Interpretation*.¹⁵ This ultimate syllogism would, therefore, as it were "include" that Judgment, while that everything, also these, is found to be a Notion (first and foundational operation as the **Subjective** or Formal **Notion**: 162) was to be expected, here where everything is Notion because

295, also included, slightly altered, in *Philosophy or Dialectic*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1994, pp. 47-61.

¹⁴ Cf. our "Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy", *Acta Philosophica*, Rome, fasc. II, vol. 6, 1997, pp. 303-310.

¹⁵ Cf. Robert W. Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas*, The Hague 1966. Schmidt considers these three operations identified by Aristotle in separate chapters as the intention(s) of universality, of attribution and of consequence respectively.

the Notion, the form of thought, is everything. On Aquinas's view of things ultimate Being, viz. the ultimate simply, of itself takes the form of Intellect *precisely* as not being limited to this or that successively. *Non aliquo modo est sed est, est* (Augustine). The Infinite could have no other form, namely, or that is what intellect (mind) is, whereas limited being itself cannot be ultimate because nothing could limit it save Being over again. For Hegel it is rather that Being emerges from Mind as Idea and even as the first Idea, thus making of the Logic a circle with no point of entry, however this dilemma be later resolved in "The Philosophy of Spirit". Mind as Freedom needs no cause (that is what Freedom "is"), as Being, as normally said, might at first seem to do. Thus in much Neo-Platonist philosophy the One is placed above Existence, and Hegel takes a similar view:

Because it has no existence for starting-point and *point d'appui*, the Idea is frequently treated as a mere logical form. Such a view must be abandoned to those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. (213)

Here he says:

The common logic covers only the matters which come before us here as a portion of the third part of the whole system. (162)

So there is just no question of the logical names being used for something else, as McTaggart comes close to suggesting in his *Commentary* of 1910. The matters discussed here are "covered" in common formal logic. This, however, also includes "the so-called Laws of Thought" discussed early in *Essence* (115), Hegel adds here. He finds that logic in his day has lost some of its unity as a science, introducing extraneous non-logical material to bridge gaps in the explanations. So what he will rather be doing here is setting logic upon a firmer and deeper foundation, after the manner, again, of the older *logica docens*, taking explicit account of the reality of logic itself as thinking about thinking, as the Notion or *nous* thinks itself, thus founding everything. Thus dialectic can be seen as a step forward, in the sense of a fusion, from the classical ordering of things according to which *logicus non considerat existentiam vel naturam rei*, i.e. he is not, *qua* logician, supposed to do that. In our day the "analytical" school of philosophy has also by and large endorsed the view that logic is itself an ontology as being the only way into ontology or "what there is" (Quine), always, *mutatis mutandis* of course, as between these two schools of

thinking. Yet nothing forbids transcending this category of distinct schools, taking Hegel on board as an analytical philosopher or, conversely, bringing the latter under the specifically Hegelian concept, the very method of his own *History of Philosophy* lectures.

Dialectic, however, only becomes thinking about thinking specifically, rather than about Being, say, or about causality and the like, in this third part, which is why consideration of logical entities belong here as, negatively and *qua* logical, they are placed at the beginning only of this final part.

We might ask, all the same, why Logic is to be considered just under this first part of the third part, the "subjective" notion, and not rather under the objective notion or the Idea, the two subsequent sections of this final part. It has to do, Hegel implies, with the general supposition that the traditional logical forms are "categories of conscious thought only" in the psychologistic and subjectivist sense (rather than "subjective" in Hegel's understanding of the term). In addition they are taken as "thought in the character of understanding, not reason". Yet, he argues, just because they are "mere logical modes of entities", unlike Being or Essence, they are more properly notions and so belong in this third part. All the same, they "just miss the notion" (164) as being "a finite mode of thought" (162, referring back to his discussion of Jacobi at 62).

Thus the Subjective Notion or the "Notion as Notion" succeeds naturally to Reciprocity (159): "Thinking... means a liberation ... this liberation is called I ... free Spirit ... Love ... Blessedness". Note that it is just as thinking as such that it is actual "liberation from finite exclusiveness and egoism". That is the joy of it, it is claimed. The preceding categories are "notions in their transition or their dialectical element" but they are not notions knowing or thinking themselves as notions. Even Cause-and-Effect was considered as a correlation of notions rather than as a notion of correlation, in J.N. Findlay's words. To consider a notion is to form a notion of that notion. All of that changes now, to these "second intentions", and to the situation with which we have, in a way, long been familiar in our formal logical studies. These consider after all, in Aristotle's words, the acts or operations of the understanding, as trying to understand them. These he identifies as concept-formation, judgement, syllogism, three which are yet one, as Hegel claims to show and even to show that this is implicit in and from the Aristotelian analysis, all knowledge being after all an *anamnesis* (a term best not translated as remembering simply, but as, rather, *re*-remembering specifically). Each of these three acts is a mental word or unitary *verbum interius*. Here though they are also and primarily *categories*, under which, therefore, everything

might be, momentarily, thought. Implied is that "the notion as notion" (163) yields to judgment and judgment to syllogism.

By comparison, that is to say, Being or Essence and their more specific categories "are only in a modified form notions" (84, 112). Being, for example, is "the notion implicit only", while in Essence "the actual unity of the notion is not realised". These strictures do not apply to the logical categories of the (subjective) notion itself, or of judgment and syllogism, which, this is Hegel's point, considered in their full amplitude are each of them *identical with all things as thought*. That is, it is not merely that we can think all things "under" them, as with Being or Substance.

Hegel is serious about the active quality of notions. He says here of the earlier categories, notions "for us" only, that their "freedom is not expressly stated: and all this because the category is not universality" in the here special sense of "the notion as notion" which will be explained. The notion is not "form only". The logical forms are not mere canons of validity, "without in the least touching the question whether anything is true", the answer to that being "supposed to depend on the content only", conceived as material opposite to the formal character of the logical entity or, rather, *ens rationis* merely.

These are not then mere dead and inert receptacles of thought, but rather shaped by it as its own intrinsic instruments (Gk. *organa*). As "forms of the notion" they are "the vital spirit of the actual world" (162). For all that is true "is true in virtue of these forms, through them and in them".

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As touching **Universality** now as a "moment" or "functional part" of "the Notion as Notion", Hegel considers it together with **Particularity** and **Individuality**, of which he says:

Individual and actual are the same thing: only the former has issued from the notion, and is thus, as a universal, stated expressly as a negative identity with itself (*sc.* in-dividual). The actual, because it is at first no more than a potential or immediate unity of essence and existence, may possibly have effect: but the individuality of the notion is the very source of effectiveness, effective moreover no longer as the cause is, with a show of effecting something else, but effective of itself. (163, parenthesis added)

To this Hegel immediately adds, as in explanation:

Individuality, however, is not to be understood to mean the immediate or natural individual, as when we speak of individual things or individual men:

for that special phase of individuality does not appear till we come to the judgment.

Thus:

"The judgment is the notion in its particularity, ... *Urtheil* ... declaring the unity of the notion to be primary, and its distinction to be its original partition ... expressible in the proposition: 'The individual is the universal'. (166)

What could be clearer, if startling? But just to recap, here within "the Subjective or Formal Notion", which as first part of the doctrine of the Notion is itself a moment of it, we have, as first moment of this moment in turn, "the Notion as Notion". This is to be followed (and superseded) by Judgment and the Syllogism (which gives way to Objectivity, the Object, called sometimes "the objective notion"). Of course Judgment and Syllogism are also notions, are also the Notion. The significance of this coincidence of names is that Judgment and Syllogism are assimilated to this "first operation of reason" which is the (Subjective) Concept or notion (Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, who also calls them instruments, *organa*, of reason) as finally becoming the IDEA, in this whole third part, "The Doctrine of the Notion". For they, judgment and syllogism, are themselves, again, "mental words", *verba interiora* or *verba cordis* (as they are too explicitly in Aristotle and Aquinas, are, that is, a form of the Concept or "mental word", singular, against which they are also contra-distinguished), "intentions" the mind makes in the course of understanding or apprehending anything. For this takes place in one of three ways, i, as concept: apprehending a nature simply, ii, as judgment: reuniting or identifying two notions or concepts formerly abstracted (the rose and its redness, God and existence), or iii, syllogism: taking the step, in a specifically triple identity, to new knowledge. For this reason the expression *verbum cordis* is mistakenly taken when applied only to the formation of the concept or "notion as notion". Hegel rightly therefore assimilates the two more complex mental operations to "the Notion", as if clearing up an ancient hesitation. There is nothing Procrustean, however, in his innovation as one finds, just for example now, in some later theories of reference, specifically, which discard without proper understanding some of the complexities of earlier theories of *suppositio*.¹⁶

¹⁶ See our "The Interdependence of Semantics, Logic and Metaphysics as Exemplified in the Aristotelian Tradition", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 63-92; also "Subject and Predicate Logic", *The*

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Such is the Scholastic theory that Hegel inherits. His special angle upon it, again, stressing the authentically Aristotelian, is to show that in fact all three operations are moments of just "the Notion" and hence are assimilable to the first operation of reason as both foundational and inclusive. They are not built up or composed of specifically notional steps but are themselves unitary notions, thoughts. Thus the thought or notion that the pack of cards is on the table (William James's example) is not divisible into separable parts. It is as unitary as the concept of a pack of cards (as this is as that of a card simply). Hence subject and predicate are no more than abstracted "functions" of it at best, not however in the Fregean sense exactly where just the predicate is a function of the subject. Thus Aquinas says that the predicate signifies only *quasi*-formally, the subject only *quasi*-materially. So anything and everything may be predicated and not just "forms".¹⁷

In judgement, however, what, for Aquinas, is especially manifested, as distinct from the mere or abstract notion in the mind, is the *being* of the unitary (united) entity, at least as an *ens rationis*. This particular contrast is, so to say, not open to Hegel's absolute idealism. The latter is, though, *open to it* inasmuch as the being or true *actus (essendi)* of anything whatever is, as an aspect of the Notion or of absolute reality, in fact itself identical with the whole (160). This reality, however, is the infinite array of Ideas into which the Absolute, itself Idea, necessarily and in perfect freedom therefore differentiates itself, inclusive of the idea of being and its "sheen".

Even this doctrine, however, is present in Aquinas under the rubric, found already in Augustine and the Greeks before him, *mutatis mutandis*, of the divine ideas (*Summa theol.* Ia 15). This is arguably Aquinas's deepest layer of thought, his philosophical position as it were sheltering behind the theological super-structure making *esse* or being *actus actuum* rather than thought. This would be needed to suggest a "lower" realm absolutely other than God (as could never be posited of the Notion, actively thinking itself only), which God in consequence absolutely transcends as his "creation" without negating it. Such a *presentation*, however true as to content, is defective in form, of presentation

Modern Schoolman, LXVI, January 1989, pp. 129-139; also "The Supposition of the Predicate", *Ibid.* LXXVII, November 1999, pp. 73-77.

¹⁷ Cf. Henry Veatch's outstanding and thorough article: "St. Thomas's Doctrine of Subject and Predicate" in *St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974), Commemorative Studies*, Vol. II: PIMS, Toronto 1974.

specifically (See the section on "Absolute Spirit" at the very end of the *Encyclopaedia*; see also David Burrell: "Aquinas's Appropriation of *Liber de Causis* to Articulate the Creator as Cause-of-Being", in *Contemplating Aquinas*, ed. Fergus Kerr, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2003, pp. 75-85).

Even the **Syllogism** (third operation) is thus assimilable to the Concept or Notion as manifesting thought's primary and sole product of the Notion in all its particular moments and aspects, each of them actual as individuals and, as such, subjects, identical in their mutual otherness. Here it emerges that the Notion, as absolutely actual, i.e. as absolute, is necessarily and indeed *infinitely* differentiated. The resulting individuals or actualities, however, to repeat, are

not to be understood to mean the immediate or natural individuals, as when we speak of individual things or individual men: for that special phase of individuality does not appear till we come to the judgment. (163)

It, viz. things, men etc., is indeed, again, a "special phase" of what is more generally brought to light here, viz. individuality as actual and, in truth, actuality as such (cp. Hegel's significantly chosen example at 166: "God is absolute spirit"). Under this what is particular or specific can have any number, i.e. no specific number, of variations into groupings articulated as individual unities as tight or tighter and more absolute than that of organic living bodies, for example. In general, again,

Every function and "moment" of the notion is itself the whole notion (§160); but the individual or subject is the notion expressly put as a totality. (163)

Therefore, whatever is thus "expressly put as a totality" itself becomes an individual or subject, as in Nature what is one individual can later become two or more, though Hegel, remarkably, sees only doubling as the "essential" development here (this could be linked to his doctrine of "polarity"). In this way "the principle of personality is universality", as indeed it is principle of any individual actuality at this level, which is thinking or the dialectic become conscious of itself.

4. The Notion as Notion Continued

We have a conception of abstracting notions or concepts by selective or partial attention inclusive of inattention. In accordance with such "abstract generality" (163, *Zus.*) we speak "of the notions of colour, plant, animal". It is in fact the basis of language, where words denominate or, rather,

signify such concepts (*suppositio simplex*) when themselves "abstracted" from use in sentences. For, of course, nothing is merely or wholly an animal, or a colour (confer here our *Africa, Philosophy and the Western Tradition*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, final chapter: "Causality and Analogy").

But, Hegel claims here,

the universal of the notion is not a mere sum of features common to several things, confronted by a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. (163, *Zus.* (1))

What is universal, he is thinking, must also be particular and also individual. These are all, equally, "moments", "functional parts", of the notion. Individuality, in fact, means "the reflection into self of the specific characters of universality and particularity". That is, it is a synthesis (163). McTaggart points out, accordingly, that

While the last two categories are the Universal and Particular Notions, this is not the Individual Notion, but the Individual ... From this point onward the thing is called an individual.¹⁸

So the synthesis (individual) as a category indicates the supersession, as a mere moment, of the Subjective "Notion as Notion" as such¹⁹, as category, the "elements" of which Individuality nonetheless "explicitly differentiates". From and out of it judgment develops, "for to judge is to specify the notion" (166). What though is "the thing" at this point, of which McTaggart speaks? We have after all left the "Thing" behind in the Doctrine of Essence. It is, as he says, the individual, **Individuality**, while "the thing is called an individual". These individuals, however, we are to think of as making up the universe. Here the name must denote not the material and abstract individuals of our unmediated Understanding jostling in discretely distinct extensional abstraction (space, time) but those inter-relating "aspects", relations over again but not parts of the *Notion*, concerning which Hegel gives continual indication here (160-165) and elsewhere. It is a matter of "the explicit or realised inseparability of the functions of the notion in their difference" (164, cp. 160, "each is the very total"). In the notion, "each of its functions can be immediately apprehended only from and with the rest" (164). It "is concrete out and

¹⁸ J.M.E. McTaggart, *Commentary on the Logic of Hegel*, Cambridge 1910, §191.

¹⁹ A(a) of Part III of EL, i.e. the "heading" for paragraph 163.

out", since it is just the "characterisation pure and entire, which is individuality" that "constitutes ... its universality."

But the universal is the self-identical, with the express qualification, that it simultaneously contains the particular and the individual. Again, the particular is the different or the specific character, but with the qualification that it is itself universal and is as an individual. Similarly the individual must be understood to be a subject or substratum, which involves the genus and species in itself and possesses a substantial existence. (184)

We might think of Aristotle's discussion of "this white" and similar notions. So it was said that specifically *this* "also is thou". The Notion or, more immediately, God, was and is meant here, hence the continuation, "neither is this thou", a qualification less stressed in Absolute Idealism since here the "this" or *immediate* individual has the being of a phenomenon merely, i.e. the mystical "blockage" is "thematized" as rational theology> "the land of unlikeness" is no longer a land. But yes, then, this is "thou", the Notion entirely, every "this" having genus and species, never being a bare or abstracted particular, since it "is as an individual". This is the unity of things, supra-organic in multiple universal identity.

Yet neither is the contingent, the phenomenon, Nature, explained away. It is what was called the analogy of being or, more (less?) fundamentally, of all beings. The latter analogy, that of "all beings", as becomes clear in Hegel, results from the former, from the Idea which *is being*, as is declared at the close of *The Science of Logic* (GL). It is in this sense that Hegel at this point understands "a substantial existence". It is in this sense that Aquinas had stated that without this analogy of being "all things would coalesce", i.e. one would have individuality or, equivalently, *the* individual, without particularity or universal, these coalescing with it. This would not be multiple universal identity in perfect unity and thus, as absolutely finite, or without analogy (of being) is impossible. It is, that is to say, from absolute Necessity that particularity and universality are alone subtended. The notion, *as* necessity, "is itself just this very identity", as being "its presupposition", since "in this identity lie freedom and the notion", which is itself "the presupposition of the immediate". It is in this sense that the varieties of the "ontological argument" can be seen as a claim that, *in* absolute logic and its "method", no argument is needed (for God's existence). Hence Aquinas, from his "moderate realist" standpoint, rejected it *as an argument* just for this reason, which reason, from the same point of view, seems the same as what Hegel called Kant's "tenderness towards the empirical" or the finite, the latter equated by

Hegel with falsity. This, as a further reflection, is not strange to Aquinas but is methodologically excluded from his system. Concerning the latter, however, it is plausibly claimed that "there are two systems in Aquinas" (Georges van Riet: "The Problem of God in Hegel", Parts II and III", *Philosophy Today*, Summer 1967, pp. 75-105), side by side as it were.

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So, the notion exists in the medium of "thought in general and not the sensible thing in its empirical concreteness" (164). It is thus far "abstract" and, also, it "falls short of the idea". The subjective notion, indeed, "is still formal". That is, it "is itself the absolute form, and so is all specific character, but as that character is in its truth", i.e. in absolute Mind. There is nothing outside of this. Even as abstract, then, "it is the concrete, concrete altogether, the subject as such". For, ever since the Outside was found identical with the Inside it has been clear that we are concerned entirely with "persons"²⁰, subjects, as in my view, it was the merit of McTaggart's reading of Hegel's logic specifically to have discerned. "The absolutely concrete is the Mind". Here the notion exists when distinguished from objectivity. Nothing else is so concrete, not the "specific notions of man, house, animal, &c., which are simply denotations and abstract representations" (164). They "just miss the notion", as does also, therefore, the whole idea of mind and body as dualistically making up man.²¹ The AI

²⁰ In using this term here I do not *a priori* exclude that a computer, or a dog, or God, or a human being, or a consciousness, to give examples, might not be persons or a person.

²¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, where the whole framework of body and soul as making up parts of man is transcended or suspended. Yet in terms of that the whole of the later theology of Incarnation and all that hangs upon it was worked out (witness the phrase "resurrection of the body", *corporis*, abstractly singular, as distinct from *mortuorum*, plural and concrete, in the Nicene Creed, but so as it were thoughtlessly employed in patristic and medieval theology). F. Inciarte, in "Die Einheit der Aristotelischen Metaphysik", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 101, 1994, pp.1-21, remarks that for Aristotle, in contrast to Thomas Aquinas, we have not, in considering "man" (*Menschen*), reached the Wittgensteinian point where the spade turns or buckles (*On Certainty*). We must go further, from *Wesen* (*Mensch*) to "*Wesensform* (z.B. *Seele*)", but understanding this, it is the decisive (*entscheidende*) step, *als Akt*, as Act. In this perspective "body" becomes, is reduced to, an abstraction or even, in some later formulations, a mere sign. See the same author's discussion of Aquinas's commentary on the *Liber de causis*, with reference to Proclus, deeply studied by Hegel (F. Inciarte: *Forma Formarum*, Karl Alber, Freiburg/München, 1970, pp.109-113). The theologians were hampered by

problematic (and opportunity) of our time would depend exclusively, therefore, for Hegel, upon whether or not it, the "intelligence", was differentiated into what, *qua* differentiation, would be fully specified individuals, thereby instanced the Notion in Absolute Knowledge as equivalent to Freedom, Love, Blessedness or, at least, "free Spirit", the "liberation" being not the flight of abstraction" but necessarily "existing in an individual form" (159). Such "artificial intelligence", that is, would have to be characterisable as "the absolute person", as Hegel says of God. Does such "intelligence" instance itself as I (159)? Only thus would it be related in reciprocal identity with me who am writing this. Only thus would it be an "intentional system" (D. Dennett, in his *Brainstorms* and elsewhere). This is quite possible or at least conceivable inasmuch as the individual is not "me the individual person", in the "finitude and ruin" of that which is purely abstract, as not corresponding to its notion. I am rather the other and absolute, and so not this "empirical" and temporal individual, just as I am not, as concrete and absolute individual, eighty kilograms in weight or seventy years old, as in the perspective of the Understanding. There was no need to distinguish the computer, or the smell of the rain-filled air, from me in the first place. Or, insofar as we are ourselves possibly computers we cannot deny personality and hence intelligence to any possible form of the computer as such, one, for example, with blood and bone as software, though neither do I mean that this latter is essential to mind, such a view being incompatible with the Absolute Idea.

This analysis, it is plain, as is confirmed by Hegel in *Enc. III*: "The Philosophy of Spirit", radically sublates any partitioning of mind into separate "faculties":

Similarly, if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations, forces, perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest of head or heart, there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole business. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind, and its activity can only have itself as aim; i.e. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity, to reach and get hold of itself, and to liberate itself to itself. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. (*Enc.* 442)

the need they perceived to defend, in terms of hylomorphic theory, the union of Christ's dead body when in the tomb with God. Similarly, against the Manichees, they wanted to defend the "ontological discontinuity" of creation (with God) as intrinsic to the meaning of this term, which it need not be (cf. our "Creation *stricto sensu*", *New Blackfriars*, March 2008, pp.194-213).

This is, *mutatis mutandis*, the same result as that of Aquinas arguing theologically (*Summa theol.*, Supplement) that in the resurrection to eternity the plants and animals have no place, but only, among "physical" things, the "bodies" of the redeemed, whose beauty, he claims, must overflowingly compensate for the absence of the former. What is this but to say that a) the material environment never had reality apart from us who perceive it, while b) our "bodies" were never "on a level with" material substances, living or not, in general. Rather than compensation it has to be a case of *absorption* (Hegel's term) of all finitude into what is infinite, of individuality into universality as, on Hegel's analysis, not abstract but individuality over again, of you, me or anyone, as the saying goes. In this way Aquinas wrote truly that when considered in logical priority to this, to eternal truth and reality, *anima mea non est ego*. This too is the hidden truth of McTaggart's atheistic system, within which only personality resists or differentiates what it thus makes the most perfect of unities, as is fully grasped, had this but occurred to him, in Trinitarian thought. His is but the second moment of this thought but held apart from the being of all co-loving persons in perfect unity as God's, "the Father's" or Mind's *own* Other as one with and in Mind, in *Christo* as immediate mediation, systematically necessary, as Hegel claims.

In McTaggart's system too this role is played by Logic, by the Idea as such, as Mind, necessarily, Hegel claims, "starts only from its own being" (*Enc.* 440). Only thus does it perfect itself in and to actuality. An "external" creation, all the same, which irretrievably ceased to be at some point, and that by design, would be totally irrational. Aquinas must thus be speaking, so to say, "as men speak", or spoke then, in terms of abstract dualism. "For my thoughts are not your thoughts", the prophet has God saying, and this is by and large how the tradition likes to leave it. Hegel, however, as a philosopher must, tries to identify with absolute thought, interpreting the oracular "Know thyself" in this sense.

So, again, "it is of the utmost importance that the real universal should not be confused with what is merely held in common". Here too belongs Hegel's citing of Rousseau's distinction between the universal will and the mere or phenomenal will of all (163, *Zus.*). Each of this universal's myriad eyes sees all, all the other eyes (and indeed *is* them), that is to say, sees, knows, loves and enjoys them in the super-harmony of what is called in religion, again, the "mystical body" and which is the Notion. "Eye" and "I" chance to coincide phonetically in English, yet we cannot so unqualifiedly, dropping the figure of seeing, say so unqualifiedly "Knows all the other I's" *et cetera* since, in logic, self and other are identified as eyes, as material phenomena, cannot be. So it is of these rational or

"spiritual" subjects that Aquinas can write (and as later will be sung) *Sumit unus sumunt mille*, in poetic mode, of the reception of the common bread thus trans-formed precisely as common. "Where one receives a thousand receive." This is why unity of faith and/or knowledge is traditionally required of "communicants", a unity, however, presupposed to philosophy as eternally realised, where "all shall know the Lord" (the prophet in *Jeremiah*) in common, communion, communication, none saying to another "Know the Lord" simply because, to raise the content from prophetic to philosophic "form", each is all and all is each. This dialectical result, we thus know, is revelation of what was there from the beginning (159, *Zus.*).²²

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The universal of the notion is not, again, "confronted by a particular" or, still less, by an individual "which enjoys an existence of its own". Such an impossible existence²³, in fact, as the Doctrine of Essence has shown, is inconceivable, could not yield enjoyment or the "play" of the Notion:

²² I try here to instance the insights of such thinkers as Ricoeur and Gadamer who urge the relevance for philosophical wisdom of the religious tradition. On this too see Hegel on Free Mind, on liberty as "the very essence of mind" (*Enc.*482), *ad opposita* and not *determinatum ad unum*, to cite the Thomistic parallel, as is Nature, mind's other. "It was through Christianity that this idea came into the world. According to Christianity the individual *as such* has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love, destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself, and have God's mind dwelling in him: i.e. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. If, in religion as such, man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being, he has also, even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence, the divine mind present within him, as the substance of the state, the family etc." (482).

²³ Cp. Inciarte: "*Es ist naemlich nicht so, dass das höchste Wesen, um vollkommen zu erkennen, das Allgemeine entbehren musste und nur das erfassen könnte, worum es bei der Erkenntnis zu tun ist: das Eigenste oder partikulärste. Dies Auffassung würde einem eigentümlichen Zusammenspiel nicht gerecht werden, welches zweifelsohne die Erkenntnis, und vielleicht auch das Sein, konstituiert ... Also doch keine blosse Gattung, und auch keine blosse Idee, den die Ideen Gottes sind nichts anderes als sein eigenes Wesen in Hinblick auf dessen Partizipierbarkeit*" (*op. cit.* p. 101-102, my italics). Absolute Mind understands all by itself alone, *uno solo*, the Notion, "*einem allgemeinem Medium ... allgemeiner als jede mögliche Gattung. Und nicht anders steht es mit dem Sein der Einzelwesen. Sie alle sind, ihr Sein ist ein allgemeinstes ... Wie ist dieses Zusammentreffen von Allgemeinstem und eigenstem zu verstehen?*" (p.102). Hegel's answer, relayed here by Inciarte, is the following: *Die Herausstellung der*

The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways
 Before anything was made.
 I was present when he prepared the heavens,
 I was with him, com-posing all things,
 Delighting each day,
 Playing before him continually,
 And my delight was to be with the sons of men.²⁴

The Liturgy applies this Solomonic utterance, of "the wise man", to Mary as *theotokos* and we may apply it to the Notion, knowing itself as other. Religion, like language, is used to objectify or re-veal the hidden, the essential as first contradicting the immediate, in both cases with some imperfection ("all judgements are false"), however.

The universal, Hegel goes on (163, *Zus.*), "is, on the contrary, self-particularising or self-specifying and ... finds itself at home in its antithesis":

It is not we who frame the notions. The notion is not something which is originated at all... It involves mediation, but the mediation lies in itself ... the notion is what is mediated through itself and with itself.

It is mediation. Rather, the whole idea of mediation is here in a sense overthrown or revealed as abstractly finite. The real ambience is one of reciprocal identity, as indeed earlier established (157) and from which the consequences are now being drawn. As mediation, it is the idea of the

Zusammenfassung einer je grösseren Mannigfaltigkeit von Formen in eine immer davon freiere einzige Form erhebt das Gefüge der forma formarum bei Thomas zum universalen Prinzip (my stress). This, it can perhaps be seen, is close to Aquinas's final answer, as given by Inciarte here, who remarks that Aquinas's Commentary on the *Liber de causis*, discussed here, is one of his last and most mature works. Inciarte, as would-be Aristotelian realist (but cp. his "Wie Aristotelisch ist der Aristotelismus?" in *Theologie und Philosophie*, 1979, pp. 94-107), however, remarks that "Der letzte Schritt" is not taken here insofar as Thomas denies, in his Commentary, "die Ausweitung des Zueinander von Allgemeinheit und Eigenheit auf das ganze Sein", instancing *materia corporalis et sensus corporeus* as wholly lacking this "universal participation of species" (meant in the sense even of inter-relating individuals here, it seems). Inciarte, however, does not envisage this restriction as implying the abstract unreality of material substance and sense-cognition, as is worked out in the later Absolute Idealism. This may be regarded, rather, as a new view of matter, in accordance or association, it might well now appear, with the latest physical theories or theories "of Nature". Then we have taken "the last step".

²⁴ *Proverbs* 8, free translation from the Vulgate text (B.A.C., Barcelona, 1965, p. 587). One may, in association, compare *Timaeus* 35.

Idea, thought thinking itself, absolute knowledge beyond knowledge, infinite re-flection, re-velation and manifestation (of the "glory" immemorially intuited). If we were to deny this then the whole structure would collapse. There is no "secular" interpretation possible, for here we reveal the *saeculum* to itself. This much, at least, Karl Marx understood, re-figuring the Idea, however, as a covert Messianism, which may indeed be one of its aspects, viewed, though, in that case, as in a sense trans-historical, necessarily. The ideal, the Idea, could not possibly be realised in a material future, as if itself transient over again, but subsists now and maximally, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Such a view in no sense subverts the call to action, to *praxis*, in whatever form. The maxim, pray as if everything depended on God but act as if it all depended on you, expresses merely the demand for the reconciliation in fact achieved in the dialectic. This is a "materialism" in the sense that it is not abstract as divided against something more concrete and total. Thus, Hegel says, the Absolute Idea, as distinct from the "notion of" it (236), is the Absolute (213, "The definition which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself absolute"). So, but also yet, "the percipient Idea is Nature" and the *Encyclopaedia* will thus return upon itself in circular or, better, spiral fashion, the return being ever new as befits the eternal. *Ecce omnia nova facio*.

At this point we argue from an intra-Hegelian standpoint only. What though is the negative force of "only" here? Within Hegelianism it cannot be introduced. "If I go to the utmost ends of the earth you are there also" (*Psalms* 139). So we may say too of the thought of philosophers and prophets worthy of the name, the *sapientes*, the knowers and tasters, the "touchers", who have "contact", the badge and mark of Spirit. "What the spiritual man seeks is contact," writes the anonymous Carthusian Abbot already mentioned.²⁵ Here we seem to "touch" indeed upon the erotic and

²⁵ In *They Speak by Silences*, a paradoxical title as lifted from Francis Thompson's poem, "The Hound of Heaven", where it refers to the things and scenes of nature which precisely for that reason, their silence, could not help the poet in his search for enlightenment, happiness etc. Mere regression to the silences proper more specifically to sensuous exchanges at their most intense (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus* 7, echoing the Neoscholastic notion of a finite philosophy), in place of thinking, is not the essence of "the mystical". This is rather the dialectical thought as a Plato, an Augustine, an Aquinas, an Eckhart or a Hegel are able to trace it. Thus the "apophatic" John of the Cross leaves us detailed rational or "Aristotelian" commentaries (*The Ascent of Mount Carmel*, *The Dark Night of the Soul*, *The Living Flame of Love*, etc.) upon his ecstatic "Spanish poetry" (cf. Hegel EL 80 *Zus.*, where Spanish poetry is oddly mentioned, also, on "mysticism", 82, *Zus.*). Bertrand Russell's title, *Mysticism and Logic*, we may note, betrays its author's

so upon *eros*, kept discreetly aside in our traditions and yet refusing to be either sublimated or finally reduced to today's or yesterday's omnipresent banality. It rather initiates and fuels the whole process, of thinking as of life, in gravitational attraction (the *pondus* of Augustine). "Everyone desires to know" (Aristotle) as the Good is what everyone pursues. In short, and as connecting with our exposition above,

the notion is the genuine first; and things are what they are through the action of the notion, immanent in them and revealing itself in them.

Hegel adds here (163, *Zus.*), concerning the universal, that it "cost thousands of years to make it enter into the consciousness of men". This is so even if in his as in the Biblical perspective "a thousand years are as a day". This thought, the universal, "did not gain full recognition until the days of Christianity", as we noted him saying above. Here he makes explicit an in itself explicit relation of the dialectic to history, in line after all with his previous situating of **Contingency** within these necessary relations as required, he has argued, by their absolute transcendence of all finitude as overlapping it. Thus reference to these "days" of Christianity is, thus viewed, on a par with reference to the specifically Aristotelian categories of formal logic or, we might even say, to the "natural historical" or cosmological categories of the "Big Bang" or of evolution. Hegel, that is, places himself with all those who refuse to philosophy the limitation of a particular point of view. Such thinkers may elect to argue, validly or invalidly, from, for example, the fact of rationality, its being human, the property of a "primate" mammal, to a divine or absolute intervention or control within nature not attributable to the contingencies of nature themselves. Their opponents would deny on principle that reason requires any such extrinsic credentials, as they appear to them. It is difficult to judge upon which side to place David Hume in such a debate, as between cart and horse!

So Hegel is quite consistent in taking account of such "days" even though, in accordance with his procedure, he should have found history, along with time and all Nature, in any case to be an alienation of thinking and yet from rational and absolute necessity to be the total reality, as thinking itself. All the same, "the Notion is pure play" or even "merely play" (161, *Zus.*). We have noted and commented on this above. So we might wonder if this latest identification, where all is identical in the sense

Hegelian past, where his senior and admired colleague, McTaggart, introduced him to a logic which, just as such, *was* mystical. It is up to us now to synthesise this historical antithesis, the spiral winding on.

of co-incident and more than coincident, is not just one more instance of notional "play". Our query centres round the justice of "just" here. For are we not rather "seriously" founding and locating this very play as characterising the Notion? We should note that posing such a dilemma compromises play as such. When you say "I am only playing" you are no longer playing, as every child would declare, were he but articulate. Here the child is father to the man. There might then be something destructive or regressive in this wish for "serious" foundation, as if foundation were feared not to be itself foundational.²⁶

We may recall here what we noted earlier about the role of **Volition** in cognition itself, as absorbing or superseding "cognition proper", namely, even as we may have a wish for "serious" or "sincere" cognition, recalling now Sartre's negative discussion of sincerity, the "project" thereof, in his *Being and Nothing*. Volition is placed, we noted, in the *Encyclopaedia* text, after "cognition proper" and immediately anterior to the Absolute Idea in what, we must remember, has, in the Doctrine of the Notion, become **Development** of the notion rather than transition or reflection of categories. Volition is "a free being of the whole notion" (161).

We might also recall Hegel's account of the Christian "idea" in *The Phenomenology of Mind* as somehow sitting loose to any compulsion of historical fact. "He is not here, he is risen", he cites in this especial intention, rather as St. Paul wrote, directly or *via* some other author, in the first generation of these "days", that "Even if we have known Christ after the flesh we know him so no more". Here we may acknowledge the role of success, of achieved fact, even as we question the latter's fancied absoluteness in reciprocal relation to our thus giving it meaning. Factuality, it is often noted, grounds Hegelian normativeness and hence disapproval of this view cannot be other than refusal to consider it. It is the actual successful survival and indeed flourishing of Christianity which grounds the universal, his text implies. We have here but the Augustinian *securus iudicat orbis terrarum* deprecated by ethicists such as R.M. Hare, although also in a measure by Hegel (71). But while Hare supposes it must restrict or limit our autonomy Hegel merely warns that "it is all important to know if the mere general conception of deity suffices, or if a more definite knowledge of God is required". Folk-Catholicism might fail the test (of true religion) as roundly as the Judaea portrayed in the Gospels where, on Paul's interpretation, "the remnant of Israel" was reduced to *one*, the "suffering servant" of *Isaiah*, in fact, whom none "will have". "There was

²⁶ Simone de Beauvoir's *Ethics of Ambiguity*, with its talk of "the serious man", doubtless had a partly Hegelian parentage. Cf. also J.-P. Sartre's study, *Saint Genet*.

no beauty in him that we should desire him" while, similarly, there exists a folk tradition that Mary, "mother of God" (*theotokos*), was not attractive to men. Just thereby, it is implied, taking this notion generally, however, does and did Christianity survive, even if Augustine's secure confidence in a Christian *orbis terrarum*, that so affected Newman, is not so easily or, dare one say, superficially, come by.

Similarly, as regarding the development of Cognition into Volition and the more general finitude of the historical as linked to that, the foundational precept of the Natural Law, for Aquinas as for Hobbes, is to preserve oneself in being. Such self-preservation extends for Aquinas into the mandatory achievement of happiness identified as eternal beatitude, answering to one's ground-inclination or "natural desire". At the same time it, in obedience to the precept, is in either case, temporal or eternal, a condition for such attainment of continued or "saved" being, not to be identified, all the same, without more ado with "mere" Existence, the "factual", Hegel's dialectic seems to teach us. In so far as the factual is indeed normative, that is, it is no longer to be viewed as merely or *abstractly* factual. Those who deprecate his view either do not take it seriously or else have not come close to perceiving what it is. As he says in another context, human nature, "not much to its credit", would rather exhibit blindness to the arguments demonstrating the unreality of the world ("acosmism") than assent to their conclusion, "preferring darkness to light" he seems to mean, or perhaps Understanding to Reason. That is, the volition is comparatively *lacking*. Have we here conceded the main point? Hegel's point is that precisely we have *not* done so, as part of his general enthronement of Mind *as freedom*, or of free consent to "the light".

Yet this conditionality of obedience or obligation, that it is necessary for survival or for flourishing, not in itself absolutely, places the ethical, at least the *sittlich* or moral, in finite perspective. One might say the same of Kant, a little differently, with his "So act as if ..." Universal law becomes, is reduced to, the entirely hypothetical, despite all the rhetoric, as we must now identify it, to the contrary. The necessity in it, that is, is as intrinsic to purely human felicity as we find it in Aristotelian ethics, though this has become somewhat obscured.²⁷ The ethical, that is, is not "first" philosophy.

The universal, however, is infinite. The moral virtues, in contrast, function as habits needed for the *vita activa* here on earth, so to say, not for the *vita contemplativa* or life of serious, because ultimately playful, *theoria*, participating in eternity. Hegel is here in line with Aquinas and

²⁷ Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, in an analysis which survives the diffuseness of his later study, *Whose Justice, which Rationality?*

Aristotle, as MacIntyre might have noticed in his later defence of the latter two. So, this means, the biological inclination is one with the urge to blessedness, just as the positive or contingent history of religions and of all else serves to found the universal. Such is the unity of Hegel's view. "The Greeks, in other respects so advanced, knew neither God nor even man in their true universality", while for Hegel God is man and man is God, which is to say that God is not God and man is not man. What we have, rather, is harmony of Mind, of Spirit, such that self is other and other is self, in abrogation of this dualist alternative where the terms are defined in mutual denial. They are, that is, merely asserted in the obstinacy of the Understanding. To assert either without the other is finite and hence false. "What is man? What is God?" a recent, now "sainted" Pope provocatively asked, thinking doubtless of the Reason that admits of no critique beyond that offered at a purely phenomenological level.

The "universal God" was "a God concealed". Why are we now speaking of "God" except because Christianity has been mentioned as catalyst for birth of this "thought", the universal? Did Christianity itself conceive this thought as such? In that case Israelite religion, at least Judaism, certainly did, since Christianity is a variant of it and grows out of it, whatever contrasts we may like to draw. "Man as man was not then recognised to be of infinite worth and to have infinite rights." Thus Aristotle denied that children or slaves could be happy, though we may balance this apparent partiality with that other Greek saying, "Call no man happy until he is dead." It could be debated whether women have souls, not merely in the sense that one may always debate anything. Nor does Hegel mention the later discussions concerning the humanity, or the human rights, of the native Americans and other peoples newly encountered. This occurred in the "days" of Christianity but before the Enlightenment, whether as seen within those "days" as a fruit of them or as calling for their termination or at least supersession.

Hegel argues, rather, that the ground for the disappearance of slavery from Europe, which he treats as unique in the world, "is only to be found in the very principle of Christianity, the religion of absolute freedom". "Only in Christianity is man respected as man, in his infinitude and universality." This "only" is uncharacteristic, while in Hegelian philosophy man is disclosed as nothing other than necessarily differentiated or individualised Reason and not, for example, a "union" of soul and body. His unity is too perfect and absolute for that.

There is though some truth in this "only" as related to the dialectic of Being and Nothing as reflecting Christianity, where the divine purpose is seen as "bringing to nought the things which are" in order to exalt "the

things which are not". The last, again, will be first, the first last, while the least honourable or more indebted is seen as the one most proportioned to or "meriting", therefore, an act of divine or infinite mercy or grace, i.e. a bestowal of what is unmerited. Here no one's personality, its reality, can be put in doubt or questioned, no "quality" or degree of it assigned to life. Rather, the very "principle of personality is universality". This comes through Christianity and as such is exported throughout the world (164, *Zus.*).

Here too, however, the universal is not what is merely held in common as lowest common denominator. So the universal will need not be the will of all (to cite his reference to Rousseau again). It is rather the notion of the will, will as such, upon which the laws for universal well-being are based and which promotes itself in the world by its own energy, that natural desire as an inclination to the object, called *bonum* of which we have been speaking. *Bonum* is not some particular object, but the object whatever it is, as universally pursued by the universal itself, in which all participate and are thus lost or "ruined".²⁸ It makes will what it is.

To this originating character of the Notion Hegel assimilates what we say in "religious language", viz. "that God created the world out of nothing". So God is not Nature:

In other words, the world and finite things have issued from the fulness of the divine thoughts and the divine decrees. Thus religion recognises thought and (more exactly) the notion to be the infinite form, or the free creative activity, which can realise itself without the help of a matter that exists outside it. (163, *Zus.*)

Form and volition or freedom, thought and decree, are here equated. The notion originates. This accounts for the naturally volitional element in our thought, to which Hegel refers us, and which allows or moves thinking to think itself while it is indeed that same movement or act (which is thinking). It is thus not entirely a matter of "letting being be", however actively we might wish to think or "let be" such a dualistic thought (Heidegger's), applicable only, and there it fits the case well, to our finite thought, confronted with an initially alien object which it "lets be".

So the more God is free, the more am I and all others (free). Thus Aquinas had explained will as itself the intrinsic inclination of intellect itself in the first place to itself *qua* intelligible form of anything in which it

²⁸ See our "The *bonum honestum* and the Lack of Moral Motive in Aquinas's Ethical Theory", *The Downside Review*, April 2000, pp. 85-110.

is.²⁹ Kant had wished to confine will to the *ratio practica*, identifying will with it and thus seeming to make of it a separate and yet repeated rational faculty, which Aquinas denies that it is, saying it is simply common *ratio* as *ordinata ad opus*.³⁰ Hence moral or ethical good is not some separate or "non-natural" species of good as such. The point here is the concurrence (of Aquinas) with Hegel, or conversely, but as a pointer to the general truth of these theses. We have here something of an antithesis to Kant's largely prolegomenal "metaphysics of morals".

I add, however, that the nature of language and of what is called style depends upon such volition as suffusing intellect in its own act. This insight is not to be equated with a purely finite "voluntarism", such as some theologians and others apply even or especially to the divine willing. It is also the only reasonable way to read the categorical imperative of Kant, taking the "thou canst will" as addressed not to the phenomenally individual but to the absolute I, in whom indeed, as reality, will and cognition are not abstractly separated.

The treatment of the "subjective notion as notion", in the *Encyclopaedia*, concludes, then, with some further pointers to deficiencies in its presentation within the formal logic of Hegel's time or perhaps of any time. Such logic in its finitude is not only subject to decay but marked with an endemic formalism as belonging to the Understanding only. "Formal" is routinely misread in the restrictive or partial sense of "formalist", as when the logical forms are taken as less than real, instead of the most real and productive of all, as abstract schemata only.³¹ Against such an error this whole section of the *Logic*, as of the dialectic itself, is directed, inclusive of the treatment of judgment and syllogism immediately following, specifically, however, by showing how they naturally occur just here as mere moments of that dialectic, understood essentially as that which supersedes itself. Thus Aristotle, who first devised or discovered (abstracted) such a logic, never actually applied it in his own philosophy, Hegel remarks. Aristotle's

²⁹ Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia 19, 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 79, 11.

³¹ See, as, regrettably, an example of this, Peter Geach, *Reason and Argument*, Blackwells, Oxford 1976. Cp. Henry Veatch, "Concerning the Ontological Status of Logical Forms", cited above, also his "Formalism and/or Intentionality in Logic", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XI, 1950-51, pp.348-365, also our own "Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy" (1997), cited above. Veatch's *Intentional Logic*, Newhaven 1952, is also still worth consulting in depth: cf. my discussions of this book and its critics in *Philosophy or Dialectic* (Peter Lang, Frankfurt 1994)..

ruling principle is always the speculative notion; and that syllogistic of "understanding" to which he first gave such a definite expression is never allowed to intrude in the higher domain of philosophy. (187)

As Aquinas put it, the logician as such considers the *modus praedicandi* rather than the *existentia rei*³², while Aristotle as "the first ... performed his work so exactly and surely, that no essential addition has ever been required", comments Hegel (183), writing before Frege or Russell, as we noted. Upon this evaluation stands, in great part, the validity of the structure of Hegel's Logic. For this is involved in the threefold vision, the descreying of reality as triadically making up "the Absolute Syllogism" of the Logical Idea, Nature and Mind as these are each variously the mean between the other two, just as in formal syllogistic and its originally three figures. The later Fregean, Russellian and Quinean school, taking it generically for now, takes a different, more distanced view. This dilemma is only truly resolved by the insight that the two activities are not both logic in the same sense at all, just as Hegel's logic transcends and yet, we claim, "overlaps" formal logic as the infinite the finite. "The syllogism is the reasonable, and everything reasonable" (181). The completeness of syllogistic³³ on its own terms is the measure of Aristotle's success:

A subtle spiritual bond, consisting in the agency of thought, is what gives unity to all these contents, and it was this bond, the form as form, that Aristotle noted and described ... the procedure of finite thought. (20, *Zus.*)

Logic, though "instrumental", "is to be studied not for its utility, but for its own sake" (*logica docens*); "the super-excellent is not to be sought for the sake of mere utility... yet at the same time other ends flourish and succeed in its train", Hegel adds, instancing religion. As super-excellent logic is ontology, as Hegel's own work shows. *The being of the Notion is the first and all-controlling instance of the notion of Being*. Thus, "all things are a judgement", the syllogism is "everything reasonable" and the Notion, that "first act of reason", is everything simply.

What differentiates its elements, making them to be such, "is the element of Individuality", not itself, we noted, a notion:

³² Aquinas, *Comm. in VII Met.... Aristotelis*, 17, n.1658. Yet the *modus praedicandi* is as much (or as little) a real nature as is anything else, thinking being infinitely self-reflexive

³³ Cf. the (penultimate) section on this completeness in our article cited above from *IPQ*, March 2002.

Individuality is the negative reflection of the notion into itself, and it is in that way at first the free differentiating of it as the first negation, by which the specific character of the notion is realised, but under the form of particularity. (165)

He says "at first". Individuality, the I, consciousness reflected as self-consciousness, while at the same time negating it since it is not distinguished against some other, this "realises" the notion's "specific character", i.e. its particularity, though this is yet a species of it (along with universality and, indeed, individuality). Yet

The different elements are in the first place only qualified as the several elements of the notion, and, secondly, their identity is no less explicitly stated, the one being said to be the other.

Each I, as consciousness reflected as self-consciousness, is every I. Each I is identically the sum not only of its "outward" relations but of all actual relations. For these in turn are all in the one Mind, thus proved to be absolutely individual, which is to say actual or concrete. "This realised particularity of the notion is the Judgment", at which the dialectic thus developmentally arrives. The absolute individuality of the Notion is its "specific notional character", however, the true distinctions of which, as "species of it", when "severed" by "external reflection", are the notion as universal (notion), particular (notion) and finally (what it absolutely is) individual. This immanent specifying of the notion is, however, the judgment, not the infinite number of judgments and notional differentiations that we make, merely, but the judgment or act that the notion itself constitutes, its life as knowing.

The absolute individuality of the notion in a sense inverts the view of matter as the *principium individuationis*. This had resulted in the individual's being judged as *per se* unintelligible, at least to us (not to God), since immateriality, as form and thus contrary of matter, was seen as the root (*radix*) of cognition. Thus a given thing is first, maybe, identified as an animal (even, previously, as a "thing"). Yet we know that nothing can be simply or absolutely an animal. Then it may be taken as a rabbit, but with the same proviso. But again, even as this individual rabbit it is only describable in universal terms. We never actually get to its individuality. An obvious explanation of this would be that it is not an individual, but this was missed in "realist" philosophy. Individuality is only known as such from within or by reflection (on self). For that reason it is absolute. The individual is absolutely individual, through and through, as each may prove for herself or himself. It is Individuality itself and has

to be. This is what necessitates the identity of each with all, of all with each, evoking Love as ultimate reach of knowledge and as synthesis of Cognition and Volition. Love or mutual inclination, binds beings together as Being and not chaos, the universe such as we, necessarily in the concrete differentiation which is identically I, know as possessed, "within" or "without", the dialectic has already shown, indifferently. Even hatred, therefore, will be founded upon a measure of love in this common or garden sense of inclination which yet founds the spiritual ideal.

Only persons, as consciousnesses of their consciousness in freedom, satisfy or "correspond to" these requirements. But rather, this requirement of individuality is itself personality, which has universality as its principle. This, we will see, is the ultimate judgement and indeed syllogism, that the individual is the universal. In Mind individuality and universality coalesce, since Mind as such has nothing to do with potentiality as a kind of deficient or finite actuality. Mind knows all things, is their knowledge, in that self-knowledge, self-thinking, since its knowledge is *act*, which it is. Hence we have the characterisation of knowing as re-membling, at the same time as it is non-forgetting. Knowing repeats the Notion, its act, as original and beginningless conception, in the utter freedom, again, of infinite and hence of eternal act. Only in the light and power of this Act, as act of acts, are we first able to seek reason why Being is, but only, again, to find our question, born of that finitude we mistakenly call "ours", repulsed. "If I were not, God would not be." That is, I am the necessity God creates as and in thinking me, without which, consequently, I would not be. "Thou wast not born for death, immortal bird". This is not "poetic fallacy", as is mindlessly given out. Rather, "No birth, no death" or, as Hegel sums it up, "Death is the entry into spirit" as exit from unlikeness, as Spirit's eternal or self-constituting appropriating of its *own* Other, there being no other other. Conversely, "all things are yours", since the efforts you make towards this self-appropriation are not your own, but another's. In your very beginning, your *conception*, is and was your end. "Behold I make all things new", since I am act, time's *nemesis*. I do not overstate my case since, necessarily, it is not overstateable. This is the answer to those impugning Hegel's account of Incarnation as unwarranted universalisation. The universal is itself the sole or *exemplary* individual. As religion so multiformly repeats, you, all, are *in Christo*, as *for us*. McTaggart would deny the reflexivity, that we would then be *for* God. I offer, rather, the rationale of it as lying open upon the pages temporally (but for how long?), but perhaps also temporarily, conserving Hegel's logical discourse.

XXI

THE JUDGMENT IN GENERAL

In Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* text (166) it is made clear, initially, that what we have to do with in the **Judgment** (the second of the three divisions of the Subjective Notion) is the specification of the Notion. It is not specified, primarily, into the kinds of judgments as concepts (conceived *qua* judgment), but simply as this or that. The Subject Notion, S, we say, is this or that, P. That is, judgment itself specifies essentially. That is, the term "judgment" names specification. The Notion admits of specification inasmuch as *qua* infinity it necessarily requires infinite differentiation, without, however, the finitude of composition.

This relation of specification is one of identity specifically between what are mutually other. Hence ambiguity arises in our (notional) apprehension of the notion prior to this present development. For in awareness of the subject as now independent of the predicate we take it "to be a thing or term". The predicate indeed we see, *qua* predicated, as just such "a general term... somewhere in our heads" (166).¹

In this sense, McTaggart pointed out², apparently correctly, the Individual is not restrictively or subjectively a notion. That is, "the true distinctions in the notion", viz. **universality, particularity, individuality** (163), are not in fact *species* of it, as they seem "when kept severed from each other by external reflection". For the third of them, again, the Individual, is not a subjective notion at all but is objective and finally absolute, absolutely concrete, the "system" even and "method" too. The "finite" individual, in contrast, is unreal and hence "ruined" *ab initio* or in essence.

The individual, ultimately, which is the same as to say any and every individual, is the universal and this, that the individual is the universal, is the very form of the judgment, rather, it is the judgment, "in its abstract

¹ This is Frege's "concept", but only so long as we consider Frege free from Hegelian influence or a similar line of thinking, apparent when he asks "what is the world independent of the reason? To answer that would be as much as to judge without judging" (*Foundations of Arithmetic*, tr. Austin, Oxford 1953, p. 36e).

² J.M.E. McTaggart, *Commentary on Hegel's Logic* 1910, §191.

terms". Presupposed, however, is the relation of naming, itself an identity or identification, rather.³ Presumed to the discussion, therefore, is what is presumed to discussion itself. Discussion not so much incarnates⁴ as projects or represents the actual dialectic as Thought thinking itself, which is System, Method and the absolutely concrete Individual. Upon or within this Individual all subjective notionality rests, just because the Individual, individuality itself but even "this" individual, *is the Notion*. Subject is "thing" before it becomes term. Thus if it is the Idea (or God) that is referred to by the Notion as an individual, as Individuality itself, a conception harmonising with Hegel's identification of universality as "principle" of personality (163 *Zus.*), then Taylor's "particular" seems quite misplaced. God may be *the* individual, "expressly put as a totality", hardly *the* particular, as it were "sundered" (*Besonderes*).

These various entities are in reality an infinity of reciprocal relations. The relations themselves are reciprocal. They do not, even as relations, exist independently or abstractly. The reference, therefore, is no longer to any specific relation of reciprocity but to the reciprocity of relations themselves as forming a unity in identity, not a merely compositional unity as in the superseded part-whole category treated in the Doctrine of Essence. So these relations, as varieties of judgment, are contained in perfect identity in the Judgment of the Notion, which they even constitute. They cannot be manipulated "by us", ourselves such judgments, in our finite efforts to set them in rational order. Therefore we have had to devise *terms* (language), as standing for, in intention, all these elements. Yet any one such an essentially suppositious term frequently has to stand or go proxy for several different supposits or elements connected by likeness and hence, in our naming (the "relation of naming" mentioned above),

³ Hegel discusses this in *Encyclopaedia* III: "Philosophy of Spirit". In Charles Taylor's *Hegel*, confusingly, for those following William Wallace's version of the "Little Logic", the triple division into universal, particular and individual (163 in Hegel's text) is put (Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.302) as "universal (*Allgemeines*), specific (*besonderes*) and particular (*Einzelnes*)", confusingly, but possibly an improvement. Compare Taylor's remark in the footnote there on *Besonderes* as cognate with English "sundering", thus distinguishing particularisation or specification as a *conceptual* action, which individualisation, for Hegel, McTaggart points out, is not. So here Hegel introduces the triple division thus: "The Notion as Notion contains the three following 'moments' or functional parts" (163), while one could indeed argue that "particular" rather than "individual" simply does not translate either the noun *Einzelnes* or the neuter adjective *einzelnes*.

⁴ Cp. W. Wordsworth: "Words are not thoughts dressed, They are its incarnation."

where they are *nomina* or terms, by *analogia*.⁵ Thus the judgment "is a connexion which is also a distinguishing", as the form "S is P" faithfully reflects. That is, as itself a judgment it reflects the infinite particularisation of the universally individual and as such it, "judgment", names the Absolute more perfectly than any category hitherto treated. The form of judgment is and has to be itself a judgment.⁶

Such particularisation, subjectively notional as it is, yet reflects and is intentionally identical with the *necessarily* infinite differentiation of the absolutely infinite, which is the Absolute. All things, Hegel therefore says, are a judgment, "for to judge is to specify the notion" (165). Judgment is its active self-specification or particularisation, as a thinking thought and nothing other than this thinking thought without limit. This indeed is the ultimate result, self-unfolding or manifestation or self-constitution ("thinging", thinking) of Being in its full self-realisation as actively self-thought. Being becomes Thought wherever it is not confined to being just one "thing" or *determinatum ad unum*, the essence of Nature as Thought's (or, therefore, Being's) self-alienation, since thought (whether *ratio* or *intellectus*) is, rather, *ad opposita* and as such not determined at all. Yet, as determined to indeterminateness, so to say, it is itself being and as such is Nature's devouring opposite within the limitlessly perfect but never perfected unity. *Das unzuverlässliche... hier ist's getan* (Goethe: *Faust*, 12106-9). "Behold, I make all things new", i.e. continually. Thought has the self as other or, Hegel will gloss and expand, is or becomes itself just in the other. It transcends self in the latter's (finite) notion. Full marks, thus far, to Hume for his negative treatment of the self! If it is itself in the other *only* then it is not itself an absolute individual except as one with the or some *final* or exemplary individuality, "absolute person" (Hegel) even. Hegel *develops* Hume as he develops Kant.

The Fregean function/argument explanation of judgment can never fully replace the paradigmatic denotational identity of Subject and Predicate since the former, functionalism, has to be explained in terms of the latter, identity, when one states, for example, what a function or an argument *is* (identical with). This is also why judgment in the dialectic replaces or supersedes the subjective notion as notion. Thus any subject, of which something is said (predicated) in judgment, must always itself be explained under the same form or, here, category that it already has. Unless we are able to say what S is (in a judgment) it will be a mere

⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *De soph. el.* I, 165a 7-16, where this is equivalently stated. This text formed the basis for post-Aristotelian elaboration of "supposition theory".

⁶ Cf. our "Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy", *Acta Philosophica*, Rome, Vol. 6, 1997, pp. 303-310.

"proper" name, simply standing for (*supponens pro*) one or more individuals, without any rationale, precisely as Hegel analyses the necessary arbitrariness of linguistic signs in "Philosophy of Spirit" (*Enc. III*).⁷ Thus I say that "telephone" means or rather *names* what I use to talk with those not present. Even this first *suppositio materialis* or, rather, *naturalis*, prior to or abstracted from sentential context, begins already to express a judgment, an identity of "telephone" with something else⁸, precisely in its being taken as a word. This is more immediately apparent in the German *Fernsprecher*, but I apply it even to such a word as *fern*, once received as word and not merely grammatically as *ad*-verb (a term not found in classical Latin). It, a word (term), implies a judgment about itself, that it stands for something, is *supposing*, as we now say, something (else). Even where it stands for itself it stands for it as something else. In Fregean terms, the subject-variables are never wholly unbound, on pain of not signifying at all, the boundness is equivalent to a judgment, whether asserted or not. Again, though, any possibility is in fact *asserted*, actual, as a possibility, whether we speak of horses or unicorns, or even of "impossibilities". Hence Hegel eliminates it as a separate modality. "It is otherwise with Actuality and Necessity" (*Enc.* 143).

In the simple understanding of notion as notion, therefore, we have, again, "a connexion which is also a distinguishing", essential judgment. Judgment is, therefore, the notion itself in its particularity. The subjective notion as notion itself passes into judgment. The judgment is saying what things are and therefore itself embodies that abstraction according to which concepts are formed. The explanation of judgment, therefore, as in essence the putting together of concepts, is false unless it is made clear that any concept is itself already either composite or a co-incident unity. As such it is superior to that towards which composition and order

⁷ Cf. J. Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology", *Margins of Philosophy* 1972 (tr. Bass), also in *Philosophy Today* 1985, reprinted in *G.W.F. Hegel, Critical Assessments*, ed. Robert Stern, Routledge 1993.

⁸ By *suppositio materialis* the term as a material or individually occurring item stands simply for itself and not for its supposedly invariant non-contextual meaning (*suppositio naturalis*). Yet even that most unequivocal identity is thus made into a judgment of "standing for", thus making *suppositio* a broader category than "going proxy for", as in some later theories of reference. It is firstly a or the "sign of itself". It belongs with a universal theory of signs in which everything has a predication relation to every other thing, even in affirming its own identity (since the predication relation is itself identity). Cf. our "Subject and Predicate Logic", *The Modern Schoolman*, LXVI, January 1989, pp. 129-139 (esp. section IV), also "The Supposition of the Predicate", *Ibid.*, LXXVII, November 1999, pp. 73-78.

(hierarchy) strive, as uniting together in an infinite identity all its aspects or elements whatever. But as such, again, it will be the Absolute Idea.

The concept, that is, is infinitely judgment. If there are composites there must be simples, Leibniz had declared. It is *this* judgment, however, this final identity, the concept, which *alone* is absolutely simple, precisely as being (an) infinite and, hence, multiply differentiated identity. Infinity is itself judgment and a judgment, though not as initiating an enumeration simply. Platonic "third man" difficulties are side-stepped in roundly declaring everything finite to be false where taken for itself merely. In this sense Being is not distinguished from anything else, since it is (is!) the basis of any "finished" perfection whatever. In this very first sense too, then, "the factual is normative".

In this sense too "The copula 'is' springs from the nature of the notion", of the notion specifically. The notion is that which is "self-identical even in parting with its own", i.e. it doesn't just happen to be that as one of its properties. This is what it is, the truth of Self and Other, as, again, "the principle of personality is universality" (163, *Zus.*). This copula, however, constitutes judgment in identifying individual and universal in a "genuine particularity". At the same time, however, the copula should be assimilated to the predicate (the "functional" interpretation where, so to say, "is P" is P) as expressing act or entelechy⁹, something alike proper to the grammatical verb and to *verbum* or word in its universality, formal before it is abstract. Hence this formality of judgmental predication is not essentially predicamental, as if finitely marking off qualities from abstract because totally unspecified individuals. It first rather brings the individual into view in its inherent universality. We have here "the identity which is

⁹ This apparent or initial ambiguity was understood by Aquinas: *is* "means that which is understood after the manner of absolute actuality. For *is*, when it is expressed without qualification, means to be in act, and therefore it has its meaning after the manner of a verb. But the actuality, which is the principal meaning of the verb *is*, is indifferently the actuality of every form, either substantial or accidental act. Hence it is that when we wish to signify that any form or act actually inheres in any subject, we signify it by this verb *is*, either simply or according to some qualification - simply in the present tense; according to some qualification in the other tenses" (Aquinas, *In periherm.*, lect. 5, no. 22. Cf. our "Does Realism Make a Difference to Logic?", *The Monist*, April 1986, esp. note 24). The implication, as in Hegel, is that also languages lacking the copula *is*, such as Russian, would be subject to this logical interpretation. Conversely, this classic interpretation is just what the Russian language and others similar have, so to say, understood, as assimilating the copula to the as such active predicate and as not, therefore, having a separate term for it.

realised as identity or universality", leaving behind the correlations of Essence.

*

Judgments are not then just "combinations of notions" (166 *Zus.*), as it were presupposed to them or made afterwards, as if these notions were themselves quite heterogeneous to judgments. Notions do not in fact "differ in kind" from either judgment or syllogism. All three are *verba mentalia* or acts of the understanding, all three are imperfect moments of the absolute idea they presage and reflect. They do not form three species even of the finite understanding, since the individual is already the universal. This, the judgment's basic form, is already the form of reality, of the Absolute, which is thus, to this extent, itself Judgment, as having judgment's form, that of identity (itself however identified as act¹⁰). The Notion itself, here as "subjective", extends into judgment and is "the Notion as Judgment".

So what is "combined" in the judgment does not at first exist independently or as if separated. Affirmation and negation cannot be reduced to combination and separation in a final metaphysical analysis. Similarly, what is separated was never combined, as we see more immediately, although *prima facie* this raises the deeper problem of how a negative judgment can be a judgment at all as this is described here. What Hegel is saying brings out what is misleading in the Venn diagrams and other mathematical analogies as illustrative of syllogistic and hence in the mathematical model of logic as a whole, as distinct from any projected logical model of mathematics. The logical relation is not the real and extensional relation of containment or inherence but identity, a relation of reason alone. Hence identity effectively excludes the duality of *relata* needed for any real relation, since this relation, as a rational relating *in actu*, declares them to be one. The written word records this, the *vox exterior* manifests it. In this sense hearing is a superior or more spiritual sense than sight, something Hegel accordingly reflects in his aesthetics. Both music and poetry, the highest art, are primarily heard and so writing and notation here, like today's computers, are primarily tools of convenience. Dialectically, of course, the extremes of such convenience pass over into something more than itself in the general continuum, from moment to moment so to say. One might say further that the musical instrument generally is a tool of the voice, whether "intoning" words or

¹⁰ Cp. note 9. That identity is identified as Act (and act as identity) and Act as Notion is reflected in religion by the axiom "God is love".

more fundamental sound-patterns.¹¹ One might wish further to see speech as an instrument of just such an absolute pattern of supra-composite unity in absolute "harmony", as the "music of the spheres". Or one might not. Hearing itself, after all, is finite and subject to decay. Yet a deaf or a dumb man, it is known, may create music while thought is not conceivable as co-existing with a total congenital insensibility. The Absolute, therefore, includes the immediate as mediating itself to itself. Sense-cognition and intellectual cognition seen as separate phenomena are unreal abstractions, an insight opening to us the mystery of the animals or, at the other extreme, of the planets and heavenly bodies, given that space is itself a species of finitude and hence "momentary", in Hegel's supra-temporal sense, an alienation of the Idea. Within a scientific perspective we dismiss planetary cognition and "influence" as baseless. At the same time it may on more general principles be a free or reasonable attribution, a way of looking at what is in the first place unfounded immediacy, the "manifest" image of man himself¹², as self in other, other in self, a moment of the Idea. The apprehensions of children also are such moments, each identifiable, in difference (Hegel's basic thesis), with the Idea.

Thus, to return to our narrower theme, one does not "ascribe" predicates to a subject. Rather, the predicate is not thus ascribed since the judgment itself declares its antecedent identity with that subject and nothing else. It is not a case, therefore, of the subject being "self-subsistent, outside somewhere" and the predicate "somewhere in our heads", in either case exclusively. Nor does even the Fregean model imply this, once the foundation of the judgement in the notion, which it specifies without going beyond, is understood. Henry Veatch's trenchant criticism of Fregean procedures¹³ rather overlooked this point, whether or not it might remove

¹¹ Further still, it is difficult not to identify speech or intoning with hearing, suspending the active/passive distinction, as Stravinsky spoke of when he first "heard", i.e. internally, his "Rite of Spring". This merely testifies to the reflexive unity of thinking in the Absolute Idea. Compare the Johannine "My doctrine is not mine but his that sent me." This becomes a general point, speculative or superficially contradictory. It is the relayed doctrine that is called mine, the universal that is finally or non-abstractly individual.

¹² Cf. W. Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality* (1966). Sellars uses this term in contrast to the "real" or scientific image (of man). This, more rigorously followed, however, would exclude even perception "at a distance" (there would be no distance). The outside would be the inside, as emerged dialectically in the Doctrine of Essence.

¹³ E.g. in Veatch's *Intentional Logic*, Newhaven 1952. The point also coalesces with that of a coinciding *suppositio*, in specific predicate mode, of the predicate with the subject of judgment, with the concept or notion. Cf. Note 8, above; see

the ambiguity of some formulations of Peter Geach when expounding Frege as in final harmony with Aquinas and Aristotle. The subject, namely, must itself always expand or extend into a judgment in order to be known at all. Similarly, we shall see, judgment itself is a concealed syllogism, "the reasonable, and everything reasonable" (181), the Idea, in a word. Veatch's point that form and matter apply only analogically in logical investigations is a valid one, to be born in mind when interpreting the concept-object schema. The referent of both subject and predicate is neither outside nor inside, since both are the same, are I, which or who refers, whatever else we may wish to intend, to the Idea, is hence "universal of universals". Apart from this reference, in identity, it remains abstract, I remain abstract, not "concreted". Such is Hegel's system, brooking no separate "system of logic". The final logical method is (the philosophy of) spirit and *sophia* as wisdom.

Formal logic for a long time ignored the intrinsic or essential nature of this "advance" from notion to judgment, making the latter "look as if it were something merely contingent". From this point of view the later post-Hegelian thesis that words only have meaning in sentences, or in context, is itself an advance, despite the limitations we have found in it above. For the earlier "supposition" theory offered a unified view of meaning in both cases. Thus what a word "stands for" outside of its sentential use, its lexical meaning or *significatio*, extends even to its bearer in the case of proper names. Yet one will not so easily escape the puzzle of whether "David" stands for all Davids (there is no need to say "men called David") living and dead. This puzzle rather supports the thesis of the comprehensiveness of the contextual theory. Used out of some context "David" is just a noise. One has at least to intend that "David" is a nice name or some such. But this too will be a species of *suppositio*, material namely.

The true state of things, alone able to explain the necessity, which we recognise, of this advance, is that the notion does not "stand still" but is as such or essentially "self-differentiating". As such, unlike words, it does not "stand for" anything, unless that freedom which it is. This is an advance upon the more figurative phrase *diffusivum sui*, applied to the notion as *bonum*. This differentiation, "the native act of the notion, is the judgment". "It is... an infinite form, of boundless activity, as it were the *punctum saliens* of all vitality." All, he says. One cannot but think of the ceaseless procession of the Word in Trinitarian belief, well known to, indeed shared

also, on Geach, Henry Veatch's "St. Thomas's Doctrine of Subject and Predicate" in *St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974), Commemorative Studies*, Vol. 2, PIMS, Toronto 1974.

(of course, as with all believers, under an interpretation), by Hegel, or of "the wonderful effects of divine love" as described or envisioned in the fourteenth century book, *The Imitation of Christ*, relating this to what Hegel says at 159: "For thinking... means a liberation... as feeling, it is Love" or, more comprehensively, both **Volition** and, in the Greater Logic, "The Idea of the Good", actually mediating between **Cognition** as first proposed, volition being the final development of it intrinsically, and "the **Speculative** or **Absolute Idea**" (235: the German makes clear that *speculative*, without initial capitalisation, is adjectival to *Idea* and nothing else). Thus Hegel would make good his final Encyclopaedic claim that philosophy has all the content of Religion and Art and more perfectly too. This much is plain as a claim, whether or not we concur in it.

"A judgment therefore means the particularisation of the notion", which is yet in itself "implicitly the particular", made explicit in the subjective notion here as or under the aspect of judgment. "All things", it follows, "are a judgment" (167). This "all" is to be taken both distributively, in the sense of each and everything, and also as undistributed. In this latter sense all things, precisely as universally particularised, are a judgment, are judgment, are the judgment. The judgment is their particularisation, as sheep, goats and whatever else may be predicated of anything or any *thing* indifferently, in act or, that is to say, vitally (166, *Zus.*). Hegel refers us again here to his analogy of the plant:

as we remarked before... the germ of a plant contains its particular, such as root, branches, leaves, &c.: but these details are at first present only potentially, and are not realised till the germ unfolds. This unfolding is, as it were, the judgment of the plant. (166, *Zus.*)

In the notion as notion, the germ, that is, "the particular is not yet explicit". This "not yet" of course refers to a moment of thinking dialectically considered, under the figure of temporality as standing for a more general series. Ultimately, temporal development is itself a figure for dialectical series, for the action of thinking and hence of judgment, the proper activity, itself made explicit in syllogism as is the notion in judgment, of thinking. Logic, we see, is science of science. The temporal therefore happens, since it is our name for "what happens", and yet, as merely figure, does not happen. Hence the Apostle wrote of the Old Testament history, as he believed it to be, of Abraham, Sarah, Isaac and Ishmael, that "these things happened in a figure". The Latin has *per allegoriam dicta*, but *dicta*, as interpretative limitation upon Greek *allegoroumena*, does not appear in the original language of the preferred manuscripts. For our purposes, however, the intuitive felicity of this classic English version may

stand on its own merits, witnessing to the Hegelian vision of things as in line with this ancient manner of perceiving events. Thus Christ's references to Jonah and the whale or Moses lifting up the image of a serpent shows no disposition to see these things as stories and not events at all. Precisely as events they prefigure or, better, simply figure, just like the words of the prophets. So what they (pre-)figure will not just be event over again.

So according to this vision those err, "just miss the notion", who demand to know, say, "Did Christ rise from the dead or not?", once the idea has been broached. It is a form, as Hegel develops this in *The Phenomenology of Mind* particularly, of "seeking the living among the dead", of limiting oneself to Understanding rather than Reason, "understanding spiritual things spiritually". We might hazard that the approach lies behind the Gospel protagonist's own confident affirmation of resurrection in the sources, and not mere pre-diction, as this is developed finally, or at least further, in the Johannine "I am the resurrection". From this the Eckhartian "The eye with which God sees me is the eye with which I see God" develops, again generalising an original figure, along with those of mission, election, messenger, sacrificial lamb and so on. These are not denied but *aufgehoben*, at once put by and taken up into the final *sophia*. This would further affect, that is to say relativise, the dichotomy between faith and knowledge, thought as such appropriating the relation, the distinction, between those who believe and those, or the one, who knows, but again in upward direction and not by reduction of knowing into believing. Mind as such, that is, is "onmiscient". What Hegel declares for it was first, as foundation, declared by one person in prophetic and, therefore indeed, "healing" mode. This, one must concede, is at least an aspect of the truth. The or a question will then be, is it, as the spiritual, also the *controlling* aspect. These openings, or possibly *aporiai*, will modify our apprehensions of the Modernist crisis, taken now in a larger sense than that with which the papal condemnation of 1907 was later and immediately concerned. It is from out of them that the Hegelian view emerges. They take further Newman's doctrine of development of doctrine (1845), itself institutionally developed further at the Second Vatican Council (1962-4), hence denominated by the then Pope, St. Paul VI Montini, as he is now declared to be, "Newman's Council". He could not of course say "Hegel's Council", even had he so wished, which is at least doubtful, but nor has philosophy as such to do with such "Councils", concern for which Hegel makes an explicit ground for distancing himself, also as theologian, from "the theologians" whose thought is thus shackled, as he clearly sees it.

The same applies to Julian's "All shall be well". It is a characterisation of present consciousness in temporal figure, whether or not this is fully clear to the speaker. As Hegel puts it, we cannot always say what we mean or would mean. We utter something different, willy nilly, as is attested even in Scripture in various forms. Thus Balaam's wish (if he ever had it: cf. *Book of Numbers*, ch. 22 to 24) to obey Balak and curse Israel came out as a blessing, "Oh Israel how lovely are thy tents", and later Caiaphas prophesied precisely as high priest the expediency of Christ's death, but in a sense not desired or meant or understood by him personally. Here magic has given way to a spiritual signification in things although, it may be, one is not yet discerning the falsity of the finite as such. These reflections cast a light as controlling as it is multifaceted upon the purportedly Dominical saying, now seen, however, philosophically or as standing for itself: "To them that have shall be given".

Not merely, therefore, is the factual normative, as Hegel is often reproached for saying, as if restricting the latter, but the normative is, rather, itself factual, in the sense of absolutely true, things agreeing with their notion (where they truly are "things"). This means, however, the notion's agreeing with itself, since it *is* this agreement, whereas, Hegel says repeatedly, "everything finite is false".

In further consideration, not only of the "not yet" as figurative, but of the notion particularised as itself "all things" and exclusively so, yet not then as Thing but as Judgment, we can take the notion of the plenitude of power. If the Pope, say, has this plenitude then he is not bound by the sins and errors of his predecessors in office or by anything at all, by those ways of acting and therefore of speaking now called "unfortunate". The Popes are increasingly realising this, to the dismay of the more literal, enmeshed thereby in the initial contradictions of pure Understanding, of religious rationalism, out of which, one may add, a reduced notion of "natural theology" was historically developed. As identified with or acting for the "all-powerful" (or supremely free, rather) he, the Pope, may declare, of his predecessors: "I will not remember their sins any more"! This, then, is the secret essence of forgiveness, that it annihilates the past as past, in implicit denial of temporality. It happened "in a figure" and not merely *as* in a figure. This is the philosophical leap of ingratitude (50), the kicking away of the ladder. "No birth, no death". Hence we posit the normative as determining the factual, the Good (and finally the Idea) as constituting Being, itself or another's indifferently.

In acting thus, however, the Pope simply assumes the intrinsic power and virtue of any person whatever, the Logic here shows, of personhood as such. He ceases to be a merely abstract universal "out there". "The

principle of personality is universality", where each is End in itself, or in self. It is a "kingdom" indeed, but "within", precisely put as transcending the outward. At the same time, however, it declares this outward to be actually inward (140) reciprocally, since the inward is itself outward or the real, beyond all figure or alienation. For we have implicitly identified alienation into Nature as nothing other than figure, since nature appears and only appears as temporally (and spatially) determined. The inward Outside supplants both core and rind, what is first seen as alien is but other, than which nothing is closer to self. Thereby it only *appears* as determined to one and not both itself and its opposite in one, *determinata ad unum*, instead of being, as is Reason (it is in fact reason, the Word), *ad opposita*, not as called upon to choose between the opposed in the freedom of judging, in the sense of arbitration, but rather to determine, in yet ampler freedom, their mutual relation in identity, *the* logical relation. Since consciousness of reason and indeed of understanding just is realised freedom so freedom must realise itself to the uttermost. "My kingdom is not of this world". All should say this. More philosophically, less figuratively, one should say: "Everything is a judgment", in particularisation, that is to say, of this Notion which simply is thought of itself as thinking. We here pass the point where it might be meaningful to ask concerning the credentials of that speaker, in finite abstraction from his actual or factual appearing as "the Christ". We have implied that he would appear, that there would be such an appearing, in normative determination. This is the birth of each person writ large. The two, factual and normative, are reciprocal as in reality one. This is the foundation of any "natural law", which, however, applies as much to history as to biology, psychology, morals or anything similar. It "takes Fate by the throat" indeed and strips off its negative mask in the same motion.

Anyone may see, again, that these categories of messenger, mission, "the one who is to come", are, as finitely positivist, necessarily transcended in the infinite, in Notion, which rather declares one will come, is ever present, not this or that one but the universal particular or personal, the Notion. This is equally the Beloved, being consciousness as such (159). "Believe me for the very work's sake". This is no banal plea for mere compromise but a dissolution, rather, of the alternative then as now at issue, as seen by the Understanding. Whoever listens to you listens to me and in listening to me *you* listen to one another and thus build the Eternal City, the community, the body, the Idea. This latter ever stands realised, though the Cunning of Reason, says Hegel, is bound to conceal it from us, since it is essentially Result, as otherwise seeming contradictory

of the Appearance which must mediate it, as the senses must mediate reason.

So then Hegel's plant, the judgment, is the unclosing of the seed, the notion, which thus dies to its abstract generality in what is *ipso facto* its fruition. This refers, still, to the "subjective notion as notion" and not to the Idea Absolute or Speculative, the Notion's true form and "the very heart of things". Everything inside is outside, and makes things what they are, for these two are one, their initial reciprocity itself overcome as heralding this unity merely.

The judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense as an operation and a form, occurring merely in self-conscious thought. This distinction, however, has no existence on purely logical principles, by which the judgment is taken in the quite universal signification that all things are a judgment. (167).

As Aquinas has it, *logicus non considerat existentiam rei*, here, however, for the seemingly opposite reason that logic has revealed itself as itself the final ontology, and not a mere guide to speaking about *ta onta*. Thus, for Aquinas too, God, the Infinite, is one with his act of self-intelligence, while, as he also saw clearly, there is no empirical nature of the thought-process. Just upon this basis we have constructed computers and are confident that we can rely upon them. The subjective is objective, the I the universal of universals.

All things are a judgment, for all things

are individuals, which are each but yet not severally a universality or inner nature in themselves. Their universality and individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other. (167)

*

Hegel now distinguishes judgments from "propositions", passing here beyond the formal abstraction of traditional logic. Such a move might seem to coincide with that of a beginner in logic who has not yet grasped the intention of abstract formality as governing or indeed founding this science of argument forms and schemata. This very intention, however, of the so-called "propositional calculus", quite ignores in practice the first two "instruments of reason", viz. notion and judgment. So "p or q", its simples or elements, leaves "S is P", $\forall x$ or any other propositional structure, as distinct from structures between (simple) propositions, out of account. The calculus is only later, after it is formally perfected, applied to concepts or classes of individuals denoted in "quantification" by x, y and

following in a way which, far from being a sophisticatedly mathematical abstraction, assumes without discussion a simple or common-sense ontology of individual substances. Such a logic is quite capable, all the same, of being used, and often is used, to question this ontology reflexively, e.g. in propounding various versions of the Ontological Argument which might negate any possible finite reality in the concrete. Similarly, the notation in terms of a series of predicative relations, monadic, dyadic, n-adic, need not be made incompatible with a philosophically strictly "monadic" affirmation of predicative identity.¹⁴ So even if it might be thought a logic "which cannot say what anything is"¹⁵, it yet does not render impossible this saying what anything is.

What Hegel rather stresses, for his part, attending to the S-is-P form as taken from grammar originally, is how this form of judgment yet more fundamentally contradicts any such a mere ascriptive interpretation of it as what some given speaker happens to propose. By this "The rose is red" is one judgment while "The rose seems red" is a different judgment, viz. "The rose is red-seeming". Rather, the latter is not a judgment at all. It is only a proposition, like, Hegel suggests, "Caesar was born at Rome in such and such a year, waged war in Gaul for ten years, crossed the Rubicon, &co.", "I slept well last night" or (in imperative mood) "Present arms!" All these have a temporal reference, to McTaggart's A or B series indifferently. They can become judgment, "subjective at best", only where some doubt or specification is being clarified, such as that I slept well last night but not the night before that, or that I slept well even if no one else did. Hegel thus subscribes to the out-and-out contextual theory of meaning inherent in supposition- or reference-theory according to which "roses are red" *qua* affirmation denies that they are blue, lack colour etc. The judgment, that is, "is an expression of finitude" (168, my stress) while the proposition is merely asserted or proposed within finitude's ambience taken as such, as abstractly "final", in the sense of finished, bounded. Thus "as such" here uniquely indicates a judgment. We come back to this, that we do not *make* judgements. Peter Geach exclaims in wonder at McTaggart's daring to say, i.e. to judge, that this is so. It does indeed imply that McTaggart is not McTaggart, nor Geach Geach. Rather, we beget one another indeed in a reciprocity only explicable as identity, as Father cannot be Father without Son and *vice versa* and yet Father is all he is, that relation namely, and not some abstract element waiting to be related or related "potentially". The potential essentially is not (actual).

¹⁴ This point is made by Peter Geach, in his *Logic Matters* particularly.

¹⁵ Cf. Henry Veatch, *Two Logics*, Evanston 1969; "On Trying to Say and Know What's What", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, September 1963.

Aristotle's celebrated distinction, we may say, is two-edged. There were never two species of Being, of Actuality. The logical copula, therefore, is never "is potentially", just as it is never "is deontically" or "is to be" (done, obeyed, etc. The gerundive is necessarily predicated in grammatical and logical entirety, one "word" still). It is always and absolutely just "is", with potentiality, gerundive force or any other such finite attribution belonging rather with the predicate as said of or identified with the subject as notion.

Judgment as it were generates finitude in self-alienation, productive of its other, differentiating just in order to unite in and through this very differentiation, as Nature is for Spirit, the dialectic is for its result, war indeed is for the peace of victory. It is a "play" indeed, a pattern, as in a game, for which we might say with the bard, "all the world's a stage". Shakespeare indeed, we know, or rather his "plays" or dramas, were virtually normative for Hegel and his German contemporaries, and not without reason (*Vernunft*). Here we have Art, they declared, as Absolute Spirit or Philosophy (Cf. *Enc.* 553f.).

Specifically the predicate in its universality "must have particularity", as at once concrete and "abstract" or indeterminate, i.e. universal again, united or connected by "is", or simply identified in thought, rather, with the subject. This identity realised as thus no longer affected by this "difference in form", of S from P, "is the content", is finally thought thinking itself. This Content, this universal identity, is what is finally posited as common to art, religion and philosophy. As such, as content, it is, there too, indifferent to the threefold hierarchy of specifically formal excellence they represent in their difference. Music, work of the muses, passes into liturgy or service of the Absolute and liturgy passes into contemplation or *theoria*, the eternal theory of theory itself. This is, so to say, the "finished" or perfected "comedy", the encyclopaedic circle indifferent to and unaffected by any chosen point of entry, since it is only entered by those already within it, i.e. entry, as if by us, is the wrong "notion". It is not we who "make" judgments since, again, we are not we. In religious terms, "How can the gods see us face to face until we have faces?" But the "I in them and they in me" of the Scripture is eminently susceptible of the philosophical treatment it has evoked. You, or we, are "members one of another", i.e. not parts at all. *Sumit unus, sumunt mille*. "Where one receives a thousand receive" communion (Thomas Aquinas). *Seid umschlungen, Millionen*, quite well translated by "● ye millions, I embrace thee", given that "I" names the universal without which universality cannot be thought. That is why we read the newspapers, watch television, study philosophy and so on, giving the subject "its specific

character and content". "The Absolute is the self-identical", uniquely, it is meant. Every notion as notion thus becomes a judgment. Even, therefore, where we would further specify the subject, the "empty name", of or as *this* judgment, we do it precisely as making another judgment. Nor can the notion as notion ever be an empty name, however. It, this "subjective notion", is therefore as such superseded (in the dialectic) by Judgment. Hence

To define the subject as that of which something is said, and the predicate as what is said about it, is mere trifling.¹⁶ It gives no information about the distinction between the two (but merely posits them over again). In point of thought, the subject is primarily the individual, and the predicate the universal (primarily! Or, as Aquinas says, the subject signifies *quasi*-materially, the predicate *quasi*-formally, thus allowing the development Hegel now makes explicit). As the judgment receives further development, the subject ceases to be merely the immediate individual, and the predicate merely the abstract universal; the former acquires the additional significations of particular and universal, - the latter the additional significations of particular and individual. (169, *Zus.* - parentheses added)

We pass, that is, as developing the same thought (it stands for the Absolute, as Frege's assertion that the sentence or judgment "denotes the True" confirms), from "This is red" to "This rose is a red rose". Particularity is thus the middle term of the syllogism, to which the judgment gives way or develops in dialectical supersession:

The individual is particular
The particular is universal
So the individual is universal.

The key insight enabling this development is that "this" is always concretely "this A", this is this rose. Only thus is sameness or identity thinkable, although the purely abstract "this" or "now" is identical with itself irrespective of species, time or place (the starting-point of Hegel's

¹⁶ In a note here Wallace (translator) cites a text from Whately's *Logic* that Hegel might have had in mind. Now Whately was Newman's teacher and master at Oxford (cf. Geoffrey Faber, *Oxford Apostles* and Newman's own *Apologia*) and Newman went on to write *The Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845), which might be described as discreetly Hegelian. After the rejection of Ontologism (a Catholic movement under strong Hegelian influence) and the papal endorsement of Thomism (1879) such a book would have been impossible, though it became the secret driving force behind the Second Vatican Council (1964.1966), called "Newman's council", I mention again, by the then Pope, Paul VI, himself.

The Phenomenology of Mind, main text), as is not the case with "this" or "now" in the concrete, however, which is then rather the opposite. "Thus while the same names are given to the two terms of the judgment, their meaning passes through a series of changes." This Hegelian remark would apply first of all to the terms "subject" and "predicate" themselves, thus presaging their eventual supersession, the freeing of intelligence from the trappings or bewitchments of linguistic form. Yet we have noted above that the logical intention of identity already shows independence of the (form of) composition habitually employed to express it. It means in turn that the judgment which things, or all of them taken together even, are is a particularisation not into parts but into differentiated aspects of the Unity, Hegel's basic thesis concerning alienation, for example. This unity is not properly therefore called the Whole, a more correlate term than "unity", though all terms, even "absolute", are in some or other respects correlate. Therefore, concern with the Absolute names the trans-linguistic. Thus there is no "linguistic philosophy"; there is only the philosophy of language, as of anything else, God, logic, nature and so on.

So "The subject as negative self-relation (163, 164) is the stable *substratum* in which the predicate has its subsistence" as, we saw, determinately standing for something, whether "real" or "rationate", *in mente*). It is therefore "ideally present" in the subject, which thus has the nature of the Idea from the start. We do not attach ideas to or form them from "bare" individuals, like those indistinguishable "points" in time or space Hegel speaks of. Hence the predicate, it can be said, "inheres in the subject". It will connote "only one of the numerous characters of the subject". Nor could this ever be the only character we know or are conscious of, as in the abstract "F of x". That is to say, "x" can never be "unbound", variability is essentially within limits, the possibilities of further specification never closed. These two extremes, as impossibilities, are thus identical.

So, conversely, "the predicate as universal is self-subsistent and indifferent whether this subject is or is not". It "outflanks the subject" which had appeared "ampler and wider", "subsuming it under itself". Hence this judgment of inherence is also called one of "subsumption". Each is "on its side" or from its own viewpoint wider than the other. Yet the "specific content of the predicate (169) alone constitutes the identity of the two". Hegel thinks especially, we learn, of the judgment that "God is being".

At first, subject, predicate, and the specific content or the identity are, even in their relation, still put in the judgment as different or divergent. By implication, however, that is, in their notion, they are identical. For the

subject is a concrete totality, - which means not any indefinite multiplicity, but individuality alone, the particular and the universal in an identity: and the predicate too is the very same unity (§170). - The copula again, even while stating the identity of subject and predicate, does so at first only by an abstract "is". Conformably to such an identity the subject has to be put also in the characteristic of the predicate. By this means the latter also receives the characteristic of the former: so that the copula receives its full complement and full force. Such is the continuous specification by which the judgment, through a copula charged with content, comes to be a syllogism. As it is primarily exhibited in the judgment, this gradual specification consists in giving to an originally abstract, sensuous universality the specific character of allness, of species, of genus, and finally of the developed universality of the notion. (171)¹⁷

Hegel refers here to the final Absolute, which all and any judgment implies and imperfectly names. This leads us on to "the continuous specification of the judgment itself", the chain of its various forms "usually stated as the kinds of judgment". Yet these are really mere markers in a developmental flow at every point where, accordingly, the Notion or Absolute Idea is totally if but implicitly present. Hence the ordinary discrete enumeration (of judgment-types) seems "purely casual", is "superficial". Really the different judgments "follow necessarily from one another" as the continuous specification of the notion. The "judgment itself is nothing but the notion specified". It thus disappears. We make no judgments, since they are as such subsumed to the notion, as are "we" ourselves. Hence and finally we are thus not ourselves subjects. This negation of judgment itself, however, is perfected in direct perception, which is rather enjoyment as ultimate, no longer of this or that. The instrumentality of thought as *ratio* is here concerned, though *ratio* too has its place in the dialectic too (cf. 105), qualitatively somewhat quantitative, however, and therefore finite (in quality). Reason (*ratio* in Latin) is indeed a "ratio" (English word) and reason itself (*Vernunft*) perceives or beholds (*intueor*, *intuitus* being placed in earlier thought above *ratio*, along with *sapientia*, a tasting, as of "sap") this.

So judgment also, we can now see, recapitulates Being and its transition to the reflectiveness of Essence, "but put in the simplicity of relation peculiar to the notion", viz. as continuous development of thought as thought, i.e., at this stage, of judgment. Hegel refers to Kant here as first having shown that "the various kinds of judgment are no empirical aggregate" but "a systematic whole based on a principle", viz. that the individual is the universal. This principle is "the logical idea itself",

¹⁷ Cp. notes 8 and 9 above.

namely. Hence, Hegel finds, the three kinds of judgment are "parallel to the stages of Being, Essence and Notion", now as it were ideated or even, we might say, taken in second intention. Yet Hegel has wished to show that absolutely this, the Notion, is first, since things are grounded in the Idea, reflected in earlier thought as "the divine Ideas", plural, since the Idea, the Notion, is essentially differentiated or, rather, self-differentiating and that infinitely.

"The second of these kinds", however, "as required by the character of Essence, which is the stage of differentiation, must be doubled" (into judgments of reflection and, secondly, of necessity). The Notion, as "the unity of Being and Essence in a comprehensive thought" (159), in its unfolding (Hegel's term) "must reproduce these two stages in a transformation proper to the notion", thus moulding what are genuinely grades of judgment (171, *Zus.*). This is the "inner ground" for this orderly and systematically graded hierarchy we now come to (172-178).

Thus these judgment-types are in no way "of equal value" or on "the same level" of thought or, hence, of reality, forming as they do, Hegel again emphasises, "a series of steps", i.e. a series simply. The difference between these steps, however, "rests upon the logical significance of the predicate". Such logical significance we have found Hegel denying as being of a purely "formal" or abstract character. Logical truth, that is, is truth indeed.¹⁸ So the differences in value are "evident in our ordinary ways of thinking". In illustration Hegel cites the material or concrete distinction in "subject-matter" between judgments concerning mutable phenomena, of colour or temperature, for example, and those identifying beauty or goodness. In explanation he says that in the first kind of judgments "the content forms only an abstract quality" needing no judgment as such since its presence "can be sufficiently detected by immediate perception". It is, so to say, a judgment of sense, hovering, in Aristotelian or Scholastic terms, between the *vis aestimativa* and the *vis cogitativa*, both relatively immediate.¹⁹

The second kind, on the contrary, concerning beauty, goodness and the like, "requires... a comparison of the objects with what they ought to be, i.e. with their notion". Hence it is mediate and we might wonder whether a more formal or properly logical distinction between mediate and immediate judgments (not then exclusively or necessarily those of sense that he cites) might lie behind as either founding or expressing and

¹⁸ Cf. Henry Veatch, "Logical Truth and Logic", *The Journal of Philosophy* 53, 1956.

¹⁹ Cp. our "Meaning in a Realist Perspective", *The Thomist*, 55, 1, January 1991, pp.29-51, esp. section VI.

testifying to this difference of value he introduces here. The dialectical sequel, concerning the four grades of judgment (the two in the middle, again, being now two parts of one part) in specific consideration, may shed some light on this. Meanwhile we find Hegel saying in effect that judgments of value have more value as judgments than judgments concerning more "value-free" or phenomenal matter! This is but consistent in systems where all is "ontologically" assimilated to the Notion as, anciently, to the Good. Rather, the ontic itself is thus assimilated in freedom of Spirit or Mind, which is necessity here where nothing can be new or contingent, nothing old either, "pure play" indeed. What is this play? This, reflection shows, can only be a playful question so the answers are not likely or desired to be serious or "categorical" either. Have a cup of tea, as the Zen master says, and stop looking down your nose at Hume and his backgammon board, trust and be not forever confounded, as loving darkness rather than light. The individual is the universal.

XXII

THE SYSTEM OF JUDGMENTS AS FOLLOWING THE LOGICAL IDEA

Reality, Hegel will always insist, is individual. Not only is it made up of individuals, it is itself individual, indivisible. To divide from it is simply to abstract, to falsify. But this individual is universal and I, subjectivity, am the universal of universals. Every individual is such inasmuch as one can say what it is. The individual is the universal. Its notion, therefore, any notion, passes over into judgment, which is of this form.

Nor can this be confused with mere classification. The individual is the universal, not just or at all a member of some class. For this too, "member of some class", names a universal, as of course does "the individual". What it is immediately is the and then in all particular cases a universal (without ceasing to be the). Just because it is the universal our attempts to isolate its individuality as such by saying "this", by pointing, are doomed to failure, since even the "this" is a universal, naming any point in space or time, any idea even.

Thus in any particular notion's specification (as universal) this notion and all notions are taken up into judgments and these judgments themselves are progressively assumed towards the ideal type of judgment called apodictic. This is then assumed (aufgehoben) into a syllogism (itself though also a notion), leading along a similar continuum into what Hegel calls **O**bjectivity. These continua reflect the three main dialectical stages of Being, Essence and Notion.

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For the realist the individual escapes the net of intellect, its principle being precisely this matter, a bare "this" indeed. For the absolute idealist such an abstracted individual is impossible and undesirable, unsayable even, just because it escapes the net nothing can escape. **O**mne ens est verum. What results is identity, I am all. Each must say this. So Hegel begins, in illustration of the elicited judgment that the individual is the universal,

with "This rose is red". He might have said "This is red" or "This is a red rose" or even "This is a rose". The sequel shows that no matter of principle is involved, since the individual is always specified in some way, as a sensible particular if nothing else.

That the individual is the universal ultimately, but yet reciprocally, grounds itself in the truth that the universal is the individual, as will be developed later. This is to say, though, that the general form of judgment, of predication, viz. S is P, is not a mere instance of one, even the chief, of its forms or subdivisions, such as "all S is P". If it were, then it would not imply, as it does, that all P is S, since P, in that subdivision, is reckoned "undistributed". This would have been nonsensically circular on Hegel's part since, also, it is absurd to say that individuals are a class of universals. The intention is to identify the notions of each as therefore implying or, rather, simply being one another. The individual is the universal because the universal is the individual.

We are not therefore enquiring "how the universal can be connected with the individual", as McTaggart seems to have thought.¹ Nor therefore do we "beg the question at issue", since this identity has been established earlier in the dialectic². This is precisely why, as he himself sees, it is legitimate or indifferent if we take "this rose" or "the rose" instead of just "this" as exemplifying that just the individual is the universal, precisely because it is already, qua individual, universal. As McTaggart puts it, we can "use" the example "to remind ourselves that the Individual... is also the subject of many other Universals" and ultimately of all of them, the universal itself being individual. This indeed is why the judgment is finally unsuitable for its aim, why "all judgments are false". If the individual is the universal then it should not be divided from itself in order to say so. Language is one huge mistake or, rather, an ad hoc stopgap or makeshift moment in the dialectical project of the Absolute's self-understanding. To this position also Wittgenstein seems to approximate. It lies behind the Pauline "when God shall be all in all", the "groaning and travailing" of the whole of Nature in the reditus to what must ever "be the case", this being finally one with what must ever be.³

So indeed we "cannot say that the individual has the universal". Judgments assuming this fictitious difference cannot be true but only "correct", Hegel declares, within a finitely untrue system, "this passing show" (☉). "The nature of a thing is to be sought in its connection

¹ J.M.E. McTaggart, *Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, Cambridge 1910, 192.

² McTaggart states this himself, *op. cit.* 194.

³ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus* 1.1.

with other things" and "the principle that a thing must be logically prior to its qualities" has been rejected.⁴

Truth, Hegel says, "depends solely on the form, viz. on the notion as it is put and the reality corresponding to it." This correspondence is in principle lacking or absent "in the limited circle of perception, of finite conception and thought: that depends on the content, which likewise is finite, and, on its own merits, untrue" (172). Ultimately, this has to mean, truth is not found in language at all. Truth is practical, works itself out, expresses itself. Thus Aristotle had said that the conclusion and hence truth of the practical syllogism was an action, and Hegel can say that all things are a judgment. People pass over these statements thinking that Hegel cannot mean them, just as a whole section of Hegelians think, indeed feel, he cannot mean his reiterated endorsements of religious tradition.

Hegel's examples are not likely to reassure such doubts. Truth as lying "in the coincidence of the object with itself, that is, with its notion" implies, in apparent coincidence with "Christian Science" (M.B. Eddy), that it cannot be true "that a person is sick", or even "that someone has committed a theft". We are, in this perspective, no better than we ought to be but no worse either, and that is the truth. "Let the sinner go on sinning" as the Parousia approaches, while Luther's *Pecca fortiter* seems not far away. Evil, Hegel says elsewhere, is a vain attempt to assert what is not, since it "has no real persistence" but is "only the absolute sham-existence of negativity in itself", not "a permanent positive" (35, Zus.⁵).

The point is, "the content is untrue," of a sick body as of a red rose. Predicating an abstract quality of an immediate individual thing cannot be true, since it is qua an immediately individual thing that a thing is itself universal but not abstract. Hence the subject and predicate "do not stand to each other in the relation of reality and notion", as the form pretends. Hence truth "depends solely on the form", as is "not found in the Qualitative judgment". Rather, there is incongruity "between its form and content" and this excludes truth. Hegel has no interest here in logical "validity". He shows rather how identifying a rose with redness is false both because it "has" many other qualities and because redness applies to or is identified with many other things as well. In this perspective saying that "red" here must stand for (*supponere pro*) just this red rose named merely admits the error or untruth, which we thus would be correcting as we go along (e.g. if we were Scholastic logicians). As Aquinas put it, only

⁴ McTaggart, *op. cit.* 194.

⁵ Cp. 24, Zus.: "The hand that inflicts the wound is also the hand that heals it."

wholes are predicated of wholes⁶, and therefore "red" here has to stand for the (red) rose. If it doesn't, then all judgments are false, he might have but didn't add, while his immediate successors missed his main point for centuries in any case, with a few scarcely noticed exceptions, such as Vincent Ferrer (*De suppositionibus*, Valencia, Spain, 15th century).

The case after all is different in the notional judgment from this contingent "touching in a single point". Thus if we pronounce an action to be good we "perceive a closer and more intimate relation", giving "the soul of the subject". The point is that this, though not the other, is or could be true.

It is not open to Hegel to avail himself of medieval supposition-theory to save the truth of such judgments. For the rose referred to in "The rose is red" has to be the red rose qua red, viz. precisely this notion, and this even "before" we have finished uttering the sentence and even granted that this will not at first be clear to a listener. It is the idea that is real in itself, as it is not in its state of alienation we call Nature and assume to our daily or immediate discourse. In saying "The rose is red" one closes the circle. To the judgment we misperceive ourselves making there corresponds an absolutely unitary red rose (there is no point in making the rose initially colourless). This might as well in fact go under just one simple name and is in fact one of those infinite relations or aspects under which the Notion or absolute idea is perceived in its entirety. The first apprehension of this as the content would be something of the order of a painting or other sensuous representation as Art. This would never be merely a copy of some rose or this rose in Nature. The frame alone would initially take care of this. What the painting, or it might be a song about this rose, contained as a particular window on the universal Content would be further delineated in Religion and perfectly contemplated in Philosophy.

If we negate (173) the particular quality, saying this rose is not red, then the judgment is equally correct. That is, Hegel is not proposing a second case where we have to do with a rose of some other colour merely. Rather, "The individual is a particular. But the individual is not a particular." We have just seen that the individual is the universal. Viewed thus, I might as well say of the same rose that it is not red as that it is red. "Such a single quality is not congruous with the concrete nature of the subject." Here perhaps we can begin to understand McTaggart's objection, that Hegel seems to go back to a previously transcended position in seeing a contradiction between a concrete subject and the attribution to it of qualitative relations. We have after all already transformed or interpreted such individuals as universal loci of the totality of reciprocally identical

⁶ Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*.

relations coalescing in the Notion. Is this objection valid? Yes and no, surely.

Mc Taggart concludes his criticism, "Thus I see no contradiction in 'The rose is red'" (Comm. 194), i.e. such as Hegel does. He thinks it is simply a matter of ambiguity we could avoid by using the form "The rose has redness", which, he thereby implies, means the same. We might note that if the S-is-P form, viz. predication, judgment, were merely ambiguous it would be on a par with "Every boy loves some girl" (Peter Geach's example), which is cleared up simply by clarifying the reference of "some" in each case. But there is no such ambiguity and it is on this basis that Hegel finds genuine contradiction, such that this category, the Positive "judgment of definite Being", breaks down.

McTaggart has not noticed that "This rose is red" stands as form (S is P) of any and all such judgments of definite Being (172). Thus his rephrasing, "The rose (S) is what-has-redness (P)", has the same logical form. This also shows that the problem remains of a single "quality... not congruent with the concrete nature of the subject". It is not what has redness and nothing else, i.e. it is not truly identifiable with that. Nor does having redness apply to the rose alone.

The negative judgment has to form the antithesis of the positive judgment (of quality) in the dialectical manner. One does not at first see how this antithesis arises since, for example, denying that the rose is red is merely a way of saying it is of some other colour; i.e. it continues to affirm its chromatic character.

This negation of a particular quality, which is the first negation, still leaves the connection of the subject with the predicate subsisting. The predicate is in that manner a sort of relative universal, of which a special phase only has been negated. [To say, that the rose is not red, implies that it is still coloured in the first place with another colour; which however would be only one more positive judgment.] (173)

Yet the individual never was or was not this universal. This defect of form effects dialectical "disruption" of the judgment (of Quality corresponding to Being) into either "the identical judgment" (the individual is the individual) or "the infinite Judgment" of "total incompatibility" (the mind is no elephant). These types of judgment are both correct but propose respectively either empty or obscure relations, relatings (speech-acts of relation) rather. They emerge thus as the truth immediate or as Qualitative judgments, viz. that they are no judgments at all. They occur, so to say, have point, only in "subjective" contexts. They show or declare that finite or "sensible" things are either emptily identical or totally incongruous with

one another. That is, there is simply no reality to this abstract plurality, abstracted as it is from the perfect, supra-organic unity, the Notion or Absolute Idea, which is in fact the Absolute (213: "The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself absolute").

McTaggart objects to treating "these barren tautologies" of Identity (the individual is the individual) as if they were a subdivision of the Infinite judgment, viz. the Negative-Infinite. This then "is in its proper place in the chain of attempts to determine the relation of the Individual to the Universal which runs right through the Judgments of Inherence (quality) and Subsumption (reflection)", i.e. elsewhere (see *Comm.* 196). But the affirmations (of identity) "have no place in this chain", are true but "do not form a category" here, belonging rather to "the category of Identity at the beginning of Essence". Hegel here, in the *Encyclopaedia*, "throws the transition from Negative Judgment (to the Negative-Infinite Judgment) into obscurity", by prefacing it with the Positive-Infinite Judgment (GL, III, 90), here called simply Identical.

What is the contradiction in these absurdities, called Negative-Infinite judgments? In not making this clear "Hegel does not do justice to his own position", McTaggart complains. The mind has something in common with the elephants, since both are "substances". "A real Infinite Judgment is impossible", since all individuals have the universality of individuality common to them. It is impossible to find a Subject of which the Predicate is denied as having "no universal in common with the Individuals of whom the Predicate could be affirmed, i.e. the Negativity remains finite." As Aquinas would say, in an analogous context, *malum est semper in subiecto*, i.e. not absolute or infinite.

So McTaggart concludes, tentatively, that "Hegel was mistaken in making infinite Judgment a separate category, the Synthesis of Judgments of Quality". The transition from Positive to Negative judgments already involved that "no Positive Judgments" are true, i.e. that there are no judgments if negative ones cannot be posited on their own (they would then become positive, S is not P becomes S is non-P or P over again). But the defect can be avoided, he thinks. The category of Negative Judgment breaks down for the reason we have just given. It would require that only Negative judgments be true of individuals, yet I can judge "This is an individual". McTaggart cannot assume, however, that this is "true of every individual" and not merely correct since, again, the individual is the universal. We thus pass, anyhow, to the Judgment of Reflection from the Negative-Infinite judgment.

Both Positive and Negative judgments of Quality (inherence) have broken down, through incongruity of Subject and Predicate simply. One

cannot start with the Subject and "endeavour to fit the predicate with it". So we must try starting with the predicate, discovering possible individuals therefrom. Such a Judgment of Reflection (related to Essence) can be Singular, Particular or Universal:

The individual put as individual (i.e. as reflected-into-self) into the judgment, has a predicate, in comparison with which the subject, as self-relating, continues to be still an other thing... (174).

This was in fact the incompatibility, incongruity rather, of the form of judgment as such. We begin to overcome this, however, when we note that some predicates, and therefore in principle all predicates where they function more as they ought (i.e. according to true logical form), rather reflect the true, non-alienated state of the individual "in existence" and not in abstract separation (the redness of the rose). Here, really,

the subject ceases to be immediately qualitative, it is in correlation, and inter-connexion with an other thing, - with an external world. In this way the universality of the predicate comes to signify this relativity - (e.g. useful or dangerous; weight or acidity; or again, instinct; are examples of such relative predicates). (174)

The "comes to" shows clearly that a continuum is here involved, as throughout this gradation of judgments, their steps to the apodictic. This is the answer to the unconvincingness of the examples of which McTaggart complains. He has read his Trendelenburg. But Hegel is rather asking us to try to see all predicates in this new light, as a test some will pass better than others.

McTaggart asks what is the connection between this new approach (judgment of Reflection), that of beginning with the predicate and asking which subjects fit it, and the previous category. There it was shown that predicates do not fit any individual subject we might begin with, since the individual is the universal. Here we stress again, in the predicate, the relativity of some subjects. The connection is precisely this that we are saying, that the new approach is dictated by the perceived relativity of individuals in their subjectivity. In the end "I" is "the universal of universals", because the utterly and not merely relative individual.

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How serious Hegel is in putting forward the judgment, a category in formal logic, as a categorial and/or dialectical moment in our progressive

thinking of the Absolute can be seen when he gives as examples of the negatively-infinite judgment (173, *Zus.*) things which are neither purely linguistic nor in subject-predicate form at all, such as crime and death. For these show, indeed, that "the infinite judgment is not really a mere casual form adopted by subjective thought" and put forward "in the Formal Logic solely as a nonsensical curiosity." The breakdown of relation of subject to predicate rather shows the necessity of there not being conceptions such as that of an abstracted subject at all but, rather, that every abstracted "thing" be related (de-abstracted, therefore) to everything else. Crime abstracts the subject from its essential and defining relatedness to all else and hence to the rights of others (justice) while death, unlike (or in final fulfilment of) disease, abstracts life from the living subject itself. Here subject and predicate, just as soul and body, "as we ordinarily say", "utterly diverge" (173, *Zus.*; cf. 208, *Zus.*). Crime is like "The mind is no elephant", thus far. Without context both are true, or false, in the same way. Yet crime and death are realities in existence, and it is upon these that the whole discussion of judgment wishes to bear. So it is rather off the point for McTaggart to keep saying that Hegel "had no right" to do this or that. Aristotle had already shown that art (*techne*) may break its own rules in achieving excellence. This "practical truth", all the same, has its equivalent in morals, i.e. in doing rather than in making, in the exercise of *epieicheia* or knowing when to break the law (rules), in pursuit, however, precisely of the highest justice. The same must apply *a fortiori* to philosophy as judging both itself and all else. Hegel, that is, does not consider crime and death in their capacity as evils here, or as what is not in its pretending to be. They are, all the same, judgments of "infinite negativity", i.e. they illustrate the "breaking down" of and consequent need to supersede judgment as such. They are judgments as earthquakes may be judgments, not however in any necessarily moralistic sense. Similarly, McTaggart will judge in his own philosophy that we make no judgments (in eternity). That is (but) to say, again, that in this graded account of judgment we are progressively overcoming the implicitly self-contradictory Subject-Predicate form, as Subject-Predicate Identity, as such. The quality of relatedness we are now fastening on begins to dissolve the subject *qua* subject. This is the connection between the new, supposedly "double" stress on predicates as both determinative (of the form of judgment to the dis-emphasising of the subject) and as, consequently, relational. It answers McTaggart's question, "what is there in the fact that the predicate, rather than the subject, should be taken as the datum, which should involve the fact that the predicate taken should be one which expresses a relation?" (*Comm.* 199)

True, Hegel now goes on to sharply distinguish the Judgment of Reflection from the Qualitative judgment "by the circumstance that its predicate is not an immediate or abstract quality, but of such a kind as to exhibit the subject as in relation to something else" (174, *Zus.*). But he is distinguishing two concepts or, less absolutely put, *conceptions* of judgment. He need not be taken to mean that we can pick them out in abstract distinctness just as they occur in speech and writing as being of one or the other type exclusively. This is why even redness might be construed in terms of the ensuing category of mere (or more) relational predicates, as McTaggart points out as if in objection although really it is the answer to his objection! The predicate, all predicates, is now to be seen as "some category of reflection". This is the "advance beyond the immediate individuality of the subject" which is just what any predicate is. Even in predicating not being an elephant of the mind, therefore, one says something about or situates (in a negative relation) such a mind. What is still lacking, however, is the indication of "the adequate notion" of the subject, Hegel says here. Many points of view, many relations, of the subject, of "the object in question", are offered, without ever coming, within judgment of this type, to the "proper nature" of the Object as such. This is to be a total system of *quasi*-relations. For just in this totality they relate no *relata* and therefore cannot themselves be called relations in the usual abstract or finite sense of everyday discourse where, for example, relations can never be persons. And yet, after all, they can. I speak of my aunt as a relation, in English at least, and not merely as a related one or person, though we do not take much account of this. She is my relation, whatever else she may be. It is a witness though to the naturalness of these conclusions to which the dialectic leads us (cf. §1 with *Zusatz*, plus 113 and 114):

The unintelligence of sense, to take everything limited and finite for Being, passes into the obstinacy of understanding, which views the finite as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory. (113)

This is the moment, in Essence, where one might state that the "proper object" of finite intelligence, of "the human mind", is material, i.e. limited or finite being. This is what is "natural" to it. By that propriety man himself, as enmeshed in "creation", in nature, is found contradictory, the notion of individual mind "abstractly one/sided". Mind itself rather, is uniquely exemplary or true. Hegel would claim that this is or should have been Aristotle's final position, as represented by the citation, in the original Greek, that concludes the *Encyclopaedia*.

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We come then to the division of judgments of reflection (after Qualitative Judgment: **Positive** and/or **Negative**) into three progressive types, **singular**, **particular** and, again, universal, the judgment of **allness**. This will show how quantity is now involved. But we start, in the Singular Judgment, by "elevating" the single subject "above its Singularity" (175). The previous Judgments of Quality were (are) all singular in form. But here a shift takes place, imperceptibly. It is a shift of attention, and hence intention, a shift of stress, to the predicate. The singularity is no longer essential to this new type of judgment. This is reflected in the types of predicate that now tend to be selected. It means also that we will be free, we will want, to modify this form of singularity if or when it is no longer suitable.

Any predicate at all suggesting a relation in the very nature of the singular subject to other natures at once thus "elevates" it above its singularity. Thus if I say: "This plant is wholesome" then this "implies not only that this single plant is wholesome, but that some or several are so" (175, *Zus.*). In fact we pass at once, in the Singular Judgment of Reflection, *via* reflection upon "an indefinite number of particulars", from the individual, indeed a universal, to "some". This in fact, taken just in itself, would appear to go no further than the traditional *logica docens* as expounded, for example, in Maritain's *Introduction to Logic* (1930), just as the cross placed in the Venn diagram never represents individuality as such or rather, in *depicting* it (the individual cross) to "stand for" (represent) "some" it would show that the individual as such has no place in science..

We pass, that is, to the Particular Judgment, "which is obviously negative as well as positive"; i.e. "some", for Hegel, includes the meaning of "not all", as it does not in traditional logic. It is the error of the "existential import" doctrine, as itself imported into logic, to forget this, that "some" includes "all" since all includes some. Thus, when Hegel says "the individual is divided in itself: partly it is self-related, partly it is related to something else", the "partly" does not here seem to depend on or derive from this more exclusive meaning of "some" Hegel declares obvious or, perhaps, immediate. For it would apply even given the more inclusive meaning, as reflecting the relative category of the predicate to other natures. Yet on the view of the individual already achieved in the dialectic there is no real division here since there simply is no such thing as a thing or individual which is "logically prior" to its relational qualities. "Logically prior" here (McTaggart's term at *Comm.* 194) begs the question whether we are speaking logically (*logikoos*) or "physically" (*phusikoos*).

We are discussing judgments people actually (or, again, immediately) make and here, in making a Singular Judgment, they must be envisaging the individual in this abstract way. This is in fact what is wrong with the Singular Judgment, its angle upon finitude:

By means of particularity the immediate individual comes to lose its independence (which it never actually had) and enters into an inter-connection with something else. Man, as this man, is not this single man alone: he stands beside other men, and becomes one in the crowd. Just by this means however he belongs to his universal, and is consequently raised. - The particular judgment is as much negative as positive. (175, *Zus*)

This last point, some implying some-not, is important for Hegel as overcoming the corresponding divide in Judgments of Quality, resolved there in the Infinite Judgment primarily. Thus, too, the advance to the final form of the Judgment of Reflection, viz. the "Judgment of allness (all men are mortal...)", is facilitated. For otherwise duality would be perpetuated throughout; we would have to deal equally or in parallel with universal negatives (no men are mortal) when in fact, as "all men are non-mortal" and similar, they can be made out as and are a special case of affirmatives.

It is also clear that the sense in which the "immediate individual" here "belongs to his universal" is different from the sense in which "the individual is the universal" as was established when considering the Subjective Notion. Here the way is being prepared for the supersession of the moment of judgment by the **Syllogism**. Before that, however, we will pass through the Judgment(s) of Necessity and finally of the Notion. So, "thirdly",

Some are the universal: particularity is thus enlarged to universality: or universality is modified through the individuality of the subject, and appears as **allness** (Community, the ordinary universality of reflection). (175: I have bracketed the last sentence, as in the German Felix Meiner edition of 1993)

"All" is thought as plural (*omnes*) before it is thought as *omnis* (every), the form proper to the universal premises of syllogism.⁷ The universal must not have "the aspect of an external fastening, that holds together a number of independent individuals, which have not the least affinity towards it". In reality "the universal is the ground and foundation, the root and substance of the individual", as was established, again, at the beginning of the discussion and, indeed, of the dialectic and throughout. (Cf. *Enc.* 20ff.)

⁷ As J. Maritain stresses, in *An Introduction to Logic* (1930), London 1946.

The point is that particularity gives way to universality, of itself, not that we merely choose to prefer the latter for dialectical purposes. This is the process described in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, II 17, using the simile of the fleeing individual soldiers stopping to form "a line of battle" (*acies*). This line is qualitatively different and gives the true being of soldier (the individual) *qua* soldier (cp. 190, *Zus.* "Analogy is the instinct of reason etc.").

Alternatively, "some" itself, particularity, is put by or taken up into universality. Thus we may rewrite, re-conceive, the elements of traditional syllogism, "square of opposition" etc., just as we say above that negativity is a form of the positive and not an opposed logical form, writing all men are non-mortal, some men are non-musical. So, similarly, "some men" must be thought, too, as "all some men", in the sense of "all of those men who" and ultimately, we saw, "each of those men who". In practice this step is taken as a syllogism, therefore, where we argue that all x who are/is y (that is, a "part" of x) are/is necessarily z.

Notions of particularity, that is, are miasmic, a "semblance". In forming a line the soldiers "come to themselves" and to one another. Humpty Dumpty, to vary the metaphor, cannot be "put together" either initially or "again" but is forever one and whole, universal. The judgment, therefore, is a matter of two universals ultimately seen to be identical. Here, as we approach "an express identification of subject and predicate", "the speciality of the judgment-form is deprived of all importance", due to this "unity of the content". The Judgment of Necessity and of the Notion will therefore bear the aspect of an abrogation of judgment as such, viewed as our usual finite "mode of thought" merely. (176, *Zus.*) So the Judgment of Necessity is one of "the identity of the content in its difference" (177), i.e. it is the making explicit of the contradiction apparent in judgment from the beginning and thereby first overcoming it. It parallels the self-abrogation of Essence in favour of the Notion at 159 and previously. Hegel divides it up into Categorical, Hypothetical and Disjunctive judgment(s). Again, these categories depend "materially" upon what type of (conceived) entities are embraced or linguistically denoted within their sphere of reference. "All things are a categorical judgment" in having their substantial nature (as described in "Essence") as "fixed and unchangeable substratum", e.g. Gold is a metal, The rose is a plant. Thus we categorise or say what something is. We study things "from the point of view of their kind" and this is the reality both of judgment and of identity, miscalled "relative" on that account, where it is actually most absolute. "I am that", the Hindu saying, means precisely that I am of one kind with "that" in transcending all kind (cf. the conclusion of "The Philosophy of Spirit", as also concluding the

whole *Encyclopaedia*, concerning, as example, Krishna). Gold, again, is not expensive in the same categorical way as it is a metal and can never be otherwise. Aristotle was therefore right and, for that matter, correct to make logical categories out of material differences of being, beginning with the division into substance and the nine categories of accident, whether or not his own list of these be without fault.

Yet also the Categorical Judgment is finite and hence defective. Metalleity, like colour, "fails to give due place to the function or element of particularity. Thus metalleity... has no leanings to any of its particular species." Here we see, again, how particularity was not dropped in favour of universality but interpreted as being ultimately a form of it, which therefore in turn must, ideally, represent this relation, not found in the Categorical Judgment. To put it differently, the genus predicated is a being-of-reason (*ens rationis*) only. It, as for example "metalleity", is not real and so is not identical with the reality of gold. So we "must advance from the Categorical to the Hypothetical Judgment ... If A is, B is." Thus we proceeded in "The Doctrine of Essence" from Substance to Cause, which is, Hegel here reminds us, an explicit relation. This judgment "expressly realises the universal in its particularising". We have also, one may note, dispensed with the S-is-P form as now "deprived of all importance".

The "specific character of the content shows itself mediated and dependent on something else", Hegel says, rather mysteriously, and this will lead us on to the Disjunctive Judgment. In fact the premises themselves here cause the conclusion. If it is gold it is metal since, the "something else" (and lurking syllogistic premise), all gold is metal. But this in turn reciprocates with the conclusion as, precisely as effect, discovering itself to cause the premises. Thus metal is either gold, silver or whatever and the Disjunction expresses that it, its being metal, causes (or is caused by) these. Here we get real identity. Such a disjunction is just what the genus is in its inherent indeterminacy as *ens rationis*. Only in this sense is it the "sum total" of the species and *vice versa*. This unity of the universal and the particular (and before that, of the universal and the individual) is the **Notion**, forming "the content of the judgment" (of the Notion).

Just as the category of the Particular Judgment in the Judgment of Reflection develops a contradiction (McTaggart, *Comm.* 202), so the Hypothetical Judgment (of Necessity) is unable to give definite form to its content (it is anyhow not of SP form) and is quickly superseded by the Disjunctive Judgment. Both it and the particular judgment have more the character of a moment, *eines Satzes*, a passing formulation, a transition,

than of anything else. In that, though, they merely exhibit or exemplify the truth or, rather, untruth of all the categories as finite.

"If A is, then B is." It is odd that McTaggart complains of this, saying that the category "must be rejected" as "quite unjustified", finding only fault with Hegel's detailed exposition of his thinking (McTaggart, revealingly, calls it a "procedure") at GL II, 1, Cap. 2, Cb. Findlay, well versed in Bradley's and Bosanquet's treatments of Hegel's Logic, points out that in the Categorical Judgment the form does not show the difference between merely contingent and properly categorical judgments. The categorical judgment "veils the necessity that it inwardly implies". It only becomes explicit in the Hypothetical Judgment, the Ground of which "will always be some specific nature".⁸ The special moment of the Hypothetical Judgment as standing for the Absolute is fully brought out in GL (*loc. cit.*) but also, in large measure, at *Enc.* 177, *Zus.*, the text we are following here, as we noted above.

Hegel is at some pains to make his intent clear. "If A is, B is." Here the two terms "receive the aspect of independent actuality... conformably to their substantiality." Their identity indeed, the ground-assertion of judgment as such, independently of finite and/or adventitious logical "forms" of it (also, for example, in languages with no copula, though it is not ultimately a matter of language at all), "is then inward only". Thus the actuality of the one (since there are still two) "is at the same time not its own, but the being of the other". This is the advance here, becoming totally explicit in the Disjunctive Judgment.

We have "to give due place to the function of the element of particularity" (177, *Zus.*), as "Gold is a metal" does not. Gold is just that golden metal which "metal" stands for there in predicative *suppositio* but does not *show*. Ultimately, as the dialectic goes on to demonstrate, the Object satisfies "its notion precisely by being the individual object that it is".⁹ Hegel offers, in "apodictic" culmination, therefore, "not a theory of value", Findlay suggests, but something "perhaps better than any such theory", namely complete and final transcendence of the Understanding as means for apprehending concrete reality by employment of the limping and distortionary tool that is abstraction. It is precisely the individual that is universal.

"If A is, B is." This is "the same advance as formerly took place from the relation of substance to the relation of cause", chiefly under the rubric of *causa sui*. This situates causality itself in relation to the more

⁸ Findlay, *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p.237.

⁹ Findlay, p.238.

fundamental and hence truer conception of the essential self-differentiation (*sui*) of the Notion:

*Der Satz der Identität sagt aus: A ist nur A, nicht B; und B ist nur B, nicht A; im hypothetischen Urteil ist dagegen das Sein der endlichen Dinge nach ihrer formellen Wahrheit durch den Begriff gesetzt, dass nämlich das Endliche sein eigenes Sein, aber ebenso sehr nicht das seinige, sondern das Sein eines Anderen ist.*¹⁰

Being is the concrete, not "abstract" identity with itself, "immediately in itself (or as such) the being (the to-be; *Sein*) of an other". If A is, B is. All things are together. Judgment, in fact, its paradox, can only be explained as first attempt, virtually identical with what language itself is, to repair the finite distortions of abstraction in the efforts of our finitude (of our species, in realist terms, but we are not realists: each individual is not alone but sovereign, is the individual as such) to understand.¹¹

That the judgment is "hypothetical" shows that it represents Ground and Consequence but also Condition and Conditioned or Causality, of which logical reason, syllogism, might thus be seen as a species. Yet the true case is that the (logical) Idea determines all else ideally or logically. *Of this* it is that causality is mere reflection, including ultimately, in the necessity of contingency, our "own" finite reflection. For such determination is one with the Idea itself in its essential self-differentiating, from which causality is abstracted:

Wie im kategorischen Urteile die Substantialität, so ist im hypothetischen die Zusammenhang der Kausalität in seiner Begriffsform.

¹⁰ GL, loc. cit.

¹¹ Cf. the semiological section of the "Philosophy of Spirit", *Enc.* III. Thomas Aquinas, in contrast, begins, with regard to this matter specifically at least, so to say pedagogically, "from the other end" when he states, in the *Summa contra gentes*, that it is to the good of society that *some* consecrate themselves to a good transcending the social. Hegel, rather, shows that "some" is a derivative from as admitting "all", as society is uplifted, in its own realisation as Notion, into *community (as **Allness**, the category, transcends abstract plurality, the dialectically long sublated **Number**) having otherwise or, as so-called only in figure, "beforehand" no true being. "You sit with Christ in the heavenly places". Here, as Hegel in effect claims, religion, as Absolute Spirit, represents, i.e. states, this truth under the figure of sitting with Christ, as, however, Word, Concept, I, "I in you and you in me".

Here it is can be noted (as pointed out by David Attenborough and, presumably, others) that biologists, or palaeo-archaeologists, have found evidence of several incipient developments, or more than so, independent of the ocular, of an organ of sight. Such a recurring chance indicates in Nature that rational potentiality Hegel assimilates to actuality, to "the true reason world" to which Nature is thus logically and hence metaphysically subsumed.

For these, causality, substantiality, and the other relations, stand together (*sämtlich*) as ultimately differentiations of the perfect unity. They are not relations as of "independent sides", but really only moments of one and the same identity, as throughout the dialectic, now receiving self-characterisation in the notion as notion. If A is, B is. This is the unity of Self and Other which Knowledge and Logic reflect in establishing. Hence Absolute Knowledge is ultimately no mechanically systematic knowledge of the Understanding but a "system" of identities, *figured* in what is the abstractly logical relation or "relation of reason", still contradictory of identity. Understanding gives way, of its own nature leads into, "the rational notion", whether of "God" or of the Absolute (182, *Zus.*). This would be Hegel's answer to those who complain of "mysticism", that they have not fully understood or adhered to the Understanding.

This unity of Self and Other, throughout existence, is thereby generality, universality. The individual is the universal and Absolute, therefore. "This also is thou, neither is this thou" (or this, simply). "I am that", Hegel's Krishna sums up. At the same time it is only and purely itself, *ein Besonderes*, and that was the fault we began here by finding with the Categorical Judgment. Gold is this particular metal which it is. Gold is Gold, though the very form of judgment would make it golden merely, the predicate signifying *quasi-formaliter* in distinction from the *quasi-material* reference of the subject, as in the Judgment of Quality particularly. As gold is this metal (which is gold), so we are returned to the individual (whether this kind which is gold or this piece of gold) which is the universal. The predicate, equally, can signify just anything as if formally, and not only a form, e.g. "This city you see below us is London", of course understood *quasi/formally*.

As Parmenides had said, Being has no parts, each is all (not merely "the whole", but all). This so-called mysticism is actually constitutive of philosophy itself in its very origin. Catholics have liked worshipfully to boast: "the Church is the home of Reason". We can, rather, expand the point, saying Reason is home itself. Both aphorisms, however, are variant interpretations, religious or philosophical, of the same reality. Thus if the Church is indeed the home of reason then it sublates itself as prophesied

and just this would have to be its "triumph", as appears to have been obscurely realised in the circles most nearly concerned, proof indeed of their legitimacy. I, the universal of universals, is thus itself real and individual, because universal and hence literally *without* number, as we thoughtlessly say. either in thought or in religious and parousial intention, intent as it is on "gathering in" not merely all but "all in all". Compare 194, *Zus.*: "All which is only another way of saying that the antithesis of subjective and objective is implicitly overcome... learning to know God as *our* true and essential self" (stress added). This is Hegel. We are all gathered in the name of one another. This in fact coincides with Kant's "Kingdom of Ends".

Was in Wahrheit daher in diesem Urteile gesetzt ist, ist die Allgemeinheit als die konkret Identität des Begriffs, dessen Bestimmung kein Bestehen für sich haben, sondern nur in ihr gesetzte Besonderheiten sind. So ist es das disjunktive Urteil. (GL II: sect. I, cap. 2Cb, Suhrkamp Verlag 6, Frankfurt 1972: pp.338-9).

The criticisms of Hegel's "procedure" here, it seems to me, themselves proceed from forgetting to measure his account of the Hypothetical Judgment against the overall determinant of the dialectical advance towards the Absolute (Idea). From this standpoint it is just here that our usual formalistic notion of judgment gives place to real Judgment as yielding to Syllogism and ultimately the not merely triple (as in formal syllogism) but multiple identity of the Absolute as Unity (of all as all in all), infinitely differentiated. Without this step, furthermore, the final Disjunctive Judgment would lose much of its point and interest, would be misinterpreted as a mere form of empty "immediate judgment" as the price of its freedom from error.

More is at stake, however. The particular formulation "If A is, B is" quite clearly derives, for Hegel, from his Trinitarian study and thought, as indeed does the whole triadic structure of the Logic. Hence the latter appears to those neglecting this background as inexplicably obsessional. If the Father is, the Son is, and vice versa. If the cause is, then the effect is, and vice versa. It was just this reciprocity that led into the Doctrine of the Notion.

But the Judgment of Necessity (Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive), "i.e. of the identity of the content in its difference" (177), really means that all things are a judgment. Absolute transcendence must overlap the finite in a total and infinite immanence. The two terms, of the judgment, have only the "aspect" of independent actuality. This makes the Hypothetical Judgment transient, since the identity, absolutely, is not "inward only", but

the actuality of the one is the being of the other. So Hegel means, as well, that the Trinitarian formulation the Hypothetical Judgment so exactly reflects is itself not a place to stop at! As a judgment it is a judgment upon the whole of reality, the fundamental unity of all things in one another, the each and all and all in each which the Apostle says God must become, "when God shall be all in all". Yet of course God in no sense becomes, and is neither this nor that. It is what he, like the dialectic, shall be revealed as or result in. If there is exitus, then there is reditus. This is the only way to read Hegel's remark a few pages on that

The definition of God given by what is called Deism, is merely the mode in which the understanding thinks God: whereas Christianity, to which he is known as the Trinity, contains the rational notion of God. (182, Zus.)

This cannot be urged as a mere sop to the religious authorities of the time and place, demeaning both Hegel and the quality of the thought he so committed himself to. He put it forward in explicit illustration of the superiority of the syllogism of reason over that of understanding. Not that notions are "of two kinds", but that we should not "stop short" at the "abstract mode of thought". So liberty, his other example, is much more than "the abstract contrary of necessity". Adequately, or notionally, considered it includes necessity as "merged in it".

"The Judgment of Necessity, i.e. of the identity of the content in its difference", is concerned above all with the genus or, as negatively, marked off from other genera, the species. These are indeed analogical or relative terms, entia rationis in fact, which the Disjunctive Judgment breaks down still further, i.e. it breaks down the abstract logical form of judgment itself, so that we shall finally see that *die Kopula dieses Urteil... ist somit der Begriff selbst*. In this, the Disjunctive Judgment, *das blosse Urteil der Notwendigkeit hat sich... zum Urteil des Begriffs erhoben* (GL II 344, Suhrkamp, *Werke* 6).

● One might think, as mentioned above, that this Disjunction represents a mere reduction of genus to an empirical enumeration of species, never finished as being dependent upon new discoveries. Not a bit of it. It is genuine judgment. Its intent, however, is not as such one of reducing the "intensional" to the "extensional" but of making explicit an identity, of particular with universal. This is the significance of disjunction. It is this or that, i.e. it is both or either entirely. Both or either, since even though a lion is entirely an or the animal a lion and a tiger or mouse placed together in the line of vision, say, would equally totally exemplify and fulfil (incarnate?) animality. Totally, even though all possible animals, and not merely one of each species, would more fully exemplify the idea, of

genus. It is the idea we are concerned with here, as mentioned above, die Notwendigkeit des Begriffes, the Betsinnmtheit als in ihren Unterschied entwickelt. This development macht das Predikat aus, i.e. it is the judgment, it constitutes "the whole general sphere of the Subject". We are not saying the phenomenal world incarnates rational judgments. The phenomenal world, as finite, is false. Rather, the idea itself, the ideas themselves, unfolded into uttermost individuality and concreteness as of a divine or absolute knowledge, do this.

A ist entweder B oder C. Die Arten... schliessen sich gegenseitig aus. This, again, is not contradicted by our example above. It is a logical, not an empirical principle. Two species can be made a unity in logical consideration, as $p \& q$ can exemplify p in propositional logic. Genus, absolutely considered, is the unity of disparate particulars in their disparity. Here, however, we might keep in mind Aristotle's caution that there is no final genus of the things which are. Genus too must supersede itself in final absoluteness. So it is not finally abstract, not an ens rationis only.

The species derive from the genus. They are not vorgefunden and then grouped together by us. The either-or excludes any further discovery. The species are contrary in their being different, but this contrariness forbids that both separately can be the genus, i.e. because something else is it at once. That is, it is shown here, the Contrary and the Contradictory are both contrary to and contradictive of one another, i.e. the distinction is not absolute.

It is because of this unity in the genus that the various and contrary species can each and altogether have objective existence. We see this especially among human beings as rational, that neither of us could be without all the others as equally necessary, as absolute ends for one another. This is the full significance of the either-or. It is really Both-and considered in unity or as one. Fully independent existence is concrete generality itself, as "it is this man who thinks".

The differentiations into species depend as to their principle upon the nature of the genus. For this reason the first member of the Disjunction must be the genus itself in its capacity as exclusively specifiable as described. The form therefore is $A=A$ or B where B is B or C and so on. $A \vee (A \vee B)$. Connected with this surely is Hegel's remark in his Philosophy of Nature that each genus should divide into just two species, an "astonishing opinion", remarks Findlay. So the disjunction itself (of the concept, the genus)

Ist er selbst eben dadurch auch unmittelbar eines seiner disjunktiven Glieder: das andere aber ist diese Allgemeinheit in ihre Besonderheit aufgelöst oder die Bestimmtheit des Begriffs als Bestimmtheit (Ibid. 342),

i.e. that it is differentiated. This is, so to say, just one, along with the differences themselves, of the basic ways of looking at it. Similarly, there must be a law that laws are to be obeyed, like the principle of non-contradiction as forming part of the totality of discourse depending upon it.

Here the species are species of the concept (genus). They are not the observable figures (*Gestalt*) of Nature, gone forth from the Idea into further independent reality. They are (logical) moments of the concept without which, it is intended to show, the concept would not be itself. If we keep this in mind we will not mistake Hegel's exemplification from colour theory here (in GL) for an uncalled-for obtrusion of material from the Goethe-Newton polemic and the passage will read much more naturally. The rest, as he says, *gehört nicht hier auszufüllen*.

The Disjunctive Judgment is still itself a disjunction, between Subject and Predicate. This, however, is negated by the copula combining them.

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The system of judgments in Hegel's logic, based as it is on a principle, forms a steady progression towards the "Judgment of the Notion", the latter, the Notion, having been its principle all along. One passes, as it were, through four degrees of approximation to it. Although Hegel credits Kant with first seeing that judgment-kinds must constitute such a "systematic whole" there is no indication that he follows Kant in any slavishly extrinsic or "medieval" manner. Kant, however, truly perceived that "the different species of judgment (sc. quality, quantity, relation and modality) derive their features from the universal forms of the logical idea itself" (171, *Zus.*). Hegel claims to "follow this clue" in thus giving in his case "three chief kinds of judgment parallel to the stages (of just this logical idea as he, not Kant, sees it) of Being, Essence and Notion." All the forms except the two outer one, qualitative and notional (each arranged in a triad) thus "parallel" Essence, in two triads (reflection and necessity), a doubling he says is required by Essence as "the stage of differentiation".

This parallelling is no mere pattern-making but has as "inner ground" the Notion's unfolding here as Result, from "the unity of Being and Essence in a comprehensive thought". Thus the Notion itself, as end and fulfilment of this process, forms it as giving the steady vantage-point for the whole, up to the only true Judgment, that of the Notion itself, "a

systematic whole in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which the Notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it" (160). In the Notion "the elements distinguished are without more ado at the same time declared to be identical, with one another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a free being of the whole notion" (161). Hence it is that in this final and perfect form of judgment, which just therefore is an abrogation of judgment itself in its intrinsic contradictoriness and a passing over through syllogism and the rest to the Absolute idea, "the subject is... an individual" (178). This was not as such required in the other forms. But the notion is a distinguishing of elements, i.e. of individuals, all then identical with one another "and with the whole", as Eckhart's eye perceiving God is identical with the divine eye perceiving him. Thus also "the Judgment of the Notion has for its content the notion, the totality in simple form, the universal" complete.

This entails, Hegel states, that the predicates of such judgments will be those called in classical Scholasticism "transcendental". He states entailment economically enough by saying "That is", i.e. he understands this as the substance of his meaning in saying that the individual subject here, whatever individual it may be (or, *ceteris paribus*, denote) "has for its predicate the reflection of the particular existence on its universal." The transcendentals, that is, are that upon which any particular existence reflects. This also is thou. Or, he says (as we mentioned denotation), "the judgment states the agreement or disagreement of these two aspects", i.e. it might be negative.

Next Hegel repeats himself from 171, *Zus.*, where his point was that judgments differ evidently in value, the highest being "a comparison of the objects with what they ought to be, i.e. with their notion." So here he says that

Judgments such as whether an object, action, &c. is good, bad, true, beautiful, &c. are those to which even ordinary language first applies the name of judgment.

For the others, he had said earlier, immediate perception suffices, judgment being only needed in special contexts, of doubt, uncertainty etc. This indeed indicates why the judgment of the notion must at an immediate stage become "problematic". It must do so precisely because it is judgment and not, therefore, perception. There is a parallel with the stages of faith in religion.

What in Hegel forms the principle of his incomplete list of notional predicates is ein Sollen (GL II 344). Just this makes of this judgment of the notion eine wahrhafte Beurteilung, actually of the Notion itself, with

which each of us, however, is identified "ideally". Ideally, that might seem to be the point in this system, whether we say it is from Kantian influence or, more probably, from a desire to accommodate Kant, in accordance with Hegel's general principles of sapiential praxis.

Thus, missing from Hegel's incomplete list is the transcendental predicate par excellence, viz. Being. For Aquinas this is the only real or objective such predicate. The others are all entia rationis, viz. this same Being viewed from the abstracted viewpoint of a particular rational faculty, such as intellect or will.¹² Thus "true" is the object of intellect specifically, yet in reality *omne ens est verum*, it is being that is true. Again bonum, good, is the object of will specifically, i.e. it is the name for the will's object (*quod omnes prosequuntur*). Yet the happiness the will naturally pursues (*finis ultimus*) coincides with what the intellect estimates to be the true and the real. Such is the position of Aquinas, for whom in fact the will is precisely and only just this natural inclination of intellect itself to the truth as good. Here again evil cannot be absolute, though we remain responsible also for the opinions we form and so there is a kind of circular dialectic between the two faculties. Hence Scotus could contradict Aquinas as to which of the two faculties was "nobler", placing will above intellect, as Hegel places volition after cognition proper as antithesis, to be resolved or synthesised in the Absolute Idea. Yet all this takes place within the Logic, within the specific domain of intellect itself, of nous, truly and effectively setting all in order.

So Aquinas will also interpret the Sollen as it were reductively or hypothetically in these terms, as what is unconditionally needed for the End as indeed, participating in it. So there may be no need to view Hegel as deviating from this vision of things. That things are as they should be is, as he says, blessedness, enjoyment, love (159).

This Judgment of the Notion, Hegel notes again here (in GL), is what Kant (negatively) called the judgment of modality. Here we touch on the determining difference between the two systems. It can also explain why, although Hegel keeps to the order of Kant's judgments of modality in GL, yet in the *Encyclopaedia* he reverses the first two, putting the **Assertory** Judgment first, as opening up the matter treated here (of the agreement of things with their notion), and the **Problematical** Judgment second as negative development out of or antithesis to the assertion, before the resolution in the **Apodictic** judgment. He wants to give to the Subjective an absolute positive sense beyond that of a mere modality of uncertainty, with which it now appears quite misleading to introduce this last set of judgments, of the Notion and not merely of modality, subjective in the

¹² Cf. Aquinas, *De potentia*, VII.

finite or negative sense. Thus he had argued "I" to be the universal of universals in the beginning of this work. The Problematic Judgment, its arising here, simply indicates that not all that is asserted is "apodictic" or necessarily true. What gives the apodictic necessity here is that this Judgment of the Notion has for its content the notion (178). The example of the house "so and so constituted" being good or bad merely spells this out, in showing how judgment here mutates into Syllogism, as containing its own self-proof. There is no longer a gap between subject and predicate. This in turn should focus upon die bestimmte und erfüllte Kopula (GL II 350, Suhrkamp 6).

Hegel's insights on the copula here at least parallel those of Aquinas, who wrote:

For [is] means that which is understood after the manner of absolute actuality. For is, when it is expressed without qualification, means to be in act and therefore it has its meaning after the manner of a verb. But the actuality, which is the principal meaning of the verb is, is indifferently the actuality of every form, either substantial or accidental act. Hence it is that when we wish to signify that any form or act actually inheres in any subject, we signify it by this verb is, either simply or according to some qualification - simply, in the present tense, according to some qualification, in the other tenses.¹³

Robert Schmidt comments:

The copula to be signifies the act to be of the thing known. This does not mean, however, that it necessarily signifies it as being in the real order; rather it signifies it in whatever order it is found...; for what is apprehended may not exist in reality (as when we say "Man is a species"); and if the copula always represented the thing as in the real order, it would often be false. But since anything of which a proposition is formed must exist at least in the soul, the copula must signify at least such an act of being.¹⁴

¹³ Aquinas, *In I Perih. Aristotelis*, lect 5, no. 22. Cf. our *Philosophy or Dialectic*, Frankfurt 1994, p.55.

¹⁴ Robert W. Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic according to St. Thomas Aquinas*, The Hague 1966, p.229. Cp. Aquinas, quoted by Schmidt: *Nec oportet quod semper respondeat sibi esse in re extra animam, cum ratio veritatis compleatur in ratione animae* (*In I Sent.* 19, 5, 1 sol. ad 5). Idealism lies coiled here, as it does in Anselm's dialogue *De veritate*, where he distinguishes the truth of falsehoods (of which lies are a special case) from nonsense or gibberish. Physicists will recognise their possible worlds.

Absolute idealism claims to establish that there is no such state of being as that of *res extra animam*, that extra is intra, as close as I am to myself, to modify an Augustinian saying. Thus the Thomist L.-M. Régis O.P. writes that

Intentional being is not a sort of logical being invented by human reason, a sort of hypothesis to account for facts. It is a creature of God, intended to expand the limited being of some of His creatures so that they might without being God... become the whole universe, or some one or other of its aspects (cf. Aquinas, *Quodl. VIII* 4c; *Summa theol.* Ia 56, 2 ad 3; 80, 1c.)¹⁵

Here the realist barrier separating him from Hegel is so thin, paper-thin, that his texts serve as commentary and explanation of Hegel, after some modification. For God himself "becomes the whole universe" in the identity of the idea of it with his essence.¹⁶ All "finite" being is "intentional" and to that extent simply false, Hegel teaches, not to be mistaken for "the true". The "without being God" shows itself indeed as residual and finite rationalism of the Understanding, in Régis. I am that which I am not and I am not that which I am. I am ther absolute universal. "The eye with which I see God is the eye with which God sees me... if I were not, He would not be" for, as Scripture and the realists have it, "He has known me since before the foundations of the world", i.e. he was never and never could be ignorant of or, hence, without me, the "universal of universals". This is Freedom, Hegel claims. It is also the natural of the issuing of Understanding into Reason, called by those who will not follow it "the mystical".

With this background the apodictic, as resulting from consideration of the form of judgment, of using its copula to signify being, actuality (therefore "in the form of a verb"), becomes plain, as, in a manner, does language itself, both its genesis and its *Aufhebung* in the Concept, the Notion. Time indeed is mere projection of the qualifications of Actuality which are the "oblique" linguistic tenses we here "apodictically" suspend, in what is indeed *das Urteil des Begriffes*, Judgment which is, actually, the Notion. The copula, *die vorher in dem abstraktem Ist bestand, jetzt aber zum Grunde überhaupt sich weitergebildet hat*.

We are thus returned to the doctrine of the transcendental predicates, treated so negatively by Kant. The agreement of things with their notion is precisely the judgment that they are what they ought to be. This, Hegel shows, is simply that they are. This *erfüllte Kopula* is *die Beziehung auf*

¹⁵ L.-M. Régis: *Epistemology*, New York 1959, p.213.

¹⁶ Cf. Aquinas, Ia 15.

das Predikat, welches keinen anderen Inhalt hat als die Entsprechung selbst oder die Beziehung des Subjekts auf die Allgemeinheit. (GL II, 350, Suhrkamp 6)

Evil things, in contrast, refusing their "ought", are not, have no stay, no future, are like dreams, "the absolute sham-existence of negativity itself" (35, *Zus.*). Hegel is deeply traditional here. Evil, as *privatio boni*, must also be *privatio entis* and is therefore *semper in subjecto* (sc. *bono*) only. There can be no "absolute evil", however bad it gets. Therefore, logically, *qui putat quod est putat quod debet* (Anselm, *De veritate*), as giving sense to the dialectical project as such. Yet thinking determines what is to be, is not passive to some "anterior", separated being of its own but affirms itself with the necessity of absolute freedom. Reason, that is, is absolute or, as we say, divine, as Cicero had understood (*De legibus*). For this reason the *Sollen* is assimilable to the predicate of "correct" merely. Hegel first lists this, "correct", with his "transcendental" predicates, at 178, then a few lines later omits!

In harmony with this we noted above that Aquinas, refining upon Anselm, makes of obligation, the "ought", a hypothetical necessity merely, depending upon the necessity of the end in question, ultimate happiness or the Absolute (God) or *bonum in communi*. It is because they lead to God, are needed for this, that virtues are honourable. *Sollen*, obligation, states the necessity of precept. Precepts, however, are only given, by self or other, from the necessity of some end.¹⁷

The end here is truth, also called goodness (practical truth). Yet truth is understood as things being what they should be, the *Wahrheit der Dinge* (a title of Joseph Pieper's), although Hegel denies that finite things have this truth. That is, he interprets the story of a contingent Fall in religious tradition as veiling the necessary untruth of the finite, thus equating the dialectic of the Logic, where we pass from imperfect and untrue to the perfect, infinite and true with the doctrine of Creation, seen as a necessary series of moments in the eternal divine thought. "In God we live and move and have our being." Any "coming out" (*exitus*) from God is subservient to that truth, that is, to a necessary complementary *reditus*, which again is a mere temporal parable for the eternal truth of things, as we say, or, rather, of the unstable things which have no truth.

To avoid the circle of a degeneration into a monstrously absolute moralism, the fairy-tale world where all depends upon the keeping of some abstract precept, i.e. one not related to any end (cf. 24, *Zus.*), we seem to need prior to truth, the concept of, rather the Notion as, Being. Hegel supplies this, but in the guise of an example merely. The categories of

¹⁷ Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia-IIae 99.

Logic "are the heart and centre of things... Being, for example, is a category of pure thought..." (24, *Zus.*).

This is, thus far, the Scotistic understanding of Being as a concept, as it is treated in Hegel's Logic. For Aquinas Being transcends all categories, is the only "transcendental category" absolutely speaking. The other transcendentals are such, again, only qua properties and/or relations of being. Thus even truth is. Yet Hegel reaches this position in his own way too by his stress upon the copula as apodictic, to which we have been referring. It is the unity and identity that all judgment is itself striving, qua judgment, to identify with. For if S is P, in final completion, then there is no longer either Subject or Predicate and the unity thus formed is in every case the same, the universal which the individual is. This is the indivisio of Being, whereby it is *unum*, which is the first transcendental modulation of Being in some versions of the old list of transcendentals.

On the other hand, while members of that list such as *res* (the thing), *aliquid* (something, "somewhat"), *unum* and, above all, Being itself (*ens*) are placed among the categories, hence not as transcending them, yet "true" and "good" appear never to have been considered under that option. They appear rather now, along with "beautiful", but also with "bad"(!) and, at first mention at least (of the two at 178), "correct", as mere material for the finite and perfected form of the Judgment of the Notion.

The Disjunctive Judgment, Hegel states, *die innere Grundlage des Begriffsurteils ausmacht*, namely, that goodness and truth, like being, are one and undivided, found wholly everywhere. Realist supposition-theory, of the most valid kind, would teach us to limit these universal and hence transcendental predicates to the individual subjects, to particularise, so that "good" in "Socrates is good" stands for a good man only (or the good Socrates) at best.¹⁸ Hegel insists, with reason, that this be reversed in favour of this absolute predicate itself. Thus this object, whichever it is, stands for (the whole of) being, goodness, truth and beauty, in unity (in this apodictic judgment).¹⁹ This is the Judgment of the Notion in process of abrogating itself into the Syllogism which all things are, as syllogism itself becomes pure Notion, the act of self-thinking.

¹⁸ See our "The Supposition of the Predicate", *The Modern Schoolman* LXXVII, November 1999, pp.73-78.

¹⁹ This view of Hegel's is strictly in line with the Gospel text, "Why do you call me good, since there is none good but God?" Implied is, if I am good, then I am God. Hegel generalises this, in accordance with the view that goodness, like being, has no parts or, again, that the individual is the universal. The consensus, from these canonical texts (and one can look back to the *Psalter*) to Augustine, Eckhart, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel and many others is striking.

So ist die Form des Urteils untergegangen, first because S and P are as such of the same content, second, because the Subject, in the apodictic judgment of the notion, of itself exceeds itself in a relation to these universal or transcendental predicates which is *ipso facto* a self-relation, to what is "closer than self". This also is thou; neither is this thou; i.e. we must say both, because we cannot say either of them properly with the extensionalist tools language supplies, born of the original abstraction of the understanding. Poetry, at its own level, attempts to remedy this in intellectual effort, while music makes the effort in pure harmony, without, as such, descending to words at all, though it springs from minds, from Mind. It is there before we speak, in that "dark pit" of which Hegel speaks in *Enc.* III. There "all things flow" and, though speech is silver, silence is golden.

That all things flow is most manifest in thinking, which is why just logic, in *logica docens*, must be understood dialectically, i.e. is not to be understood because, as formal and hence finite structure, it is not. In this sense it parallels religious dogma, consigned to endless development of interpretation in direct negation of its aiming to close debate, to "stop all thinking". This is the fate of the very notion of development itself, of all notions inclusive of "the notion of the notion". Nevertheless, it is thinking itself, the flux itself which bears the unchanging message, "Be still and know that I am God".

For the third factor in the demise of Judgment is that this very relation of the individual subject to universality is the Judgment itself, now shown itself as "the concrete identity of the notion". Its specific form was mere appearance all along, analogous, at a higher level, to the twittering of birds. The conceptual unity of Subject and Predicate posited by the copula apodictically, is itself the subject or Notion. The Notion is, non aliquo modo est sed est, est (Augustine). This is its *unmittelbar Beschaffenheit*, that it is not *beschaffen* at all, passing through all that (*hindurchgehende*) in absolute universality. This Hegel calls the fulfilled copula, full of content, recalling the passage from Aquinas's Commentary above. The two senses of "is" (*actus essendi* and *veritas propositionis*) are at bottom one. This insight, we might say, is the Grundlage of the Ontological Argument and really of any argument, in the mutual interdependence of Truth and Being determined by the absoluteness of Mind, its perfect freedom from all positedness. Meanwhile, *durch dies Erfüllung der Kopula ist das Urteil zum Schluss geworden*.

In this manner subject and predicate are each the whole judgment. The immediate constitution of the subject is at first exhibited as the mediating ground, where the individuality of the actual thing meets with

its universality, and in this way as the ground of the judgment. What has been really made explicit is the oneness of subject and predicate, as the notion itself, filling up the empty "is" of the copula. (180)

Here Hegel has actually recaptured Parmenidean Being, whole in every part and hence having no parts. The abstract Being of the first category, reflecting the 'empty "is" of the copula', has been filled up by the total Content.²⁰

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Hegel is at one with Aquinas in refusing the latter-day separation of the "is" of predication from the "is" of identity, as it is called. The latter is just one (material) form of predication (cf. Aquinas Ia 85, 5 ad 3). But whereas Aquinas states this by means of showing that a judgment of identity is never absolute identity, i.e. "even in statements in which the same thing is predicated of itself" there is difference, just inasmuch as it is predicated. This is for Hegel the ground for the final supersession of judgment (Urteil) as such. This individual is the universal. This is but the aboriginal Parmenidean insight that Being has no parts. Judgment, *via* syllogism (triple identity), leads into and back to the Notion, this absolute identity of all with all (as in Leibniz). Therefore it should not be viewed as exclusively an insight descending from the Ontological Argument or the concept of the Absolute reached at the end. It is rather the insight of Logic, which, Hegel says, is "nothing but" creation as, rather, creation is nothing but logic.

²⁰ Cp. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia, 3, 4 ad 1, on the difference between abstract *esse commune* (empty and open as to addition) and *esse divinum*, absolutely concrete and not admitting addition.

XXIII

HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF SYLLOGISM

The section on **Judgment** in *Encyclopaedia I* ends (180) with the affirmation that the unity of the notion itself, and hence of subject and predicate, is more absolutely achieved in the **Syllogism** than finally in the *Apodictic* (or most perfect form of) *Judgment*. This is not unconnected with the fact that the word for syllogism used here in the German is *Schluss*. For *Schluss* in general means conclusion, a closing or finish of what was open or ongoing. The syllogism is closure in "realisation", of the Notion, namely, as the **Object**. This means that the conclusion of a syllogism is not a mere part of it, together with the two premises. It is the whole syllogism, as the **Effect** was the result or meaning or issue of the **Cause**. Indeed, the premises cause the conclusion, inasmuch as this finite category may still be applied, an Aristotelian view, according to medieval commentators, of the syllogistic reasons regarded in much "analytic" philosophy as a scandalous confusion (of reasons with causes) although it is, rather, a deliberate conflation. So, the oneness, the absolute super-organic unity of the **Notion**, is approached more nearly in the syllogism than in the judgment. This is true, even though the syllogism, extensionally considered, is generally represented as consisting of three separate judgments. These judgments, however, unite in a triple identity over a "middle" or mean term. Just thereby have we in this unity a more absolute identity than the single identity now achieved and discerned in the twofold structure of the judgment. Any identity is single and double at the same time. That is why, in "realist" thought, it is a relation of reason only. When, however, two such doublenesses are placed as overlapping in one of their terms, then reason is revealed as the whole notion or, rather, the notion which is the **Whole**. Here is shown at the same time how the syllogism is the paradigm of all reasoning, or rather of reason as such, in its creativeness. It is therefore wrong to represent it as a mere small part of

formal logic as if lacking this other dimension, based upon the very nature of thinking.¹

Hegel states here, all the same, that "subject and predicate are each the whole judgment". This oneness is "the Notion itself, filling up the empty 'is' of the copula". This 'is', after all, posits this oneness in identity, and what are identical are indeed each the whole as not being distinct from one another, except *in ratione*, a condition transcended in intellectual vision. Hegel is at one with Aquinas here, rather than with Scotus, in implying rejection of what Scotus would put forward as a *distinctio formalis a parte rei* in such cases.² The whole movement of the dialectic proceeds as a realisation of the oneness, in reality, without such a clinging formal qualification, of discovered identities. Such formalities are to vanish along with everything else finite as night yields to day. Scotus no doubt wished to explain or justify the existence of such intellectual formalities as in itself rational, deriving from reality, in his defence of the truth of thought, that *omne ens est verum* as Aquinas had said. Paradoxically, however, this move led historically into subjective idealism. For objective idealism, however, "the individual is the universal". It is latent in the thought of Aquinas, as we have tried to bring out earlier on here. Hegel's thought may thus be viewed as the synthesis, historically, of Thomistic Aristotelianism with that conscious antithesis to it which Scotus developed and which mutated through Suarez and Wolff up to Kant and beyond. For this synthesis the universal indeed is found *alio modo* in reality to how it is found *in anima*, as Aristotle had said (it is the key thesis of "moderate realism", so-called). However, it issues beyond this frank impasse into an absolute monism, recognising more consistently that "everything finite is false" except in so far as we and our finite world "live and move and have our being" *in* the Notion, *nous*, i.e. are one with it, since the Notion is not some kind of a material container.

The Notion "fills up the empty 'is' of the copula" as giving final face to this 'is', to Being as fullness rather than emptiness:

¹ Cf. our "The Interdependence of Semantics, Logic and Metaphysics as Exemplified in the Aristotelian Tradition", *International Philosophical Quarterly* (New York), Vol. 42, No. 1, Issue No. 165, March 2002, pp. 63-92; also our "Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy", *Acta Philosophica* (Rome), fasc. II, vol. 6, 1997, pp. 303-310.

² Unless, that is, the Scotist view be interpreted as not being the contradiction of "Brother Thomas" that Scotus himself had seemed to believe it was. Such an interpretation can then be found in Hegel's system, insofar as the "formalities" discussed, or rather traversed, in the dialectic are of course themselves considered formally. The dialectic embodies a (formal or trans-formal) theory of such formalities as its very form.

The most perfect thing of all is being itself, for it is compared to all things as (their) act: for nothing has actuality except inasmuch as it is; whence being itself is actual of all things and even of forms themselves (or of the forms of these things themselves: *ipsarum formarum*).³

This "filling up" of the copula is the denial of an absolute equivocality in the two senses of "is" given by Aquinas, viz. existence and "the truth of a proposition". They are closely related, something Peter Geach's excellent exposition of the distinction in *Three Philosophers* and elsewhere rather obscured. Thus

[is] means that which is understood after the manner of absolute actuality. For is, when it is expressed without qualification, means to be in act, and therefore it has its meaning after the manner of a verb. But the actuality, which is the principal meaning of the verb is, indifferently the actuality of every form, either substantial or accidental act. Hence it is that when we

³ Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia 4, 1 ad 3, my parenthesis: many translations put "existence" for *esse*, as if it were *existentia*, and one can take Thomas as meaning existence. Thus although Aquinas speaks here of *esse* as the actuality of the form he insists in general that form is prior to existence as giving it at the same time as he speaks of the *esse* of the form itself, as, for example, angels are taken as *created* forms. *Forma dat esse*, meaning, however, that it gives what it "has". *Nihil dat quod non habet*. Actuality is thus "higher", formally to be seen as *prior* to existence (this is the Neoplatonic moment), as in the Aristotelian conception of nous or God as *actus purus*. It is in line with this that Existence is put as a *finite* category in Hegel's logic, as suggesting also an extrinsic origin (*ex-sistentia*) and this within the Doctrine of Essence, as set, therefore, for sublation as moment (of thought) merely. Hence it is, also, that Aquinas himself can speak of God as "pure form", giving existence rather than being it. The word Being, however, in contrast to "existence", might include this. In general, the thought of Aquinas, ultimately regulated by Scripture, is expressed so as to be in line with the *Exodus* proclamation to Moses, immediately interpreted, of God as I AM. For Hegel too, however, this "I" is "the universal of universals", absolute subjectivity being thus placed prior to existence, just as the latter is not placed first in Platonist thought necessarily. In this respect it remains true, even of the "filled up" being or copula, that it is "not a whit better" than the non-being of the Buddhists (87, *Zus.*). The question of Hamlet remains, whether non-being can without contradiction be considered "better" and hence more "actual". Thus Hegel says that Reason can survive its own demise, i.e. that life is not finally life, as spirit (*Geist*), even though one grant that *viventibus esse est vivere*. "Oh life that is no life at all" (Teresa of Avila). This demise, or death as life's sublation(!), is thus, says Hegel, "the entry into spirit". Thus *esse* is not finally *vivere*, after all, since, also, life, "the life that I live now", is not, we might say, finally life, but a finite category implying death as its inherent self-contradiction therefore, as with all things finite.

wish to signify that any form or act actually inheres in any subject, we signify it by this verb is... - simply in the present tense, according to some qualification, in the other tenses.⁴

However, Hegel's thought here is by no means dependent upon use of a language which has developed a particular word for such general realities as existence or actuality, as Aquinas might be taken, though wrongly, as implying when he sticks so close to grammar and the use of tenses. In fact the copula, along with the whole self-contradictory form of the judgment as such, appears for Hegel in the light of an obstacle to be got rid of. One fills up the copula as one fills in a hole, making explicit the oneness. The notion "is put" as the unity of that subject and predicate which the judgment distinguishes or, in fact, extensionally takes apart (in order to *copulate* or "couple" them). Hence we said that language is an *ad hoc* device, replacing, as we might speculate (with Rudolph Steiner and others), the intellectual clairvoyance of prehistoric peoples and (hence?) not found, according to the speculation of Aquinas and others, in the life of angels or "separated substances". Substance as such, however, is itself an *ad hoc* stopping-place, in the perspective of the dialectic.

This unity, however, firstly of subject and its predicate, which the Notion signifies or stands for or puts itself as, is itself embodied as the **Syllogism**, Hegel says at the end of 180, at least for now or, rather, at this "moment" of the dialectic. The notion is "put as their unity... in short, as the Syllogism." The Notion is also put "as the connexion which serves to intermediate" these "constituent elements" of the judgment. Implied is that no truth, no true judgment, is arrived at except as *Schluss*, as Syllogism, and this is just what the achieved or developed Notion will finally show, that there are no "first principles" upon which we finally rely and from which the rest depends. Hence Hegel writes that "certainly the judgment does in every case refer us to the Syllogism" (181, *Zus.*, my stress). The centre rather is at all points since "everything is a syllogism", in this sense, namely, of *Schluss*, conclusion, closure. That is, one should see, "the factual is normative". This also is thou. The Result, as already or eternally achieved, is that from which we trace our steps to "constituent elements", such as "first" principles, which are merely abstract. The whole dialectic is thus a retracing, as emphasised by McTaggart in particular. See here 209 *Zus.* with especially 212 *Zus.* Even as we move through the dialectic itself it is "illusion" which makes the end seem unachieved, as if a process of reasoning, of syllogising, had yet to be gone through. The Good is "already accomplished", a position McTaggart was nonetheless unable to

⁴ Aquinas, *In I Perih.*, lect. 5, no. 22.

stomach but which is fully in accord with embarking upon this dialectic at all. "This is the illusion under which we live" (Hegel), i.e. that it is not accomplished, yet the viewpoint has nothing to do with advocating some kind of practical quietism. It rather advocates the faith and hope of religion, as thinking, though fulfilling them under the more perfect form of philosophy where, no longer, "all *shall be* well and all manner of thing" or where God, namely, *shall be* "all in all" but where all *is* well and accomplished, rather, as philosophy "accomplishes" religion⁵, in every moment of genuine contemplation, as one might be prepared to add in defence of religion sublating itself in its own highest act, as Christianity sublated Judaism (or as Judaism there sublated and sublates itself). For, generally, only out of this illusion, that the Good "waits upon us", only "out of this error does the truth arise".

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The Syllogism, then, "brings the notion and the judgment into one" (181). We may take "notion" here as referring primarily to the subjective notion as notion (object of *apprehensio simplex* as Aristotle's first of the three "acts of the understanding") studied above. So (the) syllogism is notion and judgment. It is in fact "the reasonable, and everything reasonable". It is notion as "the simple identity into which the distinctions of form in the judgment have retired." This is implicit as *Schluss*. It is judgment, all the same, as "put in the distinction of its terms", the clinging extensionality, although even within judgment Hegel has overcome this.

The "distinctions of form in the judgment" retired into simple identity on reaching the Apodictic judgment (179), the "precise point by which we pass to the Syllogism" (181, *Zus.*). "In it we have an individual which by means of its qualities connects itself with its universal or notion." This action, man, woman, statement etc. is good, beautiful, true etc. "Here we see the particular becoming the mediating mean between the individual and the universal." We see, that is, that the individual, this individual, is the universal once again. For the judgment itself "puts itself as Syllogism" which, again, "is the reasonable, and everything reasonable." Just here at 181 we find Hegel's profoundest statement of the grounds for his view. It appears characteristically at the beginning of the material (here on the syllogism), before, maybe, the first-time reader will have had much chance of grasping it but illustrating Hegel's own perfect or out and out command

⁵ Cf. Georges van Riet, "The Problem of God in Hegel" (Parts II-III), *Philosophy Today*, Vol. XI, Number 2/4, Summer 1967, pp. 75-105 (French original in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, Vol. 63, August 1965, pp. 353-418).

of the thought he is thus transmitting in extensional or linguistic, semiotic form.

Thus he does not neglect tackling that most fundamental deficiency of so much discourse upon logic, that the "name of reason is much and often heard" but "no one thinks of explaining its specific character, or saying what it is, - least of all that it has any connection with Syllogism". They do not think of it but stare open-mouthed at anyone's raising the matter. Thus logic, and notoriously syllogistic, is taught as if one can thus learn how to think, as if the forms of syllogism are of any use or relevance at all to anyone who does not himself see their validity. This is what is wrong with the whole notion of "logical form" as generally presented. Arguments in general cannot truly be evaluated by such forms precisely because the validity of the forms is itself seen in exactly the same intuition. In pretending to "abstract" the form from individual arguments we merely present the most general argument of that form we can think of. That is, the putative "form" is itself an instance of the form, as remains the case even should it be symbolised, the symbols in the last or most universal, which is also the most individual instance, standing at least still for themselves in the first place. This situation is only saved from being a reduction of the whole of logic to argument from analogy upon our understanding that any particular argument is as central or universal as the form itself. Here too the individual (argument) is the universal and this of itself makes the universal ultimately individual.

Everything is a notion, the existence of which is the differentiation of its members or functions, so that the universal nature of the Notion gives itself external reality by means of particularity, and thereby, and as a negative reflection-into-self, makes itself an individual. Or, conversely; the actual thing is an individual, which by means of particularity rises to universality and makes itself identical with itself. The actual is one: but it is also the divergence from each other of the constituent elements of the notion; and the syllogism represents the orbit of intermediation of its elements, by which it realises its unity. (181)

So "at the present stage the definition of the Absolute is that it is the Syllogism", i.e. "everything is a Syllogism". Everything is a notion, which is differentiation, of its members indeed but of members which only become members in and as that differentiation. This in religion is creation, which in Hegel is no mere afterthought of divinity but constitutive of it, as Freedom is Necessity. Nor does this insight separate Hegel from Christian belief, as Charles Taylor's makeshift theology unfortunately imagines:

On the other side Hegel cannot just accept the formulations of Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz *et al.* For one thing they would be horrified to see the kind of "God" whose existence is here proved, for this existence is inseparable from that of the world as ordered whole, and this is not the god worshipped by Christians. (Taylor, *op. cit.* p.317; cf. also pp. 480-510)

The maxim of pantheism, says Hegel, is "the doctrine of the eternity of matter, that from nothing comes nothing, and that something can only come out of something" (88), thus abolishing Becoming also in his non-temporal (as I have argued) understanding of it. For the ultimate something or matter will never become. This, he says, "is the maxim of abstract identity as upheld by the understanding." Creation, however, is precisely *ex nihilo* and thus Hegel confirms the Thomistic thesis that the eternity or, rather, non-beginning of the world would be compatible with creation. Creation is this free differentiation which is the notion, for, as Hegel once remarked, logic is "nothing but creation". This remark in fact was adopted by the Italian philosopher Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852) as a kicking-off point for the plainly Hegelian movement of thought known as Ontologism.

If, though, as I hardly imagine, Hegel were ignorant of Aquinas's thesis here (as contrary to his contemporary's, the Franciscan Bonaventura's), this would merely strengthen his testimony as exhibiting an independent confluence of the greatest minds, to which Aristotle forms a third representing (Greek) philosophy as a whole or, rather, Mind. Mind sets in order the things which are, have been or are to be (Anaxagoras) indifferently, in the sense, that is, that these are ultimately the same. Otherwise what is the force of Anaxagoras' remark? Precisely in such an ongoing and self-consuming series there would be no order, no ordering mind, nor the possibility of saying so. This is why there is no creation in time and no time either, absolutely speaking. God, in a word, is necessarily immutable, "realised end" as Hegel has it, of course not meaning that there was a little bit of time in an absolute past for realising this end before the curtain came down, in crass self-contradiction, upon time as such.

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Aquinas, then, in saying that creation's having a (temporal) beginning is a truth of faith alone, may well, as assigning to it this absolute opacity, be interpreted in the light of the later Hume (*Dialogues on Natural Religion*) as transparently deferring merely to ecclesiastic authority, though a different one. In each case though the authority is at least put in its place, if not directly mocked. In any case that is what faith, in this atrophied

sense of abstracted external or obedient confession, ultimately is. Aquinas in his own time could not so easily look forward to an eventual reformulation of the doctrine or dogma, or reinterpretation of the existing formulations, Biblical or traditional, so as to remove the apparent contradiction. This is what Hegel offers, as was also offered by those Catholic thinkers condemned en bloc in 1907 as "modernists". The previous Pope, Leo XIII, he who "restored" Thomism, had endorsed the very modern and indeed "modernist" book, as in the modern spirit, viz. *The Development of Christian Doctrine* of 1845, by making its author, J.H. Newman, a cardinal. Calling a heresy "modernism" betrays a melancholy lack of confidence in the face of developments quite the reverse of the thirteenth century optimism and adventurousness on the part of the "Christian movement" at that date. Things have maybe improved somewhat since then, however, with official and Conciliar recognition of "ecumenism" as a force within the movement though it is not yet fully recognised that universal reconciliation, since the infinite differentiation is the Notion, is *the very centre* of the movement, *ut omnes unum sint*. "I if I be lifted up will draw *all* men unto me" (my stress). Hegel identifies the implicit overcoming of the "antithesis of subjective and objective" with this universalism (194, *Zus.*), which itself he universalises, as we find in a measure already in the thought of John or Paul. *Seid umschlungen, Millionen*, exclaims the contemporary poet-philosopher. Each of these millions, eternally viewed, in being drawn thus draws all the others, even retro-actively, as can be seen from Hegel's musings around the figure of Krishna at the end of the *Encyclopaedia* *an idea, or fancy as might say, also touched upon in the novels of Charles Williams, as by the saying: "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day". In our own tradition, which again is really that of all, the first is said to be last, the last first. Hegel, indeed, is the great self-effacer (see the conclusion to his Preface to *The Phenomenology of Mind*). That is the meaning of his system, which thus incidentally negates the empirical notion of self in making the other, otherness, intrinsic to it. "You are all members of one another" or "one of another", as it is figuratively expressed by the Apostle. "I in them and they in me", prays the Mediator at the end, according to the *Gospel of John*. Not that someone overheard him, but that that indicates the mind of one or more of the earliest Christian communities. "Everything is a syllogism", thus eternally reconciling within and as constitutive of its selfhood and individuality the infinite differentiation which is the notion. There are thus really no members nor even relations, where there are no members to be related, ultimately within the godhead itself, Hegel concurs in affirming

that this is the only rational conception thereof. "The principle of personality is universality".

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Remaining for a while with the untruth of the finite, we note that the imperfection, due to its figurativeness, of the form of religion as apprehension of the Absolute, the Content, is reflected in much apologetic writing (and even in much of the metaphysics of the early modern period). This results from the apologists not acknowledging this imperfection of form. They prefer to rely for the defence of religion exclusively upon the (in such areas) blindness and finitude of the Understanding, rather than to apply the transformations of Reason which make everything clear in the Notion.

A good example of this, Hegel points out, is provided by the *a posteriori* argument(s) for God's existence, the "rising to God from out of the empirical view of the world":

And what men call the proofs of God's existence are, rightly understood, ways of describing and analysing the native course of the mind, the course of *thought* thinking the *data* of the senses. The rise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite to the infinite, the leap into the super-sensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and nothing but thought. (50)

Mind rises from shadows to reality, kicking the ladder away, in "thought and nothing but thought", "in its sovereign ingratitude", beyond the animals, which "in consequence have no religion".

Now, says Hegel, "the merely syllogistic thinker" may "deem this starting-point a solid basis... as if it were only reasoning from one which is and continues to be, to another thing which in like manner is."

But the great error is to restrict our notions of the nature of thought to its form in understanding alone. To think the phenomenal world rather means to recast its form, and transmute it into a universal. And thus the action of thought has also a negative effect upon its basis: and the matter of sensation... at once loses its phenomenal shape.

Hegel refers us here to *Enc.* 13, which argues "the necessity of defining more exactly the relation of Universal to Particular", essential to his account of Syllogism, to all the particular differentiations and systems of Philosophy, as product of "one living Mind". "The different systems which the history of philosophy presents are therefore not irreconcilable with unity". Concurrently, at paragraph 23, he states that "the real nature of the

object... is a product of my mind." My reflection brings it to light, "in my simple universality... in my Freedom." Yet "philosophy may be acquitted of the charge of pride... submitting to the sway of the fact". "Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics." (24)

If the world is only a sum of incidents, it follows that it is also deciduous and phenomenal, in *esse* and *posse* null. That upward spring of the mind signifies, that the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute truth; it signifies that, beyond and above that appearance, truth abides in God, so that *true being is another name for God*. The process of exaltation might thus appear to be transition and to involve a means, but it is not a whit less true, that *every trace of transition and means is absorbed*; since the world, which might have seemed to be the means of reaching God, is explained to be a nullity. (50: italics added)

God, that is to say, as truth, is ever constitutive of mind and its thought as abiding in this truth. Yet of "God" he says that the form (of this notion) "retains... sensuous limitations", the content, on the other hand, "is... a product of pure thought." In the Absolute we transcend "God" as philosophy transcends, in form, its own religious (and artistic) content. Theism and atheism might thus, it seems, be reconciled. "I and the Father are one." The positive religious claim finds theoretical universalisation. Yet it is posited as End in what Hegel calls "the absolute religion" in and by the doctrine of the Mystical Body. This is accorded a "head" at the same time as it is said that all are "members one of another", even this (future) "head" saying "I in them and they in me", *ut omnes unum sint*.

So the Analogy of Being, to which Hegel alludes here, the mere fact that "being is said in many ways", does not direct us to any absolute "ontological discontinuity", as the phrase goes. The finite is rather absorbed in the infinite, in which, in whom, "we live and move and have our being". Rabbits do not live alongside or discontinuously with animals, or cherries beside fruits (13), or accidents beside substances, or the body beside the soul, or man beside God. Hegel goes on to say, referring to Spinoza, that "charges of Pantheism and Atheism" do not here hold, for a philosophy affirming "that God and God alone is". That men are inclined to believe it impossible "to hold that there is no world", though not "to entertain the idea that there is no God" is "not much to human nature's credit", he says. (50)

Hegel does not merely treat but presents the Syllogism of Quality or of existence under the aspect of an absolute progression through its three Figures (so called) towards the Object, the subsequent Syllogism of Reflection and Necessity mediating this. That the progression is absolute entails that it is as it were a closed circle in having no privileged point of entry from without. These figures

have ... a very real significance, derived from the necessity for every function or characteristic element of the notion to become the whole itself, and to stand as mediating ground. (187)

Upon this necessity the syllogistic figures depend as deriving from it. Meanwhile, of every reality properly contemplated the Notion⁶ is to be predicated. "This also is thou". This is to be said not of ash-trays and such but of persons. Conversely, anything of which it is said, dogs, artworks, people and such, will thereby be predicated as personal or as end-in-itself. Only persons are ends-in-themselves, forming thereby the "kingdom" of reciprocal and trans-reciprocal identity, "I in them and they in me" as each may say, making of the spatial proposition a figure for identity. "The principle of personality is the universal", principle because persons are not substances and not even, just therefore, relations, except as relating to one another in infinite regress in every case.⁷ They are neither one nor many, but "thought thinking itself" (194, *Zus.*). In this Thought, in *nous*, in God, we (*sic*) "live and move and have our being". "I am the universal of universals", but where each is all and conversely (160) this is no mere solipsism. Even, it seems, again transcending religion's positivity, we beget one another, though a mutuality of begetting shows the figurativeness. Rather, the exclusion of a linear causality is confirmed and consistently pursued. The doctrine of the Mystical Body is religion's approximation to this, as this is the "accomplishment" of the in some sense prior religious doctrine and/or intuition (of "the mystical body"), expressed universally in the harmony of art, representing and/or producing individual objects such as Van Gogh's chair, i.e. the (part-)portrait of some chair or Blake's mentioned "grain of sand". In this sense it might even be (a portrait of) an ash-tray. Again, however, an ash-tray, before such representation, may be viewed as a function of human life and hence of the Notion.

⁶ Introduced already in its full sense in the Introduction to *The Phenomenology of Mind*. "Suppose we call knowledge the notion etc.", q.v.

⁷ Compare "determinate correspondence" in McTaggart's system, where each perceives the other(s) perceiving him/her *ad infinitum*

Hegel distinguishes the "formal Syllogism of Understanding, the "immediate" syllogism (182), from the Rational Syllogism. The former "begins" with a representation of mutually alien elements, alien despite their common or middle term, which are just thereby abstracted notions not thus found in final reality. The syllogistic forms themselves depend upon such a method, uniting the abstracted elements (i.e. they first have to be thus abstract), the "subjective notions", which Judgment itself still keeps separated in their very identity. Or, as Hegel also expresses it (thereby expressing more),

We have first the two extremes, which are Individuality and Universality; and then the notion, as the mean for locking the two together, is in like manner only abstract particularity. In this way the extremes are put as independent and without affinity either towards one another or towards their mean. (182)

That is, they are thus "put" when they are not so, as Hegel's whole *Science of Logic* is set to show. Thus what functions as the notion there is in no way the corresponding concrete universality but "abstract particularity". So Hegel is demonstrating the *falsity* of such "reason and argument" (title of a little book by Peter Geach on the logical forms which omits all discussion of the concept or first "instrument of reason", treating only of propositions and arguments, corresponding to judgment and syllogism as linguistic phenomena) inasmuch as being a purely finite reasoning with no proportion to absolute truth, there being no other, therefore. It is perhaps closer to mathematics than to metaphysics. The contours of a direct continuation of Kant, in speculative contradiction of all his criticisms, become visible here. This formal Syllogism of Understanding, anyhow, is "utter notionlessness", even though it "contains reason".

In it the subject is coupled with an *other* character; or the universal by this mediation subsumes a subject external to it. In the rational Syllogism, on the contrary, the subject is by means of the mediation coupled with itself. In this manner it first comes to be a subject: or in the subject we have the first germ of the rational Syllogism. (182)

It follows therefrom (170f.), that is to say. We are seeing progressively what this means. The formal Syllogism of Understanding "contains reason, but in "utter notionlessness". The objective meaning, he says, of this "subjective" or abstract formalism is only "the finitude of things", their falsity, "in the specific mode which the form has here reached" but which we are in process of setting aside (*aufheben*). Here alone we separate

things from their universality, making of "genus and notion" mere "beings of reason". Such empiricist realism stops short of the philosophical.

The metaphysics of understanding is dogmatic because it maintains half-truths in their isolation: whereas the idealism of speculative philosophy carries out the principle of totality and shows that it can reach beyond the inadequate formularies of abstract thought... The battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the understanding has reduced everything. (32, *Zus.*)

As regards the Rational Syllogism its matter must derive from its form exclusively, and of course *vice versa*, since matter and form have in reality already at this point been superseded (in the "Doctrine of Essence") as categories. We cannot work with or think alongside a finite frame of outward forms. The "mere syllogism of understanding... has no claim to the honour of being made a form of rationality" (182, *Zus.*). Just as the Notion cannot be "degraded" to the "faculty of forming notions" in the subjective understanding, so Syllogism, Reason, cannot be degraded to this abstract and finite system of reasoning.

With all the descriptiveness and analytical faculty which Aristotle after his fashion is substantially strong in, his ruling principle is always the speculative notion; and that syllogistic of "understanding" to which he first gave such a definite expression is never allowed to intrude in the higher domain of philosophy. (187)

The distinguishing of syllogistic moods, or "whether they (the propositions) may be universals, or negatives" is "a mechanical enquiry" for drawing "correct" conclusions. This would be part of Hegel's answer to Trendelenburg's objection that he confounds contradiction and contrariety. He wishes to get behind this ultimate "irrealism", as it is now sometimes called, whereby every theory can only to be assessed in terms of a prior theory or particular formal representation.

We have noted that the form and the matter must coalesce. The ultimate syllogism is a demonstration of itself, with Particularity, Individuality and Universality as the three terms or, rather, moments as mentioned immediately above here. For the syllogism "is contingent in point of its terms" and these three are to be consumed in the one "concrete universal", the Notion or "universal of universals", absolute subjectivity. In so far as this is in itself immediate there is no proper middle term, i.e. not ever. This applies even to Nature, which as it mediates between Logic and Mind is yet absorbed in them, while at the same time it "unfolds itself into the two extremes of the Logical Idea and Mind" equally (187, *Zus.*). For at the

same time Nature and the Logical Idea form the extremes between which Mind alone mediates. Where each of the mediated in turn mediates there is *no longer mediation as such* but mutual co-inherence or perfect, supra-organic unity in identity.

So Reason does not stop short at abstract contrariety or negativity but negates them. Thus freedom merges with necessity as its ultimate expression, divine unity merges with Trinity as the ultimate identity. For Reason, as considering even our highest concepts, of God, freedom, right and duty, the infinite, even these are "only negative objects" and the question remains as to *was es in allen jenen Gegenstände ist, um dessen willen sie vernünftig sind*. Thus Hegel had objected that no one thinks of explaining reason's specific character (181). But "any reasonable matter", again, "can only be rational in virtue of the same quality by which thought is reason, it can be made so by the form only: and that form is Syllogism" (181). But it is syllogism in the way to be explained, i.e. we have not to do with the notion of formal syllogism that "really presents what is reasonable in such a reasonless way that it has nothing to do with any reasonable matter". And yet it does "present what is reasonable", as Reason will now show.

Here, however, might belong consideration of the uniqueness of Hegel's project, of explaining the reasonable. It would explain why charges of, for example, confounding contradiction with contrariety are beside the point. Hegel is not merely seeking to explain one account of rationality in terms of a more basic one, but to explain rationality as such, its distinguishing characteristic. There is no reason why reason should not do this, as it may, without contradiction, explain contradiction and that in maybe surprising ways (119, 214). Similarly we may find a new and more profound relation being proposed between the speculative and the practical. In token of this we find Hegel placing *Volition* after and hence in a superior position to *Cognition proper* (as we find them finally listed in EL) under *The Absolute Idea*, given that at the later stages of the dialectic we no longer have to do with any simple antithesis but continuous Advance (see 239 to 240 particularly), rather, as itself mediating between (a), the Beginning, "which is Being or Immediacy", and (c) the end or terminus", resolving "That contradiction which is seen in the infinite progress ... into the end", as "preserved in the unity" (242). This terminus, the notion, "is the knowledge that the idea is the one systematic whole", one indeed throughout each of its moments.

In view of Hegel's negative evaluation of the initial posture of the formal syllogism as manipulating three mutually alien terms, any of which may mediate, what remains to sufficiently characterise this third and final

instrument or act of reason, after subjective notion and judgment? This triple or Trinitarian (inasmuch as it is not merely trinal but "triune") syllogistic (cf. 187, *Zus.*) has the three moments of Individuality, Particularity and Universality. The third absorbs and "accomplishes" the other two, in that the individual is the universal. The reverse is also the case. In passing, I find reason to think here that Hegel's view is that if the Trinity is true then this triune account of Mind, of Reason, has in general to be the true one,

Thus the particular relates similarly with the two others, the relation being the logical relation, viz. identity. The individual nonetheless retains pride of place as "universal of universals" and not otherwise. "I if I be lifted up will draw all men unto me". Such apparently or in form contingent texts, as being here universalised, find unsuspected application, confirming that philosophy accomplishes or perfects the content of religion as of art in scientific, non-figurative mode. Under art, indeed, we must include the particular and individual words and *style* of any conceivable philosophical *statement* of final or absolute knowledge. So close and more is the relation between the three, viz. art, religion and philosophy, as the three forms of Absolute Spirit, as it is indeed between the three forms of syllogism. Thus we derive even the necessity, from this account, of the explicitly religious stage of art as being first absorbed in the manner of a perfection under religion expressly or, effectively, "pictorially", by representation, before yielding later, and increasingly, and as religious, to the final "pull" of philosophy as spirit's perfect and hence adequate form. One may have Christian Europe in mind mainly here but it is yet intended, by Hegel or by us, as paradigmatic generally without that it must or is likely to find full confirmation *as yet* outside of this cultural ambit. Its finding it elsewhere, however, as is implicit in the reasoning, that such finding of it *means* the Europeanisation of these other ambits. Everyone knows, that is to say, that globalisation and Westernisation (Europeanisation) are the same (I venture to refer the reader to my *Africa, Philosophy and the Western Tradition*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1995, and the various African comments thereon).

For it remains, as Hegel testifies at *Enc. III*, 457-8, that in using language we have to do with semiotic, with sclerotic but never completely dead metaphors, instancing our freedom of, precisely, intellect in our choice of these, both originally and in relating them to one another. We have to do with the contradiction of asserting identity between two things which are, consequently, one, in what is a passing over or transition. Thus Hegel gives to music a privileged place in the "romantic" aesthetic, above in being below. It is the language "of the soul" or the poetry of sound,

where poetry, however, as intellectual, is far above being the mere "music" of words.⁸ Hence precisely as poetry of sound music is no *mere* sound. The artwork, as in painting or architecture too, like the differentiations of the Notion exactly (160), stands for and is one with the whole, with the Idea. A pointer, anyhow, I add in conclusion, to the unity and full interaction of the three forms of Absolute Spirit, i.e. they are *all* equally absolute as to content, is that under art we can find even logic, and hence philosophy, placed, as *ars logica*, as by Descartes' contemporary Jean Poincot (also known as John of Saint Thomas), under the first or foundational form, *quoad nos* at least, of such Spirit, namely Art.

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The first syllogism (of Understanding) has for its form "I-P-U, i.e. a subject as Individual is coupled (concluded) with a Universal character by means of a (Particular) quality" (183). Not that Hegel makes the individual subject individual and nothing else, the predicate universal and nothing else.⁹ Rather, "the interest turns only on the characteristic through which these terms make a syllogism." As Aquinas had said, the subject signifies *quasi*-materially (matter as *principium individuationis*), the predicate *quasi*-formally (*formaliter* or as if "giving" the specific being this individual has). This is so even in the judgment of identity, A is A¹⁰, thereby in fact confirming this *analogical* character of the form and matter, object and concept. So there is no distinct "is" of identity, "is" as copula identifying in every case the subject and the predicate.

The first thing to note is that, insofar as truth and not mere validity (or correctness) belongs to the syllogism "according to its notion" as rational, an infinite regress is implied in this "Qualitative Syllogism" or "syllogism of existence" (*Schluss des Daseins*). For whereas the major and minor premises lead to (cause) a conclusion (*Schluss*) mediated by a middle term, yet in neither of these premises is there mediation, without further syllogisms being provided *ad infinitum*. They are "put" as immediate, although their truth requires mediation. This might appear to be an absurd requirement, somewhat recalling Lewis Carroll's (C.L. Dodgson, the

⁸ As J.-P. Sartre would have it in *What is Literature?* (1947), a view consistently contradicted from Parmenides up to Rilke or Eliot and beyond.

⁹ Perhaps neither does Frege, e.g. in his "Concept and Object", provided we could allow for Aquinas's qualification "*quasi*" in his characterisation of the predicate as signifying as it were (*quasi*!) formally, the subject *quasi*-materially.

¹⁰ Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia 85, 5 *ad* 3. See again our "Subject and Predicate Logic", *The Modern Schoolman* LXVI, January 1989, pp. 129-139, esp. part IV.

Victorian Oxford logician) paradox (on which see the references in Hofstadter's study, *Goedel, Escher, Bach*; also in Geach: *Logic Matters*), but it is merely Hegel's way of showing that this normal Qualitative Syllogism, whereby the Individual is Universal through some mediating quality, will not serve for more than absolute correctness. No doubt this was more or less Carroll's intent also, in his logical work, so not so absurd. Carroll concludes, says Hofstadter, that all conclusions "demand an infinite regress". This will not serve for the Notion, without that it receive further and continuous specification, as we saw in the case of the judgment. This will occur quite naturally, however, as being "realised by the syllogism itself", in "realisation" of the Notion as Object (193, Hegel's citation marks).

Thus here the Individual is mediated through a Particular with the Universal, which it is thus found to be ("put as"). This individual subject become universal now serves to unite the two extremes as their Ground. "This gives the second figure", U-I-P instead of I-P-U, expressing "the truth of the first" as showing that the (contingent) intermediation (correct but not necessarily true) "has taken place in the individual".

So now the universal, in this second figure, "occupies the place that belonged to the immediate subject". As such it is now put as Particular (the conclusion), as the Individual was first put as Universal. As such, and as immediate subject, it now mediates "between the two extremes" again, of Particular and Individual, giving us P-U-I. This is the "third figure" on Hegel's own scheme, so that Particular, Individual and Universal have in turn served as mediating terms, thus witnessing to a complete interchangeability where no other variant is possible. Individual, Particular and Universal are mutually identical and, as we have said, where each of the mediated in turn mediates there is no longer mediation as such but mutual co-inherence in the Notion.

In their objective sense, the three figures of the syllogism declare that everything rational is manifested as a triple syllogism; that is to say, each one of the members takes in turn the place of the extremes, as well as of the means which reconciles them. (187, *Zus.*)

Hegel refers this to the three branches of philosophy, the Logical Idea, Nature and Mind. It is significant that Nature, and not merely the philosophy of nature, is here posited as a branch of philosophy, of Mind setting all in order. Mind "involves Nature as absorbed in Itself" (97, *Zus.*).

In the round by which each constituent function assumes successively the place of mean and of the two extremes, their specific difference from each other has been superseded. (188)

This leads to a consideration of quantitative equality as substituting for identity, the "Mathematical Syllogism". This is called by Hegel, in the greater *Science of Logic*, a fourth figure of the Syllogism, though he rejects the by his time "traditional" (fourth) figure added to the Aristotelian scheme as nonsensical. It has the form U-U-U. This arises when by means of the total inter-substitutability of means and extremes here disclosed "their specific difference from each other has been superseded". The things, functions or elements of the Notion are identical and therefore equal, as equality is represented in mathematics by identity of quantity. This in fact corresponds to the general law of syllogism in the old *logica docens*, that of triple identity, whereby two things identical (and *ipso facto* equal) to a third thing are identical (and *ipso facto* equal) to each other. Just this is the third and final act of the Understanding and it is as unitary *verbum cordis* in essence. There are of course not three things but one thing in this case.

The Scholastic "three degrees of abstraction", developed from Boethius to Maritain, though as an interpretation of Aristotle, are reflected here. Thus mathematics stands midway between (physical) being and the Notion, between contingent or "material" individuals, opaque to analysis, and final "immaterial" or "ideal" reality, known and knowable through and through, the Object indeed, as we shall see. It is curious that McTaggart and Findlay both regard this "mathematical" syllogism as a digression from the dialectic. It is rather the proximate result of Hegel's deconstruction of the Qualitative Syllogism "of existence", via the obliteration or, rather, supersession of "the distinction between its constituent elements", even though Hegel acknowledges that equality is only "the external identity of understanding", as quantity is in general sunk in material extensionality. Number, Aquinas had said, expounding the Trinity, has no place in divine things.

Mathematics here arises inasmuch as there is a circularity, just as we have found in the syllogism and the reciprocal relations of the three figures, in all mathematical demonstrations, where one might reason backwards as well as forwards, taking conclusions as axioms and *vice versa*. The Mathematical Syllogism is there to show the finitude, the limits, of the Syllogism of Existence before passing to the genuine synthesis, after this antithesis, of the Syllogism of Reflection. Thus we have found these qualitatively different elements "reflected into" one another, while categorical **Quantity**, in Hegel's "The Doctrine of Being", succeeds to **Quality** at a *higher* level (98).

Hegel here shows how mathematics, as factual reality, is situated and explained as a moment within Logic, within the dialectic, as Frege in his way would also explain. Hegel shows his opposition to the converse project of explaining logic by mathematics, as suggested by the phrase "mathematical logic". He also shows the connection with logic. Both are Reasoning. While identity is *the* logical relation (*relatio rationis*) equality bespeaks identity with respect to quantity. But while in Scholasticism a relation of reason is contrasted against a real relation, in Absolute Idealism reason is the most real of all that can be thought, namely thought itself. Hegel will shortly apply this to the Anselmian "ontological argument", most explicitly in the *Encyclopaedia* text we are following here. This real relation must never be understood in the sense of "real" as extensional, since it is identity.

The Quantitative Syllogism, then, "is really the proximate result of the qualitative or immediate syllogism" (188, *Zus.*). It is just therefore the "syllogism in utter formlessness". What propositions are to be premises of the system will be taken from "what has elsewhere been proved and established". In fact such "premises" cannot be literally propositions. The form of judgment itself, as therefore of syllogism as a system of mediation, has been found to be self-contradictory. It results from dependence upon abstraction from the ideal unity in identity of all things in the Notion, their inter-reflectedness in the Leibnizian hall of mirrors. We may thus refer it, despite all Hegel has to say here, or especially in the greater and earlier *Science of Logic*, against Leibnizian projects of rational calculation *via* symbolic "formalisation".

The demise, then, of the Syllogism, of reasoning where the premises cause the conclusion but not *vice versa*, was foreseeable in view of the revelation in the Doctrine of Essence of cause and effect as reciprocal in notion to the point of identity. The same move will be made, will make itself, when we come to final causality or teleology as third and final expression of the **Object** (after Mechanism and Chemism). Ends and Means cancel one another out in identity, namely. What remains are Ends-in-themselves which can no longer, *pace* Kant, be called ends. The Absolute as End has no ends and is not an end but rather everything. Each differentiated element is as essential or necessary to the whole, to all others, to the **Other**, as they are necessary to it. This is the Notion, first to be reached here, *via* the final Syllogism of Disjunction, as **Object**.

The Syllogism of Reflection, then, succeeds upon the Qualitative Syllogism. We have found that the terms, Individual, Particular, Universal, are reflected into one another reciprocally, thus lifting their relation from contingency to identity. The Individual is the Universal and through the

self-supersession of the usual syllogistic mediation we have indeed now a posited "developed unity of the individual and universal" (189).

What Hegel is aiming at, in fact, just as prefigured in the Mathematical or Quantitative Syllogism just mentioned, is a syllogism where all the terms are universal, such as the Individual has now been developed as being. This is the force of his expression, "Syllogism of Allness" (*Allheit*, not a normal German term). There will still be a middle term, insofar as "everything is a syllogism" or triple identity taken as a "mode" or form essential to understanding as representing causality or, rather, unity in things. The animality of men causes them to be warm-blooded (and *vice versa*, we have seen), i.e. as mean it unites any two extremes. Syllogistic form is the third and most all-embracing subjective notion, *verbum cordis* and *species expressa* indeed. It is final content precisely as form of the notion, "vital spirit of the actual world" in virtue of which all that is true is true, "through them and in them", sc. these (logical) forms. Yet this is true only in virtue of our linguistic signs, the word which is the other, the antithetical identity of the *Idea* (213, 454-459¹¹).

Transcending any idea now of an "abstract particular character of the subject" shared by many other things, e.g. the rose's redness in virtue of which it is coloured, we take as mean rather the class to which any individual essentially belongs, such as humanity. We do this by way of Complete Enumeration. Hegel concern here is to achieve or think "equation between intension and extension" (Findlay).

In fact though, in representing the identity of Individual, Species and Genus more perfectly the Syllogism changes from I-S-U to U-I-S, with man (human) and not this Caius or Marcus as subject and the would-be complete enumeration as mean with, say, "mortal" as predicate. This is a syllogism proving nothing, however, since Caius only gets on the list if he is already acknowledged as mortal. The major premise presupposes the conclusion. As a deduction the syllogism is "a sham", representing rather an "immediate" proposition and "inference".

So the "syllogism of Allness hands us over to the syllogism of Induction" (190, *Zus.*), the difference being that it is now formally admitted or "built in" that the list is never complete. The conclusion here is S-I-U in form rather than U-I-S. The "disparity... between universality and an immediate and empirical individuality" betrays reliance upon **Analogy** (190), such that the future is (or will be?) like the past. We have, that is, as

¹¹ Cf. J. Derrida, "Speech and Writing according to Hegel: Introduction to Hegel's semiology" in *G.W.F. Hegel, Critical Assessments*, ed. Robert Stern, Routledge 1993 (from *Margins of Philosophy*, 1972, Engl., U. of Chicago, 1982).

middle term an individual, now understood relatively, or as potentially universal, as in this way we run through the three figures.

We are thus hardly protected from reasoning that, say, the moon is (probably) inhabited due to analogies with earth, i.e. from the gambler's fallacy. Hegel refers here to the Aristotelian "instinct of reason", thinking no doubt of *Posterior Analytics* II 19, where fleeing soldiers stopping to form a battle-line, i.e. they simply take form as "forming up", represent "the universal coming to rest in the soul"¹². This, though, is not by instinct so much as by the intellectual quasi-virtue or power of *epagoge*, at once induction and abstraction since it can even be performed upon just one instance, rather than occurring essentially through enumeration, as in Hume. Thus, however, it falls under analogy, e.g. of moon with earth, which just thereby might seem to lose its taint of probabilistic gamble, if we but could avoid "frivolous play" with "empty" analogies, says Hegel. Analogy "may be superficial or it may be thorough" (cf. 190, *Zus.*).

For Hegel, anyhow, it is a matter of dialectical progression to the Syllogism of Necessity. Analogy (190), after all, is rational instinct of discovery of the object in question's "inner nature", be it superficial or thorough. Thoroughness, of course, refers to the will to exclude gaps and leaps or guesses in thinking, thus contradicting or working to suppress instinct. But then it is not an instinct of reason as premised, such as Aristotle describes.

The Syllogism of Necessity is divided, just as was the Judgment of Necessity, into **Categorical**, **Hypothetical** and **Disjunctive** syllogism. In general the distinctions contained i Syllogism, the differences, here "work out their own abolition and destroy the notion's outwardness to its own self". In this destruction or, rather, supersession of syllogism in its final disjunctive form, where in fact each individual disjunct is "one and the same universal" or individual indifferently, the transition of the Subjective Notion to the Object, from which it will pass to the Idea and final Absolute, is completed. From this Absolute then Nature and Nature reconciled as Mind, outward as inward, extensional as intensional, will be seen to follow.

Hegel now summarises (192). Reasoning is not part, finally, of the Reason, the Notion, surpassing and absorbing both Judgment and Syllogism as having no "fixity" of their own (35, *Zus.*). Yet the forms of thought

examine themselves: in their own action they must determine their limits, and point out their defects. This is that action of thought, which will

¹² Aristotle, 99b15-100b17.

hereafter be specially considered under the name of Dialectic, and regarding which we need only at the outset observe that, instead of being brought to bear upon the categories from without, it is immanent in their own action. (41, *Zus.*)

The Notion is not really End, which is a finite conception. Its "action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created" and even of Time. "Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude." Truth "makes itself its own result".

Hegel summarises (192), again, that

The general result... has been to show that these differences work out their own abolition and destroy the notion's outwardness to its own self. And as we see, in the first place (1) each of the dynamic elements has proved itself the systematic whole of these elements, in short a whole syllogism, - they are consequently identical. In the second place, (2) the negation of their distinctions and of the mediation of one through another constitutes independency: so that it is one and the same universal which is in these forms, and which is in this way also explicitly put as their identity.

Being, again, "has no parts". The All of the Notion consists in its being all, explicitly as Hegel puts it. Conversely, every possible idea is within this All in identity with it or, so to say, incompositely. As Herbert McCabe put this a few years ago¹³, what points to the infinite Being or God, as Absolute, is not some specific character of the world but there being a world at all.

The "syllogistic process" couples the subject "with itself", but as seeing that it is so coupled it mediates without mediating, since there is nothing to mediate, the "characters through which its course runs" being negated. Subjectivity and objectivity, again, are certainly thoughts. But subjectivity "as dialectical, breaks through its own barriers and opens out into objectivity by means of the syllogism" (192, *Zus.*).

This "realisation" of the notion, - a realisation in which the universal is this one totality withdrawn back into itself (of which the different members are no less the whole, and) which has given itself a character of "immediate" unity by merging the mediation: - this realisation of the notion is the Object (193, cf. 160, 161).

¹³ In a series of articles on "God", published in *New Blackfriars*.

It is ●bject precisely as realisation, as realised from and yet within subjectivity itself, as "something independent, concrete and self-complete" (193). At present it is "immediate object and nothing more, just as the notion is not describable as subject, previous to the subsequent contrast with objectivity". Similarly Being, at the beginning of the dialectic, was nothing but immediate Beginning.

...the ●bject in general is the ●ne total, in itself still unspecified, the ●bjective World as a whole, God, the Absolute, ●bject.

Here we leave the Syllogism (and the Subjective Notion) behind.

XXIV

THE OBJECT

With the self-cancellation of the syllogism the Notion is "realised" as **Object** for us in our, in my, all-encompassing subjectivity. Its analogy is the emergence, the e-mergence, of Existence, ex-istence, in the Doctrine of Essence (122-123). Such existence has necessarily and intrinsically a Ground, which is not yet Cause, i.e. there is always a why-question and, presupposed to the question, a why-answer, this also cancelling itself out in infinite and therefore senseless regress, i.e. there is ultimately no Ground and no explanation either. Everything is known, rather, *in* knowing itself, as is implied whenever we speak of God as known in or, still more, as "founding", mind or as "form of forms". It is "our job" see that we be raised to this level, what Hegel calls, when using that phrase, the war we must ever wage against the finite or "natural", a war he thinks, to avoid misunderstanding here, misconceived in "monkish" asceticism. The natural appetites are most rationally treated and hence best overcome, he clearly states, in and by giving them their due and thus ridding oneself of their clamour. This is but one instance of the absorption of the practical and hence everyday into the theoretical philosophical or, it would follow, worshipful or ascetic, in the Absolute in fact, just how Aquinas characterises the *vita contemplativa* in relation to "active virtue", the latter not having place there. King Saul, to cite a Biblical analogue, thus sinned in having care for the defeated enemies' finite goods (and so incidentally sparing some of their lives) in a way preventing him from destroying totally that enemy, including the women and children. So it is said to "the daughter of Babylon", whether qualified as destructive or as already destroyed (depending on translation), "wasted with misery" in the old translation, "Blessed shall he be that taketh thy children and dasheth them against the stones" (*Psalms* 137). Philosophy is in its own way every bit as radical and more so, as instanced in Hegel's own treatment of Good and Evil, which thus cancel themselves, as described in *The Phenomenology of Mind* VII., towards the greater good of Absolute Knowledge, as in that book's following Chapter VIII. which he, himself a Biblical devotee of

"the necessary picture idea", relates to the *Genesis* account of sin, at *Enc.* 24 *Zus.*(3)), or to the "blessedness" later mentioned (*Enc.* 159), to say no more on this and related issues just here and now while we consider, in absolute obedience to the Notion, the Object, having left Syllogism behind in the shadows. Let this serve, meanwhile, in critique of Hamah Arendt's anti-philosophical notion of an "absolute evil" (in her otherwise excellent *Origins of Totalitarianism*).

But as emerging thus the Object is the Notion as outside of itself, and so "only potentially" Notion (195), like, thus far, the syllogistic middle term or, earlier, the copula. Yet it, here, is not, of course, the Object as anything other but the Object as such, only. Individual, Particular, Universal, all have lost their specifying character. As Hegel says, the object disintegrates from within. It might be anything and everything from the point of specification. It is thus far totally different. It "falls into pieces" as "itself still unspecified" (193). Its point is to give us, to yield, a world, any world. From this world, any world, the mere fact of there being a world, again (see our previous chapter, the note on McCabe) one proceeds, as, similarly, from the "pure Being" of the Beginning, to the Absolute Idea, to Thought thinking itself and only itself in the infinite sea of Possibility which is Necessity. Here error is reconciled with Truth as being, *qua* finite, the only way to it, in Dialectical Method which is the Notion (237). Thus the or a world is not so much caused by the Absolute Idea as it is an imperfect categorial aspect, as Object, namely, under which this Idea is momentarily, within the march of the dialectic, viewed. As finite it is false, illusory.

Here can be seen the essential place of **Mechanism** as occurring just here in the progression, the process or procession rather, also called emanation, as the *exitus* presupposed to *reditus*. Mechanism, considered "formally", means external connection, or a "unity of differents" (195). The object, as indifferent (to its "pieces", which are yet not parts), "is a composite, an aggregate", a world, in short. The object, which is also the objects, plural, are, as independent, hard and resist one another. This dialectical hardness is routinely mistaken for "matter", though it has been shown earlier, in Essence, that there is and can be no such "thing" as we thus imagine. Given these "external" relations, which are yet in essence subjectively conceived, we have to do, therefore, with formal mechanism and not with a merely material-ist "mechanism". It is an essential stage, a finite moment, in dialectical thinking. It refers, as such, to everything "external to sense, conception, thought" (195), all "meaningless sequence", a situation lying ready-made in the separate and discrete words of

Language, as usage and praxis, their abstract existence as such, at least as represented "in writing or print"¹:

Instead of, 'The complex sign "aRb" says that a stands to b in the relation R', we ought to put, 'That "a" stands to "b" in a certain relation says that aRb. (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 3.1432)

It, mechanism, is exhibited too in all action "extraneous" to self, all viewing of the soul, of consciousness, "as a mere group of forces and faculties, subsisting independently side by side" (195, *Zus.*).

Mechanism is also evinced in all literal inter-subjectivity, as in all pairing of individual with abstract Centrality, whereas there is only one Centre and this is not abstract since it is individual in the true sense of universal. "The principle of personality is universality", the reverse also holding. "I and my Father are one". "I am that." Self is other than self or, so to say, transcends itself and all selves, both as concept and, just therefore, in reality (*Wirklichkeit*). Hegel refers us to the "perfect contradiction" of Leibniz's philosophy (194):

So conceived the object itself has direction and reference towards the external. But this external object is similarly central in itself, and being so, is no less referred towards the other centre; so that it no less has its centrality in the other. (196)

Mechanism, that is, embraces Affinity, such that we might be said, in flagrant self-contradiction, to "beget one another", i.e. not as in traditional theology where the Father alone is said to beget the Son, in keeping with this very analogy. Cause, after all, has already been superseded in the Dialectic, back in Essence. What, anyhow, would be abstractly or entirely other, other as such, could have no such affinity.

Hegel here refers us back to Syllogism, identifying absolute centre and relative centre(s). Absolute centrality includes all, is not offset against any putative element, since this would be in essence merely relative, a "manner of speaking" indeed. The state, which we encounter daily and within which alone we live, corresponds to this. It is, that is to say, a "system of three syllogisms". (1) The person as such is "coupled" (he should say

¹ Wittgenstein seems here to agree with Hegel in giving priority to spoken language, not as such implying the separation of words where each word aspires to be only itself. Compare the praxis of Zen, e.g. in the recommendation, nonetheless proposed, to the hearer, as notion: "Have a cup of tea". There is no "second intention" here, all such conceptual science being left behind, "ungratefully", once the right point is reached. But it would be folly to try to "start" from there.

"identified") with the universal. (2) Individual "will or action... is the intermediating force which procures" satisfaction of needs and "actualisation" of life. 3) The universal, "state, government and law", is the "permanent, underlying mean in which the individuals and their satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, inter-mediation and persistence" (198, cf. 181: "Everything is a syllogism"). It is natural to the individual to be "born into a state", Aquinas had said, as against contractualist and similar theories making the state extrinsic to us.² Yet the conception here, like that of the state (or solar system) as such, remains mechanist, a system of external relations, external, that is, to the elements (substances) involved.

It can be seen, also, that dualities of created and uncreated spirit, "myself and God" (Newman), have not broken free of such Mechanism, at least in their continued use of such expressions. Eckhart broke free of it in breaking these expressions themselves in his very use of them, i.e. not breaking with them. "The eye with which I see God is the eye with which God sees me." We can wonder, therefore, concerning the ultimate destiny of language in this dialectic of Thought. This must eventually, therefore, treat of language and semiotic as a "partial" element or moment within it, and this we find later on (e.g. 448-450).

So **Object** is *Gegen-stand*, **Ob-ject**, thrown towards, against, in front of the Subject. As standing over against us or me or thrown (*iactum*) it is precisely subjective though not yet subject. Hence it is object, relational to the subject, externally, as is explicit in Mechanism. Mechanism here, again, is not merely the crassest mechanism all can recognise but a clinging habit of thought upon which language itself is further developed, as we have seen when considering judgment and its falsity and indeed the subjective notion as a whole. This just means the words we use, interior or exterior. "The limits of my language are the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein, *op. cit.*). Language, however, as this judgment itself shows, can consider its own surpassing, is hence self-surpassing, as indeed is self itself, and so is not confined. Language itself gives us only an objectual world, not the Idea. It is discrete. There is, all the same, on account of this

² Behind Aquinas, of course, lies the tension of the two cities of Augustine, yet the latter's chosen title, *Civitas Dei*, implies that there is ultimately, i.e. notionally, one city or state, where each is in all and all in each, where the individual is the universal, or "all things to all men". This is not so much ethical as parousial or eschatological. This coming last (*eschaton*), however, is seen as such, by Hegel's time, if not in essence always, as away and beyond time altogether as cancelling it, time, as unthinkable. The Judgment, consequently, is what men actually do here and now (cf. *John*, 3.19). Like the syllogism, it is not ultimately a form of words. So much for "the linguistic idiom of our time" (Peter Geach's phrase).

self-surpassing power, nothing that "cannot be said" or that "we cannot speak about", as against the constrained silence with which the *Tractatus* breaks off rather than concludes.

Thus for Spirit there is a sign to be found for everything as projecting it without since, as has been established, without and within are the same and not merely reciprocal even. To project, then, is to bend back upon or re-reflect self, endlessly. What "cannot be said" cannot be, is no *Ding-an-sich*, least of all as last putative refuge of Substance. For nothing, but nothing, is just "itself and not another thing". This has been dialectically demonstrated.

So when Hegel includes just here a discussion of Anselm's ("in whom the notable suggestion of this proof first occurs") Ontological Argument for God's ex-istence then it is plain that God *thus viewed* is an instance of the Absolute viewed as Object and so finite. This, though, is thus far anything equally, such as a world. Or we may, indeed should say, that God, if thus demonstrated, would have himself to be world, to be everything objectively, everything except, inasmuch as set over against, objected towards, me as subject, as myself then sub-jected and so, impossibly, *ipso facto* objectified. The infinite cannot be "thus set over against" anything, therefore, has to be closer than close, universally or without exception. The traditional picture of God's enemy is thus of one not knowing this, culpably or not (that is not the question here).

Indeed Hegel charges Anselm's argument with this very fault, falling short of the Notion as it does. This accounts too for our instinctive distrust of this argument as if a trick is being played, even if we ourselves should embrace it. This is indeed the wilful crassness of all cataphatic "religious" proclamation, the *creo quia absurdum* it ultimately demands. "This is he". But this can be said right across the board as being the very principle of personality. Again, if there is "one closer to me than I am to myself" (Augustine) then must this not be true of him, of that "one", that self, too. Such a "one" must be of quite a different order altogether, "neither one nor many". Thus far, indeed, it corresponds to the Object which "falls to pieces" as "the one total, itself still unspecified" (193), which is only "compared with being, existence and actuality". All these, though, are "only abstract aspects" of the Notion, "imperfectly realised". Still, the Object takes us a step further, as unity of ground and actuality, not an "essence-bred" universal causality in the abstract merely. As succeeding to the "real distinctions" of such abstract thought it is made up, so to say, of aspectual totalities, whether bank-clerk or hippopotami (or Job's or Hobbes' Leviathan, though I refer to the Victorian logician Lewis Carroll's clearly meta-logical poem) indifferently. The specific "characteristics or

categories" are not merely implied. Object as Object is any and every possibility as actual and necessary, a world. Yet the aim here is more than to show "indissoluble connexion between the notion or thought and being", viz. anything possible, real though this is. Being remains "a meagre category" merely, the variable rather its "value" as, *qua* variable, as *x*, lacking (a) value.. For indeed any world as thus far proposed might equally well unravel, the possibilities cancelling one another out, so that this would then be the universality which is indeed personality, "free among the dead", so to say, or amid a universe without grain. Even this line of thought, however, would share in Hegel's general strategy of out-flanking scepticism. For just as we make no judgments in ultimate reality so the persons or whatever we are, "distinctions found within nature", "articulated groups of spirits" maybe, as Hegel himself suggests in the *Phenomenology of Mind* (Baillie, p.452), out-flank discursive thought completely in their perception and infinitely regressing perception of their perception of one another ("determining correspondence"). This McTaggart dared to call Love as furthest outcome of Absolute Knowledge and Will.³ For this, however, he could have found more precedent in Hegel than he admitted, offering it, as he did, as an account of what is ultimately going on now, in a parousial present, so to say.

We cannot but speak of "meagre" being, all the same, as opening upon a possible and therefore conceivable, hence conceived, transition away from its containment in the Notion "into a form which is different from the character as it belongs to the notion and appears to it". Indeed with the Notion in itself, which we have not yet reached, the "remote abstraction of being, or even of objectivity, has as yet nothing to do". This is what "mars" the Ontological Argument when purporting to be anything more than a dialectical step in isolation, presupposing unity of Object and Notion, in "proving" such an "object", called God, always the other over against. This "expresses the point of view taken by superstition and slavish fear" (194, *Zus.*). "No doubt God is the Object... out and out" (194, *Zus.*), all the same, with which though, as the aim of philosophy, as of religion and art, we should "come to feel ourselves at one", overcoming "the antithesis of subjective and objective", "learning to know God as our true and essential self". This may or may not support rejection of God-language as antecedently compromised rather than open to such a development, as McTaggart would have preferred the former to the path

³ So here McTaggart yields nothing to Thomas Gilby's "The Dialectic of Love in the *Summa*" (Appendix 2 to the volume of the Blackfriars *Summa theologiae* cited above) but rather fulfils it as less abstractly stated. The "atheism" hardly signifies once the antithesis of Self and Other has been synthesised.

Hegel takes. Thus McTaggart as it were abstracts the aim of surpassing theology from that of its fulfilment or accomplishment. This one might, in generous mood, regard as a distinction without a difference, however. This latter, however, *viz.* accomplishment, is Hegel's project of reconciliation, of "breaking down the wall of separation", of making himself "all things to all men". The Pauline analogy is exact, though the situation is different, and Hegel, the former theology student, surely knew and was conscious of this.

In speaking of the unity presupposed to Anselm's argument as one of subject and object Hegel really assimilates it to the superficially quite different argument of Descartes' Third Meditation (as distinct from the presentation of this argument in the Fifth). Here it is argued from the objective existence of the idea of infinite perfection in at least one person's consciousness to its more perfect Cause in universal reality, i.e. as not just another idea. Here subjective content is objectified. The argument, that is, seems to imply the very contradiction of Idealism, making object of subject. Hegel's gloss upon Descartes, thinking of philosophy's history now, is to reverse or invert this, disclosing it as two-way or reciprocal. So here it is as "supreme perfection" that this unity, this explicit identity appears. The subject is the only object and *vice versa*. The world is the-world-as-known-by-me, i.e. object, but object merely, my object, myself object-ed, *Gegen-stand*, as in a mirror, monad "containing", one with, rather, all monads.

Unlike Anselm, or Descartes, Hegel is not restricting himself "to the question whether a certain content was in our thinking only", a dilemma he rejects in many places as unmeaning, as a misunderstanding, of or by the Understanding specifically. "He is not here he is risen" he quotes with this intention, as against a "realist" apprehension of religious truth. It is seeking the living among the dead, the either/or of the letter, the unspiritual literalness, that kills, that gives no life. Here again he outflanks scepticism *via* the very text of Scripture, near enough, indeed though by developing its hidden or deep-lying meaning, philosophically, that is to say. "The same unity received a more objective expression in Descartes, Spinoza and others" (193). For Hegel, we may note here, the modern advance upon the medieval is unquestioned, much as he may revere Aristotle and reserve himself against Kant, whom, while harshly criticising, he nonetheless completes, taking over Kant's idea of a *critique* of the Understanding (*Verstand*) particularly in the name of Reason (*Vernunft*). His philosophical system itself requires this advance, as probability requires the eventual throwing of a six, or of five sixes.

The **Object** is something that has to be, outside, over against. This is the connection with the **Ontological Argument**, of whatever stripe. Thus, too, **Objectivity** was introduced in the preliminary chapter to the *Encyclopaedia*, followed immediately by discussion of successive attitudes of thought "to **Objectivity**" specifically, in which the forms of Logic themselves, it is laid down, must eminently participate, eventually at least, as they do in Hegel, we have seen.

Here Hegel remarks disparagingly upon Kant's comparison of God with a hundred dollars in his pocket, as if both items were necessarily related to (their) existence in an identical way. For the argument works, or is intended thus to "work", specifically for Infinity only, such that infinity, once conceived, cannot but be, cannot but, so to say, transposing the Hegelian term, "go forth", exit, as Reality. We see already though that the Anselmian (it is also thus far Thomist) equation of Reality with Being and, more specifically (but less Thomistically), Existence, both in some sense superseded categories, is questionable. **Or**, we need not thus "literally" interpret Anselm and Aquinas. Aquinas in fact rejected viewing this argument as a (valid) *proof*, specifically, agreeing with Hegel that the "unity enunciated", of being and essence, is "presupposed" (193) to the premises and thus remains potential merely.

Someone hearing the word "God" may very well not understand it to mean "that than which nothing greater can be thought", indeed, some people have believed God to be a body. And even if the meaning of the word "God" were generally recognised to be "that than which nothing greater can be thought", nothing thus defined would thereby be granted existence in the world of fact, but merely as thought about. Unless one is given that something in fact exists than which nothing greater can be thought - and this nobody denying the existence of God would grant - the conclusion that God in fact exists does not follow.⁴

Aquinas also says that we know nothing of the manner of being of God, *sc.* of ultimate Truth or Reality. We only know that whatever it is it is one with the essence. This may be viewed as a manner of excluding the question, of God's ex-istence, as itself a literal "category mistake".⁵ Whether this is to "exclude" God as such we might leave open. It certainly does not exclude "the Absolute Idea" as envisaged by Hegel. The question

⁴ Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia, 2 ad 2, tr. T. Gilby, O.P., Blackfriars, Cambridge, 1969 (Image edn., New York 1969, Vol. 1, p.65). In translating I would myself prefer the word "is" or "being", as better corresponding to *est* and *esse* than does "exists" and "existence"

⁵ Cf. G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, London, Hutchinson, 1949.

of "exclusion" might itself be a category mistake, now in a meta-sense, and in this sense Hegel rejoins Anselm (as does also Aquinas in his way), saying we "put on airs" if we attack this argument "latent" in all minds and recurring willy-nilly. Thus we might dub Hegel's own philosophy out-and-out Anselmian, as when he says, in seeming scandalousness, that the factual is normative, is the norm, that, in effect, *omne ens est verum* (Aquinas), every being is true.⁶ The "natural law" doctrine will be found to concur in this.

Conversely, in line with this, "the finite is such a conception and in such a way subjective, that it does not involve existence" and ultimately does not exist on its own but in the Infinite as "overlapped" by it. This, though, may be at once used to oppose the Infinite, as J.-P. Sartre said that either God exists or man does, "and this was the very answer given to Anselm long ago" (Hegel), by Gaunilo. This identity of supreme perfection and true knowledge, which shows what a God would have to be (the potentiality of the "subjective" concept of God) "may be at once met and opposed by their diversity".

So it is and it isn't. "If A is, B is", but only if. The objections, this whole antithesis itself indeed, "are got over, only by showing the finite to be untruth and these categories in their separation to be inadequate and null". Note these words, "and null". They could not be stronger. They mark Hegel's project and method as out-flanking, again, the deepest scepticism on its own ground.

In fact the attainment of the Object is at once the negation of all difference, to which the Object, as being Object and nothing else, is indifferent. The programme through (formal) mechanism to the Idea as Notion (213) is implicit here, as is the critique of language and of judgment, the "letter" ever set to kill. So it must, like the spiritual things ultimately spoken of, be "understood spiritually", that is to say in defiance of the letter, of the material pull of language, intrinsically out to "bewitch" intelligence, in Wittgenstein's phrase.

⁶ See my "The *bonum honestum* and the Lack of Moral Motive in Aquinas's Ethical Theory", *The Downside Review*, April 2000, pp. 85-111. For Aquinas morality or the virtues are only identified as the honourable good by a certain conventional displacement, as in fact only leading to or needed for identification (union) with God who is the Absolute and therefore the only truly Good and honourable both. Should wickedness lead to God it would at once become good, since wickedness is in fact defined as that which leads away from this supreme target (*hamartia*). This is the background to Hegel's hard words about "conscience", when abstracted from this context. On Good and Evil, consult *Enc.* 35 *Zus.*, along of course with ch. VIIc of *The Phenomenology of Mind*. For the rest, *malum est semper in subiecto*, Aquinas points out, i.e. *in subiecto bono*.

But this suggestion, that "objective" reality "has no grain" or is prior to specification, as, differently, was matter (in Essence), itself reflects back upon the enterprise of reading and/or interpreting Hegel. It is quite literally nothing other than what we make of it, as necessity is all possibility, is Freedom, as Volition transcends "cognition proper" within Cognition as a whole, succeeding to (subjective) Notion and to Object in ordered progression to Absolute Idea or Notion as such. "I will be what I will be", said God to Moses, on one translation at least. In this way too philosophy shows it is not a science as the others but includes them all. The eye with which Eckhart saw God, if he but could, was obviously, in light of his whole reciprocal phrase, not a passive beholding merely. His intent was specifically to deny or surpass saying that he sees God only *because* God sees him. He was thus deconstructing or transcending the language he deigned to use, like his master Jesus, though here too master and servant are categories quickly put by implicitly (explicitly in *The Phenomenology of Mind*).

This unity, this reconciliation, of absolute perfection and true knowledge or identity into which both "spontaneously" pass over (193) is *ipso facto* the identification of and therefore going beyond the dilemma of theory and practice. They are the same, theory is a praxis, the highest (*sic* Aristotle), and praxis is theory. This is the truth behind the crudities, the mechanism, of "ideology", from which philosophy can never get free as long as it remains within the orbit of words, of "letters", of literality, the ever implicit paradigm, the undug "Ground". What is pre-supposed here, as what finally we arrive at, is the impossibility of the contingency of Consciousness, of Self. This denies also its particularity, and here lies the superior scientific quality of philosophy as Wisdom, as sapiential, "justified of her children".

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Reason is divine and therefore law. This was the ancient argument of Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and others for what was later called natural law, the law, namely, upon which any positive human legislation was founded and its validity or bindingness guaranteed. Such law, therefore, as reason itself, was a dictate of intellect rather than of "will". For reason, *nous*, was not merely like, as parallelling, the divine, as the more "mechanist" language of Scripture suggests when saying that "man" is made in the "image and likeness" of God, transcendently unique. The sacred or Mosaic writer sees, however, that "likeness" is too weak, and so strengthens his term with "image". For what is merely like is different, a kind of corpse

(*Leiche*) or memory of the original. Thus, sure enough, the theology of the image is developed in later Scripture, often through the medium of Greek, to an identity (*Letter to the Colossians*) and more. The image, identified in the first place with Jesus, is the very refulgence or sheen (shine) of divinity, in a man who is divinity's "Word". This is not merely the Word which divinity, the one God of the Jews, spoke. It is the Word which names and is God, God as Word, as *logos*, as reason. Confined, again, to this "mechanism" of extrinsic relation, which is the natural or first mode of linguistic utterance, manipulating a number of names, each of which is itself and yet another, Scripture nonetheless supplements. We read how we, beholding this Word, are "changed from glory into glory". We, again, are the "Body of Christ". We are his actual members and even, though thereby, "members one of another", i.e. not members at all but as standing each for all and all for each, the fundamental, so to say ethical principle of substitution and mutuality, so that each, standing alone, is at once end and nothing, here "revealed". The life and death of Christ is thus made into an extrinsic efficient cause of divinisation or salvation, happiness, for all, though how such a *causality* might function remains a mystery⁷. We might say that the end result could only ever be understood through presentation, by chance or design, in an individual concrete life of sufficient simplicity and directness, through which it might be generalised, through which it might be first understood that "the individual is the universal". This is also made explicit in the life of Buddha and those who follow. Here, however, it is first set forth as a philosophy, to which Christian theology corresponds, without any invocation of an efficient causality. Rather, one man shows the way, not as come "from above" so much as bearing divinity immanently, whether or not needing "enlightenment". Nonetheless, in Buddhism as in the parent Hinduism one finds the same images of miraculous births, especial graces and so on. It is natural to man to pray, to beg, whether he pray to the self of his self, absolutely intimate, or to the absolutely other, two opposites which in Hegel's philosophy are shown to be one. The most transcendent is the absolutely immanent, since it is infinite, i.e. *is* infinitely (as also Hegel says of the Absolute Idea, at the end of the Greater Logic, that it is the true Being, *erfülltes Sein*, and thus finds no end, boundary or limit).

The Word of Reason is itself Reason, standing for itself in absolute "supposition". Therefore, Hegel says, consistently, that we as reasoning beings, or, if this cannot be assumed, as reasoning, should be "laying aside

⁷ Cf. Philip L. Reynolds, "Philosophy as the Handmaid of Theology: Aquinas on Christ's Causality", in *Contemplating Aquinas: on the Varieties of Interpretation* (ed. F. Kerr), Notre Dame, Indiana, 2003, pp.217-247.

our immediate subjectivity (putting off the old Adam) and learning to know God as our true and essential self" (194, *Zus.*). Just in this process, however, we cast off the mode of dogmatic assertion he detects in Spinoza and Schelling (229, *Zus.*), as going beyond it to where thought is as such individual and, just as such, supra-universal, as in the common notion of God. "The individual is the universal".

McTaggart, perhaps Hegel's closest historical follower philosophically, is aware of these perspectives when he outlines the final reality as a communion of persons or universal individuals, beyond all possibility of making any finite judgments whatever, for spoken or "subjectively" conceived judgment (*verbum cordis*) is imposition of finitude as such. Yet that state, one of "pure perception" therefore, the final Ground where the questing spade buckles or "tums" (cf. Wittgenstein: *On Certainty*), is itself a judgment, is judgment, syllogism and notion. Only thus is each of those persons necessary to the whole (Kingdom of Ends), as our praxis requires as it requires, too, that this be not merely postulated. We reach it in strict dialectic. The whole, that is, this totality, is equally necessary to each. This is the requirement of reason.⁸

In fact the whole upshot of (this trajectory of) thinking is to confirm the dignity (*praxis*) and absoluteness (*theoria*, these two are one) of itself, of thinking. This amounts to a scepticism surpassing all else, even, for McTaggart especially, God as a form of expression, of naming, not finally freed from the finitude of the Understanding. It reveals, that is, the true meaning of the historical scepticism. For McTaggart, for example, immortality (in both directions) follows from the postulate of the reasonableness of the world, which Reason, as there found, cannot but make. He thus concurs implicitly with the Buddhist tag, "No birth no death". These names, birth, death, are as finite as the name "God", as having finite and therefore false implications, of an impossible personal contingency, for example. Instead of viewing God as originator of Reason at one remove we should understand their absolute identity, viz. that of God and Reason, in the Absolute, i.e. in absoluteness.⁹ Reason originates

⁸ Cf. J.M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*, CUP Cambridge, 1901, ch. 2.

⁹ Hegel does not, however, make God a transient category (like existence) of the dialectic on the way to the Absolute Idea. Therefore persons or groups so wishing may use this name, suitably freed from finite or figurative accretion, as shorthand or even as final name for the Absolute Idea, as does Hegel himself repeatedly. Viewed thus, "God" names the conceptual point of the transition by absorption of religion into philosophy, rather as Absolute Beauty, once known (and none other but itself, rather than its moments, deserves this name), names the transition,

itself and has to (necessity), since it is, and has been found here to be, Freedom. It has to do this, does it in perpetuity (*causa sui*, i.e. no cause). It is rationality, of the world, of existence, having immortality for exigence and here, as in the old drinking of the waters of Lethe, personal identity is simply not the issue. I do not even now have this personal identity as thus exclusively envisaged. I am rather identical with all as all with me. Thus in all notable experience one is "taken out of oneself". Conversely, as a Chinese proverb has it, "the man who looks at himself does not shine", is not, that is to say, revealed in his essence. The soul, says Aquinas, is known only in its knowing of other things, or persons, as we might reasonably supplement.

without forsaking Art, from Art to Religion, itself "already" thus Philosophy, however. It is a case of *alpha* and *omega*, beginning and end together, the Concept returning to what it never leaves. Anything else, one might wish to say, is insensate Philistinism, though one may keep the inherited trappings of gentlemanliness for a while. None of this, though, forbids assumption of the name "atheist" to mark departure from some finite fixation. For the wise, *de nominibus non est disputandum*. On the question whether this Eckhartian Hegelian view of God has the same object as does that of orthodox believers, as does orthodoxy, the question of doctrinal development, for which Hegel's logical system, the identity of "first philosophy" and *theologia*, as in Aristotle, gives the rationale, is crucial. "Whom therefore you worship in ignorance, him declare I unto you". The Apostle's word from Athens was thus later energised from Berlin, of all places, whence it will and has required further development as word specifically, as in Newman's famous essay of 1845, developing the idea rather of development itself while or through, as is his method, instantiating previous developments. Yet all the roads leading to Athens, or Rome, or anywhere, are what they lead to, place itself giving place to method, to use Hegel's term! This is a case of the centre at the circumference, of the Idea or of Mind, understood as ontology.

XXV

MECHANISM

We are treating of the ●bject under what Hegel in GL, the Greater Logic, calls Subjective Logic. ●bjective Logic had comprised the Doctrines (*Lehren*) of Being and Essence. Thus now within Subjective Logic one has, first, Subjectivity (EL's "subjective notion" as notion, judgment and syllogism), second, ●bjectivity (EL's "The ●bject", Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology), then, finally, in both texts, the Idea. Yet in GL slight variations of textual size in this title suggest a certain ordering still under the previous second section of Subjectivity, viz. ●bjectivity. At any rate the Idea, in GL, is not the ●bject, since it transcends it and leaves it behind, comprising Life, Cognition (crowned by Volition) and Idea Absolute, which is also or supremely, rather, absolute subjectivity.

Hence "the object in its immediacy" cannot but be "the notion only potentially". Really "the notion as subjective is primarily outside" the object, "its specific character is imposed from without" (195, Hegel here naming transcendence). Yet the object too gets "all its specific character from without", the mechanist *sense*, to be outlined here, fusing notions of transcendence and its immediate opposite, ineluctable finitude. That is, the system of "parts outside parts", i.e. the world (nature thus viewed), equivalently language and its limits, according to Wittgenstein, for example, is transcended as Being finally (i.e. systematically finally) transcends Nothing in as it were forgetting it, since nothing, "a shadow's shadow", thus nothings itself (compare Heidegger's *Das Nichts nichtet*). It is projected as being, which, as most perfect, though *qua* being only, has to be thus "externally" or "objectively", but only for a season, for this dialectical moment. The Notion, again, "is primarily outside it", this, *per impossibile*, absolute otherness which is objectivity.

The ●bject is immediate being, because insensible to difference, which in it has suspended itself. It ... is equally indifferent to its immediate unity. It thus breaks up into distinct parts. Each of which is itself the totality. Hence the ●bject is the absolute contradiction between the complete independence

of the multiplicity, and the equally complete independence of the different pieces. (194)

The one are the many, the many the one. This is “the philosophy of Leibniz” which, insofar as he stops here, “represents contradiction in its complete development”. Hegel here cites Fichte’s criticism of those who regarding “the Absolute or God as the Object” similarly “stop” there, at this logical moment.

No doubt God is the Object, and, indeed, the Object out and out, confronted with which our particular or subjective opinions and desires have no truth and no validity. As absolute object, however, God does not therefore take up the position of a dark and hostile power over against subjectivity. He rather involves it in Himself. Such also is the meaning of the Christian doctrine, according to which God has willed that all men should be saved and all attain blessedness. The salvation and blessedness of men are attained when they come to feel themselves at one with God, so that God, on the other hand, ceases to be for them mere object ... But God in the Christian religion is also (i.e. as well as being the Object) known as Love, because in His Son, who is one with Him, he has revealed Himself to men as a man amongst men and thereby redeemed them. All which is only another way of saying that the antithesis of subjective and objective is implicitly overcome, and that it is our affair to participate in this redemption by laying aside our immediate subjectivity (putting off the old Adam), and learning to know God as our true and essential self ... so science too and philosophy have no other task than to overcome this antithesis in the medium of thought ... to trace the objective world back to the notion, - to our innermost self. (194, *Zus.*)

Hence, we “may learn from the present discussion the mistake of regarding the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity as a permanent one”, or of *stopping there*, again. The parts are outside the Object, the Object outside the Notion, however, not as being different from but in an identity with it. Nature, along with its contingencies, is and has to be necessary just as it is. That is, the Object is precisely and exactly (like anything else in or outside of this science of logic) a moment of the eternal and necessary, of Necessity itself, that is to say, of the Notion, adding nothing to it. It has no particular character except as entirely absorbed in rational necessity seen, under Idealism, as metaphysical.

This is what explains the category of **Centrality**, while implicit here too, as it were incidentally, is the Necessity of Nature’s being exactly as it is, as eternally suspended from the free volition of. or which is, indeed, the Notion, not, in all logic, subservient to antecedent modalities or formalities. Such is thought, not to be carved up as some have pretended to

carve up Hegel's thought, going on from that pseudo-anatomy to attribute dishonesty to him, rather than face up to it in themselves, despite his explicit and consciously Aristotelian disavowal of the mathematical or quantitative approach as omni-competent. There are, Hegel will later say here, three identical and hence, all three, formal elements forming three syllogisms among themselves. These are the Central Body, the relative Centre(s) and the **Neutral** mean or **Object**, "latent in the two extremes" (196, cp. 201). The **Object** as such, in its necessary conceptuality, is Nature simply, i.e. neither "core" nor "rind". The world, just as it is, is thus as necessary as Necessity itself. That is what is being said. It is necessity of contingency retained, all the same, as contingency. The "formal objects", all of them, bear "identical weight" with their "immediate central body", in which they inhere as their subject and as the "extreme of individuality" (WL II, 425), a phrase, a notion, he elsewhere applies to God as "ultimate individual", while at the same time "likening" this final logical system both to the solar system and, "in the practical sphere", to the state, again, all three being "a system of three syllogisms".

To understand it is important to note that the full presentation of the object *precedes* all reference to "the material world". Cf. WL II, p.423, which I freely translate (all parentheses added, however):

The empty manifold of the **Object** is now, firstly, gathered together in the objective individuality, in the simple self-determining middle point (he seems to be drawing, consciously or not, a clear parallel, an analogy rather, with Thales here, as what he says here and elsewhere about Water seems to confirm). Inasmuch, secondly, as the **Object as immediate totality** (and nothing else) retains its indifference against all finite particularity, so is this latter available to it also as inessential or as a mishmash (*Aussereinander*) of several objects. The first essential determination, contrariwise, is the real mean between the objects mechanically reciprocating upon one another. Through this self-determining they are, in and for themselves, welded together. This mean is their objective or objectual generality or universality. Although this universality appears at first, in its participatory relation, as only present as it is by positive decree (*Setzen*), yet it is *objectively* the immanently penetrating essence of the **Object**.

"Essence" here means the essence of the Totality as such, which, of course, can be none other than *the* Infinite, however it may be appearing to us, "groaning and travailing" and so on. Thus Mechanism, as naming its prime instance, will be found ultimately impossible, "notionless", contradicting itself, since what is here intended, differently from the Leibnizian system of monads which makes contradiction explicit (and which, we found, Hegel extensively criticises in WL here), cannot be said.

As Galen Strawson will later say, "physicalism" of itself goes over to panpsychism. It, like or as mechanism, cannot be "an absolute category" but only, says Hegel, "a general logical category" (195, *Zus.*). It only derives its *name* from physics, where it is exemplified in such models as the solar system or even those of physiology. Causality, after all, certainly a logical category in this sense, has been found equally impossible.

Although it is the notion "only potentially" or as a mere moment in our attempt to grasp or fuse with it, in a mental odyssey or love-quest (see below) beyond all being, yet this first form of the **Object**, viz. mechanism, is **Mechanism with Affinity**. Its separately defined and independent "pieces" yet combine and are even necessarily "referred" to one another, as in gravity, natural appetite or universal inclination (love) or social instinct, at the macro-level. This is a formal, indeed an **Absolute Mechanism**, different from the exclusively micro-mechanism of physics. Thus it is carried over into all forms of *discourse* equally, and not so that the more complex forms would "supervene" upon a supposedly more simple base of a-toms or "indivisibles", still less "atomic sentences". What is built upon this defective model of "formal" mechanism is discourse itself, in all its inescapably abstract discreteness, which poetry ever and hopelessly tries, by means of it, namely, to transcend or cancel. Only music (apart from or as transcending, rather, language itself) achieves this continuousness in discreteness (the separate notes of the score, should there be one), i.e. in Time, as a medium. So human sexual congress achieves forgetfulness of the physiologically discrete, of abstraction and difference, in its very affirmation, or can and should do so, as we shall find in Chemism. So "music", said Hegel's great musical contemporary, "is a greater revelation than the whole of religion and philosophy", thus sharing, on the negative side at least, in Hegel's developed notion of *revelation*, a development obstinately taken by many as a rejection of it, just as the fundamentalists, in their adherence to "the simple gospel" as they conceive it, viz. abstractly, reject all theology.

So Mechanism points as being the pointing to stability in the "want of stability" (196), the permanence of change, its necessity ever unchanged. The **Object** suffers a violence to which it is indifferent (196). It "thus breaks up into distinct parts each of which is itself the totality" (194). It is "indifferent to its immediate unity", as one may "see the world in a grain of sand" (this being the transcendence, again), see worlds within worlds *ad infinitum*.

The **Object**, though, "is implicitly invested with the character of Notion", even though as such or taken abstractly or "one-sidedly", as we noted above, lying outside it.. That is how it has arisen here, from the

collapse of syllogistic mediation. This is its "insensibility to difference" in which the Notion is (first) "realised", while the Centre, the universal, is, again, everywhere, in "immediate unity", all mediation, which is to say all language as judgment, being "merged". The absolute Centre merges with each and every relative centre in the most perfect of concrete unities, which, McTaggart derives from this, is necessarily a unity of persons and none other. This, consequently, will be the cosmology of the universe in sober truth, in which love, necessarily, the analogy of each with the other and of the Centre with all, is the cement, whatever defects we find in McTaggart's account of love, e.g. that it preserves a certain individual selectiveness in complete divorce from a possible hierarchical ranking within this unity, as if, say, the English will still, i.e. eternally, tend more to the English, the men to the women, and so on. There was a grave inner contradiction here, wiped out at every celebration of liturgy, where "where one receives, a thousand receives", or where, of anything or anyone it may truly be said: "This also is thou, neither is this thou", a saying explicitly denied by Hegel to be contradictory in the sense of un-sayable.

The Object, in negating itself (it cannot be thus thought), "closes with itself" and is then "independent", like a "thing". As central, always and everywhere, its "outwardness" is negated. It has "a negative unity with itself", viz. subjectivity. Thus only persons as a plurality can fulfil this role, since it has to issue in a final identity, such as only consciousness, as having the other as self, realises. But personality is the negation of the mechanical.

The external to which the object as central relates is thus similarly central. Each object is "similarly central in itself" and so identical. "The individual is the universal". This is the final reach of all Affinity, disclosed by Mechanism in its very difference or non-affinity specifically. Thus it is precisely what cannot be said that all speech must attempt to say, programming the ruin or supersession of language in its origin. It too is stable in its instability, since unstable in its (illusory) stability, as the whole of the Logic hitherto has been showing. Ultimately, to borrow from the necessarily figurative language of devotion (J.-P. de Caussade: *Self/Abandonment to Divine Providence*), there is "a time when God lives in the soul", simply because beyond the very "moment" which is time, and there is a time when the soul, the individual, "lives in" or is God, the universal. These two "times", though, are one in their finite contradictoriness and thus cancelled. In this way, however, as I would note here, there is a certain Janus-like quality to Hegel's dictum on Leibniz's thought, just mentioned, as "contradiction in its complete development", certainly not a self-contradictory sentence or judgment. However, he says that Leibniz's

philosophy “represents” this only, what he, Hegel, would rather set forth or expound as self-explicating truth (as he had already done in *The Phenomenology of Mind*).

Hegel declares that this situation or relationship, which “may be illustrated by gravitation, appetite, social instinct, etc.”, “forms a syllogism” (197) in the identity of all centres, relative or absolute indifferently, is, thirdly, i.e. after (1) potentiality (**Formal Mechanism**) and (2) **Affinity**, (3) **Absolute Mechanism**, hovering around its own self-cancellation before the “moment” of Chemism, “a category of objectivity which, as a rule, not particularly emphasised” (200, *Zus.*, hence not emboldened in Wallace’s translation here). One can indeed see that he is already thinking of at least intellectual relations, of affinity up to its absorption in identity, in persons as thinkers, as points of consciousness. Thus already in WL, *Zweiter Teil, 2er Abschnitt, 1 B, a* (Suhrkamp 6, p. 416), on “the Formal Mechanical Process”, he says that the form of universal identity which the Object has, which is the Object, entails its opposite or contradiction without any need for transition. This universality of the universal is mental or spiritual (*geistig*), as such the contradiction of the “material” discreteness with which we and language itself begin. *Immaterialitas*, non-materiality, Aquinas had repeated constantly, *est radix cognitionis*, is the root of cognition. This, says Hegel now, as cognition (*Die geistige Mitteilung*) or communication indifferently, is *eine ideelle Beziehung*, an “ideal” relation, i.e. here *within* (formal) mechanism. It is a clear determination of a Person specifically, *worin sich ungetr bt eine Bestimmtheit von eine Person in die andere kontinuiert und ohne alle Ver nderung sich verallgemeinert*, i.e. in one and the same *Mitteilung* or communication. A material analogy, he suggests, would be an odour or scent (*Duft*) spreading itself freely in the non-resisting atmosphere, as it were to the point of saturation (universalisation). The personality (*Pers nlichkeit*), all the same, is of an infinitely more intensive hardness (*H rte*) than *die Objekte* of materiality. Just therefore they, the persons, determine themselves freely and not as in a relational network, which universal identity (a relation “of reason” only, since unity here replaces difference or plurality, and hence relation itself) as such transcends: no mere “inter-subjectivity”. Their or its infinite hardness, so to say, forbids even this reciprocally relational connection, of itself elicits the identities of cognition, as it will later be identified as being. Thus God has no relation to us, even or especially in his own perfect knowledge of himself. Hegel relives the insights of Aquinas here as his own, in more explicitly generalised philosophical mode maybe (though Aquinas shows himself perfectly capable of this too, e.g. in his Aristotelian and other commentaries), in contradiction to the pictorial

pieties, whether positive or negative, of the Kantian and/or Jesuit traditions. The one (person), as self, cannot be distinguished from the other(s) which, *qua* self, it is. The "in" relation is often said by metonymy, but primarily spatial analogy, for this. It is, the person as I, and does not merely participate in, the whole or universal. It is, ultimately, *die formelle Totalität des Objekts überhaupt*, the Object, and not *die materielle Objekte* (plural). This then above all, or formally, makes the Object *zu einer ungehinderte Kontinüierung der Bestimmtheit des einen in den anderen* (WL, *loc. cit.*), even though, conversely, the initial show of discreteness, of "objects", also takes on this character, *Bestimmtheit*, under dialectical pressure.¹

To this shareable currency (*mitteilbare*) correspond precisely laws, morals and rational representations in general as penetrating and saturating all individuals as such, i.e. even unconsciously, thus making themselves valid and/or operative. Already movement, heat, magnetism, electricity, say matter itself, is thus "immaterial". Matter of itself modulates, but dialectically (whether in logic only or in spirit), into the "noosphere" (Teilhard de Chardin's term) as where the dialectic or thought itself is headed as ever perfecting itself, in a constitutive becoming of what it is. The temporal-historical or realist-biological, Nature in a word, is a mere representation or model of this in "alienation" from the Idea, from "the Word", and this is what founds finite individuality, ruined in its inception. It is in this sense that self-consciousness ends in transcending individual consciousness, or rather begins there, in the knowledge that I am not and cannot be the imagined "empirical" I. Thus Hegel refers, in his "Philosophy of Nature" (first in 1816, if we discount for now the Jena writings), to Light as *nature's* "first ideality". One takes here the divine or absolute point of view, even thus showing the identity to which the process remorselessly concludes, as Substance becomes Subject.

So McTaggart seems somewhat awry in declining Hegel's characterisation of the finite as "anything which has any reality outside it"². A Person has no reality outside him or her. "The outside is the inside", it was made clear in Essence. This is what makes him a person and so infinite, never a mere means. He has, as McTaggart himself goes on

¹ *Im Geistigen ist es nun ein unendlich mannigfaltiger Inhalt, der mitteilungs-fähig ist, indem er, in die Intelligenz aufgenommen, diese Form der Allgemeinheit erhält, in der ein Mitteilbares wird. Aber das nicht nur durch die Form, sondern an und für sich Allgemeine in das Objektive als solches, sowohl im Geistigen als in Körperlichen, wogegen die Einzelheit der äusseren Objekte wie auch die Personen ein Unwesentliches ist, das ihm kein Widerstand leisten kann.* (WL II, p.416)

² McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, 1901, ch. 2, "Immortality".

rigorously to show, all unity, i.e. the unity, within self as constituting it as such, viz. as self, since this unity as such corresponds to self. It is the Centre (Hegel prefers to say it is **Centrality**, as distinguishing from phenomenally physical systems) which is everywhere, to speak figuratively. Language is inherently figurative, like much of our conscious (or unconscious) life in its immediacy, similarly limited. Our personality itself is "hidden", is not thus phenomenal, dialectical analysis has shown, confirming a deep intuition, it may (or may not) seem. It is anyhow inappropriate to speak of "common-sense" as guaranteeing "other minds" (McTaggart) in a context of general defining identification of self and other, where "I am you" (title, again, of the recent book by Daniel Kolak).³

If we now return to the *Encyclopaedia*, our original focus, there can in fact be little doubt that for Hegel all that is real is spiritual or ideal and/or personal, that is to say rational. To say that all exists in God, in the Idea, in Absolute Mind, is just to say this. God, after all, cannot be conceived as some kind of pantheistic container. This would be to keep the word for Spirit, for Unity, without the substance, if, that is, things were said to exist "in God", "in the Notion", unchanged from their everyday lifeless disparity. If we live and have our being in God then we are not what we habitually imagine. This is the root insight of poetry, mis-described as poetic fallacy. "Thou wast not born for death, eternal bird". Does anyone of mature mind suppose Keats to be addressing a mere fly-by-night feathered biped concerning the "self-same song" heard "in faerie lands forlorn" before his own imagery "tolls" him back to "my sole self"?

This, in general, is why, as Zizek rightly points out, in *Interrogating the Real*, the "negation of the negation" is wrongly viewed as mere restoration of the *status quo*. We rather, as he in effect somewhat pessimistically claims, discover that in the first negation we threw out our baby with the bath-water. Now, therefore, we stand there with nothing at all or in total alienation, in "the second death" as it were. But if Hegel represents Resurrection as the life of the Spirit in the community, i.e. as virtually a new identity, he is but in line with the Biblical perspectives of "learning to know God as our true and essential self" (194, *Zus.*), now and forever, necessarily. In thus "becoming all things to all men" each "loses his life to save it". Such "revelation" is the essence of Reason, whatever the

³ Cf. again the "in" relation of Scripture and elsewhere, a figure coming naturally to us but not literally sustainable unless as denoting identity and the corresponding substitutions, as they easily seem to us. Much of the primitively forensic theology of, chiefly, earlier times derives from blindness to this identity (inclusive of an unreflected notion of causality), which consequently infects the unreflected notions of faith, as if it were the denial of the vision or sight it rather sustains.

conditions for humanity's factual apprehension of it, indeed foreshadowed from earliest times in the fantastic forms of art and religion. *Humanus sum et nihil humanum me alienum puto*, wrote the early Latin dramatist Terence, in plainly enthymematic and hence syllogistic form. Thus everything, including Terence himself, is a syllogism, and Hegel carries the same pattern or design into his view of the State, taught to understand itself historically by the organisation of the Church or Christian community, as he seems to suggest (198). Against this some might prefer to claim that the Church developed its institutional strength through aping the contemporary Roman state merely, since that is what they would expect. That state, however, under the emperors, was never less of a model than at that time for the reciprocally "democratic" state today such as Hegel's political vision reaches out to, e.g. at 198. So where is the medium effecting the syllogism or, rather, "system of three syllogisms" if not in the experience and activity of "the life of Spirit (Mind) in the community"? My intention here is not one of apologetic digression. I take the same freedom as Hegel himself (or Žižek) in not abstracting from these perspectives. The war, the wrestling, of the dialectic is precisely against abstraction.

Thus Hegel sees a further example, or image, of such Absolute Mechanism in the solar system, no doubt of Kepler rather than of Newton. Indeed the comparison suggests that the State too is for Hegel as much or more *image*, thus falling under Objective (and not Absolute) Spirit, in *Enc. III*, than it is a putting into effect of the eventual real and perfect unity of the Object. The dialectic, meanwhile, is striving after this as its own result, creating illusions in order to get rid of them. "Only out of error does the truth arise", as infinity out of the finite (cf. 212, *Zus.*), as truth's "own result", however. Mind, that is, like Keats's singer, is itself stranger to the finite from the first, which is thus no first merely.

Politics, again, is the sphere of "laws, morals and rational representation in general" in a "land of unlikeness" or self-alienation of the Idea. Here the norm of discreteness, of civic friendship merely, is still adhered to, though in acknowledgement, as anticipatory moment at least, of the Idea of that utterly perfect unity in an identity, of even supra-fraternal *love* (yet already as "fraternal" transcending mere antique "civic friendship" even in the fundamentally Christian notions, theoretically at least, of the French revolutionaries of old), beyond all composition or without parts, of which, however, it necessarily falls short. This totalitarian quality of truth was senselessly aped by our recent tyrannies and often is still aped by the thoughtlessly half-baked "ideologies" served up by those exploiting current hysterias in their hunger for a chance actively to dominate. For the

Idea is rather identity, as such total indeed, necessarily, such as Anselm *mutatis mutandis* envisaged, as Hegel noted precisely when launching his discussion of the Object as leading, *via Teleology* (and Mechanism and Chemism, to the latter of which we now turn), into the Idea.

The immediacy of existence, which the objects have in Absolute Mechanism, is implicitly negated by the fact that their independence is derived from, and due to, their connection with each other, and therefore to their own want of stability. Thus the object must be explicitly stated as in its existence having an **Affinity** (or a bias) towards the other, - as not indifferent. (199)

That is, just *in itself* the object does not actually exist. There is an element of pure, but not abstract, quantitateness here (cp. 99). *Each* of the ones is the **One** embracing all in, precisely, one-ness. This vision was already present, both latently and patently, in the "Doctrine of Being" (e.g. at 96f.). This is but "identity in difference" nakedly viewed and set forth, *gesetzt* and confirmed now here in the "Doctrine of the Notion". If each one stands, in this relation, independently, precisely as due to a want of stability, then such independence is itself unstable, modulating to the "chemical", both, stability or independence, being eventually chimerical. This, then, will be a moment which, as indeed *en passant*, we only first apprehend as having passed.

XXVI

CHEMISM

If Mechanism has finally to be surpassed as an abstract conception, impossible because contradictory, Chemism might seem, by contrast, a representation of precisely "where we are at" now. It cannot of course be derived empirically from the former, as if interpreting inner experience in the very foundation and discovery of the logical category appropriate at just this stage of the dialectic. Rather, where experience is to be interpreted this will be in the light of and subsequent to the whole series of categories. For immediate experience routinely mistakes what are momentary and finite categories of the dialectic, of Thought, such as Existence, Cause, Substance or even, *mutatis mutandis*, the alienation of Thought in Nature itself, for ultimate and unquestionable realities or "objects". The term "object", as we have seen, is anyhow in itself ambiguous as serving to name also a category falling short of the Absolute Idea and as including precisely Mechanism, Chemism and Teleology. Thus we find also in Duns Scotus, half a millennium previously, as part of a critique of Thought's having knowledge without qualification of anything outside of or other than itself, the notion of an *esse objectivum* as what is immediately perceived *within* the Reason. This can be seen as historical foundation of the later doctrine, from Descartes onwards, though also adumbrated in individual medieval philosophers, of representational or representative perception. In regard to this, most fully worked out in Kant, Hegel cuts the Gordian knot, declaring, for example, that Logic is "nothing but creation"¹

¹ Cited, for example, by V. Gioberti (1801-1852), one of the founders of the Ontologist movement, "the only true and sound philosophy". The ecclesiastical discrediting, *via* the intervention of "the Holy Office" (in 1860), of this variant of Hegelianism in Catholic circles, in favour, rather, of an endorsement or supposed revival of "Thomism" (1879), restoration rather of a past moment of what remains alive, is a major cause of the historical delay, in many one-sided "intellectual republics", in getting to grips with Hegel's achievement as genuine successor to and amplifier of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Cf. our entry on "Neo-Scholasticism" in *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, (ed. Burkhardt and

itself and, in addition, totally exploding the attempt to think a *Ding-an-sich* or thing-in-itself, by definition unperceivable, except as, he shows, a passing and finite dialectical category.²

There is a contradiction laid bare here in Chemism too, though, apart from any such direct contradiction in the exposition itself. It wears the face, rather, of Sisyphean paradox or of the Pauline "The evil that I would not, that I do", of suggesting, that is, contradictions in reality itself, up to and including the reality of Will thus viewed. It is in Hegel's system supremely, however, that Cognition and Will, issuing finally in the Absolute Idea, take the place of or succeed to unreflected notions of, precisely, "reality". So here there can be no question of contradiction as such in these higher forms of consciousness, since it is just in them that contradiction, as, non-contradictorily, the essence of finitude, is overcome.

It is an established principle of the dialectic, in "The Doctrine of Being" as first of the three parts, that the paradoxes of finitude demonstrate its falsity. Everything finite is false precisely as contrary to Reason. As **Absolute Idea** and **End** (among the remaining categories), as speculative, Reason is both Freedom and Law or Necessity, the law, that is, of no law in the sense of external bond.

For Hegel there can be no abstract rejection of the Cartesian experience of Modernity, of Reform or Revolution, no perverse restoration of a previous moment. Absolute Idealism, we have been claiming here, rather fulfils the "Moderate Realism" of Scholasticism³ without attempting to restore it in its previous finitude as now exposed to view. It attains *ipso facto* to a truer and more profound but still Aristotelian interpretation (cf. *Enc.* 36, *Zus.* or 142, *Zus.*) as, namely, fulfilling and deepening precisely Platonism and indeed Neo-Platonism. Aristotle and Plato both equally

Smith), *Philosophia Verlag*, Munich, 1991, pp. 608-610, final paragraph. See also, more recently, Jordan Daniel Wood and Justin Shaun Coyle: "Must Catholics Hate Hegel?", *Church Life Journal*, <http://churchlife.nd.edu/2018/06/08/must-catholics-hate-hegel/>

² Cf. G. Frege's later remark, in *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (tr. F.L. Austin), "What is the world without the reason? To answer this would be as much as to wash the fur without wetting it." So much then for the Anglo-American (not precisely "Anglo-Saxon") insistence upon "Frege's alleged Realism" (article by Hans Sluga, *Inquiry* 20, 1977; see also his "Frege and the Rise of Analytic Philosophy", *Inquiry* 18, 1975, on this question).

³ In fact only moderate realism is realism in this crass sense of only going halfway with philosophy itself. The Platonic realism in regard to the Forms, in contrast, would rather found philosophy itself as real foundation and Absolute. Here Truth is correspondence of Mind not with "things" (*rebus*) but with itself, i.e. it is one with final Certainty as Absolute Subject.

recognise the Idea to be "the only truth", Hegel therefore emphasises (142, *Zus.*), while

Aristotle establishes in opposition to Plato that the idea ... is essentially to be viewed as an *energeia*, in other words, as the inward which is quite to the fore, or as the unity of inner and outer or as actuality, in the emphatic sense here given to the word. (Hegel keeps the original Greek script for "*energeia*")

Truth, that is, is not a correspondence of the mind with phenomena but of Mind with itself, even if an ultimate but subsequent "saving" of phenomena, in the sense of Duhem, is not absent from this ideal. Truth, that is, is certainty, self-affirmation, the concrete universal identical with living individuality and Subject, that real universality which, beyond the particular as it is, we have seen, beyond yet as fulfilling and including syllogism, is "the principle of personality" (163, *Zus.*), drawing all to itself in taking, merely, all as its own. This true and personal universality cancels even mutuality or reciprocity in the Absolute and is, therefore, infinitely differentiated Identity of Self and Other. This became explicit in Patristic thought as Love⁴ and it is this that Hegel now reclaims as precisely the requirement of Reason, that all is (*var.* shall be) "well and all manner of thing", that all is "set in order", as Anaxagoras had said. On personality, while recalling our noting above Hegel's characterising, seemingly with a portion of admiration, Leibniz's thought as "contradiction in its complete development", as stopping short at the object, I note here, further, Hegel's comment on "the principle of individuality", absent from Spinoza's "Oriental view of the unity of substance", namely that this principle "first appeared under a philosophic shape, contemporaneously with Spinoza, in the *Monadology* of Leibniz" (151, *Zus.*).

This fulfilment, however, as principle of personality, is achieved, necessarily, in the final or ultimate order of *philosophia* or, rather, of *sophia*⁵, from neither "below" nor "above" but as art, religion or philosophy

⁴ In Hegel himself there is no reason to deny that this term may be "appropriated" from its common or unreflected usage by the Church "fathers" (cp. 159). Such variability is reflected in the conceptually analytic disputes concerning *eros* and *agape* or indeed in the Plotinian notion of a necessary lack of envy (*bomum est diffusivum sui*) in the Infinite and hence, variably again, in the "jealous God" of Scripture who, it is finally seen, "is light and in him is no darkness at all" (*I John*, first century). Hegel inveighs, following Fichte, against conceiving the Object as "a dark power" set over against the Subject (194, *Zus.*).

⁵ Wisdom rather, that is, if philosophy is the love of Wisdom. Yet in Hegel's system the motivated and imperfect striving of desire is essential to that final

as, this latter, at once specific and generic to this trio, identical in each of its members with the "true reason world" as determined by the situation of the Subject (in regard to revelation).. Hegel cancels this Pauline "picture" or cultic metaphor, of up and down in duality of source, just in that he cancels, by identification, the conceptual opposition of Outward and Inward, as again, however, precisely pictures (of a non-existent spatial relation). Fulfilment (of syllogism, of logic as no longer self-alienating, of metaphysics and Absolute Spirit as a whole as self-knowing) was not thus finally achieved *via* the hybrid metaphysics of early modernism, importing unthematized categories from popular and figurative religion without that personal transformation of thinking (at every point) needed to fulfil them, again. Not Descartes' God as one who would not deceive him (why not? The Subject-Object dichotomy is not yet explicitly thematized and hence cancelled here where such a possibility is still envisaged) nor even the Anselmian necessary Existent upon which one had all too finitely relied (193: "The real fault" etc., which "can be got over only by showing the finite to be untrue and these categories in their separation to be inadequate and null"), but the principle of perfection, of infinity rather, in Actuality's knowing only itself, fulfils all, as Aristotle had fundamentally grasped. Hegel clearly enough indicates this as his own view in closing his *Encyclopaedia* with that decisive paragraph from *Metaphysics* XII, 7, in the original Greek for emphasis (cited in translation in our own *Hegel's Theology or Revelation Thematized*: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle-on-Tyne, 2018, p. 11). We call this actuality Reason, *ratio*, due proportion denying all proportion with anything else whatever. *Quis ut Deus?* Who is like God, indeed? "To what will you compare me?" Thus Hegel will himself not scruple overmuch in applying the name "God" to philosophy's principle, to ultimate Subjectivity. This, all the same, is the very ground upon which the post-Hegelian McTaggart will reject ultimate employment of this name "God" (as some *thing*, *viz.* a name) getting in the way of or "appearing beside" (the discourse) as, *mutatis mutandis*, would the *paremphenomenon*, e.g. brain, a thing, discounted in Aristotle's *De*

wisdom of delectation inasmuch as this is necessarily result. We may, with Derrida, then, call it parousial but as an ever-present *eschaton*. This, however, is known in religion too, as expressed in the liturgy or in sacramentality. Thus Paul (of Tarsus) says "we *sit* with Christ in the heavenly places", i.e. we *do* it *now*, and this might also be regarded as the basic insight of Buddhism, that this, and not Time, is how things really are. It might mislead, though, to call Hegelianism without qualification "a realized eschatology", though this is yet entirely accurate.

*anima*⁶, “appear beside” mind and thus render impossible the identifications in which cognition (or truth, *veritas est in mente*) consists. *Immaterialitas est radix cognitionis* (Aquinas). Absolute Idealism, however, universalises this *immaterialitas*, denying “brute” matter (127f.) as not merely correlate but identical with form. They “are at bottom the same” (129).

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So Reason intrinsically postulates, posits Perfection (in and of “the true infinite”), concluding away from Sisyphean nightmare.⁷ This is the truth, as basis, of what was called the Argument from Natural Desire, as it is also the ground of the theologies of “grace”. For grace is reason itself, ourselves as infinitely self-correcting and unmarred, precisely as transcending abstractly finite selfhood in and by *its own* otherness, in the Other and/or others, when “men ... come to feel themselves at one with God” (cf. 194, *Zus.*, again). This truth, glimpsed in Pelagianism, is affirmed by Augustine, Pelagianism’s historic opponent, in affirming “one closer to me than I am to myself”, *intimior me mihi*⁸, as the final principle. God is not merely the apotheosis but the final embodiment, whether conceptually or really, of self. *Ecce homo*. Or, it follows from Hegel’s whole philosophy, man is not only or merely “the rational creature” (Kant) and nothing else but reason purely and entirely, of necessity, inasmuch as he becomes himself, his “idea”, since it is of this that all, as phenomena, are moments. This, then, is the true or concrete “divine simplicity”, concreted in identity, of

⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima*, the best book on the soul in Hegel’s, or the late Eugene Gendlin’s, estimation, at 429a20.

⁷ We can say “God is perfect” or “God is perfectly” equivalently, bearing in mind, however, Sartre’s humanist dictum that if God exists nothing else does. Anselmian Being, that is to say, in its abstract indeterminacy, can ricochet back upon its postulator as, maybe, “not a whit better than the Nothing of the Buddhists” (cf. 87, main text plus *Zusatz*).

⁸ Not *intimius*, the neuter form. Reason, *Vernunft*, as distinct from Understanding (*Verstand*, as in Kant’s distinction), does not need to be personified, is already as universal the “principle” of the personal as it is of individuality. Thus God “is the absolute Person... a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never reached” (151, *Zus.*). Thus, again, Reason is *consolatrix* (Boethius) and *creator mundi* “in the beginning” (*Genesis* 1, i), whether of world or, in Freedom, of itself. Reason, as itself essential and hence infinite differentiation, is therefore not abstracted from the differentiations in (non-abstract) Identity. My reason *in actu* is reason itself and just as such it remains, necessarily, mine. This is the corrective to the “common intellect” of medieval Arabic thought as generally considered, against which Aquinas felt obliged to polemicise.

plurality in unity namely. "I am you", what you do to the least you do to me. "Now you are the body of Christ", to cite religion's most perfect, and hence self-abrogating, expression or representation of this. The Word is itself represented inasmuch as "put into" words. Hence the true wisdom or *sophia* has to be trans-lingual, knowing itself only when free of all composite objectification. Thus "all judgments are false" and from within this falsehood we are led on to truth, in our *philia* of *sophia*, while "the being which the world has is only a semblance" (50).

The not-indifferent (biased) object has an immanent mode which constitutes its nature, and in which it has existence. But as it is invested with the character of total notion, it is the contradiction between this totality and the special mode of its existence. Consequently it is the constant endeavour to cancel this contradiction and to make its definite being equal to the notion. (200)

This passage, introducing Chemism in the *Encyclopaedia*, is a succinct and near-perfect summary of several pages of Hegel's earlier or Greater Logic on the what and the wherefore of Chemism, its Object and Process. What is stressed here is the *Spannung*, as between opposites, Self and Other. As Findlay points out, the relations of sex and marriage, as also of friendship, of all union in plurality in fact, are here pushing forward as much as they are hovering in the background (*op. cit.* p.248f.). Such union in diversity, and the whole dialectic, is the surmounting of the chasm between One and Many, *ut omnes unum sint*, is effected in strict continuity with what manifests itself syllogistically at an earlier dialectical moment where all unity or identification is effected over a *mean*. This mean is indifferently water, giving us "material" things, or linguistic and/or "sacramental" sign in general (of which water, as the naturally **Neutral** object, is itself a sign and hence, not merely appropriately, the "matter", in some immediate sense at least, of the primal sacrament of baptism) in the ultimate sphere of spirit as inclusive in its final ideality of Nature. Water, that is to say, is also, indifferently, a kind of "ideality" in Nature itself, as Hegel says explicitly of light (see Note 10 below) and as was early suggested by Thales.

This union, anyhow, of Self and Other, has in its dual polarity to be personal union, though not necessarily of substances or *hypostases*, as our talk and assumption of "persons", of "inter-subjectivity", invariably suggests. Thus Aquinas too had demurred here, rigorously insisting that society, as of actual "friends", is not essential, not constitutive in its many-ness, to final happiness, the *finis ultimus* where happiness is and, as *beatitudo* or blessedness (159), has to be a final name for as disclosing

rationality, i.e. a divine name (*beatitudo*) of the divine or absolute.⁹ In reaching this transcendence of One and Many in opposition, however, as dialectical result, the *Spannung* of chemism reflected "logically" in Syllogism, we understand how the world, any world, is necessarily made up of individuals in greater or less harmony. Further, if world as such be seen as a finite and therefore false conception, we see how Thought itself in thinking itself will be necessarily differentiated, *but differently*, since here the harmony must be infinite, i.e. it must include or subsume not merely all differentiations but differentiation as such and not only as "the society of friends" or "inter-subjectivity". This infinite dialectical supersession is expressed in religion, or hinted at or approximated to, as "being changed from glory into glory". Thinking, as Hegel says, "is blessedness".

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Prior to or in fulfilment of water (alternatively air¹⁰), language and the final *telos* absorbing all means (Teleology is Hegel's next section after Chemism), therefore, we have union between persons, each universal. So today we would naturally posit Sexuality or the Erotic in general, as essence of generic difference, as between Water or Language on the one hand and Thought-thinking-itself on the other. That the Erotic is the essence of gender and personal difference in general is rather confirmed than displaced by the subsequent fruitfulness, in typical cases, to the point of literal or personal self-reproduction (offspring), in constitutive generation, which the natural or animal *other*-production merely reflects when not seen as here included, as is other in self generally. That is to say, biological conception is but the first stage of conceptual reproduction, as the well-educated offspring, "son", is the more perfect image of the eternal generation which Logic, God, the Father, is. Today we might want more to stress the parity of "daughter", which, however equal in dignity, is rather included in the ancient "son"-notion as in a form of hierarchical suspension, I would venture to affirm, as *homo*, even in today's "scientific" discourse, is

⁹ Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia-IIae, 4, 8. Cf. McTaggart's 1910 *Commentary on Hegel's Logic* (McTaggart 261, "Thus we learn that the Universe is as much One as it is Many", i.e. One and Many are overcome as categories). Cf. Also Joseph Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation* (Faber and Faber, London 1957).

¹⁰ Hegel would include all of the pre-Socratics, Anaximenes as much as Thales, as instances of past philosophies dialectically "submerged" rather than literally refuted (cf. 86, *Zus.* 2). Water is thus, even in its alienated or natural state, one of the first "idealities", as he for his part, again, says of Light at the beginning of his "Philosophy of Nature" (1816 version).

not posited as the opposite of *mulier* or woman. *Mulier sapiens*, as an anthropological subdivision, would certainly sound very odd (for a long time at least), while we already have "gynacological". Thus for German *Mensch* we have the word "person", with "Human being" as a fallback.

Such a union, then, concrete and "physical", raised from the abstractly biological and/or carnal to the, we are saying, all-inclusive erotic, is the first or primal union between persons in Love, such as figured by David and Jonathan or Romeo and Juliet, in absolute transfiguration or lifting of the veil. Here the babble of language is first halted, precisely, that is, as medium. The erotic, that is, rates above speech as overcoming even that primal sign which is "the body". Art, now, in contrast to sexuality, is not medium or mean of any kind but, like Religion, imperfect Form of the Content (of Philosophy) as final wisdom and Absolute Idea. As such, however, Art is onnipresent, directive and representational, for example here, of erotic or linguistic exchanges (style). Religion, too, is onnipresent as, definitively or perfectly, is Philosophy. Thus prayer is defined as "the raising of the heart and mind to God", to the Absolute, to *die reine Vernunft* beyond *Verstand*.¹¹ The lover, to be such, does nothing less. Such thoughts serve for critical reconciliation of opposed paradigms in their very opposition, the essence of "ecumenism" or of being "one".

Such means then, water, language, sexuality, embody and structure the Content at its various levels, artistic, religious, philosophic. The aquatic or liquid exchanges of extensional or "material" phenomena specifically are structured above all in the physical sciences. As *scientia*, cognition, they too, however, are finally or absolutely absorbed in philosophy, of which their specialists are typically called "doctors" or teachers, and not merely of their speciality in abstract isolation¹². They are thus expected to live up to this universality, any preference for final celibacy among spiritual leaders or the more particular representatives of Absolute Spirit finding support here if anywhere, as cancelling the phenomenal in favour of nakedly revealed spirit, such direct contact, however, being generally or at first best mediated through experience, i.e. through phenomena.

The basic *Spannung*, tension, results from each aspect of the plurality, of the system of concrete Unity, being "invested with the character of total notion". It has no "parts", is thus incomposite. This is not because it should be abstractly simple but, again, as an infinitely differentiated identity (160,

¹¹ Cf. *Enc.* 40-60 for extended discussion of Kantian Critique.

¹² But see *Enc.* 7, with footnote, for what seems a gently sarcastic comment concerning views of philosophy in England in Hegel's time. Cp. our "The Place of Philosophy in a University Curriculum", *South African Journal of Philosophy*, November 1991, pp. 111-115.

"each is the very total..."). Each such aspect is, again, "invested with the character of total notion" although it is a "not-indifferent (biased) object" in "immanent mode", as was not envisaged as possible under Mechanism as such. As necessary to the development of the Notion as to its or the Result the relations of Chemism will be reflected in any possible world or Nature, whence the Idea can "come back to itself out of that otherness" (18). In the end such going out *is* coming back, a Zen philosopher, but implicitly Hegel himself, will add. The subdivision, that is, belongs to philosophy and the discreteness of language, not to Reality itself, as mirrored in music or the other arts or in wordless contemplation, "religious" or otherwise. If it is wordless then, while it certainly obeys the Wittgensteinian injunction to be silent, yet it might still amount, and mount, to the tranquil centre from which utterance proceeds, dependently therefore, just as *constituted* as sign or derivative, and this *can* be said. Yet if the rational is the real and the real is the rational (Hegel) then there seems to be as little left of these unutterables as of the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*. All is transparently clear in the overcoming of merely abstract distinction.

This immanent mode of the object as now viewed "constitutes its nature". In it "it has existence", though freed of the illusion of substantive independence. Thus, ultimately, once again, "this also is thou, neither is this thou". This, indeed, is the truth of the "this" as such, as has been variously and repeatedly canvassed here, of any "this". Its final truth is "I", universal of universals (20; 24 *Zus.*). The individual is universal inasmuch as Means, we will later find, vanish as category, vanish into End. How else could End be end, absolute and of all things, *finis ultimus* and, just as such, *motor* of action, i.e. happiness?¹³

Chemism, its tension, is "constant endeavour" or striving, on the part of the object(s), "to cancel this contradiction", between End and Means, unsuccessful and hence constant within Chemism as such, "and to make its definite being equal to the notion". Compare lovers' quarrels, constant enough. This is the stuff of our immediate consciousness, precisely as endeavouring. As in Mechanism, the Notion still exists "only implicitly and latently", whereas in "Teleology", as **End** (204), i.e. "in the end", the succeeding category within Objectivity (194f.), the **Object** (193), as the *telos*, "has real, independent existence" (200, *Zus.*: Geach and Anscombe erred inasmuch as claiming, as appears, two utterly heterogeneous senses of "end", which rather coalesce). The later position or representation is of course nearer to the truth, it being, Hegel says there, the "cunning of

¹³ Again, on the continued validity of earlier philosophies, some vocabulary from which we here borrow, cf. 86, *Zus.*

reason" which makes us think and act, in necessary pursual, as if the End were not as yet present and accomplished (209 & *Zus.*). The *vita contemplativa*, however, simply does not belong to this world, this being what the monastic walls proclaim, the monk (*monachos*: alone) figuring, in his monastic role at least, as "eschatological icon" therefore, or eternity visible, the very type of divine or absolute incarnation, therefore, such as he is often put or seen as denying.

Divine Providence, Hegel anyhow means to say, pursues its own aims *in* the very providing, if we would accept this notion, for us. This, of course, is the very reason for its denunciation by Shakespearian and other "characters", claiming that the gods "kill us as flies for their sport". Hegel, however, stands unwaveringly on the side of these gods, who take all from us "but that we might seek it at home"¹⁴, the destiny that "shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will", in words of another Shakespearian character, even though, as an Irish wag put it, the same destiny, so it appears at least, "ends our shapes". There is nothing then very startling in Hegel's position. Death, he affirms, is "the entry into spirit", *in actu*. The difficulty has lain in finding an unobjectionable way of saying, *ipso facto* imposing, this as appearing as something we knew, so to say in the *Meno* mode, all the time, or as calling it to our remembrance.

In Mechanism the object is only an indifferent reference to itself and to self as such. In Chemism the object "is seen to be completely in reference to something else" (200, *Zus.*, stress added). Of course this begins in Mechanism, in that continuous dialectical flow which the discreteness of the dialectical "letter", of the mean (means) of language, cannot but obscure. But there the nexus of objects with one another, with all that is other, is at first only external or extrinsic to the being of each, to what they are. The semblance of independence is retained, i.e. one is thinking mechanically still. Thus we typically view Nature, as if a planet or a pet dog "would continue to be what they are, even apart from this reciprocal relation" of external connection to other planets, food etc. in "the unity of time and space" which is Motion. This is a "purely abstract and external connection" of Nature specifically, only partly identifiable with the superseded category of Becoming in the Doctrine of Being. In Chemism now the case is different:

Objects chemically biased are what they are expressly by that bias alone. Hence they are the absolute impulse towards integration by and in one another. (200, *Zus.*)

¹⁴ Cf. Francis Thompson's devotional poem, "The Hound of Heaven".

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Hegel, then, specifies the "product of the chemical process" as "the **Neutral** object latent, in the two extremes", e.g. of the Syllogism, as controlling or giving form to everything in Reason. Here we cannot but sense the presence of the classical Augustinian account of marriage, of marital union as *remedium concupiscentiae*, as neutralisation of discordant passion, where the "neutral object" is the offspring itself, in the threefold *Aufhebung* towards *fides, proles et sacramentum*. These are loyal friendship, offspring (again product, in the "neutrality" of childhood) and, ultimately, sign - of the union of all with all or, traditionally, of Christ with his entire "body" in every part entirely and hence supra-organically. Hegel, that is, sees broad analogy or kinship between the two extremes of the syllogism with their neutral or reconciling mean and the generative human pair (of opposites). It is anyhow latent here and not "far fetched". So, then, in accordance with the universal identity with the Notion as mentioned, to be "the body of Christ", distributed or undistributed, if we refer again to the syllogistic terms, is equally to be Christ ("this also is thou"), in identity. Here surely is one source at least of Hegel's basic Idea.

Each marriage is thus microcosm or rather symbolic type of universal love or union and unity, generally posited as "Christ and his Church or assembly". It is thus, in its being and *decursus*, such a marriage, "prophetic" indeed as are, if one but consider, the very *genitalia* of man and wo-man, i.e. wife-man ("wife" is itself cognate with *Weib*, woman, thus yielding "woman-man", something we touched on above), upon which we are, to our recurring embarrassment, uniquely focussed.¹⁵ Thus Chemism, typically neglected (McTaggart would have preferred its omission, he says), is the or a point where the dialectic of categories, relatively absolute, merges with our present life or the appearance thereof, in its transient and phenomenal non-reality as finite. It is chemism, which Teleology and the Idea eternally supersede.¹⁶

¹⁵ This, of course, including the thought on marriage and society, is what McTaggart would call a Hegelian cosmological excursus from "pure thought" (*Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*, 1901).

¹⁶ Cf. what Hegel has to say about sex, marriage and parts of the body or about man and woman in relation to each other in his *Philosophy of Nature*, the earlier Jena version of it especially, as also, for the last topic, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, section "The Ethical World". In referring there to woman as "that ironical being" he may, discreetly, in view of the above, be seen, after all, as having a shot at transcending the "second sex" paradigm that the historical language at first suggests, a potentiality that Nietzsche, the philosopher more usually referred to in this context, appears, notoriously, to have missed. Woman is *ironical* as and in not

The Neutral Object, "latent in the two extremes, each on the alert", can seem a somewhat negative conception, in Hegel as in Augustine. Yet here, and this is the "alertness",

The notion of concrete universal, by means of the bias of the objects (the particularity), coalesces with the individuality (in the shape of the product), and in that only with itself. (201)

Hegel tells us, we would have forgotten, that syllogism is here still involved, indeed "all the syllogisms equally". Thus the "mean" can be, in turn, individuality "as activity" and "concrete universal, the essence of the strained extremes", in tension as they are. This essence reaches definite being in the product, i.e. it, they, were not beings before, are thus, we may interpret, "made for each other", as, however, it seems, we will eventually have to say of the "neutral product(s)" too. This has, however, equally, a (concretely) universal aspect again, with its individuality, as we would by now, after the previous demise of the syllogistic specificities (191-193), expect. I note in addition, as a possible generic factor, that in Hegel's own language the noun for an *unmarried* girl, uniquely, is of neuter gender, *das Maedchen*, rather as the sun, more temperate than in Latin lands, is feminine. Our thinking, after all, tends to be directed by the circumambient language, though here too the cause can also be the effect.

Chemism, Hegel adds, "is a reflexional nexus of objectivity" (202). It "has pre-supposed not merely the bias or non-indifferent nature of the objects but also their immediate independence". It is I, still, who am you, while remaining I. Thus the "process of chemism consists in passing to and fro from one form to another; which forms continue to be as external as before". Here it reflects the earlier category of Becoming, whereas Hegel has just characterised the relational forms of Mechanism in specific distinction from Chemism as "external". Language, again, is more fluid than its form suggests, standing as it does and must (*supponens*), in its finitude of terms, for an infinite multitude, albeit in patterned relation, of

being man, a paradigm we may possibly be in process of discarding, it may be, however, only to return to it. Both it and the modern view admit of the proposal: "In Christ there is neither male nor female", i.e. all are wholly men, *Menschen*, ironically or not. Not for us, as for Aristotle, to raise even the question as to whether women too, or slaves even. Our children, can be happy. The view, that is, does not say or mean that woman is an ironical *man*, which she is not. She is put more generally as an ironical *Mensch* (or "being", in Hegel's text), and that she is, embodying strength in weakness as man, rather, shows weakness in his strength. For the record, I would deny that this is essentially "a man's view", but a sound starting-point for debate, rather..

referents. "In the neutral product the specific properties, which the extremes bore towards each other, are merged."

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Throughout the analysis we have to keep in mind, as a more than merely procedural control, that the dialectic has as such to be the product of "pure thought". Thus, even if Being might seem to be first taken from sense-experience, as by us it is, yet what *the dialectic* begins with is a pure conception. Ultimately, Hegel shows, this is a nothing, Nothing, equivalently, is not taken from anywhere, but a genuine Beginning, i.e. a beginning with the conception of a beginning (from nothing, necessarily), though he refers to this, to Beginning, as "itself a case of Becoming", as merely "another tolerably plain example", at paragraph 88, section (3). Here however he also speaks of **Becoming**, his actual category, as "the readiest example" ("of the unity of Being and Nought"). That there is nothing "absolute" about it is thus here manifest, tending to support McTaggart's interpretation of the dialectic as a "zigzag" process which must, if conducted with pertinacity and consistency, lead to the Absolute Idea, as "categorical" resolution of the categorial as such, by, within specifiable limits, whatever route.¹⁷ We have "countless ways of envisaging this unity", i.e. "oneness of Being and Nought". All the same, effectively as reservation against McTaggart's view, Hegel states here that Becoming, precisely as this unity (and not as its Heracleitian ancestor, say), "is one idea", viz. this idea of the unity of Being and Nought, as "involving" both "attributes... undivided" in it. He further gives reasons here for preferring it to "the representation of a Beginning as abstractly thought, or with Beginning as such", though in fact he begins rather with Being, as he expounds in his initial essay, after the Introduction to GL. *Womit muss der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden?* His "or" here means "that is to say". People would "more readily admit", then, the indivision of Being and Nothing in unity, but at the price of an abstractness of "method" that Hegel denies of his own solution. Being and Nought are identified, that is, *in their difference* (88(4)). This is expressed by "To become" in his usage, a concept or notion, and not by any "propositional form", for reasons gone into earlier here when studying, from much later in the dialectic, "the subjective notion as notion". The unity is an "inherent unrest". This initial and fundamental "unity" is thus "at war with itself", a state we are now finding represented, and instanced, in Chemism. For all that which merely "is there and so", i.e. "itself and not

¹⁷ J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, Cambridge University Press, 1896.

another thing" (G.E. Moore's approving quote from Butler at the head of his *Principia Ethica* of 1903), "is one-sided and finite" or "determinate". The opposition, not "put" in the unity, i.e. when attributing it, is "implied" in it as here conceived.

For Becoming too is not taken from our experience of Time specifically. The same is true of the category of ex-istence. Even if we speak dialectically of Love we are taking this name so as to transpose it. It is the same but different. Analogy in the use of terms is, again, the name for this procedure, itself therefore subject to unending analogy. It is a name from common experience, our language, but a name for something arising of necessity at a certain point in "pure thought's" unfolding of itself. Aquinas too in his own way had wrestled with this, claiming that nothing is said of God as it is said of finite things and yet that such attributions are not, as predications, totally equivocal. Strictly, all the same, we have noted, analogy is a species of equivocation in the Aristotelian sense of not being univocal. Yet Aristotle himself, in saying that "being is said in many ways", implies that everything said, i.e. *being anything whatever*, is "said in many ways", where "said" means referred to specifically, and this is how he adumbrates the doctrine of the *suppositio* of terms.¹⁸ The distinction is fine but real.

So when we remark on analogies, even possible relations, between aspects of Chemism and such "human" things as marriage, or even chemistry, we are not suggesting a causal basis for the dialectical development. It is rather the converse. Hegel's dialectical method suggests, even implies, a certain necessity in the (or any possible) world of experience, in, for example, the going forth of the Idea as Nature. Thus he speaks, again, of Light as the first ideality in Nature. Similarly water, or even "possibly" air, is exposed as an exteriorisation of an *a priori* necessity, having all the "abstract neutrality" of a "formal element"¹⁹, like unto language in the latter's structuring of spiritual life specifically. This reminds us that Nature is essentially *the Idea* alienated, i.e. the reverse of a

¹⁸ Aristotle: *De soph. el.* 1. 165a7-16: "Since one cannot manipulate the things themselves in discourse about them but uses names in place of them, we often think that the relations between the names are the same as those between the things. But there is no similarity: for names (words) are finite in number, things infinite. So it is necessary that the same sentence, or one name, should signify several things. Therefore in arguments those not experienced in the power of words are often deceived by paralogisms." There is an analogy here with the flexible Rule of Lesbos as applied in ethical questions or, rather, either "rule" is a species of the other.

¹⁹ Hegel: *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Suhrkamp 6, p.431.

philosophical starting-point. Nature, Findlay remarks, as just such an "externalisation", "loves to present as a separate existent what is really a mere phase of the Notion"²⁰, beginning, we find Hegel saying, as we noted, with light. Nature, this also implies, is not, could not logically be, "in itself" in any absolute sense. For Hegel, then, Nature, like or rather *as the Contingent*, is itself necessary, a view receiving extensive further development in his last work, *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, where, all the same, he refers the reader rather to this *Science of Logic*, in either version.

The same point as to analogy in and with externalisation applies though to Language as *Mitteilung* or "informing". It too belongs to Nature, after all, the sound, the voice, sign. In deepest spiritual reality, in Spirit, no sounds are made, no judgments even. Facts are not structured according to subject and predicate, unless on an already "subjective" understanding of "fact", e.g. as something made, *factum*, in the mind. The dialectic, therefore, is not identical with what is represented on the page of our text, its Sign, its *Mitteilung* or mediated communication (*Vermittlung*, mediation, we might thus also say in German, a word in which the ghost of a *Mitteilung* still hovers to be "divined"). Only that indeed, this truth, embodies or pictures the tension (*Spannung*) that Chemism discovers between "total notion" and the immanent mode in which any "biased" object "has existence". We pass, as we experience it, from one object (of thought) to another, but consciousness means that, is such that, each and every notion is *the* Notion, as total or undivided reality, not worlds within worlds so much as *the* world "in a grain of sand". At the same time, more prosaically but not less truly, this is but to acknowledge the truth that *all* experience as I or anyone else can speak of it (as experienced, namely) occurs in one (i.e. my) consciousness as subject and "universal of universals", since, also, "I am you" (cf. Daniel Kolak, *op. cit.*). As such it is transformed from its first unreflected impression *to idea*, to speak, thus far, with Hume.²¹

Similarly, we might even say accordingly, the dialectic reveals that reality must be personal, an articulated unity, groups, maybe, of consciousnesses. But there is no presumption, indeed it is denied, that these personal identities (in difference) are "substances", abiding in self and not in their very essence "exchanging" with what are as much others

²⁰ Findlay: *op. cit.* p.249.

²¹ Cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind* (Baillie translation), Harper 1967, pp. 142-3. Cp. also the citation from Schrodinger in Kolak: *I am You*, Pomona, New York, 2002, p. xv., cited also in my *Hegel's Philosophy of Universal Reconciliation*, Cambridge Scholars (CSP), Newcastle-on-Tyne 2013, final page 396.

as they are themselves self and selves. We may, for finite and therefore finally illusory purposes (there is only one End finally or *endlich*), "know what we are" but "we know not what we shall be" (*1st Epistle of John* 3, 3). We do not know it, that is, in some finitely imagined future absolutely viewed, since this is a contradiction. Rather, "we shall no sooner know it than enjoy it" (Thomas Hobbes). There, or absolutely, we are "in" one another, "members one of another", partaking of a "common bread", "bearing one another's burdens", as "dead" or "hidden", and yet we live, while members are normally just what are *not* of one another. We borrow the powerful proclamation, inclusive of Art or style, of the Religion Hegel calls "absolute"²², with some surface contradiction of his general position that only philosophy has the perfect or absolute form of the Content. That is, a point he himself makes, there are "necessary picture-ideas". This may require viewing, or thinking that he viewed, Christianity as religion on the way, in its history, to becoming philosophy, as it was viewed, it seems, by such as Porphyry or, within its ranks, Justin Martyr, or as it is viewed in various forms or presentations of "liberal Protestantism" or contemporary Catholicism.

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So now this neutral product of two extremes meeting, as Chemism envisages, can as well itself disintegrate again, revert to these extremes. They are each the Notion "only potentially". This follows from the objects' "immediate independence", even though each is defined in terms of its dependence, its relations which are now become itself. It is not yet seen, however, as that very relation, which would just thereby, as this identity, cease to be relation as not relating either itself or anything other. There is a "passing to and fro", the forms taken on, so to say, are as external as ever, as in Mechanism. Their "neutral" product is no different in this. Thus each child becomes a parent. The product does not actively differentiate itself as

²² McTaggart objects that we can always imagine a more absolute or perfect religion in succeeding ages. Yet Christianity is viewed by many of its adherents as including an intrinsic principle, surely dialectical (e.g. as expounded by J.H. Newman in 1845), of "development of doctrine". Is today's secularism itself "Christian"? Here one may consult such texts as Christopher Dawson's *Religion and Culture*, London 1948, Maritain's *Christianity and Democracy*, Bles, London 1944 or his *True Humanism* of 1938. Nor need one agree with Dawson, in *The Making of Europe* (1939), that "the sign of the dollar has replaced the sign of the cross" as definitive. A developed economics is but one fruit of developing consciousness or Spirit, of otherness in self.

does the Notion proper, principle of all development and newness, even or especially conceptually and logically and not merely "causally". Logic here is itself the ontology and this is the negativity of "creation" taken at root, as reflected also in so much "spiritual" writing in our tradition as in those of "the orient". Specifically Chemism stands at the threshold, summoning us to advance beyond the "to and fro" to where this itself is steadily viewed in active and no longer potential Notion, in an inner contemplation productive of all activity. "This only is desirable for itself." We are "as having nothing yet possessing all things". For the "this" is the "we", indifferently. In expounding Hegel one has, as it were, to out-Hegel Hegel. As McTaggart puts this, Hegel did not always realise quite how "mystical" his own philosophy was, despite his defences of mysticism as precisely philosophical. There is of course pressure towards this reserve, often turning to distortion, in the holding of an academic position, though not properly resulting from any responsibility one then bears.²³

Ecce omnia nova facio. Behold I make all things new, but only because I make all new things. I, the I, am the universal of universals and hence, we saw, supremely individual. This notional principle, as pushing things on or breaking them up, is not within Chemism itself. "The chemical process does not rise above a conditioned and finite process" (202, *Zus.*), even though the notion as notion is its "heart and core", within which all is contained as moment. But we need to see, as the dialectic demands or presumes, as perfecting Reason itself, the notion "come to an existence of its own". The "neutral product" of Chemism is of no final interest. There integration, disintegration and reintegration necessarily go on for ever, as overlapping or mutually independent (dependent?) processes, analogous to what we observe in Nature or in the realm of alienation. The "want of inner connexion" is the badge of finitude and falsity, that limit which we eventually observe even in our friendships. Plato is my friend, but Truth even more, it was observed. These pre-supposed immediacies, of experience, are really nonentities, says Hegel, as Chemism itself exhibits, building blocks discarded in their very use, even though such "objects", linguistically at least, tend to return as corner-stones of the final edifice, like Being itself or the finite-infinite spirits which we ourselves are.

In thus negating this "immediacy... in which the notion as object was sunk" we liberate the notion rather, investing it with independent being as the necessary alternative to this nothing. *Immaterialitas est radix cognitionis.* So it becomes in reality the **End** (Final Cause).

²³ Cf. Stephen Theron, *The End of the Law* (Peeters, Louvain 1999), chapter 6, "Hypothetical Morality and Institutional Double-Truth".

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Regarding rationality and happiness, or due order, this is approached in the "realist", i.e. the "moderate-realist", tradition (this tradition is actually one of playing fast and loose with philosophy, a "vulgar Aristotelianism") by way of the Argument from Natural Desire. This is used as pledge of a future immortality, routinely if not necessarily. Reason is supposed to know itself "and" other things (*naturam veram omnium corporum*) equally, though we should rather say identically. It is thus argued that Reason, as having natural knowledge of the universal (or, for Aquinas, "of all bodies") is by nature only satisfied by *bonum in communi*, by Good as such, all good, by God who is immortality, the *hagios athanatos*. But, to expand on this, Reason does not know itself and all bodies as it were abstractly, but in the specific sense of knowing only itself (as absorbing all in its concept), in self-consciousness, hence all else in or with itself, in one act, or itself in the particular "object", it makes no difference. It is the same relation as that described of God to his ideas, themselves divine (*ideae divinae*²⁴), as the objects of our own thought belong to Reason. We just do not have a direct contact with anything else, for the very good reason (!) that there is no such "else". The *esse objectivum*, we might want to say, is the *esse reale* and in this lies the reconciliation of Scotus with Aquinas. For it is, anyhow, always the subject that knows, or equivalently Knowledge itself, to whom or which knowledge as such belongs. It is this knowledge that is absolute. This is the concluding theme of *The Phenomenology of Mind*. The world is my world and all things are mine. This is at the price, however, of losing this "my", of graduating precisely to universal or absolute knowledge, "learning to know God as our true and essential self" (194, *Zus.*, stress added), in Cognition proper, in Volition, in The Absolute Idea, all three in progressive series, of identity, that is, in a progressive difference away from and yet, as circulating, back to the beginning of "science" which is Being, now disclosed as the Idea. This latter, Hegel says, is the Notion. The outsideness of things is itself an internal phenomenon or "moment", rather. Yet this internality itself, as figuratively so, and hence indeed phenomenal, is outside of the *identity* which knowledge is as knowing nothing of either external or internal, as a pair lying "outside the notion" (recall Goethe's core and rind, cited by Hegel earlier).

Reason, as differentiating identity, is openness and hence infinite, unbounded. Kant's famous title, that is to say, was strictly nonsensical. It,

²⁴ Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia, Q15, *passim*.

reason, is therefore beyond life and death²⁵ while being ever-active, actuality as such. One recalls a Platonic "proof" here (*Phaedo*), that the actual-as-such cannot be non-actual, though this might equally be made a motive for dropping talk of the "as such". Yet there is no finite cut-off point, "no birth no death". This same argument, in a sense, actually establishes absolute idealism itself, though no doubt not uniquely. Chemism, anyhow, "ends with a transition to Teleology" (Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.391). So Taylor closes a brief and jejune account of this, we have tried to show, richly suggestive and by no means "unconvincing" section, not really "pretty heavily indebted to chemical speculations of the time" as he would have it. The category and not merely "notion" (*sic* Taylor, unconsciously highlighting the relative unsatisfactoriness of this translation for Hegel's *Begriff*) of Affinity stretches way beyond that, we have tried to show, as indeed it does in Goethe's novel, *Elected Affinities*, cited by Taylor but only as playing "a certain role in the literary life of the period". Taylor senses its importance, as his own brief noting of its reference to sexuality indicates, but tries to downplay or exclude it from Hegel's central development, whereas it is just here that the phenomenal and the metaphysical come closest together, as *explicandum* and *explicans*, unless this be truer of the later treatment of Life as a category (much objected to by McTaggart), and it is just this centrality that we have tried to show here.

²⁵ The life of the Spirit, of Mind, Hegel says, "submits to death, and in death maintains itself." *Phenomenology of Mind*, Preface (Baillie), p.93

XXVII

TELEOLOGY

The **End** succeeds to Chemism, illegitimately, McTaggart suggests. The **Object** as End, exclusively and hence all-inclusively, had emerged first, emerges out of our syllogistic reasonings which are themselves a triple and therefore progressive unfolding of the **Subjective Concept** as, again, all-embracing, the final issue of **Essence**. Such reasoning, Hegel claims, insofar as it is a form of self-production or, even, inward self-causation in freedom, is onnipresent in our thinking, often enthymematically (183, *Zus.*). It is for this reason, indeed, that it plays an essential role in the dialectic inseparable from the **Absolute Idea**, its result. Hence **Syllogism** is necessarily operative in any possible world as the necessity which is Reason (*nous*) or freedom. This will be so, whether or not it must be first found as a formal property of the Understanding, as with us, say, rather than with angels, or indeed with animals and Nature in general, following its or their paths in a sublimely unconscious concordance.¹ That is, the human way is the rational way while, conversely, as indeed it follows, the rational is not an alien intruder imposed upon our natural inclinations for, as Aquinas once put it, amongst these latter, as indeed just one of them, we have a *natural* inclination to act, externally or internally indifferently, according to reason, i.e. rationally (cp. *Summa theol.* Ia-IIae 94 f.). This is part of the Thomistic concept of natural necessity, of God, angels, human souls and prime matter equally, i.e. of *beings*, but not, on the face of his account at least, of animals, plants and the like. Hegel, however, by a natural development of our view of the latter or of phenomenal and *hence* deciduous, on nature generally, has converted such selective “natural necessity” into a reciprocal but general or universal necessity of Nature itself, inclusive of the being of the, or to finite perception, concretely contingent, inclusive, that is to say, of just such perception, one cannot say or add “on Hegel’s premises”, since the relevant syllogism, as generally in the system, can, as he claims of discursive explanation, again

¹ Cf. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §62.

not merely generally but of necessity or universally, be reversed as regards premises and conclusion, *Schluss*, this latter term being applied to the whole or any argument as such in virtue of its being one mental word (*verbum interius*, as in Aristotle's *On Interpretation* and *passim*) or concept. Thus the Thomistico-Aristotelian notion cuts right across the Leibnizian necessity, as it is usually interpreted, as exclusively logical, of God alone or "logical truth" generally, as if this were some special *kind* of truth. This view itself, however, was to be later transformed by the *omni*-inclusive logic (the Idea) brought to light in Hegel as in accord with what Aquinas's method presupposed explicitly, but without always explicitly conforming to it, as also with Aristotle's not merely implicit doctrine. It underlies equally Augustine's verdict that contemplation alone, whether *contemplatio* or *studium*, *theoria*, is "alone desirable for itself", all else, the laws etc., leading to or being "arranged", in human society, "if anyone would but consider" (Aquinas, *Summa contra gentes*), for its sake. Logical truth, that was to say, is just truth and that finally. "A little of this is worth more than all the rest", said Aristotle, urging philosophers thereby to practice death, *athanatizein*, as, in Hegel's words, "the entry into spirit" or mind (*Geist*). Compare here Henry Veatch:

"But", you will say, "Is not this right where we all came in at the very dawn of contemporary philosophy? Indeed, if seemingly necessary truths are not to be regarded as purely formal, but as factual, then will we not be confronted with the same old difficulties of traditional empiricism over again?" To which I can only reply that if one finds oneself in a blind alley, going back to where one came in may not be such a bad idea after all. (Henry B. Veatch: "Logical Truth and Logic" as Part I of "Symposium Logical Truth" in *Journal of Philosophy*, 1956, pp. 671-679. See also the same author's "The Truths of Metaphysics" in *Review of Metaphysics* XVII 3, March 1964, pp. 372-395)

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The **Object** emerged, more specifically, out of a merging of **Individuality**, **Particularity** and **Universality** as the three syllogistic terms and/or formalities found, in fact, to be necessary categories of thought or, equivalently, moments of the Idea. It remained as the one formality, though not thereby the one or only object "materially". As well have a plurality of objects, set over against us as that *ens* or being which "first falls (*primo cadit*) into the mind" (Aquinas). Mind thereby, as Subject, is, however, pre-supposed even to **Being**, the first category, as a kind of container, it might at first seem. Thus Mind itself is left standing

as *Being* indeed long after *Being* itself, certainly "objectively" conceived in the beginning, has, as a notion, a concept, been swallowed up in **Nothing** as preliminary to giving way to **Becoming**, *Dasein*, translated as **Being Determinate**, and all the rest.

Any object, however, once viewed or conceived, is itself centre. It is, that is, "implicitly invested with the character of notion" (196), as the abstract concept or **Notion** it is, long mediated in total indifference to this and that. That is, every object is subjectively conceived. This is its "negative unity with self", its **Centrality**. Such centrality is at once superseded as found also in every object put as other to this indifferently "first" object since any object once assumed as object, in thinking, becomes itself first. "We" beget one another, we have already claimed and argued, and beget by conceiving, thus annihilating the "we" in that identity which is the primal begetting or self-outing word, as it may well be called. "The limits of my language are the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein, "my" here, however, as he did not here make explicit, being "universal of universals", in Hegel's defining phrase). A centre which is everywhere, where, as in Leibniz, each monad contains all the others, is nowhere. A monad, however, is not yet an object but a mere metaphysical postulate or, indeed, "ideality" (Hegel 194). Without it, all the same, this conception of the ●object might not, though itself superseding all history in absolute thought, have been historically attained.

This collapse of any Centre as focus, absolute or relative, for other or circumferential entities and/or phenomena, leads into Chemism and its product, the "neutral" ●object. This is itself the dissolution of ●object in its own or proper idea, thus yielding to End as at once subject and object or, rather, therefore, neither of these.

For an object is no longer distinguishable from its relations to other objects, in which, as central, it rather consists. Thus it abolishes itself and relations too at the same time. There is nothing to relate and this so-called neutral object is even neutral as to its purported objectivity. It is rather the End of all things, all else, and so all else is End too, in one concept, however, and so not else or "other" in its abstract or "separated" sense.

This is the transition to which McTaggart objects, proffering his own solution for the invalid (*sic*) category of Chemism, while Findlay, airily dismissing any *en bloc* claim for the validity of the dialectical transitions, remarks that here, with Teleology, Hegel "becomes more lucid". For McTaggart, holding Hegel to higher standards of reasoning, the latter was wrong to make of the "endless oscillation" of the Chemical Process a "ground for rejecting the category as inadequate" (*Comm.* 1910, 248).

The extremes of this oscillation from the **Neutral Object** to the Extremes, whichever they are, are still outward syllogistic terms in need of reconciliation or, rather, identification. So this object "splits up" again, in our thought of it, just in virtue of its neutrality (it is not itself anything). Hegel writes that each, the process and its reverse,

goes its own way without hindrance from the other. But that want of inner connexion shows that they are finite, by their passage into products in which they are merged and lost. Conversely the process exhibits the nonentity of the pre-supposed immediacy of the not-indifferent objects. - By this negation of immediacy and of externalism in which the notion as object was sunk, it is liberated and invested with independent being in face of that externalism and immediacy. In these circumstances it is the End (Final Cause). (203)

This passage indeed reads like a flat rejection of empiricist realism in favour of the Absolute Idea that the End necessarily will hatch out as. But the ground has been prepared throughout the dialectic up to now, as in these our own pages. McTaggart, however, claims that

It is not evident why the fact that each form gives place to another form, in unending oscillation, should enable us to assert that the Notion, which is the uniting principle of both, should be able to do without either. It is still less evident why we should be entitled to assert, as Hegel proceeds to do, that the Notion thus freed embodies itself in the form of the category of Teleology. (McTaggart, *op. cit.*, p. 250).

McTaggart also regards Hegel's misappropriation, as he sees it, of the names "teleology", "means", "ends", for his own ideas here as "highly unfortunate". Yet Hegel develops here the hidden implication of these terms, once freed from their manipulation historically in a "realist" theology itself employing a kind of "vulgar Aristotelianism" conceived as the antithesis to "Platonism", right up into the early modern period (Locke). Hegel himself makes explicit what was implicit and hidden in the unexamined or unthematized "creationist" paradigm, in the process restoring to us the continuity between Platonism and Aristotelianism as found, *mutatis mutandis*, in Neo-Platonism. We have our own being even "in" the End, *intimior me mihi*.

So why cannot we have endless oscillation? Why is freeing the Notion from matter and instability, a merely negative operation, itself an "embodiment" of it, the Notion, as Teleology or anything else? *Immaterialitas est radix cognitionis* (Aquinas), just like that, is an historical fore-runner of Hegelian negativity as positive, thus a genuine ancestor of Hegel's thought as that of the "new Aristotle", something not obviously prominent

in McTaggart's view of things. In support of it Hegel has argued, as claiming to show, that the individual (of which "matter" was the principle) "is the universal", i.e. there is no matter at all but rather Thought, no actuality but such thought's "thinking itself" (*noesis noeseos*: cf. 236 *Zus. et passim*). We might as well say, rather, thought's "thinging" or doing (acting, positing "in act") itself. This step or move is indeed the root of thought, in Hegel as in Aristotelianism, itself a version of Platonism or of "philosophy" generally. Hence Hegel remarks that Idealism is *the* form of philosophy as, in aim, absolute knowledge. This is **Inner Design**, a notion Hegel attributes to Kant's "resuscitation" of, apparently, "Aristotle's definition of life", which "virtually implies inner design" by means of the act of a thing's life-form or "soul", of what it is, its idea in fact or, equivalently, he will say, of the Idea in it. By this even lifeless things are in some sense alive, as contrariwise, they are in some sense lifeless or "false", if considered apart from themselves *as ideal* moments. The end or *telos*, forms of life, these exemplify thought thinking itself *in actu*, as *the* act, and are "not... ever merely... a mode of mere mental representation". "Inner" here, that is, has the force of intrinsic to self, to thought itself. It remedies precisely the conceptual deficiencies of "external" design:

External design stands immediately in front of the Idea: but what thus stands on the threshold often for that reason is least adequate. (205 *Zus*)

The whole section on the **Object** (from Mechanism through Chemism to Teleology), succeeding to the Subjective Notion and mediating the Idea (Life, Cognition, Absolute), may and must be viewed as the resolution *in general* of the duality of unity and plurality as such. This duality is itself unity and the only possible or non-abstract or con-crete unity. Neither can be derived from the other. Thus the unity is not *subsequently* differentiated but essentially so. It is the differentiation, whichever and whatever that is. That is to say, it is not differentiation merely conceptually or, again, "as such". Rather, the Concept is intrinsically differentiated in experience as experience encounters it. In Christian experience, for example, this was and is the Trinity. God, the unity, is in no way prior to this, as it was eventually worked out, but is this proceeding of the Persons or, equivalently, the Relations, though both notions break down in their self-modification as identical. *Ipsae relationes sunt personae* and conversely. Here too Hegel builds or endeavours to build upon Kant as, so to say, formalising logically and hence metaphysically, as Hegel develops it, the number three:

Secondly, in view of the fact that all *a priori* division of concepts must be by dichotomy, it is significant that in each class the number of categories is always the same, namely, three. Further, it may be observed that the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first. (Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Kemp Smith, p. 116 under "Table of Categories": I am indebted to Mr. Paul Trejo for pointing this out in discussion).

In the experience of men in general, to take another example, this unity is a differentiation into a strictly innumerable (insofar as the conditions for individual identity are intrinsically variable) plurality of minds, each of which has or is the universal or Concept, which means now that each has this triadicity or inwardly personal triplicity within. The individual is thus a or the (indifferently) form of the universal. McTaggart sees this as each mind's having the form, the unity, of all, of mind as such, within, this being (the form of) perfect unity as logically entailed within the system. This universal, however, is not a merely logical concept but an or the active principle of organisation, Absolute Spirit. This organisational principle is what Hegel had earlier called the principle of personality, as God, precisely as universal, is "necessity... the absolute Thing... the absolute Person" (151, *Zus.*).

In the brute animals, to take a third example of apparently active "centres" (merely apparent so that equally we, as *appearing* to ourselves, might be included among them), the unity is the differentiation into a plurality of mutually intertwined consumers, eaters, in and as an activity only limited by reciprocal resistance.

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There might seem a problem here in putting a "religious" experience and the experience of "men in general" side by side merely, whereas it belongs to Hegel's thought that the religious and the philosophical are respectively imperfect and perfect forms of one and the same absolute content. Our solution depends on whether we are right in seeing Hegel as a Trinitarian philosopher, not the same thing, in Hegel's development of Kant, as a "triadic" philosopher merely, recalling his general principle that the concrete as prior is the real universal, which is always "individual" in this very sense of con-crete as opposed to abstract. Thus he remarks (182, *Zus.*) that Christianity, where God "is known as the Trinity, contains the rational notion of God". He is known, he says, as the Trinity and not merely or abstractly as Trinity. This would be the ultimately concrete.

Usually this is referred to revelation "over against subjectivity" (194, *Zus.*), what Hegel would dismiss as "mechanism" (195), "when the words have no meaning for us". In supersession of rather than opposition to this extrinsecism he works out his view of Revelation, in both the *Phenomenology of Mind* and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (LPR III: cp. our own *Hegel's Theology or Revelation Thematised*: CSP. Newcastle 2018). It falls under, as an instance, his account of the "overcoming the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity", whether in religion, in science or philosophy in general. Indeed, all science or philosophy "have no other task than to overcome this antithesis by the medium of thought", while religion "and religious worship", a revealing addition, consist in just this overcoming. Hegel, we might say, is in a transposed sense continually at prayer, understood as the "raising of the heart and mind to God". The "blessedness" of men is attained "when they come to feel themselves at one with God", no longer "mere object", i.e. abstractly. In this way God is "known as Love". This means, once again, that "He has revealed Himself to man as a man among men and thereby redeemed them" (194 *Zus.*). "Thereby", he says, because this is "only another way of saying that the antithesis of subject and object is implicitly overcome". We explicitly overcome it by "putting off the old Adam" (he quotes the Scripture without acknowledgement, such is his familiarity), i.e. by "learning to know God as our true and essential self", which is what we are doing here in the *Logic*, in logic. Thus Lukasiewicz remarked that apprehending, in our own reason, a law of logic was for him an instance of discovering the mind of God.²

It is in accordance with this when, in theology, the economic Trinity is stressed as prior to the metaphysical made clear by its means, as in Augustine. The latter is also a Trinitarian *philosopher* in so far as we might be able to view his principle of "the rule of faith" as a species of philosophical doctrine, despite itself, in the sense in which Aquinas too will claim that it is "natural" for man to have faith. Aquinas thus transcends, from within, the apparently pronounced duality of his material presentation, dictated by contemporary, i.e. thirteenth century, societal and academic structures, still today, as also in Hegel's time, playing their role as repressive of free thought.

Hegel knows very well that the notion of a Trinitarian God is born of the experience of Christianity. But for him the experience is not contingent. As

² Cited in *A Wittgenstein Workbook*, ed. C. Coope, P.T. Geach, T.C. Potts, R. White, University of Leeds, Oxford 1971.

with reflection, it is the work of Reason, the manifestation of Spirit in history.³

The experience gets expressed ("economic" Trinity) as the man Jesus being both "one with" the first principle and proceeding (coming out) from it, the Father, Reason, in a union of Spirit which ultimately bursts our unreflecting conceptions of separate or abstract identity. We, in principle, men in a body, are the Body of Christ, *corpus Christi*, really and not just in a manner of speaking.⁴ One stands for all and what is done to one is done to each, as "members one of another", "in" both "the Head" and "in" one another. Pauline and Johamine thought, Christological under the impact of their experience, coalesce. Regarding this Head, Hegel makes it clear that this too is something that Reason required to appear, as concrete focus. *Ecce homo!* The Baptist's question as to whether he is "the one who is to come" or not is, so to say, decided voluntaristically, in the sense in which Hegel places Volition after Cognition "proper" in the dialectic. It is not a matter of "backing the wrong horse", not at this level, despite all subsequent appearances, since this, this "wrong", is a representation lying "outside the Concept". "Art thou he that should come or do we look for another?" This so to say "populist" question, therefore, never received a direct answer during the chosen one's lifetime. The Concept developed rather than mutated, *after* a departure, a rising or ascending, but there we can only speak of its *self*-mutating, as of a seed, which is in fact continual as constitutive (of the Concept). Meanwhile,

How odd
of God
to choose
the Jews.

Or, we might equally say, how odd of the Jews to advance in one giant step beyond existing philosophy, though not without apparently contributory prompting therefrom, as Hegel for one emphasises, in this way. The oddness underlines it as a *finite* mode of thought merely or "in the first place", an empirical fact, expressive of an infinite truth, namely, the priority of the concrete as the true universal disclosed in the dialectic, at the moment of Objectivity (the apodictic syllogism), as *one with the*

³ Georges van Riet, "The Problem of God in Hegel", Part II, *Philosophy Today*, Summer 1967, p. 81 (translation from *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, August 1965, pp. 353-418).

⁴ Saying this, however, does not exclude metaphor in favour of just "literalness", on a reasonable theory of language such as Ricoeur, for example, has highlighted.

Individual. The principle applies equally to Hegel himself and the appearance of *his* thought just there and then, warts and all, we might add. Again, however, others might and may follow other paths. This is the redemption of or making perspicuous of dogmatism, that a dogmatic system, to be justified, has to be supremely or, rather, infinitely, open. This is that principle of "the development of doctrine", again, Christian or other, now seen as necessary for disclosing the identity of religious (as equally, *mutatis mutandis*, artistic) **Content** (133) with the philosophical, with philosophy.

This subversion of unreflected notions of Identity is the key to resolving the dilemma expressed by a Canadian philosopher who remarked that McTaggart's system is a *quasi*-Trinitarianism, of the strictly incalculable number of human persons in unity, functioning as a transposition of the Christian doctrine. But there is no such transposition, viewing things in themselves. You cannot have the one doctrine without the other (as naturally self-transposing), therefore neither is other, since neither is either! This is expressed in finite terms by the Apostle Paul when he says that all are one in Christ until Christ himself shall deliver all things to the Father so that God will be all in all. ● Of course God is eternally whatever God is, on pain of not being God or infinite or "all in all". This, its finite expression, is what, in some form or other, of language or otherwise, "naturally" follows upon thinking philosophically, upon thought thinking itself, as figured first in the "creation", the positing, of a world, of the ● object, due, as it ever is, for sublation in the Idea.

But as things stand the imagination of ordinary men feels a vehement reluctance to surrender its dearest conviction, that this aggregate of finitude, which it calls a world, has actual reality; and to hold that there is no world is a way of thinking they are fain to believe impossible, or at least much less possible than to entertain the idea that there is no God. Human nature, not much to its credit, is more ready to believe that a system denies God than that it denies the world. A denial of God seems much more intelligible than a denial of the world. (50)

It is seldom noted that the last two sentences read most naturally as Hegel's wry comment on the reception of his own system, present or future.

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In this way, after the cited example of the animals, the dialectic seems to resolve itself, for a moment, into the factual, the actual. There is no place,

that is, for value or what ought to be, only for what is. This is not a mere Nietzschean "transvaluation of values" on their own level. It is, rather, the necessary supersession of the concept of value and the division for which the term stands, ontological and/or deontological namely, or has stood historically, revealed, we might say, by Hume in its final intolerableness and then merely taken over unreflectively by G.E. Moore and the positivists generally:

I would accordingly be inclined to make the following undoubtedly paradoxical affirmation, that the introduction of the idea of value into philosophy, an idea virtually unknown to the great metaphysicians of the past, is as it were the sign of a fundamental devaluation of reality itself...⁵

Writing in 1950 Marcel might already be including Hegel under "the great metaphysicians of the past", yet his own existence and reflection is equally proof against the reactionary conservatism he might seem to be expressing. It is rather a form of aristocraticism such as we all, paradoxically, need, the principle, that is, of striving after self-transcendence that we found Hegel mentioning as "putting off the old Adam" or, in the Gospel figure, striving to "enter by the narrow gate".

We may note again that such a transcendence of the good of virtue, if discreetly, was also the conclusion of Aquinas. For him not only Truth, unlike Hegel on the surface at least, but also Goodness were mere *entia rationis*, beings of reason as we said above⁶, on a par with dreams or the unrealised future, or with negation or nothing (viewed necessarily as something). The only real or true or actual being is Being itself, which we sometimes view, as reflecting our notions of Intellect and Will, as the True or the Good respectively.

Implicit here, again, is the supersession of language, since where each term stands for the whole only this whole "exists" or is actual or real and not these terms. They have been, in their finite number, conventionally devised or invented to stand for (*supponere pro*) that infinity of the Concept which is its infinite differentiation and which as such or as it is we could never get into our head without breaking the latter, so to say.

Since one cannot manipulate the things themselves in discourse about them but use names in place of them, we often think that the relations between the names are the same as those between the things. But there is no similarity:

⁵ G. Marcel, *Les hommes contre l'humain*, Paris 1951, p.127 (author's translation). Cf. our "The *bonum honestum* and the Lack of Moral Motive in Aquinas's Ethical Theory", *The Downside Review*, April 2000, pp. 85-111.

⁶ Aquinas, *QD de potentia* VII.

for names (words) are finite in number, things infinite. So it is necessary that the same sentence, or one name, should signify several things. Therefore in arguments those not experienced in the power of words are often deceived by paralogisms.⁷

Even in what Hegel calls the rational conception of God, of which he finds the Christian conception at least an instance, self-knowledge, of and by this Absolute, is mediated, though not objectified. It is mediated in the one ever uttered or proceeding Word (a self-transcending metaphor), repository, so to say, of the *ideae divinae*, divine ideas. Each one of these (as in 160) "is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it". Thus, exactly so, Aquinas had said that each "idea" (*divina*) is identical with the divine "essence" or, indeed, substance.⁸ Neither Hegel nor Aquinas depend on the other. Each, rather, depends upon a common wisdom. This is the Notion itself realising itself in Wisdom's development towards "absolute knowledge".

It is in this sense too that the *vita contemplativa* is viewed as superseding, or absorbing transformingly into it, the *vita activa* or "moral" life as such. In religious or eschatological figuration it is thus itself viewed as taken up into the "life to come" or Eternity, parously. One "leaves the world", actually or figuratively indifferently.⁹ Contemplation, that is, the End (*finis*), viewed as by definition realised (210-212), fulfils all that is meant by *virtus*, virtue, the unconditionally required or "ought". "This only is desirable for itself" (Augustine), "a little of this is worth all the rest" (Aristotle). This is exactly the Hegelian view of End as not standing *in potentia* to the Means, as indeed realised intrinsically and necessarily just because it is the only or entirely real, the unity in plurality which is this actual plurality (from which all concepts of plurality are derived) in unity.

One might fear a certain subversion of morals here. The subversion however is essentially religious, raised or revealed by Hegel as, in more perfect form, philosophical. The "language of morals"¹⁰ is a certain refraction or filtering of the real situation in which, as "pursuers", we pursue the good, *bonum*, since definitionally this is the object of pursuit as such, "which all desire" as aim, *finis*, and so it is, equivalently, to be pursued, *persequendum*. That is, *bonum habet rationem finis*. "As a man

⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *De soph. el.* 1.165a 7-16.

⁸ Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia 15.

⁹ This indifference is the general, though here particular, key to "ecumenism". It is misunderstood as lack of commitment, being but the highest or absolute form of this.

¹⁰ Title of a book by R.M. Hare, Oxford 1952.

is, so does the end seem to him" (Aristotle). Thus it belongs to virtue to know the end, Aquinas will insist, to know, Hegel would say, how things are, now or at any "time". The End is the unity, the whole, the end in every sense, even of philosophy, though we have still to decipher it as Idea and Absolute.

The kinship with Kant and the Kantian ethic, though Hegel somehow reverses and hence annuls it, is patent. In being an End-in-itself each or any possible end is the End entirely, and is thus entirely for itself too. The Ultimate End, says Aquinas, is necessarily sought in every human act (*actus humanus*). There are no Means to it, hence no means *überhaupt*. Here, above all, what is outside the End is inside it and what is "inside" is absolute differentiation, so that the surface, not merely of Nature (as in the Doctrine of Essence), is the entire depth or interior. This is the "Kingdom of Ends" (Kant) in its logical development, where each and everyone is End and, so to say, King, since there are no means to an end that, *qua* end, necessarily is, in just that differentiation which is its unity. We might, *mutatis mutandis*, compare the Scripture: "yes, I am a king, but my kingdom is not of this world". This is the absorption of value in Being (cf. Marcel, footnote 5), the Ought revealed as true face of Is, no longer opposed to what is actual.

Thus to act according to nature is indeed to act virtuously (natural law). To Nature belong pre-eminently effort and striving, the dialectic that is Reason. Thus the Method absorbs all, inclusive of the countless differentiations, the

articulated groups (*Massen*) of the unity permeated by its own life, unsundered spirits transparent to themselves, stainless forms and shapes of heaven, that preserve amidst their differences the untarnished innocence and concord of their essential nature.¹¹

So one seems to deal with now this, now that, but this is indifferent. There is pattern, design, and one thing alone is or can be sought, the End. The individuals are the unity, and not its mere or possibly finally unrealised result. In this sense only is it true, as spoken identically both of the Whole and of its constituent Aspects, that "everything is itself and not another thing", just because it is everything and any and every constituent aspect

¹¹ Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind* (tr. Baillie), Harper Torchbook, New York, 1967, p.452. There he is discussing *das geistige Wesen* "in the shape of a law implicitly existing" (natural law). This emerges, however, as one with self-consciousness, of the unity embracing all in identity, the active and creative Notion.

is equally everything and "indissolubly one with" the Whole (160). It cannot be any other thing than this Whole, just in being its aspect, therefore. Perceptions here are substantive, so to say. If anything were other, therefore, it would be the same in thus being (other), as two or three are one number or qualitative measure indifferently. All the exchanges of mathematics, of arithmetic and algebra, rest upon this truth.¹² The whole dialectic is thought with and by the Notion, namely, the Concept, and of all the fragments gathered up "nothing is lost". "All that I took from thee I have stored for thee at home", the religious poet has Reason saying. For it is supremely Mind that is inalienably, in every extremity, including, Hegel insists, death, "at home with itself" as one with all things, *quodammodo omnia* or just *omnia*.

¹² "Thus we learn that the universe is as much One as it is Many" (McTaggart, *op. cit.* 261).

XXVIII

THE IDEA

The *a priori*, Hegel makes clear, is what he calls, in a kind of playful analogy, the dogma of philosophy. By this, it is clear, not only history but nature, in so far as any “natural history” is posited, must fall outside of the Concept. This is the meaning of his rejection of the evolution-concept as able to supply a *philosophy* of nature, however “correct” it may become in a given cultural context. Just as the cork-tree, his example, does not exist to provide stoppers for men’s wine-bottles, so the phenomenal changes, regardable or not as developments (and this notion, same word or not, can never be assimilated to conceptual development), of the daily, annual or millennia long natural scene, has no reference to the Notion, is, misperceived, as McTaggart might say, precisely in and as being perceived rather than thought. This applies *a fortiori* to *event-ual* discoveries, of fossils etc. or, equally, of living “monsters”. This is the meaning of Hegel’s rejection of the evolution hypothesis as accounting for the *being* of nature, which is what he is concerned with, as due moment of an absolute or divine process (entirely divorcible, need I say, from the conceptions advanced in much “process theology”, as it is called). This same difference can be noted in Hegel’s philosophy of atomism, where he reprobates the fall from philosophy of contemporary physicists, a fall namely from the philosophy of nature, as instanced in Aristotle’s physics (see his *Physics*), which are thus not physics in this modern, eventually mathematical sense, a approach, the mathematical, which Hegel also reprobates as, he says, “materialist”. This ought to show what is at stake here.

There is no nature, ultimately, other than or falling short of the *Idea* of Nature, as is shown by the fact that Existence is a merely finite or surpassable category of Mind. The introduction of “existential import” was one of the crassest, least reflected of Russellian imports into logical theory. According to this idea of nature Hegel opines, for example, that there should only be two species of each genus, enough to show, surely, that he is working with the *idea* of nature (of a nature, in the sense of any possible nature, some might want to say) such as to be in no sense linked

to "the empirical", to what has been observed, even if this has been the occasion for anyone's thinking about nature at all. In reality there are no mere or abstract "occasions", all finding its necessary place. The Malebranchian "occasionalist" degrades God, whether or not with apologetic intent, in speaking so. What may seem occasional for us is either ever present to absolute mind or outside the Concept altogether.

Finally, then, any "natural history" is no more constitutive of the being and truth of nature than is history constitutive of the living spirit which is man, the knower, as he is assimilated ever to knowing as such on "the true reason world". All this is encapsulated in the thesis, arrived at as moment of the logic never to be relinquished, such as that the end is accomplished. Since this is utterable as true irrespective of time, dates or epoch it follows that there are no events as found reflected in daily speech. Nor therefore does any consideration of a temporal beginning to man's, men's or the individual man's ex-istence belong to final wisdom or philosophy. Nothing, in fact, can begin to be, this being the essence of the "refutation of time".

One cannot forbear here from considering an idea of Friedrich Nietzsche's, the only nineteenth century figure who, as distinct from worthy and profound retailers or subsidiary continuators of Hegel's thought, even if unconsciously, as among some Neo-Scholastics, can be considered as a link in the philosophical chain, where each is other to the others, of comparable stature to Hegel. I mean the idea of the eternal return of time. It is often entirely missed, whatever we judge concerning Nietzsche's own relation to this his doctrine, that this phrase names the entire subversion of time as, therefore, never having been, a mere shadow's shadow, *exactly as in Hegel*. Also missed is the representational or narrative aspect of the doctrine as quasi-poetically presented. It is presented as if the completed life then commences again *in toto* at the (temporal?) moment when, or at some "time" after (in plain self-contradiction?). In fact, what would thus return could never go away, not in any part of it. A moment of time, say my writing this, cannot wait, e.g. till death and the previous fragment in repetition, to return. It returns ever and eternally or not at all. The mirage of time is in fact here subverted, exactly as in Hegel.

So, if we go back to evolution, we can say that this has no theological import. God is not evolving. Either Teilhard de Chardin was wrong about this or he was attempting to use the evolutionary frame of mind as a truer or more applicable phenomenal reflection of divine process, of the divine or Trinitarian "processions" than what had been available previously. Thus he entitled his book *The Phenomenon of Man*, not, for example, the truth of man. Even when a truth occurs to the mind in and through an

observation, as if caused by it (all causality is shown to be an “as if” in Hegel’s logic) the two apparent events (there are no real ones, we have noted) do not bear upon one another in relation at all. This, all this, is strictly comparable to as contained in the mind’s upward spring to God which, Hegel explains, annihilates the world “in *esse* and *posse* (*Enc.* 50). That’s our inheritance, make of it what we will. Like Jacob, this man is truly called Israel. That means, in view of the universality of mind, as subjective universal of universal, that each is thus all, causally derivative only in phenomenal thinking, a point too drastic to be taken up much, but so it is, where one speaks of Christ’s humanity as *cause*, even “efficient” cause, of our salvation, with no way of explaining how. That, however hallowed, philosophy shows to be a human or finite way of speaking. Hume and Hegel are both right here. Each rather is Christ, is “in” Christ as one with him, inasmuch as in that consists in becoming what we are, to use a phrase common in Natural Law theory as thus applicable to the divine and ever New Law posited in theology, already, or thereafter (it is the same) eternalised in philosophy. At no point can our natural desire, as rational, stop short, while, in very truth, “nature does nothing in vain”. Who, what, is nature. The answer, by this philosophy, is not in doubt. “By him and in him” are all things. Him? ● or her, it or even them. We must use the words that are at hand, as did Hegel.

The truth of man, namely, to revert to the above, is that he has no truth, being divine rather, this being the outcome of Kant’s conscious or unconscious oxymoron, the rational *creature*. “What is man? What is God?” What, rather, was the philosopher/Pope Wojtyla’s intent in putting these two thus flatly together? I cannot but think that he had one, an intent, nor that he had further in mind a thought, an identification, he dared not or thought inopportune to utter. “Behold the man” said Pilate, then again, more desperately: “Behold your King”. To which, after a little while, the Apostles would add, “Behold your God”.

● tree of beauty, tree of light,
 ● tree with royal grandeur alight,
 Whereon the death of death was wrought
 And conquering grace’s battle fought. (Bp. Venantius Fortunatus, c. 7th
 century, Gaul, free citation from memory)

There we have efficient cause again. It’s poetry after all, a subservient form of the content (Hegel). But how we need that, for our life, “the necessary picture idea” (Hegel)! That is, we in no way deny its utterances, not while in this our life, as would appear, necessarily while contingently. Here too, though, it is only *after* the fact, as time represents it, that

conceptual meaning, as distinct from happening(s), arises, that we see that there is one who "shall keep", who keeps, "thee in all thy ways, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone". Thus, in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel sees, without effort, another being supplied upon the fall of Lucifer, as it were waiting in the wings for his own eternal moment. Philosophy, with and in Plato, must ever soar above language in philosophy's necessary truth to itself.

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We pass to the **Idea** (213). The *a priori* is Mind itself, into which everything "falls" (*cadit*), as it were afterwards (*a posteriori*), and the first "thing" (*primum*) which thus falls, says Aquinas, is Being. Mind itself can of course be known *a posteriori*, but this is not the case here in Logic. There is, that is to say, a thinking that is always before, necessarily.

Since this is so, however, Mind cannot be thus in relation to Being as "falling into" it, or *vice versa*, as if from without. Why, conversely, should Being "fall"? Mind, then, is Being, i.e. it *is*, in free self-affirmation such as is the very soul of necessity.¹ Hence the forms of Logic are, as forms of the notion, "the vital spirit of the actual world" (162). The Notion, however, cannot "have" forms, since it is Form itself, "ordering all things" from within itself. So Mind does not think with these forms but in the first place and in all its acts thinks these forms, thinks Form, conceives the Notion, the conceived, the Concept, itself. Mind thinks itself. Everything is a syllogism because the syllogism is not a form discovered or, still less, devised *a posteriori*, but is Mind itself. Form, that is, is not a finite concept. It is the Infinite and Absolute, natural End and desire of the finite, and, furthermore, known first in all things, since each is "put as indissolubly one with it" (160). Put! That, that is to say, is the Notion and its position. Add to this that if mind *is* being, then being has disappeared. That is, being is its own disappearance, as necessity disappears, necessarily, in freedom. This is not, however, a being "free among the dead" (*Psalms of David*, 88), the freedom of having nowhere to go. It is rather the freedom of and in self-consciousness, the freedom of the Idea, of thought, *nous*. What is new, that is, can only be thought in terms of the old, as speech is parasitic upon speech. That is, man never *began* to speak. It is in *this* sense, I believe, that Hegel spoke of the *pre-historic* forms, as we say, as never having existed, a suggestion (*Enc.* 249), though it is more than that, which Charles Taylor considers, without real argument,

¹ Even Aquinas had distinguished the necessity of precept from necessity of compulsion. Here we have the Ground and grounding of this.

“disastrous” (Hegel, p.354). Finite processes, Hegel means to say, however, belong to the finite, to finite thought and to its correctness, which is not thought, not true as truth is true. “The things which are seen are temporal; the things which are not seen are eternal”, yet the latter are not knowable without the former, without *phantasmata*: there is a time when time is real for Spirit, i.e. it is real “for as long as Spirit needs it”, which, of course, is a way of affirming its unreality (compare the Schroedinger passage cited earlier and our remarks there). Spirit, that is, *learns* that it does not need time and that it is thus, outside of the timeframe itself, unreal, a position of which McTaggart offered a proof (*Mind* 1905). Thus, just so, Spirit “snaps asunder the chain of sense” as “sound Common Sense, as well as Philosophy, will not yield up their right of rising to God from and out of the empirical view of the world” (*Enc.* 50, stress added) as “in *esse* and *posse* null... only a semblance”, mind thus signifying. Here we have philosophy’s last word, which is the only word philosophy ever speaks. It is this that is that “true reason world” which is “not the exclusive property of philosophy”, i.e. the latter is ever self-exceeding, whether backwards or forwards, as infinity requires these two to be one. Hegel finds this Heraclitian, the Becoming of which Life is merely an example or “analogue” (88, *Zus.*). By such analogues, self-known as such, even by children, he says, we are ever in as being “the true reason world”, which itself ever requires that we move forward. Meanwhile I venture the view that when Taylor introduces his chapter “Reason and History” at the end of his chapter on ethics by saying that the integration or synthesis of “individuality and *Sittlichkeit*” “he saw as the goal of history” but then adds, crucially, “Let us turn now to see how it develops *in* history” (p. 388, my stress) then his splendidly thorough book gets a certain lopsidedness through the *Logic* no longer dominating. This logic has established, namely, among other things, that there are no events, I venture to affirm, and hence no history in the immediate or unreflective sense, a view he also hints at near the end of *The Phenomenology of Mind*, speaking of “the science of the ways in which knowledge appears”. This, the region of Absolute Spirit that his whole system is set to unfold, is the same region as that opened by the originally Buddhist saying, “No birth no death”, just as Hegel’s unfolding of the I as “universal of universals” grows out of perception of *the same* contradiction as is found in the statement “I was born”. How could you be there to be *born*? Of course Hegel had views, in the everyday world of appearances, upon history, politics etc. which are, nonetheless, distinct from his Philosophy of History proper while the Prologue to the Lectures on this topic, apart from his whole system, supports what I am now saying. I am not saying, with

Gentile, that his Philosophy of Nature, finally, contradicts the system's project. That is why, in fact, this itself contains those statements, on evolution or "natural" history that Taylor must consider "disastrous".

In effect, no Hegelian synthesis develops "in" history or historically. This is the clear drift implicit to his endorsement of Aristotle's view that there can be no science of history. The Bible, for example, in which Hegel's mind was clearly soaked, can be shown not to offer that. It speaks, for example, of things "happening in a figure", *per allegoriam*, where we thoughtlessly talk of "events" happening. As situating narrative, it ensures that narrative, thus placed, is retained in our human patrimony as we seek "the second harmony", after childhood, which "spirit must win for itself" (*Enc. 24, Zus. (3)*).

Mind is Being, as (being) the first *a priori* category which the others progressively develop. Being, thus viewed, and as finally emerges in the Logic, is not abstracted from "things", as, say, the most general concept or quality of them. Hence there is no such genus as that of the things which are, said Aristotle, adding, though this is by no means the ground for his denial, that "being is said in many ways". There is not even one of these ways in which it is said as a genus.

The categories, rather, develop the Idea. They are the *minding* of a beginning, of *Beginning* as such, in which they will find their End, as not being an arbitrary or finite trajectory, suspended in the void as it were. Being, as there posited, merely names this, the Beginning, thought's primal thought, its *self-reflection*. Nonetheless, as Hegel points out, the notion of a Beginning is mediated, while Being, our very means of identification and predication (it is the copula), is not, is *immediate*, even though these two terms, this dichotomy of them, is not in itself absolute. Beginning is the specification of Being, rather, put as foundation or Ground of Thinking, of the Notion. In its free being the Notion has not chosen between being and non-being. The Notion *is* that choice, which *qua* choice and absolute Ground *founds Nothing*, that too, as indeed nothing. Evil, says Hegel, is nothing pretending to be something. Thus, and therefore, God, Being, is good and the Good, as natural choice... of the will, as we say, as in fact, this being the true statement of the case, good thus becomes, must be seen as, whatever we strive after. This reduction of the ethical to the phenomenally moral or *sittlich* is the ground for Hegel's statement that good and evil are the same, even while we must ever maintain, in our day to day life, that they are not the same. There is no purely "practical" addendum or alternative to whatever of that is found in knowledge itself and the supremacy, the onmi/competence, of its act. The conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action (Aristotle) because

sylogism itself is act and all act. "Everything is a syllogism." And consciousness includes both acting as thinking and thinking as acting. Thus will is Mind itself inclining to what is above all one with itself, to Being as its own self reflected. Will is not a separate "faculty". This is what found expression in the Trinitarian relations. Here Mind *found itself*, neither in self-critique nor in pictured psychological projection. Mind's quest is thus to find itself where it already or actually is, as "its own place".

In Logic, then, Mind studies itself, but not, again, as *a posteriori* "object", placed (put) in front of and so outside of it. ●bject is a moment merely of Mind's dialectic, its process of thinking and/or "saying through" (*dia lego*). Mind is necessarily all, since whatever it is related to is necessarily identical with it, with Mind, as *quodammodo omnia*, or as *omnia* simply. Identity, that is, is *the* logical relation, in which all "other" relations are thought. Yet if mind is all, all mind, then mind is nothing; *non aliquo modo est, sed est, est*, as Augustine said of God, thus in a sense "giving the game away", as religion in fact had ever done from the beginning. This is the context for any "greatness of man" worth speaking of.

So our enquiry is how to think the All which Mind is. We think it, we answer, as Absolute Idea or Word (*logos*). This is necessarily *logikoos* before it is *physikoos*.² God, again, is pure Form. The unity, ●ne, is prior to the existent, to Being, and this too is thought logically.

The existents, all such, are included in Mind. Mind is yet free of them as free simply in its own free Act, which it is. Mind is essentially and entirely its being, as its being is its essence, what it is. It thus supersedes both being and essence (as it is the very Form of the dialectic, form itself). As Hegel says, it is not understood or mediated through something else. Hence the existents, finite things, proceed, exit (*exeunt*), solely in order to return, making Mind, Spirit, the Idea, to be Result, the End at the end or in the end, at a moment beyond the moments when, as religious insight expresses it, God shall be all in all. God clearly was never anything less. All is in God; God is in all and each. We have therefore Platonic "radical apriorism" and this, Hegel urges, is the dogma, the foundational Notion, of philosophy as superseding the whole principle of (finite) dogma. What dogmas or opinions there are, therefore, however things seem (*dokeo*), must be laid open to this light. "In thy light shall we see light" (*Psalms*).

Just so then I, absolute universal, was not born and do not die. I am my thinking, am Thinking, conforming all "else" to me, being conformed to it,

² I write "●●" to represent the adverbial ●mega in the ●riginal Greek script.

delighting in it. This is harmony and "love" as reconciliation of cognition proper and volition. (159)

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"The Idea is truth in itself and for itself, - the absolute unity of the notion and Objectivity" (213). In terms of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* this refers to the Subjective Notion. This, as including all the categories of traditional formal logic, includes of course "the notion as notion" or *apprehensio simplex*.

This Unity itself, the Idea, is, first, the immediate Idea, what Hegel calls **Life**, then it is "**Cognition** in general", the **Theoretical** (*inclusive* of **Volition**, the **Practical**) and finally "**the Speculative or Absolute Idea**". Cognition, that is, subdivides into Cognition Proper, closer to what we naturally see as cognition, and then, as an Advance (i.e. not merely, at this stage of the dialectic, an antithesis), Volition. The dichotomy is overcome in being thus mentioned, however, inasmuch as theory and praxis are both put as cognition. Thus "theory is the highest praxis", Aristotle had declared, the conclusion of "the practical syllogism" an action, thus overcoming rationalism (as distinct from rationality), in ethics particularly, the concluding to what one "ought" to do merely, in advance at one stroke. Since there is no other unifying or synthesising category respecting these two, theory and praxis, it appears that they too are sublated in and as the Absolute Idea, just as are Life and Cognition proper. We might say that as included they are "suffered" (*sub-fero*, supine *sub-latum*) or put up with there. This is a unique coincidence in the Logic and so should be pondered upon. We bring, anyhow, our finitudes into the infinite (on sufferance) which yet is their result. This, however, cannot be made a limitation upon it. It is a result which is utterly prior, *qua* infinite, as we emerge "from shadows to reality", this priority being precisely what we thus come to see. All the same, Eckhart's dictum stands, that the eye with which God sees me, and sees me absolutely and/or constitutively, *is* the eye with which I see him, constitutively again. We recall the reciprocity of cause and effect, the consequent inapplicability of that category here. "I in them and they in me" as Scripture has it. McTaggart claimed that Hegel was more of a "mystical" philosopher than he himself realised. I rather doubt it. He is rather more so than many others have realised or wished to realise, desiring rather to use his undoubted strengths and prestige, at that time, for lesser purposes or, rather, for purposes period.

The Idea, anyhow, is "nothing but the notion in its detailed terms", rather as the first of the three parts of this "Doctrine of the Notion",

uniting, again, Being and Essence (as conceived by Hegel), was itself already "the subjective notion". The "essence" of the Notion, I have remarked, is that although called "a systematic whole" it has no parts. This is then the force of "systematic", as is already brought out in Chemism, where the "constituent elements" are not separable and in fact therefore (at this "ideal" level) not distinguishable from their so-called relations (so-called, because such "relations" no longer relate *relata* or *relatanda*). Rather, each of the Notion's "constituent functions", those "detailed terms" themselves constituting or making up the Idea as essential to it, "is the very total which the notion is". Here now "total" rather than the implicitly composite "whole" is used. Each is "put as indissolubly one with it" (190). It becomes ever more manifest that these constituents are personal, whether one or many or both, whether put or putting or both. The dialectic can thus be seen as final resolution of the antinomy of the One and the Many. We anticipated this in the treatment, Hegel's treatment, of the "realised end" (209), uniting End and Means as a single reality. Only thus can one person meaningfully be treated as absolute end, as is required in our very self-consciousness, making of murder the arch-sin, in religious or mythical terms following upon the primal disobedience as one with it. Hegel seeks to reconcile such evil, i.e. its occurrence, within the sweep of the dialectic, as does Goethe in the poem *Faust* (212, *Zus.*, cp. 24, *Zus.*, latter part). Evil remains evil, of course, but of its nature *semper in subiecto (bono)*, as Aquinas well demonstrates. As it is written, "Offences must come". Woe, all the same, it goes on, to us who commit them, whatever the final outcome. Thus far Aquinas and Hegel can be shown to agree while Julian of Norwich too, oppressed by the medieval Church's apparent insistence on actual eternal damnation, finds herself bound to declare that "all shall be well and all manner of thing", as direct result of her "shewings". Thus Chesterton's grandfather, he tells us, remarked that he believe he would thank God for his creation even if he knew he were a damned soul, religious representation thus anticipating everything in the developed system. The truly damned could not know this, it is implied, for getting now about doctrines of distribution. *Non moriar sed vivam* (Psalm 118).

Thus the Notion itself, as for itself, "has Personality" (one or many?) and is thus, "as a Person", spoken of as "impenetrable atomic Subjectivity",

not exclusive Individuality, but Universality for itself, and Cognition, and which has in its Other its own Objectivity as Object. (GL III, 327).

This indeed is Being, with which we began, which was taken as "the Beginning" and now, at the end, "all Truth". The kinship with Leibniz's "monad of monads" is patent, as it is with nothing in Kant. Kant's role, rather, in this latest development of the World Spirit, is reduced to little more than that of Objector or Devil's Advocate. Even Hegel's praise of Kant's revival of Inner Design is not without irony, since in Kant this bears the aspect of a patronising aside.

The "real" content (Hegel's citation marks) of "truth in itself and for itself" is, however, only the Notion's self-exhibition or manifestation in the form of "external existence", i.e. this is a form of manifestation, not an absolute but merely a category. Really, indeed, the Notion encloses "this shape" of alienated or external ex-istence "in its ideality" proper to it "and so keeps itself in it". Being, we might say, it too, is a "divine idea" or notional aspect. "This also is thou; neither is this thou" or, again, it both is and is not, to borrow a phrase of Plato's. Nature too is but a "moment" where the dialectic, true to form, projects an antithesis of itself as a whole prior to synthesis in Spirit.

Because it has no *existence* for starting-point and *point d'appui*, the Idea is frequently treated as a mere logical form. Such a view must be abandoned to those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and genuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories which have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. It is no less false to imagine the Idea to be mere abstraction. It is abstract certainly, in so far as everything untrue is consumed in it; but in its own self it is essentially concrete, because it is the free notion giving character to itself, and that character, reality. (213)

"Giving character to itself", he says, because in fact this Notion contains the whole of reality in all its truth. Again,

Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea: for which, therefore, yet other actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have a self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and in their relation that the notion is realised. (213)

This notion again is presupposed as initiating and perfecting all thinking. The keyword, above, is "appear". Each individual as, it now seems clear, personal yet is nothing apart, in either separation or abstraction, from other actualities, i.e. all other actualities, in mutual dependence of being as neither one nor many, again, since, each may say, "I am that". In this sense the opinion of Aquinas is recalled according to which the "society of

friends" is not needed in absolute reality or blessedness. There are no others, namely, since each is its other, Hegel here shows.³

Each person is necessary to the Notion, as it to him or her. Still, we do not know where self begins and other continues or, indeed, we have noted, how these terms are always distinguished. We are *in* one another, to use a metaphor all the more apposite for being dead. If the Absolute is like this then much of our perception must be misperception. We might be perceiving selves as something else, therefore, such as animals, or perceiving those one with us as other than us. Yet each and every aspect, as truly such, irrespective of whether we view it as individual or group, is as necessary to the System, the Unity, as the Unity to it. As having the unity in it such an aspect is identical with it and *vice versa*. Thus it is better called Unity than Whole, as having no parts. Neither members nor aspects are parts. In fact it is not composite at all and hence must be absolutely, and just therefore not abstractly, simple.

It is also for this reason that "the individual by itself does not correspond to its notion" and therefore, says Hegel, taking a forgetful dive back into the empirical perhaps, must die. It is rather that the individual as such has never lived, is abstract, a mere "being of reason". "I live yet not I." It is "ruined" in essence.

Nor is the Idea an idea "of" anything, since it is that which "particularises itself to the system of specific ideas", in this case the persons. For the same reason it "has no existence for starting-point" and so it is to this freedom, "giving character to itself", that "all are constrained by their nature to come back". They were, that is to say, never apart from it.

It is because the Idea is not "of" anything that it is one with each of the transcendental predicates, One itself, Being, Truth, Goodness, Beauty and so on.⁴ Hegel says here that such self-particularisation of the Absolute is an "act of 'judgment'" made by the Idea, which as absolute is the active notion, Notion and Actuality indeed, whereby, in this very self-particularisation, the Idea "is in the first place only the one universal substance" (213). Only! That is, its developed actuality as a subject and as mind is not yet captured in this formulation, even if it is only as such that it could be itself thus active in the first place. Mind sets all in order,

³ That Aquinas's view was open to fuller explication is suggested by his adding that the society of friends nonetheless belongs to the *bene esse* of beatitude, as if something could belong to it which was not necessary to it.

⁴ But surely not historicity, as Hans Küng strangely suggested treating as a transcendental in his book on Hegel and the Incarnation. Such historicity would be, precisely, historicity transcended as "the illusion under which we live" (212, *Zus.*) and not, therefore, a transcendental predicate.

including itself, or in freely ordering itself it sets all in order. Mind is Order, Form, before it is Being, as prior, even though we "have to think" or, rather, imagine Order as a "form" of being. It is(!), rather, *the* form of being.

This self-particularisation of the Idea is not separable, as macro-version of the same, in a later complementary perspective, from its "going forth as Nature". It is the Idea as Idea which does this, the Idea as defined at the end of the Logic in the "doctrine of the notion" (160). The "percipient" Idea, that is to say, "is Nature" (244). Nature indeed will be nothing but the persons, particularised individually and/or as groups. We may envisage pairs, trinities and so on.⁵ Comparable to Aquinas's vision, again, the "beauty of the bodies of the redeemed", as Spirit and not a part of Nature, must, out of the intrinsic necessity of the Concept, more than compensates for or outweigh our realisation of Nature's final illusoriness and alienation as commonly taken. If we stop at Nature we "miss the many-splendoured thing" or Hegel's "systematic whole" (160). Without such Beauty indeed, as one of the transcendentals, the Idea would remain abstract, partial, and so not itself and concrete. Nothing is more Hegelian than this aesthetic moment. Our Puritan urge to abstract from it is the reverse of "pure Reason".

As subject, as a subject, Mind, the End, yields to the category of the Living Individual. Every aspect of the Unity, namely, is a Living Individual naturally (i.e. as part of its own aspect) connected to each of the others, which are yet one and the same with it, as it to each of them. "You are members one of another", a text we naturally recall here. Here though we see that Individual or individuals are under no necessity to correspond with, still less duplicate, individuals known empirically or as if external to Mind, not even our phenomenal "selves". These, as Hume showed, can be doubted. As the "religious" author put it, we may know what we are but "we know not what we shall be". Here in Hegel however we have a "realised eschatology", transcending time-conditioned and finite notions of first and last. The non-immediate, all the same, is finally found to be most authentically at the surface as removing illusion.

⁵ Cp. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (tr. Baillie, 1966, p. 451-2): "The ethical self-consciousness... the universality of its own self... at home with its essential nature... has transcended itself as individual... the distinctions found within that nature (i.e. self-consciousness)... are not accidental... On the contrary, because of the unity of the essence with self-consciousness... they are articulated groups (*Massen*) of the unity permeated by its own life, unsundered spirits transparent to themselves, stainless forms and shapes of heaven, that preserve amid their differences the untarnished innocence and concord of their essential nature".

Hegel continues, concerning the Idea, with, as so often, an unexpected reflection. The Notion, utterly concrete, as "principle" of the Idea which, as absolute, it is, is the "negative return of it into self", subjectivity. The Idea, not of anything, yet "thinks itself". This brings him back to Truth, the Truth which the Idea is (213), as correspondence of Objectivity with the (subjective) Notion, "not of course the correspondence of external things with my conceptions." For Absolute Idealism the principle, truth rather, that *veritas est in mente* in no way restricts it against Being but brings out rather its primacy. Everything actual, as true, "is the Idea" by which alone it has its truth, as "some one aspect of the Idea".

So Truth (213, *Zus.*) is the "ought" of things and a bad man is an untrue man, not true to himself, his humanity or his spiritual essence indifferently. Yet, Hegel says, in agreement with Aquinas again, nothing subsisting can be wholly false or bad. *Malum est semper in subjecto* and this in which it inheres is good just as "part of reality", whereas evil itself is a lack, a non-being of what should be there, such as sight in an eye. Whereas, however, for Aquinas the evil inheres, as intimate lack, in something, i.e. in a good, for Hegel "bad and untrue things have being" in so far as they are thought in the dialectical process of the Notion. But they and that in which they inhere, as finite, are false. Or, as he says elsewhere, evil is what pretends to be, what appears, when it is not. It is, the conclusion is irresistible, a false appearance, of scarlet in place of snow⁶ or of what will not be remembered, eschatologically, because it is not. The glorified wounds (of *Apocalypse* or *Revelations*) are not, finally, wounds at all, as they appeared "on earth" or phenomenally. The Cross there is in reality a throne, a place of lifting up, as magnet of attraction. The later Hegelian account, under the same *Leitmotif* of lack as in St. Thomas, is more rigorous and thorough, less dualistic. Evil is more in the warp and woof of things, their finitude, and so essentially to be forgiven and reconciled, born, as we find expressed in Goethe's *Faust*.⁷ The Gospel

⁶ Cf. the relevant passage in *Isaiah*, also discussions of Peter Damian's thesis that divine omnipotence (God) can "change the past" by, so to say, "forgetting" it. As here such a past never was, "is not", as the "Christian Scientists" say of sickness in general. Here though it is said of temporality and/or the finite as such, again and again. It is "false", like "all judgments", they too being finite, one and all being thus superseded in the Syllogism and beyond.

⁷ A different view, however, seems to find expression in his poem "*Das göttliche*", c.1781. There what is made a basis for forgivingness in the "Sermon on the Mount" is seen as mere indifference (*unführend ist die Natur: Er leuchtet die Sonne Über Böse und Gute*). Only man is *edel* as rewarding and punishing good and evil respectively. Yet the gods, he says, act on a bigger scale (*Taten im Grössen*), recalling the Hegelian "cunning of reason" it seems. The picture as a

injunction to forgive is based on this eternal characteristic of the infinite, sending rain upon both just and unjust, and not on some esoteric or unexplained mechanism of reconciliation effected from within time and the phenomenal.⁸ Rather, this would be the manifestation of the former in finite "language". "Have we received good at the hands of the Lord and shall we not receive evil?" asked Job in the story. There is no Manichaeism here. Hegel moves rather a further step away from it, reconciling indeed. All that is bad is as such "on the way to ruin", to disappearance. Rather, the Good is "accomplished". Evil belongs to "the illusion under which we live" (212). Things subsist by the Notion alone, are "in God" the good.

Hence the Idea, rather than phenomena, is "what is completely present", and "in every consciousness". The role of philosophy indeed mimics or, rather, accomplishes that of Divine Providence, bringing back what is scattered to the original constitutive unity of Mind, its purpose therefore "the intellectual ascertainment of the Idea".

That the Idea, "an absolute Unity", is the Truth is the result of the dialectic so far. Yet the dialectic does not "mediate" the Idea exclusively or at all. It is "rather its own result", again. So it is "no less immediate than mediate." These categories don't apply, that is. Even Being (being!) and Essence are dialectical, moments merely of the Idea, the Absolute which it is, the Truth (213). Truth, that is, is more fundamental and final than Being. Truth indeed implies reflection, self-knowledge and freedom. These, more than being, are primordial.

The Idea, Hegel now says, "may be called reason" (214). This is the first of around twelve designations of it he now gives. Thus it is reason, subject-object, "unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body..." Hegel corrects some of these descriptions, as we may

whole recalls the parable of "the unjust steward", or even the wheat and the tares growing together till harvest or, most radically, the Pauline saying that the Crucified was "made sin for us". Is Biblical paradox an ancestor, an abiding figure even, of Hegelian contradiction?

⁸ We might even recall the old Jewish gentleman, accosted by latterday "salvationists" of one or the other stripe, who peacefully replied, "Well, why wouldn't God forgive me? After all, I have forgiven him!" Cp. also, again, Philip L. Reynolds, "Philosophy as the Handmaid of Theology: Aquinas on Christ's Causality", in *Contemplating Aquinas* (ed. Fergus Kerr), SCM London, 2003. Reynolds reports finding no account whatever in the whole of Aquinas as to how such an efficient "salvific" causality is supposed to operate. Aquinas only says it is "like", *quasi*, an efficient cause. This, Reynolds argues, commits one to nothing, even though a whole doctrine of grace might seem to be based on it. Regarding such "analogical reasoning", there "seems to be no way to determine what it adds."

also call them. Thus the infinite "overlaps and includes" the finite, as subjectivity objectivity, soul body (216). Yet the infinite which is infinite only, and so with the others, would "have no truth". This is "the doctrine of logic", of, we might say, the identity of subject and predicate which are yet, manifestly, different, different, that is, not merely as designators but in their designations. This doctrine was foreshadowed in the doctrine, taught by some medieval thinkers, of "the supposition of the predicate". It is not, that is, that the subject alone has reference but the predicate refers to or signifies the same thing. "Red" in "The rose is red" stands for the red rose. Thus the abstractions of judgment are healed, the focus shifting to the copula as also denoting an act of being (*actus essendi*). This "doctrine of logic" does not seem to be the doctrine of Frege as usually interpreted and which goes so far as to isolate a separate "is of identity". But identity rather is *the* logical relation. The gaoler is the same as the giver of the hemlock to Socrates, in "The gaoler gave the hemlock to Socrates". So any subsequent relation of these three or possibly four "substances" in a or the phenomenal world is neither here nor there, gets no hold whatever upon logic, where, Hegel argues, every aspect of the Notion, the Absolute Idea, is one with the Notion as such or "as a whole". In this way alone is reality "a judgment", a union of individual and universal, all along the line, so to say.

Thus "everything said of the Idea is self-contradictory... Understanding may demonstrate that the Idea is self-contradictory." Logic has shown and

shows that the subjective which is to be subjective only, the finite which would be finite only, the infinite which would be infinite only, and so on, have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass over into their opposites. Hence this transition (passing over), and the unity in which the extremes are merged and become factors, each with a merely reflected existence, reveals itself as their truth. (214, my parenthesis)

Logic shows this, that is the point, in its unity of extremes, coupling them in identity. To couple, to "copulate", is to identify, to make two one, as this one has previously, in the "subjective notion as notion" or *apprehensio simplex*, the moment of abstractiveness in the life, the developmentally dialectical advance of Mind, "illusion under which we live", been made two or many. Logic, as doing its work, always indeed divides the many into one and the rest, repeatedly as required. For in Reason and reasoning there are, again, no "polyadic" identities, just the dyad of unity. A is B and only as B is C. A is never B and C simply. Similarly, Mind is always, in consciousness and in its essence, just one and only one thought or "word", its act. This is, finally, the thought, as only possible thought, of itself. As

Aquinas had argued, the *finis ultimus* (here identified as God, absolute Idea, happiness⁹) is necessarily what is sought in any single *actus humanus* whatever. Theory and praxis thus fall together, are identified, in the Idea.

In this "Word" the thoughts of all, all words, are grouped as existent. That is, they are not really thus pre-"existent" (the theological figure) as prior to existence, *a priori* indeed. They are taken from there only in order to return, so as to be in themselves result as, all the same, determining End in unity.

All this is shown just by Logic and by our reflection upon it, it is claimed here, in this text. The text too is the ceaseless commentary upon itself. Logic, that is, its ceaseless contradiction, does not cease to be the warp and woof of all speech, *logoi*, and not merely the formal study or art, *ars logica*, elucidating this. So the "extremes" of the Idea, *qua* thought, proposition or judgment, however we shall designate them, are, as thus taken, "in their unity" and so not two. Yet the Understanding, just in such judgment "stamped with this concrete unity", takes them "as if they remained abstractions outside of it". Judgment is self-dismantlement, broken-backed, false. Thus the Understanding

overlooks even the nature of the copula, in the judgment, which affirms that the individual, or subject, is after all not individual, but universal. (214)

After all! This we have discussed exhaustively above, and however giddy the prospect or sick the sight of pure Spirit, of Mind casting away the discrete or "spaced" ladder of speech, it is too late to go back if the argument, the dialectic, holds so far. In some languages, spoken or written, there are no such spaces; indeed, they are a strictly calligraphic invention. Argument leads, anyhow, we follow, and that is the absolute humility or, equally, exaltation, of philosophy, of Spirit, saying, as it were, "Learn of me".

We remain with this finite Understanding, however, if we now accept this contradiction as such, at face value, so as to conclude that "the self-identical Idea contains its own negative, or contains contradiction", as if making here an "external reflection which does not lie within the Idea itself". This would be, so to say, the contradictory or self-dismantling view of contradiction itself. Rather, "the Idea itself is the dialectic which for ever divides and distinguishes", also here. The Idea first, not the abstractive understanding, "divides the self-identical from the differentiated... soul from body." "Only on these terms is it an eternal creation, eternal vitality, and eternal spirit". It is indeed the Idea, and could be nothing else, that

⁹ 159, end.

"translates itself into the abstract understanding", this giving it its title and license to operate. That alone is why the Understanding, in attempting critique of Reason, cuts off the branch upon which it sits and falls back to the Ground, to Reason again. The Idea, even thus, "forever remains Reason". The Understanding is not a separate, even a harmonising faculty, but Reason in a freely self-imposed "moment" of self-alienation or, again, differentiation in identity, such as is required intrinsically of all concrete or non-abstract identity, of the Unity. So the Idea is the dialectic, bestowing self-understanding upon "this mass of understanding and diversity". The dialectic "brings the diversity back to unity."

In calling this a "double movement" in the same paragraph as he speaks of a "double misunderstanding" of the understanding he seems to give the latter the means of self-correction. It is not "separate or distinct in time" from the eternal or "timeless" "vision of itself in the other" which is what the Idea is (and why there is no time). It is because the Idea is this that the other is the same as it. "I and my Father are one", words penned by an author of the *koinonia* four centuries after Aristotle had identified the Thought which thinks itself. And now here is Hegel, and we reading him. This too is the deeper reason why, as Aquinas noted, the soul is only self-known in its knowledge of others, even of other "things" (in making a mathematical operation, say). It is, it too, the "vision of itself in the other" and even the Idea (160). Thus the Idea is "the notion which in its objectivity has carried out itself", "object which is inward design, essential subjectivity".

These "different modes of apprehending the idea", not mere designations after all, are "more or less formal. They designate some one stage of the specific notion." The Notion has only its own character *qua* notion, viz. the total character. *Non aliquo modo est, sed est, est*, as Augustine, again, wrote of God, no doubt grasping essentially the same truth. The grasp, in fact, is the free self-constituting of Mind itself, the "pure Act" which is not merely its act, but it. This, too, is final Objectivity, the *Gegenstand* which is final and entire reflection back on Self, on Self, not thereby myself or yourself, but the Socratic self-knowing which is "absolute knowledge", "the total character" of individual become itself, i.e. universal. This is Thought, Conception, Concept, "the infinite judgment, of which the terms are severally the independent totality", i.e. just what they could not be unless these "several" terms had identical designation. Each, just in "the fullness of its own nature... passes into the other". "I am that". In this way we might also call the Idea "absolute negativity", adding "and for that reason dialectical", right within its own nature. That is, it is not we who do dialectic, who "dialogue" with or upon it.

The Idea thus grasped as a process "runs through" what Hegel designates as Life and Knowledge to the Absolute Idea, where it comes to rest. Since the first two of these terms are merely taken from finite experience we must be careful of taking even "Absolute Idea" too absolutely, as if it is an Idea specified as absolute. The Notion, we have just seen, is essentially unspecified, total. It is, we might say, the final and inexpressible (unspecifiable) truth of consciousness as such, of *conscientia*, as that which it is, knowing all things, ultimately persons, spirits, with or within one another and only so. As System, therefore, it depends, for its own part, upon the being, the being-there, of each one of them as, finally, End or *finis*.

XXIX

LIFE

"The *immediate* idea is Life" (216). We have, however, just seen that the Idea, as the "result of this course of dialectic" (213, *Zus.*), is mediate. Yet it is not mediate only, since it mediates itself as "its own result". Hence it is "no less immediate than mediate", which is to say that this category or quasi-category is abrogated¹ in regard to that function, inasmuch as it is itself that *thinks* the categories *in* thinking itself. Hence the "stages" it mediates, the categories proper hitherto, are not "something permanent" in their distinctions. As dialectical they are, and this is "the only truth", themselves "dynamic elements of the idea" (213, *Zus.*). "The Idea itself is the dialectic", therefore. It "is the infinite judgment" (214). Yet, or just therefore rather, "the Idea is *in the first place* only the one universal *substance*" (213).

As the Idea is (a) a process, it follows that such an expression for the Absolute as unity of thought and being, of finite and infinite, etc. is false; for unity expresses an abstract and merely quiescent identity. As the Idea is (b) subjectivity, it follows that the expression is equally false on another account. That unity of which it speaks expresses a merely virtual or underlying presence of the genuine unity. The infinite would thus seem to be merely *neutralised* by the finite, the subjective by the objective, thought by being. But in the negative unity of the Idea, the Infinite overlaps and includes the finite, thought overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity. The unity of the Idea is thought, infinity, and subjectivity, and is in consequence to be essentially distinguished from the Idea as substance, just as this overlapping subjectivity, thought or infinity is to be distinguished from the one/sided subjectivity, one/sided thought, one/sided infinity to which it descends in judging and defining. (215)

This passage should be born in mind when considering our frequent references above to Hegel's concluding affirmation in the final section of

¹ For mediate *vis à vis* immediate, see *Enc.* 70-78. All references here, as previously stated, are to the *Encyclopaedia* unless otherwise indicated.

the Greater Logic of the ultimate *identity* of the Idea and or with being, identity as final self-abrogating species of unity, so to say. See also 95 (for rejection of the "neutralisation" mentioned) though the whole paragraph should be consulted when studying the citation above from 215:

The negation of the negation is not a neutralisation: the infinite is the affirmative, and it is only the finite which is absorbed. (95)

This one-way absorption or "overlapping" of the finite by the infinite is mentioned in several places, in connection with the "falsity" of the finite taken on its own, and is thus not "one/sided" in the sense Hegel repeatedly criticises.

So the Idea as Life is also one of those many ways, of which around twelve are given (214), in which the Idea "may be described", the "unity of soul and body", "inward design". This unity, however, is also that "of the ideal and the real", "of the finite and infinite". It is also "the possibility which has its actuality in its own self", "that of which the nature can be thought only as existent". Life, meanwhile, is only the Idea immediate. "The *immediate* idea is life" (216). Hegel's view here coincides completely, therefore, with the old tag, *viventibus vivere esse*.

All these ways, meanwhile, even that last Anselmian moment (unity of the ideal and the real), coalesce, therefore, in the immediacy he calls Life, identified with soul (German *Seele*) or the realisation of the Notion "in a body". Soul here is *anima, psyche*, and the background is clearly Aristotelian.² Hegel declares elsewhere (*Enc. III*, "The Philosophy of Spirit") that Aristotle has written the only book of value on the soul (*Seele*). Thus "the soul is the immediate self-relating universality" of that "externality" which is the body, an ex-tension as having, definitionally, "parts outside parts" (216), *partes extra partes*, an expression of clear late or Renaissance Scholastic provenance. Yet the body is nothing apart from the soul particularising it. Abstracted from *anima*, its form, the body is mere *materia prima* or *potentia* for life, for *Seele*. Thus, "in this way", "life is essentially something alive", says Hegel, almost in direct quotation of Plato's *Phaedo*. As immediate, therefore, as we shall see further, it is "this individual living thing".

Whether by coincidence or design Hegel is closely following Aquinas, the medieval thinker who not only penetrated deepest into the actual mind of Aristotle but succeeded in depositing this transforming influence deep into Christian tradition and scholarship, too deep, maybe, for the general understanding. Thus even he himself continued to write in or fall back into

² Cp. Hegel's earlier *Science of Logic* of 1812, where this is more brought out.

the old way, referring to both soul and body as "incomplete substances", for example. Yet if the soul is "the form of the body" then the body is "nothing other" than the soul, "expresses no other distinctions" (Hegel 216), as we have stressed also in our previous chapter here, in consequent rejection, with Hegel, of all such seeming dualism. For soul "is the Individuality of the body as infinite negativity". It is

the dialectic of that bodily objectivity, with its parts lying outside of one another, conveying them away from the semblance of individual subsistence back into subjectivity... (216)

Further,

So far is life from being incomprehensible that in it the very notion is presented to us, or rather the immediate idea existing as a notion. And having said this, we have indicated the defect of life. Its notion and reality do not thoroughly correspond with one another. The notion of life is the soul, and this notion has the body for its reality. The soul is, as it were, infused into its corporeity; and in that way it is at first sentient only, and not yet freely self-conscious. The process of life consists in getting the better of the immediacy with which it is still beset: and this process, which is itself threefold (cf. 215, *Zus.*), results in the idea under the form of judgment, i.e. the idea as Cognition. (216, *Zus.*, parenthesis added)

This cognition, for Hegel as for Aristotle, is a form of death (*athanatizein*) and not merely a dying. It is thus "the entry into spirit", Hegel affirms in *The Phenomenology of Mind*. He thus remains true to that element of "natural" Platonism, no longer a dualism here, however, but a final monism represented in Christian imagery as a "spiritual body".

We need here to forget that phenomenal construct we call Man. In Aquinas's terms Hegel would be referring to "the unicity of the substantial form", the ultimate difference, "particularisation". This supersedes or takes away (*aufhebt*) all other specificities as making anything what it is, uniquely and exclusively, its "what" in virtue of which it is at all. *Forma dat esse*. The alternative "bundle theory" of a "hierarchy" of forms is thus far a mere travesty of the Aristotelian scheme it is imposed upon. For such a theory reflects the *temporal* succession merely, the stages of growth of living things. Thus it considers a foetus passing through the vegetable and animal to the rational stage as if it retained the earlier identities, as if animality and later rationality were merely added on, instead of transforming or taking over. To this Aquinas says, anticipating Hegel, that the metaphysician must speak a different language to that of the abstractive logician. Things are what they are and, as with the dialectic,

which they indeed instantiate, not a compound with that out of which they developed themselves, as truth too is not compounded with the error out of which it arises (212, *Zus.*). It is in this sense that they "spring fully armed from the head of Jupiter", like Minerva. Connected with this is a critical or mediated view of Time and a corresponding refusal to absolutise the evolutionary aspect of phenomena.

Aquinas insists, consistently with this and with all the rigour of the later Hegelian dialectic, that the intellectual soul, the *intellect*, is "form of the body", informs or gives it form and hence being. There are no other materials in the materialist sense, but only the *potentia* to this form as act, act of just this potentiality and as such complete.³ There is, in other words, no body at all. It is an abstraction of the Understanding, abetted by the likeness of a corpse (German *Leiche*) to the person we knew sensually. Corpse and soul, however, as "different ingredients", just for these reasons show up "only... when the living being is dead". That is, there are not ingredients of him or her, or even of Fido the dog. The matter becomes less clear the lower down the scale of beings we go, however. It is the element of truth in the Aristotelian theory of substance, even allowing for the constitution of substance in the mind of the Subject, finite or infinite. McTaggart argues that as developed and transformed by Hegel, where substance yields or gives way to subject, only our notion of a person, in an absolute or perfect unity where each counts for or contains or, I would add, even "begets"⁴ all, can accommodate it.⁵

Death, anyhow, belongs to the alienation we habitually call nature and it is as Nature that the divisive or abstractive Understanding is constituted. Hence the corrective to Understanding claimed in the rational dialectic of both Logic and Spirit is *a priori*, from "within" and not from Nature thus defined or understood. Here, too, incidentally, and this is no mere analogy, the previous contribution of Kant, or indeed of Aristotle, is no part of Hegel's final dialectical result. What Hegel calls Nature, we might add, is, in accordance with his general dialectical praxis, a name taken from the phenomena of "experience", i.e. from our system of language, for an internal exigency of the dialectic, viz. that of the external procession

³ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII.

⁴ Cf. our "Begotten not Made", *The Downside Review*, January 2006, No. 434, pp. 1-21.

⁵ J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge 1901, ch. 2. It is crude Procrusteanism, as Peter Geach points out in his rigorous study of McTaggart, *Truth, Love and Immortality* (C.U.P. Press 1977), to unreflectingly group this philosopher with "the British idealists".

and/or alienation of the Idea. As such it is logically created. "Logic... is nothing but creation".⁶

That just Intellect as such forms the natural, the external, as *forma corporis*, is sufficient explanation of the finitude of the immediate, of this "sphere" of Life, "beset" in its essence with immediacy (216, *Zus.*) and thus in essential process of "getting the better" of it. This is, after the essential Individuality, *Einzelheit* ("corporeity"), of Life, a second mark of its finitude prior to its final, yet all the time implicit, disclosure as Kind, "with essential universality of nature" (220). The German word Hegel uses, *Gattung* (of course the German word for Kind or genus) derives, as accomplished act (suffix *-ung*), from the names for spouses, *Gatte*, *Gattin*. Espousal, the "appointment for one another", "affinity of the sexes", is thus lifted more easily into the sphere of dialectical necessities along with Kind (220). The Individual, it has anyway been firmly established in study of the "Subjective Notion", is the universal. "I" is, or rather I am, "the universal of universals" (20, 24 *Zus.*).⁷ It is the totality of reality, of which it is not therefore a mere part but is itself the individual which reality itself is, End, that is to say. Hence the individual has, each and every time, within itself the unity of the whole system. This follows already from the category of Realised End as well as what is said of the Notion from the beginning of this third part of the Logic. It is hence, as identical, inseparable from it or necessary. The Scholastics spoke of "intentional identity" in knowing. Hegel brings out what has to be meant by this, a real identity, namely, of what is nonetheless differentiated, not a mere modified or partial identity, if such were even conceivable. Rather, I am,

⁶ Hegel, as reported by V. Gioberti (1801-1852). This basic method which is itself both motor and result and essence of the dialectic itself is nonetheless guided or monitored at times by empirical considerations, in view of the unpredictable or stochastic element in Nature, its imperfect rationality, and this is even a feature of the dialectic itself (its need, our need, to proceed at times in zigzag fashion). Cf. Alison Stone, *Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel's Philosophy*, SUNY Press, 2005, who distinguishes this strong reading from the "weak" one holding that Hegel "tailors" his system to the latest empirical scientific perceptions or theories. He adjusts it, if at all, not so much "at the edges", however, as simply in his choice of language. This reading is more cogent as illustrating Hegel's *praxis* more than as retailing unambiguous methodological statement by him. It also allows for Hegel's thought to remain relevant through various later more or less radical developments of empirical science.

⁷ Cf. GL (the Greater Logic), "*Die Idee des Erkennens*", Suhrkamp, Band 6, pp. 487-498, for an exhaustive and indeed biting rebuttal of the merely formalistic Kantian treatment of this truth and of the contradictions and absurdities into which it falls.

under whatever aspect, what I am not under another, if even that is not too weakly expressed. This necessity is immortality, properly understood, not a contradictory continuance of specifically mortal or immediate life but a separation of reference, a passing over or transition such as characterises the dialectic as a whole. Thought thinks itself, in a merely seeming (or dialectical) process or procession towards its "result". All is accomplished (212, *Zus.*).

Hegel has set forth the "ideal", so to say, of the Realised End as a necessity of Reason⁸, to be further decoded under the modalities of Cognition. It is therefore not inconsistent to insist here, in GL especially, on an in some respects inadequate manifestation of the Idea in this its immediacy, in Life. The paradox is there already in the fact that Intellect itself functions as *Seele*, as Life. It is the living life-principle, *anima*, of, essentially, the individual, just in that it is *quodammodo omnia* (Aristotle), in a sense all things.⁹ This only seeming paradox is the ultimate truth of the individual as abstractly conceived or posited, i.e. it is not the same "abstraction" as that of the term "individuality". This, rather, is the abstraction of an abstraction. This truth of the individual means that he or she is "ruined" from inception, is taken up (*aufgehoben*) within the Whole¹⁰ as never having been or to be separated from it. That, and not Kind, is the abstraction the category of **Realised End** proximately overcomes.

Thus Life "is a contradiction" (221, *Zus.*) and so the "death of merely immediate and individual vitality is the 'procession' of spirit" (222). Hegel finds a reflection of this in "the Affinity of the sexes" as incarnated in their coupling (the Judgment). Thus he finds intellectual or cognitional significance in this spiritual reality drawn, like the term Kind itself, from the phenomenal world of the animals. Man and woman, the sexes, become one spirit with each other in this act, he seems to be saying¹¹, producing indeed their own "in kind", the *Kind* (German for "child").

Life then is the first or non-mediated expression or, as category, attempt to think the unity of subjective notion and objectivity reached as Idea, "truth in itself and for itself", thought become thinker, so to say. This is

⁸ This is the true Ground of the classical Argument from Natural Desire, which is in fact a desire for absolute knowledge or to "see God", inclusive just as such of blessedness (159).

⁹ Cp. the later Franciscan exclamation, *Deus meus et omnia*, my God and all things (not "my God and my all", as it is sometimes piously rendered, as if the "all" were an individual subject's self-limiting choice).

¹⁰ Accordingly Hegel quotes the text "God wills all men to be saved" as declaring "that subjectivity has an infinite value" (147, *Zus.*).

¹¹ But cp. I *Corinthians* 6, 16-17, also *Ephesians* 5, 28-33.

"the form of external existence" succeeding upon the united idealities or "conceptions" of formal logic and of an End as realised, what it might possibly be. Hence the Idea is first of all that limitless possibility of Truth as such. For since anything is true insofar as it is Truth, in itself and for itself, this is possibility, this openness of the free consciousness. This openness, or Idea, cannot be closed, it is destroyed or confined by being closed. So we "have nothing to do with the individual, nor with figurate conceptions", as in religion, "nor with external things" (213). Yet, or rather, thus, "everything actual, in so far as it is true... is the Idea... Every individual being" as true "is some one aspect of the Idea" while no such beings severally more than appear "to have a self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and in their relation that the notion is realised."

This appearance is what is immediately apprehended as Life, under which all things, the System of Realised End, would be a living organism, an organic unity, in which each only had being and functioned in the Life or Being of the whole System. Such individuals, however, subject to death as hands can be severed, are not yet universals, as it has been established they should be and each and every one of them the universal. This entails both their necessity and their identity, which is only so to say covered under the rubric of a creatively active cognition eventually seen as absolute, as seeing and having all that is conceived and conceivable in itself. This indeed is, necessarily and logically, the manner in which each and every individual is for itself as End. Such a type or "kind" of individuals can only be Persons, are, precisely, what we call Persons, the End realised, in "inner design" with all possible means (*media*) superseded.

Life, however, appears as intrinsically individualised, but by the body, by "matter" as *principium individuationis*. This matter though is unknowable as being nothing actual, the potential merely upon which the life-principle, *Seele*, works and, we might say, depends so as to be what it is, "first act of an organised body having life potentially", in Aristotle's definition. This is misleading, however, if we forget that it is the *Seele* alone which does the organising, right up to the extent of effecting or informing the organs. It is thus more active than, say, a genetic code that the matter involved merely follows. It would have to fashion such a code as well, in making the entity concerned what it is. By the parameters of the Notion then it must be embedded in and hence identified with absolute knowledge, *quodammodo omnia*. Nothing less fashions the individual and yet supra-individual person. This is the truth hinted at in the doctrine of Innate Ideas, its deep Platonic roots. Our ideas, that is, are not "a foreign importation", but nor is development of what is thus implicit, "mediation"

that is to say, set aside (161, *Zus.*). These ideas are "mere capacity", albeit universal, for, in other terms, *omne ens est verum* and *veritas est in mente* (67 and *Zus.*).

An organ is thus a psychic accomplishment. Thus it is that *anima est quodammodo omnia* and this not merely in that the soul "intentionally" becomes what it knows. Nature, in its apparent reversal of this, shows its finitude or falsity when taken as anything other than the backcloth of conditions for this dialectical plant's growth and nourishment of itself from within. Thus for Hegel history too is dialectical.

From Nature, all the same, this category of Life, of a necessary individual life, which yet will have to embrace all, its name at least, is taken. Hegel, McTaggart rightly says, "connects the immediacy of Life with the possibility of an inadequate manifestation" of this universal "organism" (*Commentary*, 266), of death as we might say.

It is the rooting of Mind or Thought itself in immediate life, "individual vitality" which has, in realised Kind, in the category or conception thereof, to yield up itself to "the 'procession' of spirit" (222). "All that lives must die", says Hamlet's wicked uncle, himself a murderer or voluntary life-taker. The life-principle, *Seele*, "in a sense", as intellectual and therefore totally universal, "all things", is yet, in absolute contradiction, life-principle of the individual and moulding cause of its "body" or, that is to say, of itself. It is a kind of outpost of eternity and design set up amid the forces of disintegration and destruction "continually on the spring" (219, *Zus.*) to re-take the position. Thus we have the cholera or whatever reclaimed Hegel close on two centuries ago now, the tree-branch that fatally concussed the ass-born Aquinas, on his way to the Council of Lyons, five or six centuries previously. Aristotle concurs, inasmuch as he likens *epagoge*, the formation-process as such of ideas "in the soul" where the universal "comes to rest", to a scattered group of retreating soldiers turning to form a line of battle, Latin *acies*, thus halting the disintegrative rout¹², the dying which is daily living. Thought once thought, the stand once taken, however, abides, though it is only figuratively, as bound to this still finite category, that we say it "lives on". Such figure, however, as Ricoeur and others, have demonstrated, is the very warp and woof of language, even the language Hegel must use to incarnate his thought, as he recognises in asserting the falsity of the subject-predicate form, i.e. of the form of saying anything at all. This world of sign and signification is investigated further in *Encyclopaedia* III (esp. 445-461). So it was said, again, that *viventibus esse est vivere*, for the living to be is to live. Yet Life and Being are distinct categories. Hence one may exclaim, "●h life that is

¹² Aristotle, *Post. An.* II, 17.

no life at all" (Teresa of Avila) or even "I live now, yet not I" (Paul of Tarsus). One may teach a man to "hate his life in this world so as to keep it in life eternal" or, the same source teaches, in "knowing God", absolute knowledge surely being meant.

This is the background to Hegel's unpopular claim that an art-work, though non-living, can have more value, as vehicle of Spirit, than some living example of Nature, like an animal or plant. God is spoken of as living, from our finite standpoint, yet Spirit seeks to conquer self, the finite or "abstract" individual. "Nothing must bind me to life"¹³, Spirit exclaims. This is the condition, this universalisation, for the proceeding of Spirit Hegel invokes (222).

With Life then we have new imperfection, so to say, along with new horizons, mirroring the subsequent procession *ad extra* of Nature herself as dictated by the essence, the Concept, of the Absolute Idea, *diffusivum sui* indeed. "The idea exists free for itself in so far as it has universality for the medium of its existence" (223). Thus, just so, it "is its own object", i.e. there is no longer an Object, Objectivity. It is, was, a "moment". One can remark here a kind of aesthetic canon, "inner design" one might almost say again, to Hegel's choice of form, of shape, to his Logic as living thought, how it is divided up so as to be set out and "take" form. The dialectic bends back to advance, it moves from side to side. One notes something similar in the main *Summa* of Aquinas, no more a mere sum than this is an encyclopaedia, the way, for example, his account of the four kinds of law (in Ia-IIae) bends back upon itself, in a circularity, the last being first. Wisdom plays indeed, and thus alone, as in a game of riddles, is the prize released, the prize which is herself.

All this is included under *Seele*. Its imperfection explains why immortality is not best conceived under this rubric. The Subject should rather recall, as is stated at the beginning of *Genesis (Torah)*, that he or she, once given, is and can only be given as "image and likeness" of what is absolute, the Idea. I live now, yet not I. This corresponds to the correctives supplied by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* to what he says in the rational biology or psychology (*On the Soul*), such as that the soul is "the place of forms ... but only in its thinking capacity" (429a 28-30). At *Metaphysics* VII he makes clear that the intellectual soul as ultimate difference is the true and final reality and not the composite we call man.¹⁴

¹³ Beethoven, *Notebooks (diaries)*.

¹⁴ There was always this paradox in the theology of Incarnation, that God "becomes what he was not before", that is, eternally. But what he is eternally is his essence and being, and not an assumed or "put on" nature. Therefore this nature is itself intrinsically mere appearance (i.e. not, as in Docetism, the mere individual

It is in this sense, as also the *De anima* well brings out, that sensation too is a form of thinking, is in fact *quaedam ratio* (Aquinas). But "the mind is separable" because it alone is, as the Notion. It is, as compared to the senses, "as a bent line to itself when pulled out straight" (Aristotle, 429b 18, recalling the line of battle corresponding to the universal coming to rest in the soul, i.e. to the presence of soul itself as act and not as substance, in *Post. An.* II 17). This straightening is the transcendence or *Aufhebung* of the bentness, of the bent line, as henceforth mere phenomenality or "appearance" (Hegel, *Enc.* 130, 131). This is the "deeper insight" that "reveals God as creating the world out of nothing" (128, *Zus.*).

Anima est quodammodo omnia (Aristotle, 431b 21-22). For this reason Aristotle denies the possibility of a material or physical tool of thought. It would "appear beside" or get in the way, as *paremphenomenon* (429a 20), of that absolute identification, "reaching right up to the reality" (Wittgenstein), which absolutely and alone constitutes thought as thought, which yet, or just therefore, thinks only itself. It is "actually nothing until it thinks", while

In the case of things without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for speculative knowledge is the same as its object. (430a 8-9) ... Mind does not think intermittently. When isolated it is its true self and nothing more ... (*eodem loco*, 22-23).

That is, the object is the knowledge or method. This is exactly what Hegel claims for the Dialectic, its concept or Notion.

*

Seele, that is, Life, has to be transcended, overcome, both dialectically and as that within which we (seem to) find ourselves. *Media vitae in morte sumus*. In the midst of life we are in death. We die daily. I have said you are gods, but you shall die like cattle. These are the paradoxes, this is the "absolute contradiction" of Life, entailing death.

nature assumed, but just human nature as such, realised however as always, by Hegel's logic, in its own individuality) and one cannot finally distinguish, therefore, the *kenosis* of incarnation from the eternal process of the Word as other within God. This, indeed, receives its final face as the Spirit within and indeed forming the community of spirit(s) identical with or in possession of one another in the Notion.

The Thomistic principle that the intellective soul is also, and not just by accident or contingently, *forma corporis*, could also of course be taken, or attempted to be taken, in the opposite, "reductive" way. Such a making of it to be finite is the self-contradictory assigning of it to the realm of nature or alienation, excluding Philosophy of Mind as such. All would be a kind of internal "understanding" (between the individuals of the Kind), unable to recognise or proclaim itself meaningfully or objectively as such, as we seem to find among the ants or the bees. In this way Absolute Idealism, as overcoming this contradiction, is the only possible, as ultimate, Realism.

Thus we noted that Hegel declares himself against a theory of evolution such as Darwin was to systematise, up to a point, in the next generation. He says that

It is a completely empty thought to represent species as developing successively, one after the other, in time... The land animal ~~did not~~ develop naturally ~~out of~~ the aquatic animal, ~~nor did~~ it fly into the air ~~on~~ leaving the water.¹⁵

We need to attend to the phraseology, to Hegel's fastening of attention upon the real or individual animal, that *this* did not self-transform in this way: it is, though, as if he tries to attend to the exemplar and "real" individual as one, while it is a fact that amphibians, for example, or caterpillars, do develop in just this way. Why is it "a completely empty thought"? Because, simply, it is not philosophy, not thought's thinking of itself and of all else in that one unitary act. For Hegel, we noted, even history is as such or in itself dialectical, i.e. it is not "history" in the usual unthematized, merely phenomenal sense. History is indeed travelling towards the absolute omega-point and/or noosphere (Teilhard de Chardin). But its departure from biology or "natural history" into this sphere of thought, where "all is accomplished" (cf. 212, *Zus.*), is itself not so much a temporal separation as it is a dialectical advance or distinction, *epoche* rather than epoch.¹⁶ The last is indeed the first. Only in this "dialectical" sense is the Infinite "dependent" upon the finite, "is its own result", in Hegel's words. Nothing of course is its own result. Categories of result and cause have been transcended earlier on, back in Essence.

This is "the illusion under which we live", that the end is not "accomplished", the illusion that is Time, and Nature and natural process

¹⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature* (i.e. *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, II), 247-251 with the additions

¹⁶ Teilhard de Chardin explicitly abstains from this further, "philosophical" consideration, wishing to limit his role, he says, to that of natural scientist.

and all contingency belong to this illusion. What is put (*gesetzt*) as last might just as well be put as first. As sketches of ourselves the animals might just as well be reminiscences as creatively originaive, an ambiguity retained in the very notion of a "sketch". Memory is equally creative, while hypotheses such as evolution "merely translate the senseless side-by-sideness of things in Space into the equally senseless before-and-after of states in Time", comments Findlay in interpretation. Yet this is more "absolutely" true than Findlay appears to recognise or grant, whether for Hegel or for himself. Somewhat Averroistically, in the sense of "double truth" associated with Siger of Brabant, he says that "from a philosophical standpoint" the world (he says "the Natural World") "is timeless and a-historical", since the "well attested... aeons of past development contribute nothing to our understanding of it". The point is, though, that in that case they are not and were not, are indeed "the illusion under which we live" (212 *Zus.*, 209). This returns us to Life, the category of an intrinsically individual life-form. This, taken as the Idea, is a further attempt to allow for, incorporate or retain individuals, but both abstractly and non-abstractly at the same time. It both identifies each individual as the universal and retains the plurality. It is therefore effectively a repeat or modified version of the "philosophy of absolute contradiction" that Hegel had identified in Leibniz's system (194). According to this system, as now considered, the whole is not to be thought unless as individual. Each such individual aspect or mirror of the whole is itself, while considered, simply the whole. I, as was stated at the beginning, am the universal of universals and one with the Absolute or Infinite, the Realised End in fact. Is not this the terminus at which the whole dialectic had been aiming, we might want to ask? Why is Hegel going to prolong the agony and toil, so to say?

In fact we have here only the exact mirror-image or reversal of that final and absolute Idea which engulfs and supersedes all that is particular in what is the true self-transcendence in universality of the Individual. What is proposed here is like being forgiven while retaining the offence, to quote the wicked uncle-king again. Life can do no other, essentially individual as it is in concept, and hence it must yield to Cognition, where alone self and other, all other, Self and All (absolute subjectivity) can be one. It is the biologism of biological science, now expressed in evolutionary theory, which requires philosophy to negate and go beyond it, go beyond Life as a category.

This step is taken in the two immediately emerging categories, Life-Process and, again, **Kind**. This however has to be shown, the way has to be prepared, in a step by step emergence from or setting aside of the category of an individual living being or Life, the successive steps Hegel

calls Sensibility, Irritability and Reproduction. These steps are indeed categories, "separate subdivisions of the category of Life". Hence "the third seems to be taken as a synthesis of the other two, and to form the transition to the next category", the Life-Process.¹⁷ It is merely their names that are borrowed from a contemporary but now obsolete biology, and so their functional role in this *a priori* dialectic is evident.¹⁸

To ask if a category is true or not... is the very question upon which everything turns... In common life truth means agreement of an object with our conception of it. We thus presuppose an object to which our conception must conform. In the philosophical sense of the word, on the other hand, truth may be described, in general abstract terms, as the agreement of a thought-content with itself... God alone is the thorough harmony of notion and reality. All finite things involve an untruth: they have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not meet the requirements of the notion (e.g. Nature). For this reason they must perish... It is in the kind that the individual animal has its notion: and the kind liberates itself from this individuality by death... The study of truth, or, as it is here explained to mean, consistency... And the question comes to this: What are the forms of the infinite, and what are the forms of the finite?... it is from conforming to finite categories in thought and action that all deception originates... Truth may be ascertained by several methods, each of which, however, is no more than a form. Experience is the first of these methods. But the method is only a form, it has no intrinsic value of its own... Reflection... The most perfect method of knowledge (truth) proceeds in the pure form of thought... entire freedom. That the form of thought is the perfect form... is the general dogmas of all philosophy. (24, *Zus.*, my parenthesis)

Hegel goes on, from the above citation here, to compare this "disruption" of our "immediate knowledge" to the "Mosaic legend of the Fall of Man", his loss of the "natural unity" of the former, which actually occurs already in the emergence of abstraction (the Understanding) and hence of language itself. This is the difference between man and "the natural world" he thus "leaves", since "for the spirit it is a duty to be free", free of the evil of subjectivity ("his evil is to be subjective"). So "The term 'Objective Thoughts' indicates the truth... absolute object of Philosophy" throughout (25), as the form of consciousness. It thus becomes the aim of the

¹⁷ Cf. McTaggart, *op. cit.*, 267, commenting rather on the "Greater Logic". The triple scheme, further worked out by Schelling, goes back to one Haller, W. Wallace, Hegel's Victorian translator, informs.

¹⁸ On the *a priori*, rather than seeing being as abstracted from experience in making an absolute generalisation, Hegel rather sees experience (of being) as reminding one of this Notion as a category and hence as true.

succeeding three chapters of the *Encyclopaedia*, covering the same ground as "my Phenomenology of the Spirit", Hegel says (25), to reach this form "in the shape of a result". This form is one with the Form of Logic itself, the Notion, inclusive of all logical forms.

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We emphasise again that what occurs here is a setting aside, an overcoming of "the illusion under which we live" (my stress), of Life itself. There was always a certain hesitation about whether to include intellectual or spiritual life under *bios* or whether to view this as analogically life merely. The dilemma however is not much more than linguistic and thus conventional. Life of plant or animal is in reality, in Logic ultimately, a dialectical moment only, inclusive of all phenomena or "things which are seen", such as "eating and drinking" or "giving in marriage". We have found this reflected in the view that *Seele*, *anima intellectualis*, is at once intellect as it is *forma corporis* or "first act" of it, of "the body". Hence it is nothing but such an act, being the human bodily substance's "ultimate difference", thus *forming* and so in a sense being the whole (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII). Aristotle also says,

The mind is a form which employs forms, and sense is a form which employs the forms of sensible objects. (*On the Soul*, 432a).

He means here intelligible forms, which "reside in" the sensible forms. So the notions are not the mental pictures without which they cannot occur. So the soul is in a certain way "all existing things". Just as such it is not itself a thing at all, but act. The form of body is ultimately Act, knowledge identical with its object. "Mind does not think intermittently", is even "immortal and everlasting". It "makes all things" and "is actually nothing, until it thinks" or, rather, he should say, is nothing without that it thinks. This separability of mind, however, is really the annihilation of the non-mental, so that it can only think itself, and this is Aristotle's final metaphysical conclusion, which Hegel clearly retraces, amends and fills out.

The interpretation of this apparent doubleness of *Seele*, of Life-Principle, is precisely that Life is an imperfect and hence transient category, a "moment". It is even the very name for the transience of phenomena and, hence, the denial of itself. "In the midst of life we are in death". Yet Life is spoken of as in victorious conflict with Death, in religious terms, in the Passion of Christ as God-Man supremely. In reality, however, there is a "passing over" (*transitus*) from life to a beyond life,

call it **Cognition**, *visio beatifica*, a phrase retaining still the metaphor of phenomenal sight, the Absolute Idea. "I go to the Father". This going, however, is, again, its own result. Spirit returns to where it is and was ever-present, since Life is finite and hence illusory or false, though even as such necessary.

In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. (212, *Zus.*)

The Idea is intrinsically dialectical, to the point where it *is* dialectic or Reason, the Method itself, of thought as such and its "history". The "method is not an extraneous form, but the soul and notion of the content" (243), even though all the elements of the Notion each "appear as the totality of the notion."

The first of these three steps towards the Life-Process (215, esp. the *Zusatz*), "which consists in such a self-maintenance of the **Organism** by means of its external relations" (McTaggart, *Comm.* 268), Hegel calls Sensibility. All three of these sub-categories turn upon this question of an external relation which is yet internal (the equivalence established back in "The Doctrine of Essence") and are thus easily conflated at first appearance. The difficulty, the subtlety, of the conception is anchored by Hegel's choice, which is also insight, to treat of Life as intrinsically individual. This in fact is the distinguishing mark of the category, mediating between **Realised End** and **Cognition** precisely as objectively universalising the individual *qua* individual (realised Kind), the notion thereof, in accordance with the findings within the sections on Subjective Notion and Syllogism in particular. There is no question of reversion to an "abstract universal" (as opposed to a "system universal"), as McTaggart charges in his *Commentary* of 1910.

Life is "beset" by an immediacy incompatible with the final result and so requiring, indeed, aspiring, to be got rid of" (216, *Zus.*). This condition is stressed more in the *Encyclopaedia* than is the original paradigm for life of **Organism**, as *partially* transcending a model of Whole and Parts (135). It is a Process, including as elements the three processes or indeed syllogisms, of Mechanism, Chemism and Teleology (198, 201, 207), Hegel says, as themselves severally and consecutively proceeding or processing. The living being is said to coalesce with itself as, it seems, essentially a process towards Cognition, where Self and **Other** are one. Inside itself, firstly, the (individual) living being "reduces its corporeity to its object or its inorganic nature" (which is trans-corporeal). In this process

it ever produces itself ("reproduction" in this special sense) in "actions" of the several organs, in each of which the whole is felt or experienced, whether of the living individual or of reality as the whole or total system, the Idea. Any **Organism** as such is affected by what is outside and contiguous to it. The very word "contiguous" already negates the absoluteness of externality though it is found more characteristically in Hume than in Hegel. Impressions are thus communicated to whatever tangential part of the organism is felt in unity by the whole. That they are sometimes felt as pain, or spontaneously rejected in the feeling of them, corresponds to or manifests the contradictions within this category as finite. That is, pain, *qua* contradiction, is to be expected *a priori*, as, therefore, is an "organism" capable of feeling it. Blessedness belongs with the infinity, thought alone as thinking itself.

Hegel calls this susceptibility to the external Sensibility. Yet it is only *exemplified* in what is commonly called Sensibility, in biology or daily living. The Sensibility here attributed categorically to "all existence" is of a different, more general order. It means that everything is "in touch", connected, with everything "else", fundamentally or as Ground or cause and effect, necessary to the whole as that to it.

From this there follows continuous affect (as an "effect") upon what is outside and contiguous to it, at the point of contact yet by means of the integral *Seele*. This, an action of the whole organism *qua* living, he calls Irritability. It is, however, more of a complement to Sensibility than it is the antithesis or pure negation often found in earlier "second" categories.¹⁹

These two processes together make up what he calls, again, Reproduction, meaning the organism's self-maintenance through temporal or other vicissitudes with or by means of these external contacts which are yet, or even *ipso facto*, internal or intrinsic to it. The Whole is Part, the Part Whole; hence both are abrogated. In GL Hegel says that such Reproduction may be called Feeling (*Gefühl*), the very sense of self, as enabling it to be, in "reproduction", precisely what it feels, or in a higher stage wills or chooses, itself to be. Such Reproduction leads us into the Life-Process (219). This will give way then to **Kind** or genus (220).

Reproduction, in this sense, is the means, in relation to what is "outside" it, of the **Organism's** (capital letter here as using the word to stand for the truth of organic life, even though not maybe expressly naming a category,

¹⁹ In an analogous way, in Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, the *sed contra* of an Article is often found, particularly in articles proximate to the end of the *quaestio* treated, to develop more than it contradicts the initial *objectiones*, which are just "put", objected, as first adumbrations of the conclusion in the body of the article rather than as what we would call objections to it.

as does **Life**) self-maintenance and self-expression. Every organism must have a something outside it, and this is the finitude of the category, of Life *qua* organic and individual. Yet this **Outside** has to be the Inside as connected. But is there then such a plurality of organisms? Does Hegel even assume this, illegitimately as McTaggart charges? Is it not rather that he posits (*setzt*) it merely, as the most likely way of accounting or allowing for what we experience in or as Nature? Nature, that is, its forms, he derives from the internal logic of the Concept, not ceasing to be dialectical, as when he says that Light is the first ideality in Nature. He too does indeed see Nature as "petrified intelligence" (Schelling), the Idea "gone forth", gone forth from "home" but only to return in or as Spirit (*Geist*), as being always and everywhere "at home with itself", the very mark of Mind. **Only** subsequently does he compare Nature with his *a priori* system, mapping it on to it rather than just supplementing the "logical grid" with empirical observation as if the two activities or "studies" (sciences) were on the same level.²⁰

Hegel, as Alison Stone remarks, is not always entirely explicit or unambiguous concerning his presuppositions or, rather, previously attained dialectical results which he then applies, as it were robustly disdaining backward glances at critical or unimaginative readers beyond a certain point. Holistic interpretation is called for. So, when he asserts, as against the "completely empty thought" of the successive development of species in time, that

The moment the lightning of life strikes into matter at once there is present a determinate, complete creature, as Minerva fully armed springs from the head of Jupiter ("Philosophy of Nature", *Enc. II*, Introduction),

then we should first of all recall that the rationalist Hegel, devotee of Lessing, would be the last person to assert "creationist" miracles in a Fundamentalist and/or "realist" sense. He would not falsely literalise a romantic fairy-tale such as C.S. Lewis's, where the animals burst up, fully formed ("armed") out of the heaving earth at a divine lion's "e-vocative" singing (*The Magician's Nephew*). The tale nonetheless captures Hegel's meaning in its own mythopoeic manner, as much as does Hegel's own comparison, surely made with forethought, of the fully formed goddess springing from Jupiter's head. The implication is that she is ever-present or "at home" in that head, here springing forth as an eternal moment, ever known and willed.

²⁰ Cf. Alison Stone, *Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel's Philosophy*, SUNY Press 2005.

Thus natural forms are each and every one, generically or individually, aspects of the Concept, here of Life, as a "moment" thereof. Their prior or ground reality is as ideas, as "divine" ideas of infinite Reason. What is "completely empty" is to explain their very ideation, as it were, in terms of time, matter and change. This is a mere or empty "category mistake" (G. Ryle). This much is presumed to the whole system or established at its inception. These divine ideas form a doctrine elaborated historically and, therefore, for Hegel, elaborating itself, dialectically, in and by such as Augustine, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Descartes, building on Plato but adding less ambiguously the ideas of individual realities, of persons above all (each one subject to divine Providence). These ideas are each identical with "the divine essence", the whole Notion, exactly as we find in Hegel. The elephants and, equally, each elephant, are known and conceived eternally and necessarily (the absolute freedom of "creation"), as is "the Elephant", or not at all. That is, or equally, they are conceived in identity with and not apart from that Idea (it is in this sense that the individual gnat, singled out by Hegel's village schoolmaster in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* III, is "not an object of knowledge", as this honest person had imagined. Alternatively, though rather identically, what is thus timelessly known is the human (i.e. Spirit's) idea of elephants inasmuch as they do not exist or are not "found" in any other way. This applies especially to finitude where or as negative or evil. Evil, Hegel points out, developing a controversial thesis of Aquinas and the tradition, is nothing pretending to be something, "the absolute sham-existence of negativity in itself" (35, *Zus.*). In this sense it has no "idea", absolutely speaking, but betokens the phenomenal enmeshment of finitude in shadows, in unreality or falsity. In this sense the Judge says to those on the left or "wrong" side "I never knew you", thus eclipsing dualist Manichaeism. Sins are not "remembered", i.e. they do not occur; life "runs away", i.e. there is no life, but that of the living Spirit.

This interpretation is consistent with Hegel's ground-propositions. It clarifies a situation which neither Findlay nor Houlgate, though he acknowledges it²¹, succeed in making plain. This is what Hegel "drives at" but fights shy of bringing into the open unnecessarily, no doubt taught by the fate of the less prudent Fichte in those days of a more overtly enforced conformism (not strictly identifiable, however, with "orthodoxy"). There is no dishonour in this. Hegel might reflect that his opposition to naive "miraculism" could be gleaned from his writings in general. One thinks of his interpretation of Resurrection in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, his

²¹ Cf. S. Houlgate, *An Introduction to Hegel, Freedom Truth and History*, Blackwell 2005, pp. 173-4 *et passim*.

statement that even or especially religion has nothing to do with assertions or denials of empirical facts (as contrasted possibly with the sphere of the empirical as such, when taken "absolutely"). Fact, for Hegel, is not an or the ultimate category, hovering uncertainly as it does between language and reality, like the subjects and predicates themselves of which fact is made up. Behind all this lies the classical realisation of the utter unintelligibility of matter. This governs also the Hegelian sense of "the imperfect nature of biological unity", to which McTaggart takes exception in his Commentary.

So we come back to the second of Hegel's three major categories of Life after that of the Living Individual, itself comprising Sensibility, Irritability and Reproduction in dialectical sequence. Hence it is just Reproduction, in the sense defined, that leads into the next major category on a level with the Living Individual. This is the Life-Process, though it is not formally named as such in the paragraph dedicated to it in the *Encyclopaedia* at 219(2). All these categories are governed by the polarisation of Individual and Universal, in progression from contradiction (in the immediate Idea, or Life essentially) to identity (in realised Kind). This in fact duplicates or makes a wider concentric ring²² around the earlier analysis of the Subjective Notion or "vital spirit of the world" captured in the forms of logic, as also indeed in the three given forms of ●bjectivity (Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology).

Midway between such contradiction and then identity lies the Life-Process. The fluidity of these categories as grounding their artificial or "momentary" discrete and linguistic character is here, under the rubric of Life, especially palpable. This fluidity, flowing, recalls Heracleitus and Hegel may well be giving to or else discovering in this ancient thinking a deeper layer of sense. The flow is dialectical, the percipient Mind perceiving itself perceiving, as a unity, a Becoming, though having nothing to do with "time-flow". Time, in fact, is the last thing to flow as being its obstinately irreducible metaphor, or metaphor of the necessity, i.e. the finitude, conditioning it. Specifically dialectical flow, the flow or "stream" which is consciousness, turns out to be not the ladder that must be kicked away (Wittgenstein) in ingratitude (Hegel) so much as the ladder transforming itself in identity into the Realised End ascending to

²² Though useful for understanding the material in exposition such analogies run the risk of reducing the Hegelian to the "visual" method of Petrus Ramus in logic. Hegel's however is an out and out metaphysical (or post-metaphysical dialectical) logic in that it identifies this logic with the reality it sets forth and, therefore, this reality with the logical method itself. There is thus also or even an aesthetical identity of style (of thought, in this case primarily) and content.

itself by means of it. Time, in this way, is on an exact par with Matter, that category now put by or transcended (126-130, cp. 62: "the indeterminate aggregate... of the external finite").

The Life-Process then is categorically continuous with the Reproduction leading into or disclosing it, self-maintenance namely by means of external relations. Means, of course, have been superseded. We should rather recall Hegel's image of the plant that grows or develops according to entirely internal specifications while yet in a manner dependent upon external or environmental circumstances or relations for its (phenomenal) being (161, *Zus.*). In fact *Seele* as intellect or Thinking is shown here rather to reverse this dependency, inasmuch as the (thinking) individual is itself universal, absolute, that is to say, and thus not finally individual at all. It is the Idea that goes forth as Nature as constituting it. So, ultimately, it is in no sense found within it or "found" anywhere. It is the mother of all environments and dependencies. Relation, however, as a category was superseded in *Essence*, is, that is to say, momentary or "subjective". It yields to "self-relation", i.e. Identity.

The Process is a kind of continuous assimilation such as Hegel finds exemplified in the phenomenon of eating. As any animal would fain eat or consume the whole world, so the individual (life) is the universal, very life itself. Hegel even illustrates, in surface contradiction, his own series of identifications by calling what is outside the individual organism "inorganic" (219), a nature with which it "stands face to face". Yet the Universe here *ex hypothesi* consists of nothing but organisms or is even one **Organism**, in accordance with that coalescing of unity and plurality, of **One** and **Many**, we noted.

All that is meant is that the living individual **Organism** stands before something, and has to, with which it is not in organic relation, even if it must be an other organism, for

The self-determination of the living being has the form of objective externality, and since the living being is at the same time identical with itself, it is the absolute contradiction.²³

That is, it is precisely the self-determination that, in contradiction, has this external form. Here, or in the Greater Logic (GL), rather, Hegel, we noted, mentions pain, typical of the Life-Process, as contradiction in action, so to say. Pain, the phenomenon, signals the conceptual insufficiency or contradiction adhering to this moment of the dialectic as reflected in actual or phenomenal life. There is a kinship here with the thought of *per ardua*

²³ McTaggart: *Commentary* 268, citing GL.

ad astra, that life, like virtue, is concerned with difficult "passages", *virtus est ad ardua* (Aquinas). Virtue is concerned with or called for by difficult things. Life, after all, and it is the whole point here, must be left or lost, transcended, so as to be "saved", we might say, in the Concept, which thus indeed "saves the appearances", making all well, is rational, that is to say.²⁴

So here "the Particularity of the Organism is transcended" (cf. McTaggart, *op. cit.* 269), it itself being elevated to Universality in that it makes, characteristically, what is external (to it) internal, identifying these as really one. It thus posits itself as Kind. There is a hint of voluntarism here (use of the word *setzt*) consistent with Hegel's subsequent placing of the voluntary *after* the specifically cognitional, this, at this stage of the dialectic, indicating advance rather than antithesis. Scotus had affirmed against Aquinas that will was more "noble" than intellect. This term comes from *gnobile*, knowable (as *gnosis*). It is, in Aristotle's terms, more knowable in itself (than things knowable to us). Thus there is a knowledge by "connaturality" or love, whereby the seeker knows he must beat upon what is precisely a "cloud of un-knowing". Such connaturality with its object, for Aquinas, is what elevates Wisdom, *sapientia*, where what is known is, just as such, tasted, above the limitations of *scientia*, these being two of the "intellectual virtues", along with *ars* and *prudentia* (though just this latter is simultaneously a "moral" virtue specifically)

Nothing, however, is further from Hegel's intention than any kind of competition between two faculties of "cognition". Intellect itself, rather, is progressively manifested as will or freedom, the voluntary. *Ratio*, reason, is itself *ad opposita* (Aquinas), not *determinatum ad unum*. Here is the fusion of freedom and necessity, reflected indeed in our common acceptance of the term "judgment", first cousin to "verdict" (*vere-dict*). The role of will in verdicts, whether juridical or sapiential, is patent. Nor is the will as such identifiable with the subjectively irresponsible, being rather the free in the sense of spontaneous apprehension of the Good.

So what of Kind or genus, we may ask, third and final category of "the process of life", *viz.* life as leading to Cognition? We will work in the first place from the *Encyclopaedia* text, as we have done throughout here. The Living Being is immediately Subject inasmuch as it is "the Idea immediate". This latter, the Idea immediate, is what is first called Life in the dialectic and not the more generalised but also more particularised assumption of it in empirical biology. What they have in common as

²⁴ The intrinsic connection of rationality with happiness follows syllogistically from Aristotle's two premises, that "all men desire to know" and that "the soul is all things". Knowledge, that is, in its unitary fullness, is happiness possessed.

defining *locus* is self-maintenance or self-reproduction, between which, Hegel shows, there is ultimately no difference but an identity. Self, that is, embraces all, as Cognition will yet more clearly demonstrate. We are begotten by and beget one another. I here insinuate a certain ambiguity hidden in the term, the category, Reproduction, after all. Ambiguity, however, cannot be in a category as such but only can appear so to the limited Understanding. The dialectic will show, that is, how self-maintenance is not merely identical with but is further fulfilled in Reproduction as itself extending forward into the Process of Kind.

This immediate subject is set (*gesetzt*) to become absolute subject, or knowledge which is itself knowing, and knowing of itself as all. It is not at all exclusive of Being, but is it itself. This, the True, is itself the Good. In being determined by itself, and hence free, it determines itself and *vice versa* indifferently. So in reality there is no determination, such as our "subjective" thinking would impose, either way. The Notion, we might recall, "is pure play".

The movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as play: the other which it sets up is in reality not an other. (161, *Zus.*)

As thus set, as immediate Subject, the living being, which as notion is *Seele (anima)*, "reduces its corporeity to its object or its inorganic nature", as we noted above. This is only a "split" (218) in the sense that being might be split from non-being. Or, it is a split of levels of thinking and discourse. For the corporeal, namely, processes, assimilation etc. are "only the living subject's one act", (re-)producing only itself.

The "inorganic nature" confronting the living thing is thus pre-supposed, as negative of the animate, in that it confronts the subject. Yet it is no less part of, existing in, the animate, i.e. in the subject objectifying its corporeity, as "defect or want". But by means of this lack or privation the living thing ever develops itself. As *Seele* or ultimate difference (of the supposed composite), in Aristotelian terms, it, the cognitive and true, Intellect, Reason, forms its own *materia*, its possibility, out of the nothing which it is, and is yet, it seems thus far, dependent upon having this "dynamic" possibility.²⁵

Again, these are not literally, as in "neutral" chemism, two confronting equal sides on one and the same level. The living being "embraces its other" and absorbs it, by its own nature as living, set to consume it in, ultimately, the fire of Spirit, of the Absolute Idea which each part or aspect of the Notion is. There are no parts and the Notion is its own aspect

²⁵ Cf. again Aristotle, *Met.* VII.

absolutely and uniquely. So what the living being consumes is or was anyhow from the start virtually itself or what Life is actually (219, *Zus.*). Yet Hegel speaks here of the soul fleeing from the body with its self-consuming processes against which "life is the constant battle". This is merely to say that Life as immediate is thus far a finite and hence false conception that we must leave behind, by dying or in our thought indifferently.

In thus assimilating "external objectivity" the living individual or immediate Subject and, be it remembered, immediate subjectivity, "puts the character of reality into itself". It acknowledges, rather, that it always had it, i.e. that it, "the idea in the shape of life", is and was "implicitly a Kind", such as the universalised species our thought attributes to empirical "reality" exemplify merely. The universalities we abstract from nature, as *entia rationis* merely, are here essential and real, as *Deus* is one with *deitas*, says Aquinas. ●r as individual is universal as defining it, the individual, and not as the latter's being absorbed in the universal. Each is the other and this concreteness. This goes further than does an extensionalist but phenomenal account of species or Kind in concreteness. Kind, all the same, "ties" individuals "appointed for each other" in the "Affinity of the sexes". It is most striking that Hegel includes just this affinity under Kind in the definitionally *a priori* dialectic, and it would be a mere superficiality in one's degree of engagement with Hegel's thought to assume error or inconsistency here.

Affinity, in fact, we have already met as a category in the transition from Mechanism to Chemism and there too the affinity of the sexes, surely a variant upon Goethe's "elective affinities" in the novel of that name (*Die Wahlverwandtschaft*), is implicit. By including such a plurality, or the I-thou duality in this primal form, by no means necessarily though an absolute or irreducible "inter-subjectivity", as it is called, Hegel recalls us to the Trinitarian base of his philosophy, as when he says, at 182 *Zus.*, that "Christianity, to which he is known as the Trinity, contains the rational notion of God" (cf. 161 *Zus.*). So here, on the threshold of the Absolute Idea, this primal instance and paradigm of the union, indeed the absolute affinity and "appointment", of Self and ●ther-as-self-again, is "put". The "highest cannot stand without the lowest" because the high is not high and the low is not high (nor low either). ●r because the first is last and the last is first, because the beginning of the dialectic is the end and *vice versa*, the Absolute Idea both the method as such and its own result, because, accordingly,

Love has pitched his tent
In the place of excrement (W.B. Yeats),

or somewhere "down there", as we say, highest though love be. Physiognomy itself denotes that ultimate difference which negates and reduces physiognomy, viz. Spirit or knowledge by connaturality, with which *Seele* is put as one, in the very "putting" of an ultimate "difference" (of sex) within its own relativity and material evanescence. No difference, no affinity.

Here, in what is both love and Incarnation, materiality is neutralised. It is "lifted up" or indeed as it were "enthroned" in what seems its own most intense manifestation, as music sublimates or "disproves", in an extreme of dis-approval, time, and that just in the strictest conformity to it, "keeping" time in going beyond or negating it. Thus, on the very threshold of Paradise, Dante does not see the incarnate or particularised Universal except as reflected in the eyes of Beatrice, "appointed" for him in this "affinity of the sexes". That is, the process and category of Kind here does not, in this "affinity of the sexes", descend to being a mere regulation of sex. That indeed could not be found in the *a priori* dialectic from which Spirit, as moving principle and ground-cause, results. The poet was never married to the earthly Beatrice, never had and never would have sexual relations with her in our immediate or unanalysed sense.²⁶ The "affinity" lies or can lie deeper still, as deep as absolute identity in difference. Thus the Absolute Idea, Father, because he is Spirit and indeed universal spirituality, is also spoken of as mother, "as a mother" says the prophet Isaiah. Thus this third synthesising category of Life is named "Kind", as drawing some of its import from the empirical realities of "reproduction" of kind. Yet this gives no or insufficient ground for restricting the category to the propagation of species in Nature in a manner totally at variance with the dialectic as such. The dialectic grows or develops like a plant entirely from within, from the "germ", although placed of necessity in the empirical environment (161 *Zus.*) as Intellect is also, as such, *Seele* or "form of the body", while remaining absolutely and perfectly Intellect, Reason:

Not merely has God created a world which confronts Him as an other; he has also from all eternity begotten a Son in whom He, a Spirit, is at home with Himself. (161, *Zus.*)

Here, rather, is the ground for the Affinity of the Sexes as a necessary dialectical moment, as "in the process of development the notion keeps to

²⁶ Thus according to Dante's *Vita nuova* Beatrice was around the age of nine when they met and died shortly thereafter. Still she, and not his wife or mistresses, was "the one".

itself and only gives rise to alteration of form", of idea, "without making any addition in point of content." The Idea is not of anything other than itself.

This, though, is no abstract duality, whatever be the case with *Ying* and *Yang*. Infinity, rather, is infinitely differentiated, is differentiation itself. The Notion actively transcends all abstraction, such as the Understanding would foist upon it, even abstraction of Liberty and/or Contingency from Necessity (145-149). Thus the Affinity of the Sexes is ultimately the affinity of the different as such and this grounds the vagaries *qua* vagaries of our spiritual faculty of Affect. It is the ground-principle of Spirit, whether as Cognition or Volition, with their common factor of Freedom, that it is *ad opposita*. It thus negates or transcends Nature defined or understood as *determinatum ad unum*, finite in a word. It is the nature of a frog not to be a bird, of Spirit to be all things. Thus Spirit is not "a nature" or "natural kind". Under this principle comes also love of the strong for the weak, of the full for the empty, compassion, forgiveness, as also disinterested investigation and consideration generally, inclusive of dialectic as such, at once method and content. For Will, said Aquinas, is nothing but the natural inclination of Mind itself, of Truth, to the Good and/or, in delight, the Beautiful, thinking of Beatrice again:

Is she kind, as she is fair,
For beauty lives with kindness?

to transpose the Shakespearean lines. By means of Kind, as of kindness perhaps, we transcend Life (221) as the "idea immediate". We transcend, that is, the idea immediate. This transcending is the essence whether of *eros* or of consensual death. "My *eros* is crucified" (Ignatius of Antioch), and this is but its destiny and own instinct, as we have learned, *mutatis mutandis*, from Plato to Freud. The connection is there, as there is no greater love than laying down one's life for or because of or on behalf of friends, *quia amore langueo*, this as a translation of being "led by the Spirit". Again, *mors est janua vitae*, death is the gate of life, that is, no longer as this natural or "ruined" life of the individual, but as "passing over" or "going to the Father", in the Christian terms seen as variant here upon something common. "Thou knowest that all that lives must die." "Aye Madam, it is common." And then the uncomprehending question, "If it be so, why seems it so particular with thee?" Has the dialectic Shakespearean roots, somewhere in Hegel's youth perhaps? Anciently death was spoken of as being "gathered to one's ancestors", in what is a

"going out of time", the Swedish equivalent²⁷ to our "passing away" as capturing death's substance. Or, abstract death must become concrete *Liebestod*, dying daily as they say, always as *Liebe*, a matter of affinity, found or sought, to the other, even the supremely Other, of Life to what is beyond it, of *Seele* to "thinking".

So by Kind the living Individual, fount and locus of Subjectivity, is, says Hegel, mediated and generated. Yet if *Seele* is generated it mediates itself, since it is found in all, as living life-principle (cf. *Phaedo*). That is, the very basis of Kind unites or transcends (*aufhebt*) Kind itself. The case, we have seen, is similar with individuality *qua* individuality, as what it is. It is what it is not and is not what it is. It "sinks" or is absorbed in universality (221), ultimate negating difference of the phenomenon of the human animal, which thus "is what it is not". "The living being dies, because it is a contradiction." That is to say, it never lived, is but a moment in Spirit's dialectical self-realisation. This consideration indeed is later applied to Nature as a whole.

Those who made out of this an invitation to plain murder, viewed, we must suppose, as purely phenomenal and hence false or no crime at all, were deluded, muddled. Spirit is ever accomplished as not needing to realise itself in this intra-temporal way, while time itself is ultimately a waiting. This, and not force, is its self-revealing activity and contemplation, "moving mountains" like the very words of creation, of Mind, moving to every kind of duty or self-transcendence in blessedness and thought-full tranquillity, of an intensity indeed that "flesh" is ultimately unable to sustain. This indeed is death's role, but a dying "in the midst of life", not a merely abstract and unexperienced (Wittgenstein) ending to it. An end to experience would not be experienced.

Kind then is the "highest point" of more than animal vitality, of Spirit indeed, as the prophet Zechariah spoke of a "spirit of kindness" to come, where they "will look on him whom they have pierced". The immediate living being ever "rises above its immediacy" (221, *Zus.*). So "life runs away". The "real result" is an overcoming of this besetting, as it were brutish immediacy in a "coming to itself". Spirit comes to the truth of the idea of life, as we reflect it to ourselves, habitually retired from it into the citadel of our thought, the Idea, as we compose ourselves for sleep and its habitually forgotten dreams each night. It is this idea of Life, not life the mere phenomenon, that "enters into existence as a free Kind self-subsistent". I am that. "The death of merely immediate and individual vitality is the 'procession' of Spirit" (222).

²⁷ *Han (hon) gick ur tiden*, went out of time, they say, speaking of a death.

This freedom, then, is universality, is Kind as the individual's self-superiority (or ruin as such). It is its medium of existence, where "the idea is its own object". Objectivity itself is notional and thus real (and the same applies to Existence). This is universalised subjectivity, the Idea, Knowledge knowing itself. Yet, Hegel goes on, the Idea, in "judgment... repelling itself as a totality from itself", presupposes itself "as an external universe". There is a kind of two in one here, he says, though they are not put explicitly as identical. "In the beginning", in the first verse of *Genesis*, cannot be taken abstractly without detracting from God's infinity. It must either, in self-contradiction, mean in the beginning of time specifically or, more rationally, it must mean in God's beginning. "In the beginning God..." It then is revealed as a statement, however we judge its correctness, concerning the essence of the Absolute Idea.

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Life is the immediate idea. That is to say the Immediate in the Idea corresponds to the prototype of what we call life. The statement is thus the exact opposite of a concession to empiricism, to the "everyday" (*cotidianum*), the "daily bread" we need but do not alone live by. The bread of life is Philosophy, the Idea, identified by Boethius as a Lady, as Consolation, in typical male eyes at least. For males' more feminine inner nature, the Jungian *anima*, as for females, representations both after all we have said above, it is the Christ or "anointed" one (*christos*, *chrío*), again as bearer of (the oil of) consolation, the Word, in short. This is eternal life, to know God, to know absolutely, rather, if we adverbialise the deity and thus transcend the contradictions of judgment, of subject and predicate identity that Hegel highlights. The knowing is its own object, i.e. there is no ob-ject by this stage of reasoning. In religion it is called salvation, otherwise blessedness (159). The Absolute Idea is the Sender sending Itself in ultimate "mission", the true and final self-knowing enjoined by the Oracle. Such Gnosticism is already expressed in, is not separable from, New Testament theology itself, of Paul or John, and it is the link with the Greek philosophy it supersedes or, simply, continues. The remedy, the good news or Truth, is at once Delphic, Socratic and Judaic, all varieties of what is elect or "chosen". This is the volitional aspect, the freedom of Cognition as such, as being *ad opposita*.

As to the Sending or "Incarnation", its promulgation is, as such, one of "the fullness of time". Now no God, no absolute, could be determined extrinsically by such a fullness. The fullness, then, is the sending, a historical necessity vindicating rationality identified with blessedness.

Secondly, there is no time that is not "fullness" or, that is to say, Presence to a subject. Therefore each and everyone is thus "sent" as, precisely, necessary to the whole. This is the "kingdom of ends". Its king is the Idea, which is nothing other than the dialectic and its method. This "light of reason" is the "true light" that "enlightens every man" or woman "coming into the world".²⁸ That is, such coming is enlightenment and not some factitious birth of another in the process of Kind merely. The individual is the Kind, the universal, and all stands or falls, as we say, with him. It stands, is indeed a status, a standing, the State, the estate of Reason, and of the "rational creature", understanding now that "logic is but creation" or self in its other, subjective-objective, though the first "overlap" the second. So it is said that "in thy light", in the Light itself, enlightening each and all, "shall we see light". This is philosophy, reason, fulfilling the individual's destiny, ruin or self-abasement or denial as universal, as, so to say, King, beyond life or hope, absolute. The best name here, as supra-cognitional (in vision), supra-volitional (in delight), is Love and its attendant, Play.

²⁸ A possible ambiguity in the text and its various translations is here neutralised. The light comes into the world and enlightens every person coming into the world, as we enlighten (and even beget) one another. I cannot enlighten you if you have not enlightened me. You are part of my world because I am part of yours.

XXX

COGNITION IN GENERAL

Life, once considered in the Idea, as idea, "throws off" itself, its *phenomenality*, "this first immediacy as a whole" (222). We pass to what is "closer than self" (Augustine), as presupposed dialectically to self. To know oneself as "a thing derived" is already to pass from self to Self, simply because one cannot thus know self. The one then closer, as generating, is precisely closer ... than self to self, is my true self. Reason understands this, this being the self that it seeks by natural desire, for the boundless (infinite) alone.

Since doubt and indecision play as we have seen no part in the metaphysical notion of freedom, there is no conflict between the submission of the will to reason (and that means, at least in the tradition of Christian metaphysics, to the will of God) and human freedom. On the contrary, the freedom of the will is only then fully realised when it is unshakably founded upon reason. Subservience consists precisely in refusing to be dominated (*arche*) by that which is one's own (*ousia*), indeed one's own in the deepest sense (*intimior me meo*). Thus the refusal to submit is identical with some other, genuinely alien domination (uncontrolled passions, political ideologies, or whatever). (Fernando Inciarte, "Metaphysics and Reification", in *Philosophy* 54, London 1979, pp. 311-327, p. 326)

Inciarte adds this remark from Aquinas: "Since man is precisely that which is in harmony with reason, he is truly a slave when he is led away from reason by anything alien to reason" (*In Epist. ad Rom.*, c. 6. Lect. 4). The difficulty, famously, and well brought out in Hegel in his polemic against the Kantian "ought", lies in knowing *what* actions or thoughts of this harmoniously rational being, standing by his or her act insofar as he does it, are "alien to reason". The polemic is of course further developed in later post-Hegelian philosophy, for example in Sartre's study, *Saint Genet*, or De Beauvoir's *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. The unshakeable foundation upon reason, that is, cannot be more firm than the unshakeable flexibility of thought itself, as traced in the Hegelian system, which, as

system, must be taken as a whole, this being the point we have reached here. As Hegel puts it, the identity of good and evil, the sameness, must be as strenuously denied as unshakably affirmed, the meaning of the position being the finitude of the category, but a moment, even if the final one, in "the Method". Thus this position, first broached in *Phenomenology of Mind* VII, section c, is unmistakably declared in the *Encyclopaedia*, 233-235. It is Hegel's answer, at one, as we claim, with religious tradition, indeed proclamation, with its paradoxes, to the self-contradictory moralism of Kant and Fichte but principally as developing within logic itself, that, namely, of "thought thinking itself". It is "the **Speculative or Absolute Idea**" (*Enc.* 235).

Rationality, anyhow, is expressed in religion by saying I am made in God's "image and likeness", that is, made as an image like to God. Yet an image is not a thing, is actually, *qua* or formally image, nothing. I am not what I am, since I am what I am not. That is, self dependent on other for selfhood, as in "traducianism" (self as "got" from one's parents), is a contradiction, unthinkable and not subject to experience, a form of words merely. The Son's dependence upon the Father is precisely *self*-dependence, just this explaining the Son's saying "I do always (i.e. constitutionally) the things that please him", just as the Father is nothing other than his own *self*-fathering *in actu* as Word, it being precisely self here that is other, self's own other, as Hegel expresses it. The finite is *in* the infinite as transcended and only so can it be at all, thus not in itself at all. But the world as not in itself, as thought, of Thought, is no longer thus abstractly finite, that is to say false. Frankenstein's monster was thus indeed a monster, to which a too literal reading of the metaphor of creation brings us uncomfortably close, never able to be "like God". Infinity, for its part, is *infinitude*. Necessarily or in its own conception it has to be this, as the infinite God, to be God (*Deus*), has to be godhead (*deitas*). The uniqueness is thus absolute, likeness notwithstanding. Thus we found already Aristotle not merely "refusing to distinguish" (Findlay) but affirming no distinction to be drawn between pure thinking and its thought, between subject and object, thus effectively "annihilating" the world as such and for all subsequent philosophy, Hegel claims, this being the "dogma" or "chief maxim" (95) of philosophy, as distinct from an out of place "dogmatism" *in* philosophy (32). It, infinity, is thus one, though not alone, in the sense of not more than one, but Unity itself, in perfection, "that they *also* may be one in us", as it was said in the figurative mode, again, of religious contingency. Similarly, one is exhorted, in the "realist" account of natural law, to "become what you are", a perfect contradiction. For if the they are one then they are not "they". Just this is their trans-

formation. We have rather to *know* what we are, the presupposition there being that we know it already. The movement, **Becoming**, that is, will be dialectical (it is a category) or "moment", rather, a leap from the shadows of a merely phenomenal forgetfulness. "I will not remember their sins any more", the prophet represents deity as saying. This signifies that such "sins", as evil, were never real, are ever a "sham-existence of negativity in itself" (35, *Zus.*). In this sense Hegel's philosophy has been called "a realised eschatology".¹ This "moment", of categorial **Cognition** rather than its realisation, however, is at least included in previous thought, as when the Apostle writes that we "sit with Christ in the heavenly places", while explicit and implicit Platonic texts could also be adduced.

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That is, we can and do "forget" the future and the past equally, in the phenomenal "world". Time is the principle of such a world's being, its evanescence. "When I was a child I thought as a child, but when I became a man I put away childish things". As a child I wondered how I could be, how it was possible that just I, thinking, could be one of that number, that crew we call "the others". Or, later, I might wonder how they could be if I was. This leads on, in youth, to the solution of religion, that God "made me", gave me my being, for which I was bound to be grateful. To this "making", however, we can now see, there can be nothing pre-existing or, better, logically prior. So it is a making in not making, in unity of the subject, of subjectivity. This, applying to all mind in particular, even thus extends to all "things", to Nature, but as deconstruction, in explication, of making itself, thus given the rationale of creation in its (the) concept.

Augustine had long ago seen through this construction of a "dark external power" which he yet seemed, as it were pastorally, to affirm. "There is one closer to me than I am to myself" (*intimior me mihi*). But this "one" is then myself, as being Self as such, and I "am that", a constitutively self-universalising subject, there being no other possible. The I of the childhood I seem to remember never was, is not. I have put it away indeed, as it were voluntaristically, in a determinative knowledge, kicking away the ladder whereby I ascended, the ladder which is or was Time.

¹ Yet an eschatology that is realised is no longer such. The same applies to Derrida's use of the term "parousial" in, for example, his "Speech and writing according to Hegel" (in G.W.F. Hegel, *Critical Assessments*, ed. Stern, Routledge 1993), originally entitled "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology" (in *Margins of Philosophy*, 1972).

As Hegel had written earlier, the notion, *qua* spirit, which knows what it is (sc. ego, spirit, notion, "pure negativity.... the content... in its otherness... still at home with itself"),

... does not exist before ... the completion of the task of mastering and constraining its imperfect embodiment - the task of procuring for its consciousness the shape of its inmost essence, and in this manner bringing its self-consciousness level with its consciousness. (Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1967, pp. 798-9)

Here, however, Hegel speaks, quite properly, phenomenologically. As he says, spirit, when thus "distinguished into its separate moments" has, just therefore, "not yet reached the substance, or is not in itself absolute knowledge". Here the "not yet", all the same, is not temporal but dialectical. In mastering time, in ascending *via* time, spirit annuls time. That is to say, it declares it null. *Qua* spirit it was, is and shall be this very declaring, as it now self-consciously declares over again, having "reached the substance... in itself absolute knowledge", i.e. spirit *is* this. That is, it is not a "knowing substance" merely, this being the "self of the spirit which is not yet there" ("not yet" here is again dialectical), at the stage of "immediate, or... imagining consciousness in general", childish thinking. "The revelation which substance has in such a consciousness", looking out upon the world, "is, in fact, concealment". Not only can the child not be just one or even one of the finite multitude. His question itself, why or how come I am one of these, cannot have an answer. The God he later learns to thank for his existence is his very existence itself in its fundament, his necessity as Subject. Without it the world, the others, could not be, as indeed he could not after all be without them, as the Process of **Kind** has shown well enough after its fashion. Gratitude, that is, as enjoined here, is itself a figure, a representation, of the fact, as self-consciousness witnesses, that self cannot just "come about", not because it is particular but because it *is*. Or, if anything is then everything is, including the supersession of plurality, since being, the Idea, cannot *itself* become, i.e. not even if it be *seen as*, in what is also itself a categorial moment, **Becoming**, that idea being a mere moment of itself, the **Idea**, of self, again. This lies hidden in the Anselmian "argument" along with as *in* the mind that thinks it, that first *knows itself* as that which thinks it. It thus first knows what it constitutively ever knows, in eternal *birth*, God's own birth "in the soul", to borrow Eckhart's speculative image. Such a divine birth would not be conceptually separable from absolute or eternal self-generation in inward otherness, in inner outing (cf. *Enc.* 138f.).

This concealment conceals everything as that, this very "everything" or Truth, which lies hidden, at the surface to which Spirit, the estranged spirit, must, within time, ascend. "Nothing but certainty of self is revealed" (*The Phenomenology of Mind*, p.799). We have here an extended corrective to or amplification of Descartes' second "meditation", of which Hegel shows himself in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* to be highly aware as indeed "fathering" modern philosophy, however we today may judge that historical assessment *qua* historical. For inasmuch as it was a son which fathered, as every father is a son, there can be no substantial entity which is "modern philosophy" and it is an error to pretend so. Further to this, the fossils we excavate lie in our own grave, ourselves thus vain or evanescent in our self-representational digging, as in all our history as immediately thus presented. Thus thought, I mean also Thought as the "chalice of this realm of spirits", in its supra-organic unity namely, does indeed "pour forth to God *His own* Infinitude" in what, clearly, is "the ruin of the individual" if or where taken as less than the whole, or as less than "universal of universals" (from *Phenomenology of Mind*, final page). "Old hat", we may well say. Where does it get us? It "stops us in our tracks", rather. Or, why does the *adagio* lead on to the fugue unless to *re-affirm itself* as what it finally is, but as having, as truth, to *result*. In hearing the final fugue we must "have heard" the *adagio* (I refer principally to the form of Beethoven's longest piano sonata, *opus* 106). The last of the notes or chords of the latter must, therefore, ideally, in perfect or "reduplicative" form (*tetelestai*: it is finished), itself contain the preceding material, so to say, as, in the manner also more of fugue, returning upon itself. Here, in the music itself, however, a dialectical point is being made, that the slowest is the fastest, that the negative is "swallowed up" or even itself turned into its opposite and, without prejudice but seeing further, *contrariwise*. Music is music, we might say. This is the moment of total contemplation music itself ever represents or re-veals, unveils. It plays or, as wind or spirit (art as its first form), "blows" itself freely. "Play on", then! Meanwhile the spiritual "annulment" of time is the putting of it out of court, like a marriage that never was. It in no sense builds upon that from which it "ungratefully" emerges. Hence the faults Hegel points out in the arguments for the truth of God (in his final *Lectures* on this topic) urge themselves where these arguments' formal imperfection in this respect, as if religion itself "developed" philosophy or (logical art, *ars logica*) art religion, are not acknowledged. There is a general question here as to how art and religion have the same relation to philosophy with respect to difference of form and sameness of content as do logic and *philosophy of* nature to the philosophy "of mind" specifically. Nature itself, one may

note, is not an element of either triad. This might be the answer to Gentile's drastic objection, as a devoted Hegelian, that the philosophy of nature Hegel presents contradicts his own exposition of Absolute Idealism.

Music, that is, or art generally (as of the *muses*) can *appear* more spiritual or *geistlich* than philosophy through its innocence of linguistic representation, as a direct *motion* of spirit, itself remaining direct appearance, however (and hence representation), like nature herself, which spirit, the Idea, "goes forth as" (244) and that more perfectly, Hegel insists. In a similar way, but differently, the quasi-mystical typology of astrology gets and got immediately preferred, as a spiritual contemplation, to the quasi-anatomic analyses, with or without observation, of astronomy, which alone, however, has actually led and "leads to the stars". Ideally, therefore, one turns aside from philosophy to music, for re-creation, while one ascends from the latter to the former as or in becoming, terminally, all that the latter was and *this* is "the music of the spheres". Do I "protest too much"? Or is the first last and then, as last, first after all? Or, we might suggest, what we have been thus led to, in mathematicised calculation, has as much or as little relevance for philosophy as the journeyings to the graves of the apostles or to the "holy sepulchre" or "place" itself had or has for religion. Play on!

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The constituent elements of substance, of objectivity, get torn out and reinstated in the development of self-consciousness to include or be all, the invariable value, all-producing. "In the notion... the moments thus make their appearance prior to the whole" and this is nothing but the Method of the dialectic, not anything temporal, viewing things absolutely. The whole "comes into being" dialectically, or as its own result. It is thus "prior to the moments" "in consciousness". The dialectic always knew or knows where it was going. This though is of its essence and not an objection to it, as early critics such as Trendelenburg had seemed to suppose. If I do not know where I am going I will never get there. In my beginning is my end indeed, as in my end is my beginning. But then each is all, as "having" all. This all is found concretely only in each. All are thus One, in concrete differentiation, which is in concrete or non-abstract Reason. I think, therefore I am, since that *is* what I am, what "I" is, as "universal of universals". I am to think, or I am I-think.

"Hence spirit necessarily appears in time" (*Ibid* p. 800). Time, that is, is appearance merely, "form of empty intuition". Spirit thus *appears*, therefore, "so long as it does not grasp its pure notion, i.e. so long as it

does not annul time". This "so long" is again dialectical, not temporal (the joke included or not, indifferently). The annulling too is a simple non-being. The child's question, above (Why me?), and hence the child, is appearance only, a form of re-membling which is in fact a figurative "membling" in our imagination of what is not and cannot be thus "seen". "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." The Apostle here propounds a true thesis. Reason, each one's property, is in essence philosophical. This finds expression in democracy as affirmed value. Yet children do not have the vote and hence "are not", each is "father to the man" merely. The joys of parenthood are hence themselves phenomenal, not yet the true joy in which they may nonetheless "participate", as a look into the face of one's child may yet communicate that all is well with reality², that "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world".

Time is the pure self in external form, apprehended in intuition, and not grasped and understood by the self, it is the notion apprehended only through intuition.

That is, it is a false or finite apprehension of the notion. So it is in a sense precisely the transcendence of time that philosophy as such is concerned with, which thus has to be thought through thoroughly and consistently, not looking back. This is mirrored exactly in the very temporal, hence phenomenal process of "growing up" (and indeed dying). So when

This notion grasps itself, it supersedes its time character, (conceptually) comprehends intuition... Time, therefore, appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete within itself. (*Ibid.*, Baillie version 1967 throughout, p.800)

● Obviously, one might want to say. Hegel, however, is clearly not referring here to mere biological death or "going out of time" as what overcomes or, still less, supersedes time, but, as he says, to the self-grasping of the notion. This notion though is not what "we" are. It rather transcends the "we", is "absolute knowledge". This for Hegel is not transcendence of consciousness but its acme. "I didn't ask to be born". No, and that's just why you weren't. You are what you have become, a thought-process of which time is the figure merely, not as ordained in the sense of invented but as the telescopic lens through which alone conceptual absolutes are viewed or as verbs have tenses, even though ultimately in reduplicative

² An image used by Joseph Pieper in his *Happiness and Contemplation*.

perfection or even as more than perfected or even as future perfect. Whatever you will have done, this tense of necessity, you did long ago, therefore.

Time, then, is at once spirit's own illusion and what compels it to enrich itself as a universal self-consciousness. There is no exit from such freedom. "I didn't ask to be born". This is its destiny, to "manifest" what is inherent, to make outside what is inside in its very interiority, as what both is and is not, an appearance merely, the Platonic show of images on the cave-wall. These categories, that is, are insufficient here. Spirit must "pass through" this illusion as, again, resulting from it.

Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. (*Enc. 212, Zus.*)

So we pass through, without renouncing, childlike wonderment, religious or obediential acceptance, arriving at "knowing as I am known", which is an opening of infinite vistas. All the citations in this section are taken from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, the final chapter, unless otherwise stated. There we read that

The content of religion... expresses earlier in time than (philosophical) science what spirit is; but this science alone is the perfect form in which spirit truly knows itself. (p. 801)

This citation shows that the imperfection of the form of religion, as Absolute Spirit, is, in Hegel's thought, directly related to its "earlier" situation "in time". This form, that is, is finite and phenomenal, like "this life I, we, you are living", to recast or pronominally amplify Erwin Schroedinger's words cited earlier. This would seem to imply a similar qualification of art as form of the content (of Absolute Spirit). This has to imply, apart from a surely unthinkable demise of art, that art too is set to coincide formally with philosophy, something we might claim to see traces or presentiments of in Nietzsche's or Heidegger's *oeuvre*, as, on the reverse side, the compositions, and pronouncements, of a Schoenberg or, yet more consciously, a Scriabin or some novels of Lawrence or Woolf, or the truth of (modern) poetry as outlined in Michael Hamburger's study, *The Truth of Poetry*, there being yet bolder examples, while paeans to art as especially divine are far older than these. We may, therefore, either discount or otherwise subordinate somewhat Hegel's suggestion as to temporal precedence, or temporality generally of these forms, directed as it is at eliminating the "picture" element specifically, i.e. particularly. Or we may ask, as in a riddle, "When is a picture not a picture?" Yet, as follows

from this "earlier in time", both religion and philosophical science (as objectified, e.g. on paper) are as such phenomenal, finding both completion and, for the first "time" or, rather, eternally, completion and "realisation" in the Absolute. This "is the *noesis noeseos* which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the idea" (236), the knowing of knowing, thinking of thinking, as act. Here, says Hegel, spirit "completes itself as a world-spirit", consciousness becoming (Socratic) self-consciousness. This process is "actual History", which thus ungratefully matures into the open sea of timelessness, prefigured, he seems to say, in "the religious communion, in so far as it is at the outset the substance of Absolute Spirit". This, harsh and barbaric outwardly, is yet sign or sacrament of this Absolute as, in realist "temporal" terms, it is of "redeemed humanity", he clearly means. Yet it does not well understand itself. This community "returns into self-consciousness", matures, identifies with all, realises its being in superseding itself.

All unsatisfied endeavour ceases when we recognise that the final purpose of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself (234, Zus.).

To this he adds:

Thus the truth of the Good is laid down as the unity of the theoretical and practical idea (i.e. there is no abstract praxis: or, where eternally there is only the Good, become Being as the Idea, there can be no talk, in futile distinction, of the good, ever an *ens rationis* merely, as Aquinas had already recognised) in the doctrine that the good is radically and really achieved, that the objective world is in itself and for itself the Idea, just as it at the same time eternally lays itself down as End, and by action brings about its actuality. This life which has returned to itself from the bias and finitude of cognition, and which by the activity of the notion has become identical with it, is the **Speculative or Absolute Idea**. (235, parenthesis added)

This is clearly, by chance or design indifferently, a Christian view, though not in any exclusive sense, albeit, many might think, of a somewhat advanced or "modernist" kind. Doctrine develops, ceases to be "doctrine", returns into self-consciousness, he says, i.e., we might surely say, after the interlude of actual history, as being outside of it, though as indeed containing it, altogether. For this "interlude" is in itself illusion, his whole Logic makes clear. In other terms, "this world", in its actuality, is "discovered" to be its, the community's, spirit's, "own property". It is thus "overcome". "This is the victory, even your faith that overcomes the world." Faith, for Hegel, we have noted, though junior companion to the Absolute Knowledge which is its outcome (though one might in logic

reverse this, due to the finitude of knowledge as such: i.e. it becomes itself "faith" or "~~knowing~~ as I am known"), is not such to the phenomenal knowledge of saint or scholar, which it, faith, rather transcends and perfects in the higher consciousness just described. To avoid misreading me here one should read over with equal care Hegel's discussion of, *inter alia*, religious or Christian *vis a vis* philosophical faith (as presented by Jacobi), at *Enc.* 63 and 64.

Hegel here seems to wrestle, as so often, however, with simultaneously occurring conceptual opposites. Spirit "descends from the ideal world" but so as to "quicken the abstract element of the intelligible world with concrete self-hood". Here, as it were in illustration, he runs through the development of Cartesian philosophy up to Fichte and, implicitly, himself. Spirit "brings to light the thought that lies in its inmost depths... expressed as Time" (*Phenomenology of Mind*, pp. 802-803). He speaks of a "unity of thought and time" as superseding the Spinozist unity of thought and extension. Yet time, "distinction left to itself ... really collapses upon itself". Time really collapses, in an intimate relation with extension such as a later physics has accustomed us to.

On his final page (of the *Phenomenology*) Hegel might seem to some to take back something of what he has reached, merely hinting, with the citation of the couplet from Schiller (see above here), at a relation he has not yet managed to explicate. But the goal, he is clear, is "the revelation of... the Absolute Notion", where Inward is, so to say, more outward than the Outward itself as we had ~~known~~ it in abstract separation (from the inward). We may leave the further clarification of his text to the exegetes, having set forth our own position as clearly as possible for us.

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The doctrine of **Analogy** (cp. *Enc.* 190 for this as a category specifically), of the analogy of divine or other names, is in itself merely descriptive, an attempt to guarantee correctness to theological statements. Its so to say supine employment amounts to acceptance of the Hegelian verdict upon religion and hence theology proper, whether called "dogmatic" or "systematic", as in essence figurative, albeit a figurative form of the truth, the content. Analogy has no place, however, in philosophical method. This consists precisely in overcoming analogy, in passing from mere appearance to its opposite, to Essence and hence to the Notion. Thus we pass from theology to Philosophy of Religion or, in the first instance, to philosophy or metaphysics simply. That there is a philosophy of religion specifically implies merely the continuing validity of religion upon its own

terms. The same applies to art and, hence, aesthetics or the philosophy of art. Philosophy overcomes analogy, its doctrine, by inverting it. To say we speak analogously of God is to affirm the analogy of language as such. Thus to say the cat is on the mat or is that which is on the mat is to deny the cat, affirming therefore not the analogy but the sameness of **Nothing** and **Being**, which is, again, to deny nothing or, with equal right, being. Thus the true being, Hegel says, is not being but the Idea, which is thus itself *die reine Unmittelbarkeit des Seins*. This, as Idea the method (*die Methode*) of logic, "is the (*der*) pure concept, which (*der*) relates itself only to itself; it (*sie*) is therefore the *simple relation to itself* simply, which is *Being*" (WL II, Suhrkamp 6, Frankfurt 1969, p.572). In the *Encyclopaedia* Logic, anyhow, there is no separate category of Method as such, but only **Analytic Method** (227) followed by **Synthetic Method** (228), coming to Speculative Method not put as a category specifically, however (238), which is "method of the content" (237). For criticism of Method as abstractly taken, its "doctrine" following on that of the syllogism "in the common logic" or "the Logic of Understanding", see 192, *Zus.* Of these two methods, analytic and synthetic, Hegel says:

That these methods, however indispensable and brilliantly successful in their own province, are unserviceable for philosophical cognition (our present subject) is self-evident. They have pre-suppositions; and their style of cognition is that of understanding, proceeding under the canon of formal identity. (231, parenthesis added)

Once concede this possibility of thinking absolutely, by negating the finite, and analogy is revealed as false, as sham-reality. It is not even the "drop of water on the rim of the bucket", to quote the ancient prophet's figurative dismissal of the finite, stopping short of philosophy's categorical dismissal of the finite as false. Or, to say we cannot speak truly of God gives no licence, *in philosophy*, to continue speaking falsely of him. Outside of philosophy poetry and religion retain their rights as and in their dignity. Theology, therefore, must overcome analogy, overcome the "bewitchment" (Wittgenstein) of language as such while remaining perforce within it, and this Hegel attempts, as one wrestling with God. The finite only exists at all, if at all, as a moment in the dialectical advance to the Infinite or Absolute, which absorbs and "overlaps" it, to speak figuratively again, as "its own result", as *causa sui*. This expression uses the term "cause" to transcend causality and is hence properly notional. It is not, that is, analogical. Philosophy, that is, concedes the Ricoeurian figurativeness or metaphor clinging to language as such. Language itself is metaphor or sign. Hence in itself all predication or judgment, as itself finite, is false, an

identification of what is yet kept separate, while the individual cat or gnat, as alone empirically encountered, is not a possible object of knowledge, being denied with time. Anyone's cat is any cat, in loving which one loves the notion and/or cat-notion. This explains, further, the naturalness of love of neighbour as self (while if charity were not natural, states Aquinas, it would be a vice). It is as thus natural that grace is said to perfects it. It would also explain why this is coupled with love of God, the most concrete universal, as being in fact *where* God is first (and last?) loved. We naturally sacrifice ourselves for others, Aquinas claims, citing as analogy the hand readily extended to break its possessor's fall. This shows his mind, however we rate his analogy here.

Infinitude, as absolute unity, "exists free for itself", though in an existing that necessarily transcends "existence" as normally taken. That is, again, we would use this term analogously of it and should, therefore, rather avoid it. The Absolute Idea, as necessary, neither exists nor does not exist. It *is*, rather. Augustine saw this: *non aliquo modo est sed est, est*. Yet even the term "God" contains figurative elements such as philosophy seeks in its essence to overcome, "understanding spiritual things spiritually", in the apostle's words, or truly simply. Thus "the letter kills; the spirit gives life". This Gospel maxim reflects an abiding or universal principle, eliciting the necessity for a philosophy of language, using language, accordingly, to transcend itself, in one way or another. The Quinean and associated variants, for example, in saying that "to be is (to be) the value of a variable", agree with us in transcending existence as normally taken. Stopping, however, at saying that this, language, is "what we do" is as supine, again, as the final reliance upon analogy in much theology, in reality, therefore, nothing more than catechetics. Theology, that is, like faith as believing rightly, *orthoos*, neither refusing belief nor believing lightly (*leviter*), is philosophy, *sophia*, and contrariwise, the position of Hegel as of Aristotle. But nor is this a retreat from the Christian dualism of yesterday, due to its representational or catechetical account of creation, old or new. The "new" creation is rather the revelation of what ever is, and the mystics, as those in the forefront of the movement were and often are called, ever saw and declared this. Thus Hegel himself, when following this style phenomenologically, declares that in "the incarnation" God (and hence man) first comes to himself.

So what we have, in fact, is a triad wherein the intervening dualism, as negative moment after Aristotle's monism, itself *becomes* that higher unity where the Idea is not merely "worth more than all the rest" (Aristotle) but alone "desirable for itself" (Augustine) and indeed "all in all" (St. Paul) or, simply, "the true being" (Hegel, WL II, p.572).

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The Idea, the Notion itself, is "independent and for itself" (244), not reducible to a definition in other and hence, again, finite terms. Its "essence", what it is, that is to say, is not other than its being, but this is equally to say that its being, its actuality, its *actus essendi*, is what it is, its essence.³ There is, however, no opening for the jeer, "There is a God; that's what God is". This statement, however, intending absurdity, is ultimately true. Since this is so, the very form of *predication*, as attaching some other "what" to God, of any kind, as when we say "God is" or "God is such-and-such" indifferently, is finite and hence false and this applies *a fortiori* to "God is not". "It is not the case that God is" is therefore not strictly identical with "God is not", as the Greeks distinguished *mee on* from *ouk on*. This is the theologians' analogy, when they insist on continuing to speak of "the existence of God", as if God were an object among objects, albeit supreme in this class. Such talk may be permitted to pastors or parents but has no place in pure thought or contemplation, alone "desirable for itself" (Augustine, Aristotle), as supreme value and true Good, as blessedness *die höchste Entfaltung der Sittlichkeit*⁴ as, in fact, transcending it. I have no virtues, declared a modern "saint", Thérèse Martin. Here, indeed, we find the ultimate rationale for the "religious" discourse of trans-phenomenal grace, not reducible to mere imputation, which finds place as Blessedness and Love in the Hegelian discourse (159 *et al.*).

The Idea, the Notion, is "the true first" (215, *Zus.*). Hence everything said of it, that it is this or that, must be self-contradictory (214). The Idea is not so much universal as it is Universality. Thus it "is its own object" as, ultimately, in spiritual or "immaterial" things, knowing and what is known are one, a thesis common to Aristotle and Hegel, as thought thinks itself or is in essence the thinking of itself or, equivalently, self-manifestation, externalisation of precisely the internal. The external, that is, is not external at all, as seeing is being seen (Eckhart), knowing, rather, is being known.⁵ Subjectivity is here universalised or, rather, seen as universal. It is a process of self-completion which "keeps itself", no longer though misperceived as self in any finite sense. For Subject "is the further judgment of repelling itself as a totality from itself". Subject, as self-repelled, is identical with Object in the superseding of both categories. The

³ Cf. also the final chapter, "Absolute Knowledge", of *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

⁴ M. Grabmann, *Thomas von Aquin*, Munich 1959, p. 159.

⁵ Cf. *I Corinthians* 13, "Then shall I know as I am known".

idea's subjectivity, in the same judgment, is "presupposing itself as an external universe". All the same, there "are two judgments", "implicitly identical" but "not yet explicitly put as identical".

Its (the idea's) subjectivity, thus universalised, is pure self-contained distinguishing of the idea, - intuition which keeps itself in this identical universality. But, as *specific* distinguishing, it is the further judgment of repelling itself as a totality from itself, and thus, in the first place, presupposing itself as an external universe. There are two judgments, which though implicitly identical are not yet explicitly put as identical. (223, parenthesis added).

This "not yet" is the very suspension in which we live, in and amid "Nature", which thus "groans and travails" as "waiting" (*Romans* 8), in the vision of the Apostle, until "God shall be all in all". God, of course, as we have just noted, was never intelligibly anything else, as he, Paul or whoever, very likely well knew. This "until", viewed absolutely or philosophically, is dialectical rather than temporal, as "all in all" gives the essence of the Notion in the Notion's own terms, though *further development* of this idea has been already indicated earlier in Hegel's treatise, at 161, *Zus.*

Not merely has God created a world which confronts Him as an other; he has also from all eternity begotten a Son in whom he, a Spirit, is at home with himself (161, *Zus.*).

One might replace "also" here with "rather", if we recall the endorsement of not merely Spinozan "acosmism" at *Enc.* 50. He qualifies this statement, though, by adding: "as it is expressed in the teaching of Christianity". All the same, *what* this teaching is expressing is, over again, that "the other which it (the movement of the notion) sets up is in reality not an other", all its "movement ... to be looked upon merely as play", rather. The use of "play" is profound as coming nearest to respecting the impossibility of attributing an *anterior* reason to such absolute determinings. For that they proceed from the divine goodness is merely "analytical". This "pure play" of divine Wisdom (cf. *Proverbs of Solomon* as probable source for this idea) is surely the seed-ground for the later anthropological development of the idea of *homo ludens*, looking back also to those Shakespearean gods who, in *King Lear*, are said, by one who has just had his eyes wantonly put out (analogue of our time's "camps"), to "kill us *for their sport*". Such "total domination" (Hannah Arendt) is

innocent or free from malice only for "the Being of beings", in reality "not an other".

That is, beyond what "confronts" as an other is the Notion's own other or that actual self-utterance (Word) or manifestation of self to self, in the first instance, which it, the Notion, is, as all, as itself other and so doubly self returned upon self. Hegel, in a still officially confessional culture, finds it more convenient simply to speak of begetting a Son "from all eternity"⁶ as an expression, rightly understood, encapsulating this meaning. A man's son is indeed his own other, after all, though in some social arrangements more so than in others. The use of language to overcome language, referred to above, implies a certain liberty of choice as to how much latitude of compromise to permit oneself, self-contradiction "in performance" being inevitable in any event.⁷

This, again, all this, is the "movement of the notion" which is merely play, as it is not merely creation of an other as "world". Its essential movement essentially results in this, while Wisdom itself plays before the divine throne for all eternity, as ancient Jewish Scripture, we noted, represents things. The "other which it (*sc.* the notion) sets up is in reality not an other". The otherness is in itself, its own other, again, which it is. We should not then ask: are they the same or not, Son and world? The ideas of all things are in the Word, on this model, which is yet not word of

⁶ I.e. not in the first place, or here, begotten temporally upon the Virgin Mary, as I have seen Trinitarian doctrine represented in an *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, published most artistically in Pakistan, speaking of "the Christian Trinity of God, Jesus and Mary". The fact remains that in Christian tradition the eternal generation is also spoken of as a begetting, as in, for example, the oft cited Davidic psalm saying "Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee" as liturgically applied to the Christmas event. Still, Hegel here in a manner abstracts from this as the "metaphysical" Trinity abstracts from the "economic" Trinity (or Trinity in action "historically") upon which it was first founded. History itself, however we represent particular events, here becomes dialectical figure or figure for dialectic, rather, since, an important point, not only for Hegel, God, the Idea, "absorbs" history, fulfilling by sublating it, as we have said of "the end of time".

⁷ It is not correct to equate such "contradiction in performance" with contradiction proper or as in Logic, as B. Lonergan seems to do in his zeal to refute not merely scepticism but the doctrine of essence as "contradictive" of the shine of what immediately appears: cf. his *Insight* and other works, ultimately dismissive of philosophy as consequence of his refusing to subordinate even "scientific" theology to it. He speaks of philosophers "going into a huddle" when they question the "self-evident" or immediate. John Finnis also indulges in such intellectual barbarisms for coercively apologetic purposes (see his "'Historical Consciousness' and Theological Foundations", *The Etienne Gilson Series* 14, PIMS, Toronto, 1992).

anything else, and each idea is one with "the divine essence"⁸ or, here, the Notion (160). It is also stressed, in the earlier *Phenomenology of Mind*, that

The power of diremption or of coming forth out of its inwardness lies in the purity of the notion, for this purity is absolute abstraction of negativity.⁹

Anima est quodammodo omnia, in Aristotle's terms, and hence itself nothing or "negativity", though this was not at first made explicit. That Mind becomes this or that indifferently in "a free being of the whole notion" (161) is foundational for the "systematic whole" as Hegel expounds or lets it develop. There is, it is plain, no *genus* of mind. The obverse of this, or that of which it is the obverse, is that *immaterialitas est radix cognitionis* (Aquinas). Yet more radically, as has been remarked already here, thought is not other than what is thought (or than what it thinks) and conversely. "This also is thou; neither is this thou." This is also the condition for Hegelian self-consciousness, alone able to do what it does (*Age quod agis*: Jesuit motto, as it happens) as remaining ever at the centre. Thought, then, is not *reducible* to its object(s), nor they to it, although the primacy of act belongs to thought alone in Absolute Idealism, such as Hegel claims not to be found worked out in Berkeleyan idealism. This, again, is the sense in which Hegel earlier sponsored "denial of the world" rather than "denial of God" (50), however, the sense in which he puts Spinozism above and beyond atheism. Act in its purity is entirely God's as, therefore, necessarily realised end. This is the essence of theology, mystical and/or dogmatic, as revealing to religion what might still remain hidden from it. Philosophy does not, therefore, hold aloof from religion as many of the British Hegelian idealists had wished to do a century or so ago.

The correlativity between the two ideas or "judgments" discussed above, in an "implicitly identical" judgment (223), of self repelled from self to the other or "external", "constitutes the characteristic of finitude in this sphere" (224). Yet it is within Cognition still, according to Hegel, that we will proceed to the Absolute. Still, the Idea as we have it so far is distinguished "in its own self". It is "only the first judgment - presupposing the other and not yet supposing itself to constitute it", constitute it, that is, in the very being what it itself is and not merely by some external "creation". In so far as it can be spoken of as "external" at all it supposes itself "as an external universe", monistically. But this, although each and

⁸ Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia 15.

⁹ *Phenomenology of Mind*, pp. 795-6.

every category is monist in this sense, as representing all, is a "moment" merely, this too. The "idea realises in one both itself and its other".

The Idea is "the certitude of the virtual identity between itself and the objective world." On the long view the ghost or spirit of Descartes and the birth of explicit subjectivity hover close here, yet Hegel's statement takes up this subjectivity into the objectivity Descartes desired, we might say in vain, for it. This "virtual identity" means that the phenomenal "I", with its insuperable puzzles, is left behind. We do indeed lose our life to save it, in knowledge which is at once certitude or "eternal life" for the subject. Why do just I exist? This unanswerable question stands exposed as illusory, since I am not I but, rather, "universal of universals". "Forget also thy father's house", one might quote from Scripture, using that "mystical interpretation" with which, Cardinal and now declared Saint John Henry Newman claimed, orthodoxy "stands or falls". Yet, in this "forgetting", all, without exception, is supremely re-membered or trans-figured in rational understanding, as, it was said, the merest sparrow is not forgotten, the hairs on the head "numbered", though not, surely, in propositional separation. Neither can be known, or is a proper object of knowledge, in abstraction from the rest. The sparrow falling to the ground is also the Idea, there and then, as are There and Then themselves, knowable in relation to the whole and only so. Absolute knowledge has to be simple, all of a piece, explain it how we will, each in all and all in each, and we need not, should not, insist on the hairs. When is a hair not a hair, or a tree a bush (R.M. Hare's example)?

So, in science, Reason goes to work, inclusive now of the Understanding:

Reason comes to the world with an absolute faith in its ability to make the identity actual (sc. "the virtual identity between itself and the objective world"), and to raise its certitude to truth; and with the instinct of realising explicitly the nullity of that contrast which it sees to be implicitly null. (224, parenthesis added)

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After this overview we should now go back over these two content-packed paragraphs of the *Encyclopaedia*, 223 and 224, line by line, so as to lay bare the genesis of the completed understanding.

The idea exists free for itself, insofar as it has universality for the medium of its existence, -

The idea: this is the idea as such, the Idea Absolute, Mind, unity of Concept or Notion. It "exists free for itself" *qua* universality, the allness which is All and so, "all in all", a phrase common to philosophy and religion, though the former can specify it more rigorously and not as merely commenting upon the latter. Similarly it, philosophy, takes no stimulus or nourishment from the worlds of art or artefact, still less does it build upon the economic or social conditions of the phenomenal moment in which **Cognition** merely appears manifest. These, rather, are constituted in perfect harmony with it by its own action. It could not be otherwise, if Thought is anything at all. In fact, it alone is, is in fact Being, that Beginning as such (and nothing else) which is now the end, that is, both conclusion of the dialectic, or finish, and Realised End or *finis*.

It, the Idea, "has universality for the medium of its existence". The medium of its existence, this phrase, is a concession to our subjective or finite apprehension of things. It is, simply, thought. Universality is absolute, or itself to be taken universally, as was said earlier of Subject, of I. Each or any must thus be all, to so to say qualify or escape from "ruin". **Or**, the individual, as or if true, is the universal. All else perishes, inasmuch as never having been other than illusory, unknowable therefore. Thus it is that the ultimate Judge, which Reason is (as *ad opposita*, free), is represented as saying to the wicked, indeed to all that is wicked, "Depart from me: I never knew you." Evil, says Hegel elsewhere, in full accord with the Augustinian-Thomist account of evil as *privatio boni*, is a mere sham-existence or show. It, the Idea, is all, universality as such and infinite Subject, i.e. **Objectivity**. Just as such and only as such, again, does it "exist freely for itself".

Our notion of existence, in fact, is an echo of universality as the "immediate" idea is the living individual, who alone thinks. The individual is the Idea, incarnates or, rather, realises universality. Such universality is concrete and as such first, perfect, in no way abstracted. Empirical individuals, the confused profusion of Nature, signify rather imperfection, confused perception indeed. That is, the imperfection consists in what is not, at first, perceived. There can be no actual or positive imperfection just as, according to Hegel, man cannot really be "fallen", whatever role this representation has to play in religion. Maybe "the fool sees not the same tree that a wise man sees" (Blake), but there is after all only one tree and, ultimately, only perfect unity beyond, as putting by and/or absorbing, while overlapping, trees as such.

Hence he says that "objectivity itself has notional being." The idea itself, necessarily and from within itself, confers being (on itself and all else indifferently), that is, utters itself outwardly, the outward being

required by the inward as such. The reverse is equally true, but then the Inward is understood, *qua* inward, as prior or *a priori*. The movement is outward, yet not so as to oppose the Idea, which is thus "its own object". For, really, objectivity and all categories save the Idea itself, here as Cognition, but finally Absolute, have been or are, in their own root, superseded.

"Its subjectivity, thus universalised, is pure self-contained distinguishing of the idea." Hegel does not say "self-knowledge" here. The distinguishing is prior, more "universal", as root of self-consciousness. It is a universalised subjectivity, through and through. The idea needs, brooks, no materials, no objects. It is self-contained. As containing itself it is beyond all containing, all composition. Just in this simplicity it distinguishes itself, not from all else, but from any other or non-actual possibility. The possible indeed is the actual (and *vice versa*), we saw back in Essence. As pure self-distinguishing, as distinct Idea in fact, of itself, Idea as such, it is absolute and most perfect Unity, of system, of the System as Notion, whole in every "part" (*eidōs*, Greek for form as active before meaning the more specific "kind" merely, thus "form of forms"). This is Subject and Subjectivity, hence consciousness, not necessarily in the merely psychological sense (this might be transcended), but as knowing what or, which is the same, *that* it knows. What is known is the same as the knowing itself in mental or immaterial things, said Aristotle already, we noted, and this is why or how "thought thinks itself". Hence the Life is in the knowing, ultimately the knowing of knowing, and not, say, a knowing of or belonging to this or that life-form. Form as form is not limit (as is often said of essence), not a "principle of limitation", but infinite. It is the essence which is being (*esse*) and not an extrinsic limitation upon it, as it were taken from nowhere. Life, again, "throws off" its phenomenality in this methodical dialectical process we are tracing.

The intuition, this intuition, which is intuition as such, "keeps itself". It keeps itself "in this identical universality" which is a or the only self-keeping. Existence, that is, again, is reflected off it, is how it appears to us, as uncaused maintenance in being or *causa sui*, an oxymoron signifying ablation of cause *qua* category. Thus in religious discourse it is said that God is ever new, ever affirms himself, never passively finds himself in being, is thus "pure act" in Aristotle's insight prior to its qualification as *actus essendi* by Aquinas, however we judge of this latter expression. Hegel, anyhow, speaks here, as following from this, of "*specific* distinguishing".

The transition Hegel has made from Life as **Kind** (*Gattung*, 220) or as Realised Kind to Cognition in general stands against a certain overall background. It represents a successful attempt to see a dialectically unified reality, from a first or minimal conception of Being even before being is concretised into a Something (and is hence conceptually equivalent to Non-Being or Nothing), to a final Ab-solute and hence Ultimate Truth. Since on the road to this Hegel encounters **Life**, the category,¹⁰ he has to come out of it again by this or some similar transition. He knows, namely, that the final "end" is Thought and that, as, so to say, Event, this Thought subsists or realises itself as thinking itself. Thinking is thus the primary realisation of self and all else. It is **Order** in a self-affirmation in and through which any further or dialectically contained ordering occurs. Since Hegel seeks to think precisely from this absolute point of view, the very definition of science, the question concerning supposedly finite thinking agents does not arise here at this point.

Thought is reflexive awareness of self, of I.¹¹ **Only** self can postulate, postulates, its other; from this a concept of an other or **Otherness** is abstracted merely. Thought can be called Truth as what is indeed thought, i.e. "thought", as, in short, Mind. Mind is no more than minding, thinking. Self-awareness is thus awareness as such. We represent ourselves to ourselves as being aware primarily of others, or other *objecta* in general, whatever they might have to be, persons, electrons. This though, we have just indicated, is abstract derivation. The baby's eyes only seem phenomenally to look outward in what is much more awakening self-knowledge or, at bottom, knowledge of what is closer than self thus taken. That is, the baby is itself phenomenal. "He was little, weak and helpless." Well, was he, is one? All the wonder, the paradox, lies there and is reflected in the tradition itself. "He came down from the heaven he did not leave." This heaven is Mind, thought in its absoluteness and its self-seeing. It is Self, interiority, though known always in its other. In this, which is the Absolute and Idea or the only and sufficient, since infinite, Concept, all, inclusive of or as one with Self, is known. The Concept (Notion) is itself All. This is Absolute Beauty, guiding yardstick and star now, it can seem, even of the physicists, for whom it, the object of his science, is becoming literally the rational harmony sought or music, while able to

¹⁰ He ~~does not~~ himself insert **or** select it, as Findlay wants to suggest. Such would ~~not~~ be the freedom, which is necessity, of Cognition Proper but mere *arbitrarium*. "It had to be you", the old song runs, intuiting the very **opposite** of enslavement.

¹¹ Thus **one** has even to see, be conscious, explicitly **or** implicitly, of the truth of the laws of logic before they can function as laws in **one's** thinking. No **one** can think to an extrinsic **order**.

accommodate or "place" a measure of chaos itself (i.e. chaos is not chaos), this being the latest figure in which they, *qua* physicists, but not as men or philosophically, are enclosed. Or, the term "music" itself permits and hence demands such enlarged application, though there is surely no singing in the perfect repose of rational apprehension. Its traditional externalisation is a way of pinpointing the oneness of *ratio* and the absolute, in a *lumen gloriae*, taking now sight as basic sense, basic analogy among phenomena. Here we use an analogy of being rather than of logic, an analogy, in fact, of *Being with Non-Being*, exhibited by Hegel as yet the basis of all logic and highlighting the place of negativity and evil in the dialectical journey of self-realisation. Thus in the Concept the particularised or "individual" I vanishes or, which turns out to be the same, finds itself.¹²

This sameness, of other and self, is the final outcome, hence key, to the above-mentioned transition of the moment of Life. We may call it "Hegel's treatment of Life" but the intention is rather universal, as of Universality reflecting itself. Hence, conversely, Life is not treated absolutely but in a dialectical context, though this is the only absoluteness to which Life can lay claim. In this self-awareness all is reflected. Such is Mind or Spirit. In the history of philosophy, into which such thought inserts itself unreservedly, Mind's infinite fecundity, as one with or both originating and resulting from self-awareness or its own spirituality, became yet more explicit in the Trinity, an achievement of Greek and Semitic thought combined. The prophetic declarations typifying the latter and the analyses of the former are not distinguishable as forms of mediating the Absolute, as Revelation. This is the position in the *Phenomenology* and wherever Hegel treats of this aspect of Thought, of Mind, and his intention is clear, despite deprecatory remarks about prophecy in the restricted sense. Revelation is what is revealed, what reveals itself, and both such representations of thinking stand or fall absolutely by their own rationality. The appearance of a man or men or women who are themselves Word or

¹² What has fascinated so many in Hegel's thought has been the sense of returning to the same point, the same identity, from wherever in the system one starts and on or in whatever occasion or context. One feels one cannot escape, that these are the "tentacles of ideology" whereby, in transmogrified or grosser form, whole populations might be dominated. Yet thought at its most refined and absolute must indeed have this character and must indeed possess us. Hence the power even for evil and denial, once chosen. The question then becomes, wherein are good and evil differentiated? Answer: in that Good alone names the following, again on or in whatever occasion or context, of the dialectic to its End, its self-*Aufhebung*. Evil and error are one, as volition comes under as, here, succeeding to Cognition (233).

rational is itself the supreme embodiment and actuality of Reason, as self, the individual itself, we said or saw, is none other than "thought thinking itself", the universal. "Believe me for the very work's sake". This is "he that is to come" indeed, and Scriptural declarations that there is no other are in harmony with the identification here of Self and Other, core of Trinitarian thinking. "He that hears you hears me", crassly or too simply identified with a mere institutional prerogative. In this sense "he that is not against me is with me", is one with me, as indeed he that is not thus with me will be against me. Thus it is that some Moslem thinkers have identified Mohanmed with the Holy Spirit or Comforter promised in the Fourth Gospel. This can only seem unfortunate to the informed Christian but the point here is that he would have to be that if or as fulfilling the earlier and not as a mere passing antithesis eliciting, one may hope, further development or synthesis. Thus of the earlier too it had to be said, "This is he that is to come".

*

The sameness of vanishing and self-discovery is thus the essence or heart of Realised Kind. The living individual discovers itself to be the universal, as was the outcome of the self-reflexive moment of the Subjective Notion. In knowing itself the individual knows that it finds itself everywhere. This "everywhere" is concretised in the "appointed" other-of-itself, the only non-abstract or real other, in which it perceives itself, "bone of my bone" as the first story has it. Here the first, necessarily creative perception occurs, of self and its other in one, the Affinity of Sex, represented in the extended or phenomenal world as the "Affinity of the Sexes" (220). This is a part, necessarily, as first awakening or, rather, first dialectical manifestation of the desire or drive towards or back to the indwelling Infinite or unitary Self or indeed self with a small s, in which all are one.

In this process the unified individuals, each of which is All, as having All, generate or, more truly, manifest a third. This process, of Kind, continues, as extending itself, indefinitely or infinitely. Insofar as each contains all the others, as known and/or knowable, they are all identical in a true infinite or organic unity. Such, anyway, was the picture, the figure, of Life as "idea immediate". So we speak of the figure of Beatrice or of some other actual or imagined individual. We refer indeed to his or her "figure" (*Gestalt*) as his or her most real or immediate appearance. Thus, as Aquinas somewhere makes explicit, *forma* made manifest is *formosa*, graceful, well-"formed", hence attractive.

This idea is accordingly represented in Christian iconography as the "mystical body", where each has the care and/or knowledge or possession of all to the extent that each begets all others reciprocally as, after all, its own other(s). The same analysis applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to friendship as creative, placed anciently above the sexual affinity. So, again, the individual finds itself in loving itself as universal and thus Life itself ushers in Cognition or Knowing in general, "throwing off" "this first immediacy as a whole". (222)

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In Thomism the double function of *anima*, die *Seele*, as *forma corporis* (add "*humani*" where we are speaking of the intellectual soul) and as intellect itself, rigorously derived from Aristotelian principles, sits awkwardly nonetheless. In Hegelianism this very awkwardness is explained and is thus no longer awkward¹³, a step not actually taken but yet, it can well be argued, implicit in Aquinas's results.

Seele, as is further clarified in *Philosophie des Geistes* (i.e. *Enc. III*), is, like the term "God" itself, too much bound up with finite associations to serve as more than a categorial moment. Rather, these terms can serve, within that web of metaphor and association which language itself, as the particular and finite association which it is, constitutes. Soul names or, rather, seems to name a supposed "soul thing". When Aristotle called it an act, *prima entelecheia*, proto-act ("of an organised body having life potentially"), he could as well, from that moment on, have stopped speaking of *psyche* or *anima*. The sense in which "soul" animates is closer to our notion of acting animatedly than of any kind of indwelling. Yet the latter is typically made ontologically prior, as if repeating or merely doubling the potentiality of the "body (having life potentially)" which it thus and as such should actualise or make to be.¹⁴ But it is, rather, the first act, the very first. This means that it does not come to "an organised body having life potentially", as if that were already in place, due, it would have to be, to some *other* form, but that it is itself the first act as itself constituting this organised body having life potentially, only potentially since it is the form itself that gives life and indeed being. That is, it is first act of an organised body in or as organising what thus becomes a "body", this being a term, Aquinas consequently remarks, of no interest for

¹³ Cp. Hegel, WL, Suhrkamp 6, p.487-498, "*Die Metaphysik des Geistes...*"

¹⁴ That this though is Aristotle's own view is clearly brought out in Eugene Gendlin's excellent "line by line" commentary on the *De anima*, itself the only book worth reading on the soul, Hegel comments.

metaphysicians but only for (formal) logicians, since deal in finitely false concepts or truths indifferently.

This, though, should close all remaining openings to seeing it, body or soul, as substance or *ousia*, still less, though inevitably, as "incomplete substance" (Aquinas), a move really and compellingly ruled out in advance by the argument of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* VII. It is only explained by the fact that Aquinas wrote here as a medieval theologian and teacher, for whom a realist or thing-like account of soul was not negotiable, so to say institutionally. Some people want to say that this is exactly how Hegel writes of "God", retaining while transforming a traditional term. In either case soul and not-soul, God and not-God, become one as the "finite associations" (with the web of language) are pulled away. Let me not speak too much of God, Eckhart had prayed, the ancient horror turning to a total inclination in self-cancellation.

For Hegel all substance-philosophies, inclusive of Spinoza's, for whom there is but one and infinite substance, are examples of finite thinking. They do not capture the infinite Life of Spirit, blowing where it will, of the Notion. Thus indeed Wind, the prime analogue or, rather, expression of Spirit, is not a thing, not even air moving but the very moving itself (of gas maybe, but with "gas" here but naming a last residue of substance as less than act, our bondage to the category of abstract possibility). Wind is windy. Life too, in fact, is not the "thing" living, but the process within which things, organisms, are "moments", movements. Life is alive.¹⁵

This eternal movement, self-utterance of the Notion, of Thought, is Intellect, traditionally classed, confusedly, as a "power of the soul", alongside Will, the second main division of Cognition here in Hegel. As it is not a thing at all, so nor is the "body" of which it is said to be the form. At this highest point of its expression, its prime example therefore, the hylomorphic theory is itself superseded, as anticipated in Essence (128). The way is now clear for Hegel to bring out the abstract falsity of this division of Mind into intellect and will.

It is indeed but according to this abstract manner of thinking that a prime division is made between the "implicitly identical" judgments of the Idea begetting itself as Idea and its "repelling itself" (the essence of "externality") as, truly, universe, between being and doing. *Operatio sequitur esse*, act follows being, indeed, but because they are one, "implicitly and as life are identical" (224). Only finitude reduces this identity to mere correlation, as of Theoretical and Practical (225). For "the idea realises in one both itself and its other" (224). Hence, again,

¹⁵ In Plato's *Phaedo* this is made into an argument for immortality, that life itself, as alive, cannot itself die.

Reason comes to the world with an absolute faith in its ability to make the identity actual, and to raise its certitude to truth; and with the instinct of realising explicitly the nullity of that contrast... (224)

●therwise this would be inexplicable, as all physical or finite attempts to explain it issue in blatant self-contradiction and not merely "contradiction in performance". Cognition, though, must then include "volition" as, in earlier terms, *the inclination of intellect itself to its object* and not a separate "faculty" at all. There are not "two different movements". It is thus that the subjective "is... taken to be the genuine objective", the world itself "estimated as only a mere semblance, a collection of contingencies and shapes at bottom visionary" (225).

Shapes! These have to be "inwardised", the "existing world" "received" into the Idea and not contrariwise. Thus we mis-perceive shapes etc. in the first place or immediately, argues McTaggart, expounding Hegel. The instinct after Truth or after Good, theory and practice, are thus, again, one and the same, really and not merely implicitly. The *vita contemplativa* subsumes or absorbs the *vita activa* or life of virtue. Alternatively, the "intellectual virtues" are rated above the "moral" virtues, to the extent indeed that the main virtue, prudence, is at once moral and intellectual. Absolute justice, again, is inseparable from Truth-Goodness, while temperance stands for the beauty of the whole and the corresponding philosophical habit, all being guaranteed by an inner fortitude, Reason maintaining itself in the face of or even as going into death, Hegel argues, the "Golgotha of the Spirit".

●nce this equivalence is established philosophically, discussions concerning the contingency or necessity of, say, God's or infinitude's creating a world or doing something equivalent (both to that and to himself) become or are seen to be invalidated at their root. The action of both is *ad intra* since, it has here been repeatedly demonstrated and from all points of view, "the outside is the inside". So much for pantheism! We have rather its opposite, acosmism, though even that expression is finally incorrect. The cosmos is in, lives and has its being in, the Absolute Idea, as the ●ther is within the Self.

The Body, now (*corpus*), is above all else a language or system of signs. It has no place in metaphysics, Aquinas had already noted. Metaphysics deals with the things which are. The body, though, is an abstraction from reality (216), belonging as such to Logic in the usual restricted sense of a science of abstraction in the "second intention" of abstractions performed upon abstractions, as in mathematics or number-theory. The living individual, abstractly taken, will thus far have a body, destined for ruin (216, 219 *Zus.*), as being no more and no less than *principium*

individuationis, matter, in short. Since the "soul" is not a "thing" it cannot make a thing. There are no "things". "Active principle" is a contradiction in terms, abstract again. To say that life, organisms, has/have a principle is to "de-construct" life without yet seeing that or making this process, this insight rather, explicit. Active principle is just act, acting, movement, blowing as of winds and gales. Such is Thought and such thought "prepares for itself a body" or, rather, posits phenomena. It posits appearance as such as the prime condition for manifestation. Manifestation, namely, is nothing other than an invitation to penetrate beyond such manifesting to its generating Result. Such is the body and such penetrating we do effortlessly when we study face or form of a person. Nature, too, has to be looked through, which is to say unified, as when painters paint it within one frame. It is all they ever paint.

So in the end there is only or entirely not *Seele* but thought, act constituting itself. This, the ultimate or specific difference (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII), thus turns out to be Difference itself, the Otherness in which Thought is ever "at home", alive even supremely in death. Death is thus itself superseded, a mere non-being or "sham-existence", not able to be experienced since it signifies, again abstractly, an end to experience. Thus death is not experienced. Rather, the sense of finitude distances Spirit from phenomenal life.

Non moriar sed vivam. I shall not die but live, declares the poet-king, or prophet-king, of Israel, "and declare the works of the Lord". Well, which of these two is it to be, life or declarative Cognition? "Oh Israel, how lovely are they tents!" had sung another such royal prophet, even against his will, as the twelve tribes pushed into "the promised land", his land. "How shall I curse one whom God does not curse?"¹⁶ All that of course, like Israel itself, is phenomenal narrative, whether in itself or as representing events indifferently. Not so the Idea, here of Israel, of, that is, a bearer of tradition. Even this then is idea and not itself a bearer. Tradition bears itself. Idea is tradition in the sense of ever-one, ever developing from the primal interior seed independently of all that surrounds it (166 *Zus.*, the "judgment of the plant") and which it nonetheless needs, as soul needs body, a language, as God is necessarily "Father", both utterer and uttering of the one Word, which is Himself and his own Other. As expressed in specifically Christian tradition, this Other too has a like relation, identity (no need to say "analogous"), to the "members" of the assumed Body of himself and them in one, together or severally. For what that body becomes it always is and was and shall be,

¹⁶ Balaam, *Numbers* 23, 8.

since "body" is figure for language and this in turn, predication, superseded and absorbed in "absolute knowledge".

Hegelian ideology holds one as in a vice, of freedom grounded and established. One wanders as in a hall of mirrors, finding oneself whole and everywhere. Thought itself is transmuted from what one had "thought" it was, as it "thinks itself" and does and is nothing other than that. Exactitude confesses itself as beyond the finitudes and falsities of language *per se*, as, in consequence, one is indeed invited to a keeping of silence as the still centre around which these words, in their season, cannot but revolve. Scepticism and the deepest reach of assertion in universal identity, of universal and whatever is individual and/or real, are reconciled. Rather, we discover what scepticism was getting at. This is precisely the move from the book of *Ecclesiastes* to the *Johannine Gospel*, composed, scholars urge, not in rejection but in conscious answer to it. Now Hegel's thought is personally and therefore often related to these and similar documents of tradition, which he therefore finds one and all imperfect as to form (*Enc.* 572 f., 574: "the logical system but as a spiritual principle"). A similar relation existed earlier of Plato to Augustine, Aristotle to Aquinas. Hegel, however, unlike these, includes Christianity already explicitly in his thought, his philosophy, and not merely as "philosophy of religion", whatever the requirements of current "academic" study-programmes, as variously funded. Study has rather to be *founded*, upon truth and reality. So Hegelianism, uniquely, is at once pure philosophy and that development of (Christian) doctrine it suited Newman to find chiefly in the past, but which has an endless future in development of development itself, logically enough. Indeed, that development is inseparable, is one with, the development of the Idea, as found also and equally in Plato, Aristotle, the Hebrew prophets, theoretical physics, other philosophers before and after Hegel, art or wherever. Art indeed, the first of the three forms of absolute spirit as last, might have the last word, before silence ensues, some kind of quartet *pour le fin du temps*, maybe.

XXXI

COGNITION PROPER

Knowledge is in essence determinative. It is never passive or determined by what it knows. This becomes clearer in the later *Encyclopaedia* account of it. At first one contrasted knowledge and will on just this point. Really, however, all knowledge as absolute passes over into or elicits volition, will, in unity whether as term or further motivation. The transition from knowledge to will is precisely that from finitude to infinity. It is for this reason that the finite processes of coming to know (**Analytic Method** and **Synthetic Method, Theorem and Demonstration**), despite the judgment Hegel passes in passing beyond them, are indeed categories of the dialectic (227-232) as applying at just that place of this transition:

That these methods, however indispensable and brilliantly successful in their own province, are unserviceable for philosophical cognition, is self-evident. They have pre-suppositions; and their style of cognition is that of understanding, proceeding under the canon of formal identity... In the background of all this, certainly, there is a dim consciousness of the Idea, of the unity of the notion and objectivity, - a consciousness, too, that the idea is concrete. But that play of what is styled 'construing' is far from presenting this unity adequately - a unity which is none other than the notion properly so-called; and the sensuous concreteness of perception is as little the concreteness of reason and the idea. (231)

Both Kant and Schelling, *mutatis mutandis*, appear to be targets here, besides Wolff and, implicitly, late "Jesuit" Renaissance scholasticism, as distinct from that of the Dominican Jean Poincot, styled "of St. Thomas", while excluding, explicitly, Spinoza, indeed "especially addicted to the use of the geometrical method" and yet "speculative in spirit". Leibniz, however, is surely the more immediate target, respecting his own inclination to "mathematical" philosophy as expressed in "constructionism" and, Hegel judges, misplaced calculus.

The category under consideration here, **Cognition** as **Theoretical** or "proper", is not merely, or at all, the idea of perfect knowledge in abstraction

from the latter's processes or "methods", as McTaggart suggests it ought to be (see below). We may note though, regarding categories, that "in the notion ... their identity is expressly assumed" as being each a function that "can be immediately apprehended only from and within the rest" (*Enc.* 164), a striking affirmation. Otherwise, though, any "category" would have to be seen as one, just one, of the categories, a step not found in Hegel's logic. One has to pass, rather, from finite categories "as arrested by the understanding", to *notions*, in the sense Hegel later gives to these, whereby it emerges, accordingly, that there is but one, "the Infinite and the True". See here also *Enc.* 61 and 62, where this line of thought, although presented as that of Jacobi, whom Hegel immediately shows himself concerned chiefly to criticise, is very close, if deceptively, to that of Hegel in style and preoccupation. Here too, if we return to the criticism of quasi-mathematical rationalism contained in 231, the method and its result are one while the idea is the method of the content (cp. 237), as the act of knowing is one with what is known, as Aristotle also declares, once we have left the empirical or phenomenal sphere (of discourse). Thus this applies here too, to the knowing of knowing, which can be taken as "analytic" or "synthetic". It is, that is to say, both. Thus the finitely closed category as such, "clear and distinct", not yet a notion, is not one of the categories of Hegel's logic.

The perfect unity of all with all, of each with all and all with each, in an absolutely distributive necessity, freedom's uttemmost establishment, which "no man can take away", is Act or, we might say, Love, without which there is neither knowledge nor being nor primal generation. Thinking, "as free Spirit", is Love, Love is thinking (159). Hegel states this and we should not, therefore, abstract from this identification when trying to understand or present him. There is thus no "having the other as other" without that other being thereby made non-other or Self. The other as such or in-itself is unknown or, rather, unknowable. It is not, therefore. In being known at all it is known as self, since that is what knowing is, the removal of alienation. This, its result, dialectically, is thinking's own self, *ab aeternitate*. In my beginning is my end. It is within this frame that knowledge of evil, a "sham-existence", must be situated.

"All men desire to know" (Aristotle). But this is no mere contingency or chance. Knowledge, it is stated, is universal love or "what all desire", this last being the ancient definition or true denotation of Good. Good is Being (itself finally logical method, the "way to go", or reason itself, as outlined in Hegel, it is claimed) as presented to the will, i.e. it is not really or simply Being but is, as Aquinas had put it, an *ens rationis* merely or

“being of reason”.¹ Thus Hegel’s system of logic, reason, *nous*, even or sovereignly the Idea itself, this and these as willed (to be known) are variously good and *the* good. Behaviour doesn’t come into it but is only *called* good, “the honourable”, *as leading to* this cognitive possession in union (this doctrine is straight Aquinas). Absolute Idealism, in fact, discovers an inversion of what is otherwise little more than an analysis of finite linguistic usage. It discovers “the sovereignty of good”, the perfection that is Reason, i.e. of which Reason is the essential elicitation as is nothing else. For the residual “is” here, *die blosse Kopula* (G. Frege), results from the falsity of finite predication or judgment as such. Some languages omit it. It is the contradiction of identifying two elements as one.

Good thus “de-fined”, however (and for which “volition” is an alternative name, according to Aristotle’s definition of it as “what all desire”), as being without bound (*finis*) or end, since it is ever desired, or ever delights, in the infinitude of volition, which is again the very “Idea of the Good”, within the Absolute Idea, is itself **End** (as **Being** is, finally or end-ly, the **Absolute Idea**) and as such realised. *Bonum habet rationem finis*. Good, that is, “has the intelligibility of End” (Aquinas). As thus realised, necessarily, Good is one with Being and this is Truth. Men, as such, do not come into it. The form of Life is Spirit or “eternal life”, the knowing of God, say rather absolute knowing, which is the knowing of knowing, the self-realisation (*causa sui*) of Reason, principle of innovation. There is an imperiousness here, as of will fulfilled in the very willing of, say, a world, beyond that need for effort or “physical” force which weakness or finitude solicits.

All desire to know. Necessarily, that is to say, the desire or, supremely, the final, absolutely realised delectation is knowledge and *vice versa*. “Seek and you shall find” is thus no merely contingent injunction. Knowledge, thus ever possessed as possessing itself, absolutely, issues in Love, in concrete will, which is yet its prime motor, not as temporal process, in which it is nonetheless reflected (otherwise “we” would not know it so as to ascend, ungratefully, thence), but as its own result. In “knowing as I am known” knowing has or shall or ever does “vanish away”, as the Apostle has it. The Idea, we shall see, “goes forth”, not merely to become but “as” Nature, where all eat or are eaten in perfect exchange, being eaten in the eating, forever “at supper”, to apply Hamlet’s phrase, in either case. ● of course in the “natural” or phenomenal

¹ Cf. Aquinas, *QD de potentia*, VII. See also our “*Ens Rationis* I: Medieval Theories” in *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, ed. Burkhardt and Smith, Philosophia Verlag, Munich 1991, pp.245-246.

perspective action and passion in the same respect must occur at successive times. "Not where he is eating but where he is being eaten" says Hamlet of the recently killed Polonius, the worms mentioned being now, for us, but a figure. There is a time to live and a time to die, but Spirit sublates precisely Time. Such death of the "merely immediate ... is the 'procession' of spirit" (222). The Idea, in logical abstraction, is indeed the method, is dialectic, where, however, each member, category, is absolutely identified with every other as each stands severally in ordered process for the same unitary All, for self-intending Thought. The dialectic sublates itself. That is its function. Here, as was said, there is neither male nor female, neither Jew nor Greek, neither, we might say, religion nor (abstract) philosophy, to say nothing of the latter's revealed Content in art, in figure or parable, in the eternal play of light, Nature's "first ideality", upon innumerable leaves. "The Notion is pure play", is thus ultimately beyond all finite seriousness.

There is no mere collection, anywhere. This is the total presence or ubiquity traditionally attributed to God as necessary, as a necessary attribute. It negates, *aufhebt* rather, both place and space, even the transitional concept of cyber-space. It is not finally possible to subsume philosophy under any further concept or category, such as "discipline" or anything else. There is not even any concept merely of philosophy, since this is the Concept or "absolute first". This is the point, the significance, of the laugh, the "play" referred to. Rembrandt once sketched laughing Homer beside frowning Aristotle, somewhat prejudicially no doubt. But the laugh has the last word (or laugh), whether for artist or prophet or philosopher, something Milos Forman tried, if with limited success, to convey in his film of Mozart as absolute artist. All these people are thinkers, after all. That is why they should have the vote, why the King necessarily becomes, *qua* ruler, a philosopher, good or bad.

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"Man is what he makes himself and nothing else" (Sartre). That is to say, man does not exist, is not, though this was perhaps not seen in speaking of man as "a useless passion" merely. Man is scarcely mentioned in Hegel's Logic, to which whatever is said in the "Philosophy of Spirit" (*Enc.* III) is subsumable, is referred, on pain of being illogical. The same subsumption applies to the Objective, to Objectivity, as finally disclosed as Subject, just as Life, in the Logic, gives way to the Idea or true "life", "throwing off" its immediacy. This phrase might be regarded as Hegel's account of *death*. It is even more radical than might at first appear and is indeed but logical

consequence of Hegel's own systematic approach, taking its place within this infinite circle of mediation, where nothing is as it first appears. Involved in it is Hegel's rejection of the whole idea of death as a punishment as being sheer picture (of the finite, itself however picture over again and so on, onion-wise, through the Idea which is true Being, he finally says, to the pure, as infinite, self-thinking Self which is Spirit, *radix cognitionis* (precisely as *immaterialitas*, Aquinas would add, evoking the positive in and even as the negative which Hegel will make explicit). Purification of the notion of sacrifice from that of sin-offering is involved here. Life, rather, as religion or, indeed, nature, is consecrated to its own transcendence, to death-practicing in and by philosophy and/or spirit in all its forms, Aristotle's *athanatizein*. This is wisdom as indeed "from above" as being in itself above all else, the final or absolute word breathed forth, so to say. In this sense one may indeed write of the "sin-paradigm" in religious tradition as evoking its own eventual transcendence (see our own "On Thinking the Tradition – II: Beyond the Sin-Paradigm" - the good monks excised "beyond" without consulting me - in *The Downside Review*, January 2007, pp. 19-36, also as Chapter Three of my *Reason's Developing Self-Revelation*, CSP, Newcastle-on-Tyne, 2013, with the important "beyond"). This, in fact, just is spirit or, as we say, spirituality, to which the whole Christian body and indeed humanity as such is by nature summoned as naturally transcending nature's presuppositions. Thus nature itself is self-defeating, finite in a word.

Representation of this point is found in the legend, or self-report rather, of the "saint" or thinking person who, in prayer (raising of the heart and mind to God) said to his co-respondent: "See, I have given you everything". "No", came the reply, "you have not". "What then have I not given you?" Answer: "Give me your sins". To this corresponds the Hegelian doctrine of achieved self-consciousness or, equivalently, the Schopenhauerian or McTaggartian idea of each individual, thus "ruined" in such abstract individuality, posited (*gesetzt*), however, eternally in his idea in the Idea as whatever he or she is and/or will be, from which there is no deviating. McTaggart is at pains to show that this realisation is not "destructive of morality" though in fact it destroys or absorbs morality root and branch, rather as charity, love, "covers a multitude of sins" (i.e. forget about them) or as in the classic doctrine of the *vita contemplativa* as having "passed over" from the "active life" as itself figuring a conformity to eternity, thus making of the figure of the monk, *monachos*, the one alone, *monos*, an "eschatological icon", in the sense that Hegel's philosophy, and hence philosophy as such, has been dubbed eschatology. These, that is, are ever the last days, though it is only in the last days that

this has been realised, a proposition from which the nullity, or alternatively, in picture, “eternal return” of Time, i.e. of just that which *as such*, in its idea, could not return, follows naturally as following logically.

There are thus clear parallels between Hegel’s view of death and Wittgenstein’s Schopenhauerian vision, not merely what he has to say of it in the *Tractatus* chiefly, but in his own *athanatizein* or death-practising, so close to the classic counsels of John of the Cross for entering upon “the way” of negativity, the Cross, in Christian terms, in which is “strength and life”, as Thomas of Kempen writes in the chapter “The Royal Road of the Holy Cross” of his *Imitation of Christ*. Thus Wittgenstein longed for death and admired the suicides of more than one of his fleshly brethren from that strange Viennese family. His last words nonetheless were that life had been “wonderful”. Whether or not he was received or re-received into the Catholic Church on his deathbed, or if this were done mainly to please Elizabeth Anscombe, his hostess at the threshold, cannot perhaps be ascertained. No one knows who, including themselves, has faith. In any case there is no reason to think he shifted from what he wrote, or had with him, as a young P.●.W.:

Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits. Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal survival after death. But in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies *outside* space and time. (It is certainly not the solution of any problem of natural science that is required.) How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself *in* the world. The facts contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution. It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists ... Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical. When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. The *riddle* does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it. Scepticism is *not* irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists and an answer only where something *can be said*. (Wittgenstein: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.4311-6.51, translated Pears and McGuinness, though I have dispensed with their paragraphing as following the *Tractatus* numbering)

Thus Wittgenstein speaks at the beginning of this work “of facts, not of things” as making up the world as a totality. That he goes on, regrettably perhaps, to speak of things, the things, *die Sache*, is negated “in the telling”, both by his identification of the things (*Sache*) with “states of affairs” (*Sachverhalten*) and with his declaration that “It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs. In logic nothing is accidental” (2.011-2.012). One only marvels at Wittgenstein’s not having read Hegel, if he didn’t, where one forgets “the unity of philosophical experience” (E. Gilson), inclusive, just for example again, of Nietzsche’s treatment of time under the ancient figure of an “eternal return”. Even the Devil himself, by which I do not mean Nietzsche, self-styled “the Crucified”, must witness to the truth, believing and trembling, as, Hegel claims, in his very denial of it, that “evil is the same as good”. So let’s have no more judgment. “All judgments are false” (Hegel). Yet what is philosophy without judgments, principally the one just cited? Well, “*this* is the judgment, that men have loved darkness rather than light”, to cite the Scripture (my stress, however). Or, again, as Wittgenstein put it:

There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself. (*op. cit.* 6.422)

The Gospel itself, in my view, takes its place in this philosophical account, though ultimately it must be a controlling place and such is Hegel’s conviction, controlling, that is, by the force of Spirit itself, when it declares that “To them that have shall be given” or, as Wittgenstein expresses it: “The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man” (6.43). Note that he does not declare that he himself is happy. That is not required.

So the State and all that belongs to it, “God on earth”, gives way in conclusion and resolution (of the whole *Encyclopaedia*), to Absolute Spirit, to Subject as Content or as I, universal of universals, perfectly disclosed only in or as *sophia*, actively loved in *philosophia* or “*sophophilia*”, to vary the emphasis. Because it is “God on earth” the State is not God but, like “the body”, seen through. This is because “earth” is annulled dialectically. There is no earth, no place for God to be “on”, only “this passing show” (Quine). Dialectic is this (graduated) annulment. Earth is the ambience of subject, his, her, its “world” indeed but just for that reason not “a” world, not concretely this essentially abstract object. Much physics has still to see or rather acknowledge this. Similarly, Christ would be God in so far as he is not Christ, exclusively or abstractly, as the Word is the revelation, the uttering, of the Father. “He that has seen me has seen the

Father". Man, as we said, does not exist. "Behold the man", *ecce homo*, says Pilate, in this same mystical or speculatively rational text of the Fourth Gospel, where "it is expedient that one man die for the people". Here the narration of this unconscious "prophecy" of Caiaphas, high priest, exactly parallels Hegel's recalling of that other text, "He is not here he is risen", in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, used there to transcend realist religion or even, beyond the Crusaders, as a comment on the later resurrection "appearances" or, indeed, on the whole of history as such, the nations seen, irrespective of before and after of this apparent event (the resurrection), as a "drop of water on the bucket (*Isaiah*), by which is meant seen as nothing or not there to be seen, in their necessary contingency, necessary as moment of the *method* of the Idea. That is what the nations are, appearances in their not-being. "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body". Even this saying of the Apostle Paul's we may take universally or as transcending though including (overlapping) his finite intention, as Hegel says of "I" in the Logic. We cannot mean what we may wish to mean. My examples intend a general exemplification, not as abstracting, however, from the very likely causal role of their content as generative of Hegel's thinking, of thought itself in either direction of time's strictly phenomenal arrow. This content is caused by, however, as much as causing "Hegel's thinking", i.e. not at all, each vanishing in the light of the other. Thus the dialectic results in and underpins being, its beginning, perfect and without parts, i.e. whole in every part, as Parmenides had once established.

In general, the individual is the universal. The Concept is the "absolute first", is, as primal, all. Just this then will be perceived and acknowledged in the well-ordered and perfectly just state, in its turn justice realised, justice "in the soul" (Plato) and nothing else. What Socrates artfully proposed as an example, again, of legal or political justice, was in fact the prime *locus*, as the soul is "all things", *omnia*, all in fact. It is not therefore any state on earth; hence, the state that is God on earth cannot be any state on earth but rather God himself. If God were to be on earth *in propria figura* he would burn and shrivel it up, as we are told will "one day" be the case, this figure of "the Day of the Lord" standing, of course, only as interpretable, as, in another figure, "the present moment", yielding eventually a notion of philosophy as *wrath* (*dies irae*). What else, as supreme corrective, could it be? It follows that mind too is not on earth. Knowledge, that is, is not a mere example of anything, not even of this category of knowledge (as McTaggart would urge). It is the Concept become conscious of itself, "its own object" (223).

To think the phenomenal world rather means to re-cast its form and transmute it into a universal ... If the world is only a sum of incidents, it follows that it is also deciduous and phenomenal, in *esse* and *posse* null ... Human nature, not much to its credit, is more ready to believe that a system denies God, than that it denies the world. (Hegel, *Enc.* 50: he has Spinoza chiefly in mind here)

So it is precisely in thinking, by mind's eternal act, that the burning and shrivelling occurs, in apocalyptic representation namely, of that which never was since it *is not*. In McTaggart's representation, we are in heaven but do not realise it, a speculative contradiction indeed. Could that be what atheism is? Or what belief in God is, for that matter? A speculative contradiction, after all, is a "saved" contradiction, saving even or especially the "appearance" (Duhem) of the original or, rather, initial one. Thus we arrive, with Hegel, at the idea of philosophical "science"(s), threefold in his *Encyclopaedia* (of them).

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The Inside "presupposes" the Outside (224), it "realises in one both itself and its other". Or, as we said above, the known other is no longer other, there is no other as known, as loved. To know Hitler, or one's mother-in-law, is to love them. It cannot be otherwise.² No love no knowledge, since knowledge is possession as self. Thus Christ again, supposed perfect, was "made sin for us", it was and can be said. In this perspective we can fruitfully understand the Christian pre-occupation with the Anti-Christ. Early Protestants, identifying the Pope with the Anti-Christ who was to come and then came, can once again be taken seriously, also by "papists". The mutual recriminations, like mutual recrimination everywhere, are dialectical. Thus it is indeed that "Liberalism" "overthrows the nature of an opinion", as nineteenth century conservatives objected. Hegel, indeed, will have nothing to do with opinion, *doxa*, like Plato before him.

Knowledge is union and, therefore, ultimately or as infinitely exercised, unity. It is certitude which is here, in logic (not in "the Logic" merely), raised to truth. The truth is the "nullity of the contrast" between Subject and Object, self and world. It is in favour, however, of Self as *causa sui* and as its own result. The presupposition, this duality in identity (224), is the "universal finitude of Cognition" against which Cognition itself, as

² Such was the intuition of Lars von Trier, apparently misunderstood when expressed with some humour, naturally offensive to some, at a recent Cannes film festival. On knowledge of evil as such, on the other hand, cf. 35 *Zus.*, also 212 *Zus.*

Thought, is first in protesting (226). This is again the falsity of the form of predication, S is P-which-is-thus-S, dividing the indivisible, the incomposite or absolute unity. Hence Cognition itself wills, must will, the Absolute Idea as its own inclination or nature, intrinsic to it as the interior necessity of (logical and “synthetic”) consequence, this interiorised necessity which is absolute freedom, proper to Thought alone as ultimately superseding it, that utterly primal “pure will” of which Boehme was obliged to speak. Such a “pure” will of course is by no means an abstract will. Since it is first there is nothing from which it might be abstracted. It is rather the true face of Thought, of *nous* beyond all *arbitrium* or free will in our finite sense. It is Thought in all its completeness, the deep water on which discursive thought lies as a film (Wittgenstein, speaking though of “words”), there being no water without surface, no surface without water. Still it is, in an inversion, the “face” or identity of Thought, its destiny, as what lies concealed lies open in its artless concealment itself, as the surprised animal standing stock-still so as not to be seen. We have to speak of it, of what no one can speak (*sic*), since it is that and nothing else which engages speech and speech, when not thoughtless, is infinitely self-reflective.

It is this division, as into subject and predicate, which lies at the root of, even founts, Understanding in its abstract distinction from Reason. This is the “result of that specialisation”, this one judgment, its presupposition of a “contrast”, as “aspect” of diversity, instead of seeing “the world in a grain of sand”, should we refer to the inspired stammering of poets, among whom thought was Parmenides.

The assimilation of the matter, therefore, as a datum, presents itself in the light of the reception of it into categories which at the same time remain external to it, and which meet each other in the same style of diversity. (226)

“Reason is active here, but it is reason in the shape of understanding”. Understanding, that is, is a “shape”, a figure, of Reason, as body is the shape of soul, world shape of the Notion, the Concept, the one Word which is thus more than a word, than even a maximal quantity. In this sense conceiving is begetting or generating which includes, as essentially eliciting, will or love (as will satisfied or wanting in nothing, infinite), again. Calling it a word is of course a backward reflection, words themselves being originally named from notions, interior activity. Thus in Scholastic, following Greek, thought the concept becomes the *verbum interius*. Compare German *geworden*, *werden*, to become, *Wort*, of which there exist as plurals, accordingly, both *Wörter* and *Wörter*. The German, Gothic, has preserved an etymological connection, reflecting that of

thought (*Wort, geworden*) as brought out here, less discoverable in the Latin, where one may ponder instead the hidden connections between the various senses of *verbum*. The similarities are there, in the life and thought of a people, whatever derivations the dictionaries give. Word and Becoming are thus associated concepts. Philosophy, in Hegel, now discloses the retroactivity of Trinitarian reflection, thus first or more securely grounding philosophy and *vice versa*. Yet one might argue that such reflection was all along reflection upon thinking, upon self-consciousness, in this or that man or woman, reason now pushing the empirical starting-point, the history, “ungratefully” aside, as it must.

Hegel knows very well that the notion of a Trinitarian God is born of the experience of Christianity (*Lectures on the Phil. Of Religion*, London 1895, III, p.99, -SW, t. 16, p.308). But for him the experience is not contingent. As with reflection, it is the work of Reason, the manifestation of Spirit in history. Each philosophy, as each religion, comes in its time. The privilege of Hegel is to have been born at the moment when absolute religion had reached maturity and to have been able from then on to reflect on human experience in its totality. Also, in his eyes, the affirmation of the Trinitarian God is neither a “theological” affirmation (in the sense of St. Thomas) nor a thesis of “Christian philosophy” (improperly rational, because inspired by faith), but it stems directly from the philosophical order, and the task of showing the truth of it belongs to philosophy.³

The Concept is not of anything, though it is infinitely self-reflexive. It is not of world, therefore. It is uniquely first, onmi-generative; “an inaccessible goal in a world of its own” according to finite Cognition (226), i.e. this is exclusive to the necessarily finite Understanding, its “style of diversity”.

The truth which such cognition can reach will therefore be only finite; the infinite truth (of the notion) is isolated and made transcendent, an inaccessible goal in a world of its own.

Even such cognition, all the same, “stands under the guidance of the notion, and notional principles form the secret clue to its movement” (226). Philosophy, that is, discovers secrets and this is its connection to the

³ Georges Van Riet, “The Problem of God in Hegel” (Parts II – III), *Philosophy Today* Vol. II, No. 2/4, Summer 1967, pp. 75-105, 81 (original complete French version in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 63, August 1965, pp. 353-418, although, as mentioned above, the true original is an earlier Latin version which Van Riet presented at a “Thomistic Congress” held in Rome in the 1950s).

arcana or hidden truths of religion, not immediately disclosed. Some would make out of this a quasi-religious or religiously “heretical” dependence of Hegel upon secret or “Gnostic” writings, old or new,⁴ but such an un-philosophical dependence by no means follows, even if both were interpreters wrestling, in their time and place, with the same problems. Compare here Glenn Magee’s article, “Scholarship on Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition”, accessible on the Internet.

Thus it is that the birth of abstraction, of finite Understanding, comes necessarily to be understood in realist terms, i.e. in its own terms, currently those of evolutionary theory. This gives rise immediately to intimate self-contradiction.⁵ Really, as finite or false, abstraction was never born, never “emerged”, being dialectically transcended, along with emergence, evolution and the rest, or “overlapped” (215) in its very notion. It is, in a word, phenomenal and so, like such realism itself, a necessary moment in the dialectic of the Absolute, from which the latter results but as from its own momentum. In the beginning, which is Being (Cf. Hegel’s essay, “With What Must Science Begin?”, prefacing the Greater or earlier *Science of Logic*), is its end, ever “realised”. On Hegelian terms, on the terms of absolute idealism, there is no escape from saying this. Such idealist thought thinks itself and, as self-thinking, is the premise of all true philosophy. It is indeed the philosophic stance and can thus be elicited from what we have of Aristotle or Aquinas, often styled “moderate realists” accordingly.⁶

This, be it noted, is by no means to deny or renounce the Understanding upon its own terms and at its own level. It is “as real as tomorrow’s breakfast” (McTaggart), no more, no less, and so to be “abided by”, like the law of the land. Nonetheless, Spirit is free and blows where it will and must. Nothing stands above philosophy and, in particular, the philosophy of logic (*logica docens*). Yet, as such, the judgment it makes upon the Understanding is strictly transcendental, i.e. it leaves it precisely as it is while setting it in the context of Truth, of itself, of philosophy, of Wisdom.

Here no world is “pre-supposed”. Nothing is “pre”, least of all “the consequent view of the knowing subject as a *tabula rasa*”. This is

⁴ Cf. Cyril O’Regan’s *The Unorthodox Hegel*, Notre Dame, Indiana, *passim*.

⁵ This is traced for example by Axel Randrup, Danish psychologist and anthropologist, in various papers on the Internet. Randrup advocates idealism in consequence as required for scientific method, but without referring to or showing familiarity with, Hegel.

⁶ Cf. Hegel’s comparison of Aristotle with Plato at 142 *Zus.*, also F.Inciarte’s “Wie aristotelisch ist der Aristotelismus?” in *Theologie und Philosophie*, 1979, pp. 94-107.

... an outside theory of Cognition. Such a style of Cognition does not recognise in itself the activity of the notion – an activity which it is implicitly, but not consciously. (226, *Zus.*)

Hegel's view here coincides with Peter Geach's anti-abstractionist reading of Aquinas, and hence of Aristotle, according to which the mind makes concepts actively.⁷ But this presupposing of what is distinguished (not therefore separated) from the act cognising it as "something already existing and confronting it" (object, hence "objectivisation", the seeming "doubleness" of knowledge⁸) constitutes the Finite as such. Finite cognition, Hegel shows, divides into two "methods" or types of activity, abstractly viewed, the **Analytic** and the **Synthetic**. In the former it isolates differences in what is thus pre-supposed or projected as, even this, viewed in the light of Reason (and not Understanding merely), a *processio ad intra*, since *extra* is itself a variety of *intra* in this current, notional perspective. They, the methods, are thus given "the form of abstract universality". Or such finite cognition sets aside what "looks" unessential, making of what is left in "the concrete thing", or bringing it "into relief", "a concrete universal, the Genus, or Force and Law".

This universality, he says (228), "is also a specific universality". Here he leads into the latter or Synthetic method, consisting in the "reception of the object into the forms of this notion", i.e. the "specific or definite notion of understanding" as described above, in which, as finite cognition, again, the notion "has not its infinity", is not therefore the true notion as such.

These forms are three, **Definition**, **Division**, **Theorem** (*Lehrsatz*). It is from the latter of these that Hegel transcends or sublates Cognition proper in **Volition**. Regarding the relation of the two methods, one does not choose between them. The type of object determines which method is applicable. "Analytical cognition deals with an object which is presented in detachment", aims to trace it "back to a universal ... Thought in such circumstances means no more than an act of abstraction or of formal identity ... the sense in which thought is understood by Locke and all empiricists." (227, *Zus.*)

This contradicts the purpose of Cognition as such, "to take things as they are", since it separates the concrete or given into abstract elements for

⁷ Cf. Peter Geach, *Mental Acts*, London 1958, "Appendix". This view implies that Aristotle's doctrine of *epagoge*, or of "the universal coming to rest in the soul" (the gradual forming by soldiers of a battle-line after a rout, *Post. An.* II 17), is not "abstractionist" in the Lockean sense.

⁸ Cp. P. Butchvarov, "Knowledge Representation", *Dictionary of Metaphysics and Ontology*, ed. Burkhardt & Smith, Philosophia Verlag, Munich 1991, pp. 431-432.

consideration “in isolation”, Hegel claims. What is known, is analysed, is thus no longer what was first to be considered, *das geistige Band* has been severed or even removed (Goethe, *Faust* I). The analyst “sticks to” his abstracted elements without reintegrating, as we are told today that water is H₂O or what water consists of merely, but it is not. Water is the result of that compounding and has its own inalienable properties in direct experience. This observation is meant not as a refusal of “scientific” sophistication but as confirming the call to integrate natural science into the overall “Notional” view. This call can be viewed as much in a philosophic-scientific as in an aesthetic light (sameness of the total Content). The sense of the latter, of the “fitting”, may be found on occasion taken up even more by natural scientists or mathematicians than by philosophers as a relatively sure guide to theorising.

The Synthetic method, by contrast, starts with the universal “as a definition”, then divides it, drawing conclusions, thirdly, in the theorem or thesis. These, definition, division, theorem, correspond to the three “moments” of the notion, universality, particularity, individuality (163), applied finally to the “object” with which Analysis would have begun. This though, as necessity produced in demonstration (232), will translate into the category of “Volition”, viewed as, we shall see, the acme of Cognition. “Necessity *qua* necessity is implicitly the self-relating notion.”

The subjective idea has thus implicitly reached an original and objective determinateness, - a something given, and for that reason immanent in the subject. It has passed over into the idea of Will.

Volition is thus a “technical” name, not to be undifferentiatedly identified with its normal signification though it might be taken as fulfilling the latter’s deeper implications, as philosophy (science) itself fulfils or “accomplishes” religion and *a fortiori* art. Indeed it is only in this way that philosophy will shed the abstract finitude its would-be practitioners (in the sense of *theoria* as “highest praxis”, or so it ought to be at least, but was and is not with the sophists, ancient or modern) so often pin upon it. In this way we can divine a secret admiration amid the irony when Hegel speaks of philosophy as it is understood in England (*Enc.* 7, especially the footnote’s final sentence). His final account of Cognition thus harmonises well with Aquinas, for whom absolute or divine knowledge is necessarily or as such determinative or “causal”, thus active and indeed “volitional”. Phenomenal finite knowledge “appears” opposed to this precisely as abstracted from volition, as that in turn is then abstracted from knowing.

McTaggart in his Commentary (§281) treats this discussion of scientific methods as an untoward excursus from the dialectic, due to an error in

Hegel's perception of his own aim and method. This though seems to be an oblique assertion of a difference in just such aim between these two thinkers. McTaggart omits discussion of Analytic and Synthetic cognition (which occupies four pages in the earlier WL) as outside the category considered, whereas others place them as themselves sub-categories, as, surely, in the later *Encyclopaedia*, does Hegel himself. "Once more, Hegel has been misled by the concrete state which he has taken as an example of his category" (McTaggart). Can there really be anything in this? Can one, logically, approach Hegel's logic in this way? Is it not precisely analogous to criticising "pure" reason in terms of reason itself, in a word Kantian, a regress?

If Hegel himself includes analytic and synthetic knowledge under "The Idea of the True", under "Cognition Proper" (the second word here is added to the original *Erkenntnis* by W. Wallace, Victorian translator of the *Encyclopaedia*), then they belong to his scheme as sub-categories and we will find justification offered for this as we find even for the further group of categories, Definition, Division, Theorem, subtended and indeed derived from Synthetic Knowledge, the category, specifically. It is from the last of these specifically, again, that Volition (WL, "The Idea of the Good") emerges. Hence McTaggart's intra-Hegelian dissent obliges him to add that

Hegel's error in introducing these subdivisions does not destroy the line of his argument, for we can go directly from the undivided category of the Idea of the True to the next category the Idea of the Good... just as well. (McTaggart 282)

Is it "just as well" though? Might it not be that McTaggart's modification leaves him with a doctrine of the transcendental predicates, Being, Truth, Goodness, no different from that of, say, Aquinas, where there is not, on the surface at least⁹, the same suggestion of Volition crowning or taking further Cognition and its "essential finitude" (Hegel)? Aquinas discusses them more phenomenologically, we might judge, allowing truth and goodness, in contrast to being, to *appear* as mere "beings of reason"¹⁰, whereas in Hegel the Good, for which Volition is put as an alternative name merely, as indeed Aristotle defines Good as what all will or strive

⁹ Yet in the downward sweep of the discussion of the divine attributes in the *Summa theologiae* perfection and goodness are placed next after being, the most perfect attribute when considered non-abstractly, as containing all the rest. Knowledge comes later. Hegel's upward sweep coincides.

¹⁰ Cf. Aquinas, *QD de potentia* VII.

after, succeeds as *advance* upon "Cognition Proper" (truth in *mente sola*, i.e. itself a mere *ens rationis* as compared with Being, for Aquinas). Thus, in Hegel, when at the end of WL especially the Idea is declared nonetheless to be true Being (after having been identified with the Good) we can seem to have a coincidence of the two systems, or three if we include Aristotle, at least viewable temporally, i.e. historically, as an advancing series, as signalled by Hegel's placing of "Good" here.

In fact McTaggart remains Hegelian on this point, acknowledging Volition as "an advance", but for what seems a different reason to the one Hegel offers at *Enc.* 232, though I believe it is also to be found in Hegel. Similarly, I do not mean to deny that a similar doctrine can be extracted from as at least latent in Aquinas, once again. The truly latent, anyhow, is *ipso facto* patent, to the Notion or "objectively" ("agreement of a thought-content with itself", 24 *Zus.*).

We will find here that the necessity to which Hegel appeals as produced by Cognition in **Demonstration** (of a "theorem"), just because this is both or equally "external" and internal (232), elevates Cognition above its "starting-point" of "accepting its content as given or found". It is again like the plant which matures from a principle or base independent of the environment with which it all the same, as "part" of its own being, interacts. Deriving Volition in just this way is essential to the absolute dominion of the Notion, the identity of each, of the Subject, with all, with both universe and universal, with Subjectivity in a word, as being "universal of universals" (20, 24 *Zus.*, cp. 42 *Zus.*, WL II, Subrkamp, pp. 487-498 on *Die Idee des Erkennens*, largely a negative evaluation of Kant on *das Ich*).¹¹

McTaggart has a different stress, perhaps an *idée fixe*, which, however, he has well brought out in his Hegelian writings (i.e. those prior to *The*

¹¹ This identity of subject and subjectivity is important for any discussion of Hegel and immortality (such as McTaggart undertakes in *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*). There is an undoubted kinship with the "Arab" Aristotelian view of a "common intellect", roundly rejected by Aquinas (in the *opusculum* "On a Common Intellect" and elsewhere). Yet it is with this universality that each has to identify, in a kind of death where all phenomena, including temporality itself, are here and now negated and/or *aufgehoben*, as is everywhere championed by Aquinas. "I live now, yet not I" and so on, by no means necessarily a "theorem" of a positivist theology merely. Grace, said K. Rahner, is everywhere. He thus philosophised and/or "thematized" this concept, as when some say that man is that being who transcends himself (in community of intellect, *inter alia*?). Here in the logic, however, we cannot assume "man".

Nature of Existence)¹² as, so to say, the secret motor to the whole enterprise, Hegel's or his. Of Cognition specifically he writes:

The conception, I believe, is as follows. The whole Universe forms an Organic system. The parts can only be explained or described by reference to the system, and through the system, to the other members of it, while the unity of the system can only be explained as the unity which does connect those parts. But the fresh element is this each of these parts, which may now be called individuals, has within it a system, which corresponds to the larger system the system of the Universe. (McTaggart 275)

He is referring, of course, to Cognition as the “fresh element” in the dialectic. He stresses that in the dialectic “Cognition” is by no means synonymous with cognition as ordinarily spoken of.¹³

Hegel was no doubt justified in naming this category after a concrete state of the human mind. For knowledge in so far as correct, and volition, in so far as gratified, do form systems which correspond to the objects which are known or which gratify the volition... Indeed, no other examples of this category can, I think, be found ... Indeed, it might be said that he has not completely defined the new category at all, but has left part of the definition implicit in the statement that the correspondence in question is the one of which true knowledge and gratified volition are examples. (McTaggart 277)

This might rather suggest, however, that the new category, the “correspondence”, can only be “illustrated”, embodied and take form rather, through just these states, at least one of which (cognition), is essential, though not exclusively or at all in its psychological aspect, to any conception of Logic whatever. In this sense biology, in our conception of it today (evolution of Reason discerned by Reason!), participates in Logic as a category to be superseded. Reason is only truly perceived, thought, as the Notion.

This is why the case is different, as McTaggart notes, with the category of Life, as indeed is explicit in Mechanism and Chemism, where other examples of the category are in fact given, “besides those drawn from Mechanics and Chemistry”. In Life they are not given but it is possible to supply the deficiency. The unity which is expressed in the different parts of a beautiful object – a Persian rug, for example, or an Adam ceiling – is

¹² See the final words to his *Commentary* at §296.

¹³ He distinguishes categorial use of such common terms from their normal usage by writing initial capitals, a method I have followed too, though not with perfect consistency I fear.

an example of what Hegel calls an organic unity (McTaggart 278). Here McTaggart implicitly duplicates Hegel's assertion that works of Art, of Spirit, can be of more value than the data of Nature (though this is also the work of Spirit).

In general it is necessary to read Hegel sympathetically, to go along with him part of the way at least, if one wishes to understand.¹⁴ One should hesitate to say, for example, that Hegel "gave up", in Life, the idea that he held before in and as Teleology, and after in Cognition, of Existence forming one organic system and that "having once given it up he has no right to bring it back, except by a fresh demonstration of it, which he does not profess to give us" (McTaggart, *op. cit.* 277).

Why would Hegel bumble about in this way? Has McTaggart read the section on Life correctly? When we read of the category of "an individual life" (*Das lebendige Individuum* in WL) we should not forget the result attained under the Subjective Notion that the Individual is the Universal, "the notion expressly put as a totality" (163). Just therefore the fact that life is essentially individual is an advance as taken into the dialectic. All subjectivity is concrete, is subject, and each is all, the very essence of the Notion from its first introduction (160). After that we get now the "fresh element" McTaggart himself mentions, of the "system" of the whole within each individual, as determinedly corresponding to the whole as unity of all individuals, i.e. each is necessary to that Whole which is necessary to each of them, whatever or whoever they are or might be. This is indeed the "Kingdom of Ends" (Kant).

This corresponds to Hegel's advertence to a doubleness at the beginning of Cognition (223f.). It is specifically knowledge that duplicates the reality with which it is implicitly but not "yet" explicitly identical. As Aristotle had said, the universal is found differently, *alio modo*, in thought and in things. This is the moment of "moderate realism", about to be surpassed, in Absolute Idealism. As McTaggart puts this point,

Correspondence here does not mean exact similarity in nature. My correct knowledge that A is courageous does not resemble A's courage at all closely. Nor, if my will approves the fact that A is modest, does my gratified volition closely resemble his modesty. (McTaggart, §275)

This, refuting at least some versions of the later "picture-theory of meaning", is just the finiteness of Cognition, i.e. of Knowledge plus Volition before or until they are unified, fused in the Absolute Idea where "all unsatisfied endeavour ceases" (Hegel, 234). That is, it ceases here and

¹⁴ Thus here already there is a volitional element in knowledge.

now, in conceiving the Concept. Here is Hegel's so-called mysticism, in that in thus conceiving one accomplishes what was (is) in essence the mystical quest, that of seeing and uniting with reality whole, something one never could see from outside of it, without volition, that is. This is why he regards the Christian conceptions as equivalent to their truth, it being a misunderstanding to attempt further "proof". It is why also he will give the dismissive account of abstract morality he gives under Objective Spirit. One finds a similar relegation in Aquinas, as compared to an "abstract" element in Greek ethics. This is also, one might say, the background to Nietzsche, for whom the superior man will endlessly forgive, "delivered from revenge", this being the quintessence of Christianity. "Love and do what you like", Augustine had long ago said. The only obedience is to Reason, is Reason, while *Sittlichkeit* is a mere or rather a sheer "letting being be", as Heidegger said of Thinking. That is, it is Hegelian logic in action and nothing else, nothing added. It is a "meta-ethic". No doubt we are no better than we should be. One has to be patient, this being of course compatible with all normal effort. It is it in fact (*patientia* as a virtue, *ad ardua*) on the phenomenal plane or, here, plain whence I, or anyone, "lift up mine eyes to the hills".

So the doubleness, along with the abstract Object, vanishes, is overcome. "The finitude of Cognition lies in the presupposition of a world already in existence" and the "truth which such Cognition can reach". Presupposing such a contrast "will therefore be only finite" (226 plus *Zus.*). Hence Hegel's account of Truth, as agreement of the object or bearer of such truth with its concept, is ultimately a matter of complete identity. It is in fact the Concept which is truth (*veritas est in mente*, even here still), but not in this case as "agreeing with" anything else or other, but as perfect and hence concrete unity.

The clear blueprint for such absolute knowledge is precisely the Absolute. It alone *is*. Its knowledge, of necessity omniscience, is one with omnipotence, i.e. it is undetermined or, which is the same, self-determined, free, onmi-constitutive and hence, we shall see, infinite or absolute volition. If God's knowledge does not determine himself to be what he is, freely therefore, then God is not God, not omnipotent. This alone is why Reason is the absolute freedom Hegel says it is, of which necessity is the badge.

The fact is that for Hegel the realised harmony of absolute knowledge is not abstractly separable from the process or method from which it results. That idea applies too. Again, since the dialectic is precisely knowledge, is thought, *nous*, in its ultimate, i.e. objective and absolute, form, it follows that knowledge, the "Idea of the True", can hardly be treated as an (the

only) example of the category. It is the category, as it is Knowledge itself that leads into Will and then, in their synthesis, the Absolute Idea or “realised End” indeed of the dialectic. The apparent doubleness of the dialectic was just that, an appearance.

Again, the “process” of coming to know, how it “becomes”, has little to do with any temporal or “gradual” becoming, any more than does this original and originating category itself. It is rather part of the continuous bending back, re-flexion, determining the dialectic as a whole, its complete transparency as viewed integrally in the Concept. Here first it begins to seize itself or, rather, finally and truly does seize it, the individual (category) not exemplifying but being the whole, the universal, Subject.

This is a wide-ranging theme. Suppose, for example, that Spirit can only be “illustrated” through Man, that the concrete human mind is our only and indispensable “clue” to Spirit. Then, at once, man becomes, dialectically, Spirit as such.¹⁵ Here we would have an example of philosophy’s “leaving everything as it is” (Wittgenstein), the key premise, also, of Zen. But this is precisely how truth has always been recognised and hence, inasmuch as “always” signifies the Necessary (holding in all ways), it is truth and “the” truth. Materialism, as an abstract doctrine, often mistakes itself for this truth, for the Idea. Insofar, however, as Absolute Idealism itself signifies the unity of theory and praxis (volition), there was no need or call to attempt to stand Hegel on his idealist head to arrive at this, Hegel’s own terminus.

¹⁵ Man, of course, could not then be thought of as a union of soul and body, still less be identified with just such a soul. These categories, rather, as the abstractions they are, would be sublated. The ultimate difference, rationality, becomes definitionally constitutive, as in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* VII.

XXXII

VOLITION

In Hegel's Greater Logic (GL) this category, which we have already begun to explore in our previous chapter, is called "The Idea of the Good", a better name, McTaggart comments, "in so far as it does not, like 'Volition', suggest the idea of change" (*Comm.* 284). Yet "Volition" is better in that "the example Hegel means to take is clearly a psychical state and not the ethical idea of Goodness". It seems not so clear, however, that it is either of these, since goodness, indeed absolute goodness, is involved in either case and such goodness in Aristotle, Hegel's perhaps closest model, is the general name for the object of pursuit, voluntary or involuntary, everywhere and by anyone (*quod omnes prosequuntur*). As such it is necessary, not contingent, as talk of the "ethical" might suggest.¹ It is not an option shared with "evil" (*malum*), but the End (*finis*) of all praxis whatever. *Bonum habet rationem finis*, i.e. Good means, has the intelligibility (*ratio*) of, end, that's what it is as such and/or what is thereby denoted, as Aquinas transcribes Aristotle's doctrine, while the converse will equally hold. Our end or aim is what we hold good. The sense is that which Milton's Satan employs, as declaring his intent, in saying "Evil, be thou my good!" It is noteworthy that traditional formal logic cannot well explain, in its own terms, why the doctrine of "distribution" (of the predicate) might seem to apply for "all men are animals" but not for "Every man is an animal", as if there were *two* judgments here, albeit in a possible mutual implication, the only true judgment in logic, in thought, however, being that for *every* x, if x is a man then x is an animal. Compare "All gold glitters" and "Everything (anything) gold glitters". Distribution, that is, was an interior corruption of the older logical theory. Consult here the group of papers on this topic collected in Geach's *Logic Matters*, which does not, however, go into the philosophical reasons, laid bare in Hegel, for this imperviousness to

¹ Cp. our "The *bonum honestum* and the Lack of Moral Motive in Aquinas": in *The Downside Review*, April 2000, pp. 85-111.

thought of the empirical or abstractive use of “all”, carried over, in what is sheer “mathematical” representation (the reverse of logical “quantification”), in the contrastive adoption of “some” for “there is an x such that it both F s and G s”, say, though this latter variant is at the price of the comparable or worse error of making “existential import” a formal element for logic. In fact, however, “there is a man” and “there is a dragon”, alternatively “For some man” or “For some dragon”, have, *thus far*, i.e. prior to further predication, exactly the same logical force or import, whether or not, left as statements on their own, either might be true or false.. This is the force of talk of alternative universes or worlds, again, appearing in this context as a mere picture or appearance indeed. What it obscures is the truth, on which Hegel insists, on the necessity of nature or of external reality as it is in its “alienated” state, a necessity compatible with as actually naming the freedom of the Idea (cf. *Enc.* 244) and, again, conversely; i.e. this freedom is what necessity is. “This truth of necessity, therefore, is *Freedom*” (158 *et f.*, emphasis original).

The objection we made above to McTaggart’s talk of taking an example here still holds. In religion the notion of “the will of God” is the highest or, as exemplar, by no means an example of anything, since it is, uniquely, both divine attribute and identical with its “possessor”. It is, that is, *attributed*, as naming, one can say, an absolute harmony and rationality or goodness. If God willed evil it would be good, late-medieval theologians, anxious not to compromise God’s “absolute power”, were fond of declaring, perhaps too fond, however. Aquinas, speaking of the “honourable good” (virtue, morality) as good, as it were specifically, as leading to the final good or good as end, preserves better the innate “sovereignty of good” over evil, its contrary, to be relativised again by Hegel, however, in the manner less expertly indicated by those theologians.

“In” Infinity, then, of which, although this may be treated or mistreated as *a* being, or even as, abstractly, being simply (*the Idea* is true being, Hegel concludes his Greater Logic by saying), there cannot be a plurality, differentiate though we may and must the knowledge necessary to it. The question even arises, in view of the fact that “Being” in German necessarily is said or written with the article, *das Sein* or, in further discrimination, *das Seiende*, as to whether Hegel’s *das Sein* could not well, or better, be translated as *the* being, if we wish to capture his full intent, thus avoiding, again, the abstraction (*sic*) of being simply, while “the true being”, in English, remains ambiguous on this point. Latin has to make do with just *ens* and *esse*, its act (*actus essendi*) and this poverty of language sets the stage for or elicits the rich subtleties of later Latin philosophy specifically..

Infinity, in its concept, cannot be limited by, in the sense of being dependent upon, anything. Its knowledge, inasmuch as we may attribute knowledge as such to it, when meaning, rather, *the knowledge which it is*, is therefore determinative, whether of self or other indifferently, necessarily in either case within its own self as itself infinite, as it were conceptually and hence volitionally or freely self-determined (the sense of *causa sui*). Where, however, Aquinas sees or posits correspondence by analogy between finite and infinite knowledge here McTaggart sees in knowledge a phenomenal figure of the non-phenomenal Absolute. This is clearly implicit in Aquinas too, however, just as when Hegel describes "absolute knowledge" at the end of *The Phenomenology of Mind* he might, if we abstract from the ground-plan of this book, well have used some other term or have just dropped the term "knowledge", speaking of the Absolute simply as here, in the Logic, he will speak of the Absolute Idea. For this is itself the Absolute and not a "logical" species of it (213): "The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself absolute ... is the Truth". On this topic, in WL, he repeatedly declares that the Absolute Idea is the union of the Concept and "Reality" or, also, of Objectivity. This will be when the two "judgments", viz. idea and "an external universe", are "explicitly put as identical" (223).

The correlativity of finite and infinite life, Hegel says at one point (224), however, characterises finitude. Compare the Pauline "I live yet not I", not divorceable however from the sacramental concept of baptismal *death* but still treating of God (as the heavenly or "risen" Christ) or, implicitly, the infinite under the *figure* of divine omnipotence. Thus it is that God allows himself to be called "God", we might have finally to say. There is, meanwhile, a "virtual identity between" the idea that "exists free for itself" (223) "and the objective world". From this Hegel will speak of "the percipient idea" which is Nature as *self*-perception, the Idea's "unity with itself". That is, absolute cognition (first envisioned as "cognition in general" at 223) turns out to be freely self-constitutive or, rather, free self-constitution, the absolute *causa sui* (cause of causality), just as *causa*, i.e. each member in a hierarchy of absolutes, stands for and is the whole or Absolute, equally viewable by Hegel's reasoning, however, as *effect*. The part (of the Notion) is the whole. So much for "examples", while if we mention St. Paul we must not deny to the Infinite the will and capacity, essential to Religion, to affirm or deny (as what acceptance and rejection here come down to) union, in what Aquinas calls friendship, Paul indwelling, with or "within" this or that element or person, not forgetting the established factor here (in Hegel's logic) of identity in difference and its converse. The denial, religion's "I never knew you", would thus come

down to annihilation or a shrivelling up from within or without indifferently, the fate of all alienated appearance, or nature thus viewed, as alienated or as not “redeemed” indifferently. What God does not know *is* not; this is a simple truth, irrespective of the different forms of Absolute Spirit. Infinite life remains, thus, as figure, contradiction, since “the living being dies”, life being accordingly sublated in the Idea. Hence death, its nugatory contrary, is “the entry into Spirit”. Hence it is said of spiritual or thinking (*geistliche*) persons that they “die daily”, philosophy thus being a practice of death, *athanatizein*, says Aristotle, without our being killed, in the sense of “killed off”. Death, that is, is not life in the sense of being freedom from life, *me on* rather than *ouk on*, again, while that *viventibus vivere esse* is neither here nor there. For the colour-blind nothing is coloured.

Hegel concurs, then, with those late-medieval theologians whose child he is, child of their “voluntarism” inasmuch as volition, power, achieved harmony (i.e. rationality simply, achieving its own achievement), crowns, as “realised end”, a purely theoretical Cognition or Truth. This insight will later be recast as “nihilism” or as a form of unrestricted self-determination merely, in individuals particularly. This is really no more than Hegel’s initial finding that Being is “not a whit better” or more real “than the Nothing of the Buddhists” (88, *Zus.*)². Compare Sartre: “Man is what he makes himself and nothing else”, himself, however, in strict consistency, “a useless passion”. Yet it remains true that it is precisely Cognition, unrestricted, that is determinative, causing even our free acts, reasons Aquinas. There is no “pure” will in any abstracted sense, however, but only as including that previous moment of the theoretical. *Voluntas sequitur intellectum*. Even the will that drives on the dialectic must arise out of a prior or indeed primordial cognition itself *inclining* to what thereby becomes the Good, of necessity or in essence. In this light, Kant’s statement that practical reason is nothing but the will can seem unexceptionable. Aquinas, however, retains the distinction between even practical mind and its inclination, between “This is to be done” and “Do this!” Which, of the two, our proximate question must then become, is the more Hegelian? The distinction that is not thus dualistically maintained in Aquinas is, rather, that between theoretical and practical reason in the first place. The same is true of Aristotle as declaring that “*theoria* is the highest *praxis*”. Thus for Aquinas “practical reason” is (the one) reason “directed

² The idea, I may just remark here, that the material in the *Zusatz*, from Hegel’s lectures etc., is likely to be more “popular” seems to me a rationalization of a wish to keep clear of the more controversial Hegel, of the real Hegel in fact. In his lectures he was more free to be himself, popular or unpopular. It would not be a matter of pandering to a mass-preference.

to a work", *ordinata ad opus*, not a second species of reason (this is important for understanding texts such as Ia-IIae 94, 2, of the main *Summa*). The whole idea of two or more species of reason, as some take the distinction between Understanding and (speculative) Reason to intend, conceals deep confusion. At this our human level, necessarily constrained by finitude, Understanding, conceptual abstractiveness, is absorbed and perfected in (speculative) reason, a process without which reason itself in its perfection could not be.

Mind and will, then, like being and non-being, belong together, are indeed one. Otherwise Mind would not be principle and result of its own development eternally while Will, as bare *Trieb*, would not be at all, remaining as an unmanifest because unmanifestable abstraction like its dialectical ancestor, Force. As Aquinas had put it, "There must be a will in God *because* he has a mind" (*Summa theol.* I, 18, 1, stress added). Intellect, thought, of itself inclines to itself, and that *constitutive* inclining (as distinct from a separable inclination) is will. Thus knowing is proportional to willing and this is the truth behind the maxim: "Knowledge is power". This is not, though, a return to the *Kraft* that Hegel negates but rather the opposite negation of *Kraft* in its normal or phenomenal sense in favour of *metaphysical* truth.

This Will, then, is "a harmony inevitably and originally perfect" (McTaggart 285). McTaggart's objection to Hegel's dealing here rather with the process of achieving this harmony can be met simply by thinking of such process as included, as is the whole process and method of the dialectic, in the Absolute itself, and not as "an extraneous form".

It thus appears that the method is not an extraneous form, but the soul and notion of the content, from which it is only distinguished, so far as the dynamic elements of the notion even on their own part come in their own specific character to appear as the totality of the notion. (Hegel 243).

Thus,

Within the range of the finite we can never really see or experience that the End has been really secured. The consummation of the infinite end, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion (i.e. that "under which we live") by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise ... for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result. (212, *Zus.*, parenthesis mine of text transferred from three lines earlier in the original)

There is deep concurrence here even with Schopenauer's argument for the *unalterability* of character and consequent destiny (pointed out to his readers by Mr. John Bards of the Yahoo Hegel Discussion Group). If, as the above identification implies, Volition ultimately names delight, *delectatio*, or fruition (from *frui*, to enjoy), as in the mystical tradition (Hegel: "the Notion is pure play"), yet this is under the aspect of subjective necessity in the sense of the necessity of subject, of any subjectivity or any subject indifferently, of I as the "universal of universals". Will thus *emerges dialectically* from consideration of the **Theorem** (231 concluding to 232). Delight, that is, fruition, is a dialectical necessity. This only surprises those who have yet to see it. This necessary fruition is therefore more calm even than resignation, as being calmness itself, its principle, as the true Idea in its own "blessedness" (159, a "marked" text as concluding "The Doctrine of Essence").

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In the same way as we have just dealt with McTaggart's objection as to treating process so we say that Hegel's treatment of the methods and process of knowing, inseparable from knowing itself as equally a coming to know (this already answers the objection), shows that they are included in knowledge as essentially resulting from it, and this applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to finite and infinite knowledge indifferently. Similarly the **Synthetic Method**, as "reverse" of the **Analytic Method**, is *ipso facto* inseparable from it (like the reverse side of a coin). As starting from the universal as a **Definition** it proceeds through **Division** to the **Theorem**, whence Hegel derives **Volition**, the dialectic's most important penultimate step, i.e. penultimate as far as the Logic is concerned. I make this qualification to emphasise its continuous passage into Nature and not merely or solely into "the philosophy of" Nature, at least as we have the latter here in linguistic form. For Nature itself, herself, may well be styled philosophy, in so far as absolutely thought, it too passing from Theorem into Will. This, again, emphasises the two judgments which are already one (223, 224), something essential to notice in any idealistic thinking. Nature is nature known and known by me. As remarked already, this may well be the clue to answering Gentile's root and branch objection to the inclusion of a philosophy of nature in an idealist system. Nature herself, namely, is none other than the philosophy of nature, than nature as nature thought. Or, it is the creation, the Idea's "freely going forth".

The necessity which cognition reaches by means of the demonstration is the reverse of what formed its starting-point. In its starting-point cognition had a

given and a contingent content; but now, at the close of its movement, it knows its content to be necessary. This necessity is reached by means of subjective agency. Similarly subjectivity at starting was quite abstract, a bare *tabula rasa*. It now shows itself as a modifying and determining principle. In this way we pass from the idea of cognition to that of the will. The passage, as will be apparent on a closer examination, means that the universal, to be truly apprehended, must be appreciated as subjectivity, as a notion self-moving, active and form-imposing. (232, *Zus.*: cp. our "Classificatory Expressions and Matters of Moral Substance" in *Philosophical Papers*, Grahamstown, May 1984, pp. 29-43, reprinted as Part Two, Ch. 1, of our *Philosophy or Dialectic*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1994).

The readiest instance of this is the fact that even the basic principles of formal logic, of any formal logic, have no force or authority for anyone not seeing their intrinsic truth, which again implies a fault in the very conception of an abstractly formal logic as determinative for true thought. What this means is that although this discussion has the Understanding for its object the latter is discussed by (or from the viewpoint of) speculative Reason here, exactly as occurs in the Scholastic *logica docens* as distinct from *logica utens* (cf. John "of St. Thomas" Poinsett OP, Descartes' contemporary: *Ars logica*). In Hegel, however, the "philosophy of logic" shows itself to be integral to logic itself, as sublating this Scholastic distinction. It has to be so since it is the whole point of the Understanding that it be superseded or taken up into Reason proper, into *nous*. This is Hegel's point as to how Aristotle made no use of his discoveries concerning formal logic for his speculative thinking or *nous*.

So Hegel asks where Definition "comes from" (229, *Zus.*), not a usual enquiry in logic textbooks. Definitions, indeed, "originate by way of analysis". Everything "depends on what perceptions we started from", i.e. on a (finite) beginning and therefore not upon Being except as naming, in the Logic here, an and hence *the* absolute beginning that, as absolutely "first" (it is the Notion), cannot be defined.

The object here "presupposed" (233) offers "numerous" aspects for "various" definitions, just as there appears to be a great number of various persons. The richer the object the more numerous are the aspects, "of life, of the state, etc." Only in abstract enquiries such as geometry is there one true definition specifically. Hence this is not the true model or definition of Definition (229), in which Volition plays a part right here within theoretical cognition still. But this is not yet volition as necessity. Indeed and in any or either case "in respect of the matter or contents of the objects defined there is no constraining necessity" (229, *Zus.*). Still, this text continues,

We are expected to admit that space exists, that there are plants, animals, *etc.*, nor is it the business of geometry, botany *etc.* to demonstrate that the objects in question necessarily are.

Animals and plants, natural bodies in effect, *are not*, Hegel and Aquinas agree, not, that is, in the eternal realisation or “accomplishment” of the Concept, or “in the resurrection” (Aquinas). The “beauty of the bodies of the redeemed”, the latter adds, will more than compensate for their absence, as this absence is the same, it is already implied, as their being taken up (*aufgehoben?*) into that, “raised (as) a spiritual body”. This in fact will be the resolution of the “groaning and travailing” of just Nature as envisaged in *Romans* 8.³ For Hegel, anyhow, Body must remain a finite or “momentary” concept unless in a sense presumed intended by the text saying “it is raised a spiritual body”, while Aquinas’s open formulations on this topic might well be compatible with this.

Space, we shall see, as the absolute self-alienation of the Absolute (Idea), is rather non-existence as such or, a variant, ex-istence as non-Being. Being, Aristotle had remarked, “is said in many ways”, but it is in just one, onmi-comprehensive way its own. Thus I, as individual or “part” (being has no parts, Parmenides taught), am not what I am and am what I am not, thus far. “I live yet not I” and he that loses his life (denies himself) keeps it “unto life eternal”. Hegel was soaked in these texts. All this, anyhow, the speculative Reason finds out independently, and the “epoch” of religion preceding, as much dialectically as historically (for it is the self-nugatory dialectic of religion itself), belongs or is necessary to this finding out.

This very expectation, this intrinsic assumption “makes the synthetic method of cognition as little suitable for philosophy as the analytical” (229, *Zus.*). McTaggart’s supposed point against Hegel’s procedure was thus there in Hegel himself. Philosophy “has above all things to leave no doubt of the necessity of its objects”. This is the Cartesian point. Finite rationalism, however, is that failure to differentiate rational “enlightenment” or self-awareness against or as overcoming which the whole Hegelian system takes its rise. This thus marks an antithesis to Spinoza’s “geometric” method, the synthetic in particular. Spinoza “begins with definitions”, where they can have no place. The concept of *causa sui* is enlightening, but to begin with it is “dogmatic” or less than absolute. “The same is true

³ Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theol. Suppl.*, Q 91, 5. Cp. the Pauline text quoted in part above: “It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body”, in Hegel the speculative contradiction in resolution, in the “Philosophy of Mind” (*Enc.* III), of Nature and Logic.

of Schelling", Hegel says. Both begin with an absolute (Schelling: "I call reason the absolute reason"⁴), which Hegel, or philosophy, allows rather to discover for itself in dis- or uncovering itself.

This assertion of the arbitrary in *definitional* procedure, however, is to be distinguished from the necessarily personal character of any philosophising, always "done" in a particular style, a particular language indeed, with a personal choice, inevitably, as to how to set matters out, and so on. For this, though personal, is never properly called "mine" (contrast Schelling's title: *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*) in the abstract. Hegel himself refers to "my" *Phenomenology* without scruple, yet as claiming simultaneously for it to be identical with Thought itself while acknowledging its historical character as an objectified, e.g. written, phenomenon. The individual is the universal and to represent the self-effacement involved here as arrogance or worse, often attributed to Hegel, is either misunderstanding or finite malice. Why, though, cannot the same be said of definitions? What makes just them "dogmatic"? Just because they are finite, they de-fine, inevitably on a presupposition and, indeed, a stipulation. The biological definition "rational animal" is a prime example of this. How avoid inferring it is best to say nothing at all? Thus Aquinas at life's end judged all he had written "but straw". Still, says the Preacher, "There is a time to live and a time to die". This cessation of time, however, cannot itself be temporal. Life is a passing, an evanescent category, it too. Thought is not in it, the page before us but a means (to thought).

*

From thus seeing the universal as "the specific notion in general", i.e. in explicit self-contradiction, we pass to the "universal as particularising", in this "synthetic" method of thinking or coming to know, as "given by Division", to go back to the details of categories already mentioned somewhat. Hegel even calls this "the second element of the notion" or, rather, a or the "statement" of it, again "in accordance with some external consideration", i.e. specifically as less than philosophical. Philosophy, indeed, is bound thus to consider and situate the less than philosophical. This is the core principle of dialectic as such.

Division, classification we might rather wish to say, though Hegel avoids this (as presupposing), "ought to be complete", as it never is unless there is a ground providing, as stipulating this, the forever implicit. Yet this ground "must be borrowed from the nature of the object in question", (230, *Zus.*), thus giving the appearance of non-imposition at the price of a

⁴ Schelling, *Werke* IV, 1147.

finitely closed circularity, as it were aping the perfect and legitimate circle of philosophy, it too affording no privileged point of entry from an outside finally understood as imaginary. This finite region of a particular science is "designated by the division in general". This is but natural though, not arbitrary. Particular science, that is, belongs to the alienation which is Nature. Thus the Concept, as absolute, excludes all judgment, all predication of identity as otherness. The keeping silence Wittgenstein mentions at the end of his *Tractatus* should not be, as he is often understood, a call to finite stupidity but a direction towards pure thinking. He too reaches this within a treatise on logic, is *logico-philosophicus*, though not as, with Hegel (developing Aristotle), representing logic itself in its full self-reflexivity and consequent sovereignty over any finite language. Language, we might say, both in history and in the life of the individual, is an *excursus*, generating and yet consequent upon abstraction, from which thought, the Idea, returns with a spiritual harmony more solid by far than the original natural harmony of childhood or innocence (21, 24, incl. *Zus.* in both cases).

So Division aims to distinguish the particulars, the finite group, as they distinguish (and assert) themselves, e.g. by teeth and claws. Here we have a form of the two judgments, of Idea and World or Nature, which are really one, again. That is, "genuine division must be controlled by the notion" (230, *Zus.*), as "secret" principle of any Understanding. Thus Hegel shows that there is no "tragedy of knowledge" (N. Berdyaev's phrase, following Kant), that knowledge, the Notion, is active, is Act, *nous*, "setting all in order" (Anaxagoras) in its own notional act as, analogously, the animals are separate in separating themselves. Hence we have our own liberty, voluntaristically, in a sense more ample than the fourteenth century theological conception, which was reacting, after all, against Aristotelian "necessitarianism", as then conceived (though Aquinas had earlier shown the identity of necessity and absolute freedom "in God" as he puts it), to alter our consciousness of individuality, by thinking, by knowledge, which is active love.

Here Hegel claims a predominance "in the sphere of the mind", in reality therefore, of "trichotomy" (230 *Zus.*), which yet "may go to the extent even of four members" (cp. Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Baillie p.772), crediting Kant with highlighting this (perhaps at the *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction 9). The greater prolixity of division in Nature underlines therefore its alienation from or, indeed (actively), alienation of Reason, since this latter, as the identity of necessity and absolute freedom, as *nous*, is simultaneously or, *qua* Nature, essentially, or by its own "nature", Reason *qua* rational self-alienation, a "wilderness of

contingency" where, insofar as we come to see each as necessary to the whole, teleology reappearing, we will find Nature, as at first abstractly conceived, disappearing or suspending itself towards the whole and absolute again, to Spirit.

Though a division shall have three members, as synthetic method itself has three members, definition, division, theorem, yet division, as particularity, "exhibits itself as double", thus yielding "four members", he thus says. We might be reminded of C.G. Jung's insistence upon Mary as an increasingly explicit fourth in the Christian Trinity according to his prioritising of four over three in general (the *mandala* principle).⁵ The doubleness here, however, depends merely upon the "borrowing" of the classification principle from Nature's own self-differentiation, necessarily. This, again, is the very doubleness of knowledge itself aforementioned (223, 224). Where there is knowledge of p there is p but ultimately, absolutely, Hegel claims to show, *vice versa* (though for him it is not a case of the propositional p that is known but of the Object which is finally and solely Subject). Knowledge is itself absolute as, where complete, infinite possession of self, as is also the aim, in still incomplete subjectivity, of belief.

Knowledge is finally "individualised" concretely as **Theorem**. This will involve **Construction** and is finally **Demonstration**. The role of schoolboy or schoolgirl geometry is evident here. Just as there, in a geometrical theorem, the subject introduces such a "construction", as in the theorem of Pythagoras, so, Hegel, wants to say, the reflective (demonstrating) subject at a certain point produces thoughts or principles out of itself that, so to say, leave behind the original starting-point from the external, in the "given or found" (232). This is indeed annihilated by "ungrateful" Spirit (compare Wittgenstein's ladder that we "kick away"). As he had said earlier, "Unless the being of the world is nullified, the *point d'appui* for the exaltation is lost" (50). And this very "upward spring of the mind signifies, that the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute truth ..." In this process "every trace of

⁵ One might "turn" this by stressing an identity between any and every "incarnation" which might possibly take place. Mary would then, as divinely incarnate, be the same absolute or divine person as the Son, here as it were phenomenally being her son also, I in her and she in me, to apply the Johannine formula. A reference to "the Christian Trinity of God, Jesus and Mary" which, to repeat, I once found in a history of philosophy produced in Pakistan, seems, by contrast, to be a misunderstanding which might itself be "turned" in the way suggested.

transition and means is absorbed" since the means, as it were, of reaching the Absolute is found to be "a nullity".

This is precisely what is now called Will, **Volition**, the idea of Will, the idea of the Good even. This corresponds to, denotes rather, a necessity which starting out as a transition from the external "shadows" to reality, to Truth, is at completion "the self-relating notion", not "accepting its content as given or found" (232) but, "for that reason", "immanent in the subject". This necessity is literally "the reverse of what formed its starting-point", known now to be necessary. "In this way we pass from the idea of cognition to that of will." The passage means "that the universal, to be truly apprehended, must be apprehended as subjectivity, as a notion, self-moving, active, and form-imposing." This is precisely the outcome of a consideration of absolute knowledge as is found in the classical treatises upon divine knowledge, whether in Paul, Augustine, Aquinas or Calvin or in earlier Jewish writings, as even in Anaxagoras or Aristotle. This is the absolute knowledge that can declare "I will not remember their sins any more" or "I never knew you". It is Will as we normally understand the term, without special stipulation. The burden of proof has been claimed historically to lie in just this identifiability with knowledge understood in this absolute way.

How does this relate to the Good? We have seen above how Good classically links with End, with whatever is desired. This, considered absolutely, cannot be subject to evaluation without going in a circle. This transcendence of the ethical will reappear when Hegel comes to propose the wickedness of Conscience as such, as pretending to outflank the idea of the *sittlich* (objective spirit) as he expounds it. In the end we do what we want, as is shown by the fact itself of our doing it. This, rightly understood and as urged by the very form of the novelist's art⁶, is what Sidney Carton meant, when sacrificing his life, in saying "It is a far far better thing that I do now" and so on. This "better" is not some "idealistic" or "mystical" retreat from reality, in the self-congratulation of "conscience", but, clothed and symbolised in the form of one noble action, the final self-disclosure of Will to itself in accordance with the parameters of Hegel's philosophy, of Hegel's logic, that is to say. To Freud this appeared as the "death instinct" while, for Hegel, Will, the Idea of the Good, indeed participates logically in the transcendence, the superseding, of Life itself, characterised nonetheless as "Idea immediate". Thus it was said, "This is eternal life, to know ...", that is, to know absolutely. This is

⁶ Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*. The same applies, *a fortiori*, to the warp and woof of the declarations of the Protagonist of the fourth Christian Gospel particularly.

not the Gnostic salvation by knowledge alone since such knowledge is absorbed by Hegel into an active Cognition, annihilating in concrete reality any divide between abstract notions of theory and practice.

It is important to see that the Good is essentially realised, not, again, as an or the End in any finite sense (for then we would be back in a cancelled Teleology). Otherwise it would not be Good, the Good. It stands, that is, for an absolute harmony, the logical, the rational. McTaggart says Hegel means “clearly a psychical state and not the ethical idea of Goodness” (*Commentary*) but it is, in fact, *die höchste Entfaltung der Sittlichkeit*.⁷ It is indeed a psychical state inasmuch as absolute cognition is and has to be conscious through and through, but it would be error to see or dismiss this as a form of quietism *of ours*. Unsatisfied endeavour, to use Hegel’s phrase, is rather misinterpretation of whatever actions are engaged in, these being rather themselves as much a form of contemplation as is anything else. “Whether we live or die we are the Lord’s”, religion declares, and the same applies to whether we sit down or stand up, rest or run. Even the Marxist moment of Hegelian interpretation, I would hazard, can be taken, interpreting the interpretation, or at least reset, in this way.

Our argumentation might seem to imply that Hegel’s Logic is nothing other than a thorough filling out of the Anselmian Ontological Argument discussed at *Enc.* 50 and elsewhere. This is so far true as this is an argument for the Absolute, identified by Hegel with the Absolute Idea, where the Idea just *is* the union of the Concept or Notion and Reality. Absolute Thought cannot be less than reality insofar indeed as it is absolute, while each one must be identical with, must embrace, the whole, as it was said (e.g. by Aquinas: *Summa theol.* Ia 15) that each *idea divina* is, must be, identical with the *essentia divina*, that, the idea, of the absolute, namely, which does not at first appear to us, does not “appear” at all, but is reached by the inner necessity of Thought, the Notion, in unconquerable Will, annihilating all else, as it were declaring it in knowing it to be not “else” but Nothing (else) or All. Conversely, “In God we live and move and have our being”. Where then does God have *his* being? God is, rather, beyond existence, is absolute and “absolutely first”. He **sists* (neologism taken from “ex-sists”) or stands (compare the new movement of “sistology” as defended by Richard Sylvan). Whatever is

⁷ The phrase is Martin Grabmann’s, referring immediately to Aquinas’s analysis of the Ultimate End of life as happiness or blessedness (beatitude), in his *Thomas von Aquin*, Munich 1959. One need only add that End itself is to be logically transversed (*aufgehoben*), that “all unsatisfied endeavour ceases, when we recognize that the final purpose of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself” (234, *Zus.*).

true in a mere rationalism is here taken up into the rational view, Reason being not rationally able to doubt itself, the original Cartesian insight remaining with us. Precisely as *logical* impossibility this is no limitation. It is, therefore, not meta-physics, not, that is, a quasi-physical impossibility, but the self-knowing of Logic, of the Idea. The Idea now is nothing other than primordial self-consciousness as “universal of universals”, as, in an older terminology, necessary being, First and Last. Now self-consciousness, as the consciousness of consciousness, is one and is ultimately that of the community (of salvation, typically, of the happy or true, non-despairing community, so to say). There is no abstract or particular self, that is, of which consciousness might be conscious. Consciousness is only conscious of its self, of it itself, *se* converting to the merely intensive *ipse*. For the individual just *is* the universal, is not, therefore, *just* the universal abstractly.

XXXIII

FURTHER REFLECTION ON VOLITION

Cognition perfects itself towards Volition from within itself, what it is intrinsically. This is that same act as Hegel had earlier noted in commenting on the Ontological Argument, where it “annuls the world”.

That upward spring of the mind signifies, that the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute truth; it signifies that, beyond and above that appearance, truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for God. (*Enc.* 50)

This is now further seen as an act of Volition, remembering however that Volition is not volition abstracted from Cognition but is itself the highest species of Cognition, including while transcending Cognition Proper, or knowing as finitely understood.¹

Here he generalises what we now see was a dialectical step in the knowledge of knowledge, in theological mode merely², naturally unveiling the Absolute in virtue of the *infinity* proper to knowledge, to Reason. The Freedom of Volition is found in the intrinsic Necessity of the Inference (232), here too as it were annulling the world. This, the “subjective idea”,

¹ Recall Luther: “Tell them that Dr. Martin Luther will have it so”. Here we have the way he might have wanted this to be taken. It is a variant, but also an interpretation, of the Dominical “But I say unto you”, said here too with a subjective sense of absolute authority and not directly as one commissioned by “the truth itself” extrinsically viewed. Gang-leaders ape this unsuccessfully as having to rely upon physical force.

² This idea of “mode” I use is of course analogous to Hegel’s use of “form” of the Content, when evaluating Religion and Art as such in relation to Philosophy in discussing Absolute Spirit, e.g. at the end of the *Encyclopaedia*. Here, rather, though, it is a further instance of the same “category” and one might relate the hypotheses of physics (to the Logic) in the same manner or according to the same rubric. In the Ontological Argument as, more remotely, in some poetry and music or in liturgical practice, Reason first discovers its absolute character reflexively, and this is the usual way, acknowledged or not.

originates and objectively determines because it is, simply, the Good. It is, *as self-realising*, “the reverse of the idea of truth”. At first it directs itself “towards moulding the world it finds before it”. Yet Volition finally “has the certitude of the nothingness of the pre-supposed object” or of any apparent impediment or limit to its act. Only as still finite will it retain a “purposed end” to which it conforms, since this is a “mere” subjective idea of the Good. The true “subjective idea” is the **Good** itself (233). Good is Subjectivity, both being identical, in syllogism, with the Concept.

This Freedom, freedom as such indeed, embodies itself in the syllogism of **Demonstration** (231). As in geometrical proof we have the **Construction**, so in syllogism generally a second identification is brought into operative conjunction with the original or “major” identification to create a third identity, simply proceeding thence as deduction, under the law that “two things identical with a third are identical with one another”. This further, unrevealed identity, however, has first to be manifested, in a process identified in the traditional *logica docens* as a type of causation, in freedom, i.e. in cognition. The premises “cause” the conclusion, yet these are premises adduced by the one reasoning. He (or she) it is who knows he has forgotten to erase his fingerprints from the murder-weapon and it is essential to thinking and hence to freedom that we have a world where they remain where we have left them if not *further* (the “practical” conclusion as action) “tampered with”. Judgment as such is *ad opposita*, not determined except in so far as itself determining, just as is said definitionally of what we call “free will”. This naturally must extend down to those judgments we normally all make, whether in the arena of phenomena or, more fundamentally, that of logic. The “certain” is not merely the tautological. Both, that is, judgment and volition, arbitrate and *are thus one*, in a *verdict*. In this way, too, it is Reason itself that *elects*, and hence selects, the minor premise it will employ, there being *no further reason* for this selection or election since to see that it fits is a judgment only available in terms of the conclusion, the action, as already concluded towards.

Phenomenal “ought”-discourse, it follows, as finitely abstract, fails to see that its own conclusion towards the “ought” is itself such a free act, in *theoria* as “the highest *praxis*”, fails to recast Cognition as Volition on the way to the freedom of the **Idea**, which is the seeing of all in one as the “Method of this content” (237), now neither Analytic nor Synthetic but “Speculative” (238), as “the specific consciousness of the value and currency of the ‘moments’ in its development”. For and by this an authority is claimed to overturn all the intelligence-bewitching, *qua* finite, terms of language, language as such rather, not merely by forging it anew,

in what would be merely technique, but by and in thinking, by thought. Words, what remains of language, are merely “the film on deep water” (Wittgenstein). So, in searching for a term with which Logic, or Science (*Wissenschaft*) “must begin” Hegel lights upon Being, which, however he finally identifies not as Being simply but as the Idea including while, identically, being, it, “the true being” (*die reine Unmittelbarkeit des Seins*), which is also the Method, *der sich nur zu sich selbst verhaelt* (see WL II, p.572). It is in the light of these considerations that puzzles about Hegel’s choice and use of category/names should be approached, always bearing in mind, however, that this his method is in the service of dis- or un-covering reality, is “thought thinking itself”. In thus relating the term “volition” to the term “cognition” he aims to say what both *referenda* are, finding in every case, since for him it is a general principle and/or conclusion that any such objectified object is what it is not and, therefore, is not what it is, that phenomenal language is a miasma, which we but need to ascend to where we will cast it away on the final “page”, so to say. In general it follows that anyone, in knowing what he is doing, or whatever he chooses to know, does what he wants or thinks what he wants to think (we are all responsible for our opinions, therefore), as Christians must say that Jesus the Lord, though sweating blood, went to the Cross as embracing it, his will choosing to deny itself wholly. “I lay down my life of myself”, no one else takes it from me, what was called “holy dying” (Jeremy Taylor), for philosophy Aristotle’s *athanatizein*, the final act of will as giving way, in the Logic, to the (Absolute) Idea. The distinction between conception and acting out, on this account of Volition as, a further note, the very idea of itself, passes away as mere appearance, this being in fact the final note of mysticism as speculative, of the terrible “dark night” of the approach to God (of philosophy even, as *sophia*, it follows), “who is light and in whom there is no darkness at all”. Why must there be this paradox? This is what Hegel investigates, we have seen already, under the finitely transient category of Life. Still, it is one thing to see the wooded country from afar, another to tread the way towards it (Augustine), and yet, we seem to be saying, it is not one and another. To know is to do, transcendence of “force” (*Kraft*) the only force.

Here we see the Cartesian-Leibnizian foundations of Hegelianism, while it interprets even these in properly Aristotelian terms, thus showing the dialectic of philosophy’s history now raised to a fresh unity. Implicit, or rather explicit, in Hegel is that each succeeding position views itself as, and thereby, or rather, makes itself to be, in this way, the best reconciliation available, bound however to give way to further disruption and consequent (or implicit) advance. Reason, the Idea, “advances” (239)

while Nature goes in a circle (234, *Zus.*). Philosophy may thus both affirm and deny each succeeding system arising. As implicit and intrinsic this contradiction does not negate philosophy's truth in "relativism". It is the whole movement, the Method that is both true and truth. Within it the children are free as in the mansion(s) of their father, of Reason. One cannot, however, assume that whatever new synthesis lies "waiting to be born" will have precisely the same dialectical structure as Hegel's. This structure, though, will remain in general as itself subject to benignly endless interpretation, like the syllogistic of Aristotle. This is why, in fact, it is no limitation upon the "method" that Hegel expounds the subjective idea and freedom itself therefore in terms of just the syllogism, of "syllogistic". Fregeanism itself, indeed, does not abrogate the syllogism.³

The "action supersedes the subjectivity of the purpose" (234). There is an ethical urgency in Hegel here, as it were accidentally however, as having the Kantian metaphysic in view. Really action abolishes "subjectivity as a whole". The self-reflection, as due, belongs internally to the object as self-constituted, i.e. as constituted by self, the "universal of universals" which is the individual in action. Only the individual acts. The "objective world" is Mind's "own truth and substantiality" (234). Thus the activity of thinking, Heidegger will later remark, "is letting being be". In such action, or activity, rather, one does not unite with some kind of force, again, this being a badge of weakness after all. One is already, as thought, some kind of absolute master.

"Will takes steps to make the world what it ought to be" (234, *Zus.*) and thus, it is meant here, what it really is, and not the "mere semblance without reality" immediately presented. Will, that is, is pre-eminently "absolute knowledge", the knowledge that posits, by virtue of its own act, which is power, *potentia*, itself. The inclination of intellect to the understood good, i.e. the will, is but the completion of that very same intellectual and unitary act. This is the true meaning of "ought"; namely, that the good "has to be realised", since it is in essence that which is realised. In the end we arrive necessarily at the position that what ought to be is what truly is. Hume's critique is turned in its very acceptance. No OUGHT from an IS because the OUGHT is the very IS itself. What is normative, however, is not merely the factual but the actual, the essential as negating the immediate. This is clearly the logical soil upon which stands the later rating of background Custom as superior, in a sense there

³ Cf. our "Argument Forms and Argument from Analogy", *Acta philosophica*, vol. 6 (1997), fasc. 2, pp.303-310; also "The Interdependence of Semantics, Logic and Metaphysics as Exemplified in the Aristotelian Tradition", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, New York, March 2002, pp. 63-91.

explained, to individual Virtue. We will not treat directly of that element of Hegel's Philosophy of Objective Spirit here. His predecessors, he says, implied the following contradiction:

If the world then were as it ought to be, the action of will would be at an end. The Will itself therefore requires that its End should not be realised. In these words, a correct expression is given to the finitude of the Will. But finitude was not meant to be the ultimate point: and it is the process of Will itself which abolishes finitude and the contradiction it involves. The reconciliation is achieved, when Will in its result returns to the presupposition made by cognition. In other words, it consists in the unity of the theoretical and practical idea. Will knows the end to be its own, and Intelligence apprehends the world as the notion actual. This is the right attitude of rational cognition. Nullity and transitoriness constitute only the superficial features and not the real essence of the world. That essence is the notion in posse and in esse; and thus the world is itself the idea. All unsatisfied endeavour ceases, when we recognise that the final purpose of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself. (234, *Zus.*)

The Will that as it were requires that its End be not yet realised is Will in its finitude. This Hegel has already called illusion (212, *Zus.*). The process of Will itself "abolishes finitude and the contradiction it involves". Will is presupposed to Cognition as "the unity of the theoretical and practical idea". It is, again, the thrust of Cognition itself. Things are as Mind knows them, as God causes a man's action to be free. This is the truth of the Good, "radically and really achieved" (235). Compare, in religion, "All shall be well and all manner of thing" (Julian of Norwich); "God is light and in him is no darkness at all" (1 John). Hegel's thought is not so much or merely a "realised eschatology", by chance as it were, as it is the demonstration that any possible "last things" are eternally realised as necessary and not merely possible or contingent.

We find a parallel to Hegel's attitude to the Ethical in the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. In both cases there is an advance over Greek ethics, i.e. over the ethical as such or considered abstractly. This was implicit in Aristotle's calling metaphysics "first philosophy" in relation to a "secondary" ethics or philosophy of praxis. Hegel explains philosophy itself, however, this very "first", as the Method and as "action", the Good ever realised. Yet Aristotle too had remarked that *theoria* itself is the highest *praxis*. He thus negated the division in unitary subordination and the same move, anticipatory of Hegel, is to be found in Aquinas's vision of *lex naturalis*. If he was not finally "a natural law ethicist" this is because he subordinates his whole ethics of virtue and not of law to a law higher than ethics, as, in raising the honourable good, *bonum honestum*, to

union with the Absolute Good he in fact abolishes it as a subspecies. It is rather an appearance only and so the parallel with Hegel is exact.⁴

Aquinas's thought regarding action, *actus humani*, is governed by his account of the last or ultimate End of human living as the Good absolutely. It is true that he stresses the hierarchy of the natural inclinations rather than their universal participation in the Absolute, in the Notion. At this level he seems to deny the Kantian affirmation that there is nothing absolutely or simply good except a good will. Yet he rejoins this at the same level as Hegel does, a level where this good Will becomes merged with the Absolute itself, with final reality. The Kierkegaardian "Purity of heart is to will one thing" must thus be seen as all-inclusive, the Notion itself, and not as a *via negativa* simply. The case is the same with the mistranslation of Francis' "My God and all things" (*Deus meus et omnia*) as "My God and my all", at best ambiguous, at worst misleading, as pointing back to a subjective piety not yet thus enlightened. What he says, though, in more simple adoration, is that God is "everything" or, equivalently, that there is nothing else. In this sense God is indeed the object but, as infinite, inclusive of the subject thinking this.

Aquinas is thus, like Hegel, not a moralist, whatever was the case with Kant. Of the *bonum honestum* he says that it is taken as the moral good or good of virtue specifically only by a kind of routine appropriation. Really the Good, and hence the *honestum* and *honorabile*, are God and beatitude (happiness), names for the *finis ultimus*, "to be honoured beyond virtue as being more excellent than virtue". This alone is desired or loved only for itself (as Augustine had said of contemplation, Aristotle of "study"). *Honestas*, in the sense of virtue, is only to be loved, is only loved, as having in it something (by participation) of ultimate happiness, "even when it seems to bring us no further good". In general, all the same, it is desirable as leading us to that Good. We do not worship virtue. He uses the terms "God", "beatitude" and "happiness" (*felicitas* simply) interchangeably, as esteeming all three above virtue (he has "proved", at the beginning of *Summa theol.* Ia-IIae, that happiness is not found in the

⁴ See our "The *bonum honestum* and the lack of Moral Motive in Aquinas's Ethical Theory", *The Downside Review*, April 2000, pp. 85-111; also *Natural Law Reconsidered*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, Berne, New York, 2002, esp. pp. 42-50. Cf. also V. Bourke, "Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?" *The Monist* 1974, pp. 52-66. Bourke's contribution remains largely negative however. The point is that Aquinas, like Hegel, is a meta-ethicist, and not merely a "virtue" ethicist, though he is that as well.

various non-virtuous idols men set up). In this sense E. Gilson⁵ claims that the Christians “stood the old pagan philosophy of virtue on its head” and this is what comes to fruition in Hegel where “the whole conception of the moral end is thereby transformed”, whether or not beyond the ideas of Gilson. The *bonum honestum*, stipulates Aquinas meanwhile, is “that which is to be enjoyed but not used”, *frui* not *uti*. We might thus draw a parallel between *frui* and *logica docens* (i.e. not *utens*) in the sense of contemplation, the Method. The dialectic as a reality is, actually, not this difficult text before us but “blessedness” (159) as its import, what the words convey or “stand for” (*supponunt*).

We apply *honestum*, whether term or concept, appropriate it, to virtue, as that which is more known to us (than is God). Hegel, for his part, offers us what he claims is a delineation, even a participation of and identification with the Absolute in the Dialectic. He thus transcends virtue and, we shall later see, even conscience as this is often taken, within philosophy itself, without dualistic recourse to theology. This is the very same way in which he subverts and/or sublates theology too. This involves a philosophy of religion that sublates religion towards philosophy, while continuing to honour and indeed practise it. Wisdom comes indifferently from above or below, since these are the same, *are* Wisdom. “Above” and “below” are metaphors for different exercises of Reason, whether by self or the other of self indifferently. Applied to Christianity we may note that the Cross itself, that action, is not a “sign and wonder” of the sort with which the accounts of it are nonetheless strewn. It can rather be seen, as we already outlined above, as a supreme instance of that Volition of which we are speaking and which “annuls the world” (see again *Enc.* 50):

His dying crimson like a robe
Spreads o'er his body on the tree.
Then am I dead to all the world
And all the world is dead to me.

The poem, also a hymn, mirrors the position that Hegel reaches dialectically. Such idealism, though, we may say with Hegel, is the natural stance of both philosophy and religion, negating phenomena or transcending them in Essence in order to deal more justly with them. It is what binds them together and is not rightly assessed as a merely ethical move. It is the “upward spring” of rational will as itself End. Here too, in

⁵ Etienne Gilson: *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, Scribners, New York 1940, pp. 325, 473 *et al.* But Gilson should rather have said that they set it, the old philosophy, in its full context, treating ethics no longer abstractly.

both cases, “the individual is the universal”, also that individual, ruined, who made this explicit, as the Notion makes the dialectical movement explicit or self-conscious. In that sense the individual human nature is always “assumed”. So *ecce homo* indeed, behold the man, self or other, universal as individual, but, at base Mind, Spirit, *nous*. Yet such an individual assumption, the assumption of individuality as Reason’s intrinsic concreteness, of a world, of objectivity in subjectivity, is the mark of Reason. Still, there was one, just one, who was “to come”, in the nature of things, and granted that there are many “men of the moment”, men, that is, or women, of different moments. I say no more than Hegel himself says on this matter of the necessary unique mediator. Those who leave their mark on the world, like Mohammed, have to be taken seriously⁶. This was Hegel’s approach to Kant, for example. Beyond eclectic choice there is the freedom of the necessity of all that is as a seamless unity, the robe put upon the individual facing ruin on or as entering into the Life and Blessedness of the Notion, of Thinking, of being a “house” for Being itself, i.e. of being just Being, without parts or delimitation. But what one becomes one *is*, as one’s own intrinsic result.

● or shall we say, merely, “as it turned out”? This would be to retreat from our dialectical apprehension of the Necessary. Rather, what “turns out” is *ipso facto* necessary, as the proof of the pudding is in the eating but even more in its having been eaten, to a degree. Finally, the proof of the eating is in the pudding. ● one may say the same of the Jews’ “chosenness”, *quod olim Abrahae promisisti*. This is only fully known at the end and conclusion of the process, the initiated dialectic, once seen as necessary rather than “chancy”, and we are not there yet. ● one can surely apply this to any other religious or similar window on things without having to set the inclusive and the exclusive against one another. What is exclusive includes

⁶ In that sense those Moslems who suggest an identification of the Prophet with the Comforter promised in the Gospels is on the right track and I say no more than that. He would *have to* be seen as that, in proportion as one might ever want to justify the reception given him, apart, I mean, from its simple factuality as still abstract moment. This would call for a more nuanced, less dualistic account of Spirit than has been usual. Spirit would be inseparable from the Age (*aeuum*) of the Spirit, as its Notion, this final *aeuum* yielding dialectically to the Eternal. We have after all the saying of Christ, “Greater things than I have done shall you do”, referring to the chosen community of his first followers and witnesses. What is seen as the death of death, in that absolute yet personal *athanatizein*, however, is *thereby* not a moment merely but interpretation, *sophia*, lifted out of history while yet within it, as is, specifically, all our thought, in Trinitarian procession as it is associatedly taken, in *exitus* and *reditus*, i.e. nothing else happens. Necessity is here concretised, all gain otherwise loss, all loss gain.

all. This is Hegel's point about transcendence, the Infinite.⁷ The question will always be asked, however, as to whether one can distinguish the choosing of the Jews from the Jews' self-choice for that role of the chosen, in their exclusivity, the two concepts being closely allied. Here, though, we might recall Aristotle's refusal to distinguish thought from its supposed object in the case of spiritual, i.e. thinking, beings, *id quod* from *id quo*, though Aquinas's difference here is more appearance than real., referring to man specifically in his alienated or "natural" state, nature itself being alienated as Hegel shows. (Cf. *Summa theol.* Ia 85, 2)

The *bonum honestum* as applied to moral life is thus in reality just one exemplification of a general metaphysical truth, viz. that every "thing" (but also "everything") is good in itself (to be enjoyed, we said above) which fulfils its nature or, more generally, in so far as it is. This is so even though it is also true that every finite thing is to be used (*bonum utile*), so as to lead us to the last end. The action which is really useful is thereby the action which is beautiful (*honestum*) in itself.⁸

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Mention of the Heideggerian-type "house" of or for Being above might recall the text: "In my father's house are many mansions. If it were not so I would have told you." Context suggests reference to different outlooks among the members of the father's household as all being "gathered into one" inclusive of their apparent differences. Without this or a similar interpretation, i.e. an interpretation of some kind, the second sentence appears weak or without point. On the above view, however, it clearly means, in general terms, that if there were not such a plurality, "including everyone that is born of the spirit", if there were still ritual or other material prescriptions you must all observe *then* I would have told you, instead of simply insisting on that fraternal love which is already the love of God as being entirely spiritual and free.

⁷ We take here the right to set forth things in our own particular terms (as does Hegel), since these are terms which accord with unprecedented fullness the right to all others to do the same and as having a validity. This, the Spiritual, is in fact the source of tolerance, humanity, democracy and all secular or other values. That, at least, is a point of view for which we demand tolerance. Academic guidelines and boundaries do not possess an abstract otherness here denied to all else, all now being always all, without parts.

⁸ Cf. our *Natural Law Reconsidered*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt 2002, p.47. Cp. Aquinas: *Honestum concurrit in idem subjectum cum utili et delectabili, a quibus tamen differt ratione* (*Summa theol.* IIa-IIae 145, 3).

XXXIV

ABSOLUTE IDEA

With the truth of the Good, the unity of the practical idea, the “doctrine that the Good is radically and really achieved” (235) in “unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea” (236), “we have had the content already” (237, *Zus.*). What we have now is the knowledge that “the content is the living development of the idea”, the Method itself, “not an extraneous form, but the soul and notion of the content”. Each specific element is the totality. This is “systematic” and itself “only one idea” in that it is an infinitely perfect, trans-organic unity, without parts therefore. What the Method “concludes by apprehending” is “the notion itself”. The translator, W. Wallace, cites Schelling:

Every particular object is in its absoluteness the Idea; and accordingly the Idea is also the absolute object (*Gegenstand*) itself, - as the absolutely ideal also the absolutely real. (*Werke*, iv. 405)

Accordingly! This reads like a sentence from McTaggart, and indeed of Hegel, for whom the “I” is “the absolute universal”. “Every particular object is in its absoluteness the Idea”. The Idea in fact, just on this “point of this its unity with itself”, “is Nature”. Nature, taken whole, is that Will which, we saw, is entirely and solely its own object. Nature is thus not in abstraction Nature at all, as a self-manifestation is nothing other than self. Just this, however, means that Nature is not that spatial and temporal extension of “parts outside parts” which the Understanding proposes to itself without modification. Since each part stands for the whole, is it “implicitly”, it is not a part. Nor is the (or any) whole a (composite) whole, but the Idea. This, viewed in the searchlight of philosophical idealism, is the “groaning and travailing” of nature (*Romans* 8), whereby the Apostle names nothing other than our own mental striving to think things as they have necessarily to be, once given the freedom of thought in the first place. Compare here *Enc.* 453, to which Hegel himself in a later text refers us back: “intelligence is to be conceived... as the *existent* universal” etc.

Hitherto we have had the Idea in development through its various grades as our object, but now the idea comes to be its own object. This is the noesis noesos which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the idea. (236, *Zus.*)

The “idea is the one systematic whole” (242) and yet the knowing of this is itself the idea. In the *Encyclopaedia* treatment of this Hegel seldom mentions the Notion but always the Idea. For the Logic is itself an ontology, as is frequently claimed by today’s Fregeans for their logic, yet an ontology transcending mere existence as this is unreflectively thought. So in *WL* (the Greater Logic) he says that

The Notion (*Begriff*) is not only *Seele*, but free subjective Notion, which is for itself and therefore has Personality – it is the practical objective Notion, determined in and for itself, which, as a person, is impenetrable, atomic Subjectivity, but which is just as much not exclusive Individuality, but Universality for itself, and Cognition, and which has in its Other its own Objectivity as Object (*Gegenstand*). All else is error, confusion, opinion, strife, caprice and impermanence; the Absolute Idea alone is Being, permanent Life, Truth which knows itself. It is all Truth. (*WL*, final chapter: *Sulzkamp Verlag* 6, Frankfurt 1969: p.549).

So, in the Absolute Idea,

not only the Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good are synthesised, but also Life and Cognition (McTaggart, *op. cit.* 290).

Hence we stressed earlier that not only is Cognition a clear advance upon Life but also Volition is a clear advance upon Cognition Proper abstractly considered. That is, these two are not after all merely “synthesised”. This “Advance of the idea” (239) is a permanent step or stage “of the Speculative Method” which itself advances more to the fore, as compared with antithesis and synthesis, as the dialectic itself advances. Whether this synthesis is the Method itself or a result, as it were beyond this Method, is a fictive dilemma merely inasmuch as the very Method itself is, in a phrase Hegel uses, “its own result”. Absolute knowledge is indeed absolute. It is therefore also Love or Blessedness (159) and includes as overlapping them all previous moments, which are indeed moments rather than stages. A series of moments, namely, is equally one moving moment or, an ancient view of time, eternity in motion. McTaggart is not therefore justified in proposing Love as a superior termination to the dialectic, transcending absolute knowledge understood as the Method as a whole. Such a transcendence already took place as that of Volition over Cognition

Proper, understanding by that the absolute freedom of a procession characterised by or simply being inner necessity, exercised, known and disclosed in Thinking. This is the Love in terms of which Nature itself unfolds. The (percipient) idea is Nature. Notionally viewed, any aspect of Nature “is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it” (160). Now Nature does not, cannot, abstract from the human presence in Nature, whether as mere *detritus* or as not merely a formative element of it but even its very form *tout court*, in view of the total role of Mind or Spirit, since in fact “nothing but Spirit exists” and the Absolute Idea “must be true of all that really exists”, according to Hegel. This “nothing but” (McTaggart’s), though serviceable here, is not such a good way of putting it in any absolute context. Spirit rather names Being, its true character, as an essence, as Essence rather, with which it coincides (as also, *mutatis mutandis*, in the thought of Aquinas). Understood in Hegel’s way, this is to say that Being is not as it first appears, is not what is immediate, even though as or when we arrive at it there is nothing else, the ladder is thrown away, the world “annulled”. That is, the dilemma, again, of mediate or immediate is here transcended, a facet, indeed, of the identity of means and end (206-212) on which all subsequently turns.

Even the human face as represented (e.g. in a mirror) belongs to Nature, as do the words of the language used in any presentation, any “objectification” of the dialectic and its Method. That is, they do not *themselves* belong to Nature, being, as their own result, Absolute Mind. So we do not have the faces we seem to have. That is why we do not see God face to face. Not that we ever could, as C.S. Lewis might seem to imagine, in having a character of his novel *Till We Have Faces* ask “How can the gods see us face to face until we have faces?” The absolute is deep within us, behind all faces or surfaces, all *facies*. The face is in Nature as a sign, as Nature itself is one great sign. The Spirit moving upon the face of the waters is anterior to as deep within the waters, within all movement itself unmoved or, in terms of our last category, “blowing where it will”.

The Sign is treated by Hegel in the “Philosophy of Spirit” (cf. 454 to 458 *et sequ.*). There the dilemma of Being and Non-Being is further developed. In Aristotelian semantics (*De interpretatione*), which Hegel appears to endorse indirectly in his assessment of the *De anima* as perhaps “the sole work of speculative value” on the topic, even thoughts (*verba interiora*) are signs, i.e. *verba*. In these terms concepts themselves, the first “instruments” of logic, came to be identified as what were called *signa formalia* by certain scholastics of the “second (Renaissance) scholasticism”, from Peter Fonseca to Descartes’ contemporary, Jean Poincot (John of St. Thomas). Admittedly for Fonseca such signs were still truly signs,

principally the retinal (or aural or other) image which one in principle never perceives but which “formally”, that is as it were solely or absolutely, signifies the object. So it is the absolutising of an analogical concept which Poinset arrives at in his account of concepts, which for many commentators (e.g. André de Muralt), however, comes too close to overthrowing the nature of a sign as such, of the “standing for”. Already in Aristotle, all the same, concepts are *verba cordis* or *interiora*, again, thus likened to *voces*, the sounds we utter. This whole debate is continuous (if backwardly) with what we find in Hegel’s semiotics. So we can say, to pick up the thread, that the whole of the dialectic, the Method which is absolute spirit and knowledge and, if we so wish or will (!), love itself, in which “knowledge is made perfect”, is faithfully mirrored and indeed identical with this written text, considered universally or even as this battered set of marks now resting on my table here. The representation is what it represents, precisely in not being it, not being anything on its own. As an “element distinguished” it is “without more ado” identical with the whole and in its specificity “a free being of the whole notion”. Hence it, the Logic with or as its forms, is alive, even though this paper, like my own body (and face) is slowly crumbling to dust. It has, that is to say, Form. The point here is to show in what sense “the Idea is Nature”, as the Logic concludes by affirming (244 with *Zus.*).. Insofar, though, as Nature, conversely, is the Idea it is not Nature and there is no Nature. There is, rather, and let us not say “only”, the Notion, “Universality for itself”, and “all else is error and confusion”, confusion above all,

a negative which, though it would fain assert itself, has no real persistence, and is, in fact, only the absolute sham-existence of negativity in itself. (35, *Zus.*)

Here we may say “only”, where Hegel is describing Evil specifically as impossibly a negative absolute, as, rather, in the words of Aquinas, *semper in subiecto*, understanding any such subject as good, that is. There exists no nature that is evil. Rather, nature does not exist. This is the truth stressed by all mystics. “I am he who is, you are she who is not.” Further than this, however, Eckhart declares that God’s knowledge of us is our knowledge of him, of God, a paradox only resolved by the utter universality of any conceivable subjectivity, subsuming any object such as is intrinsic to our “intentional” notion of knowledge. It is upon this ultimate ground that Hegel, at least ultimately, stands.

“It is certainly possible to indulge in a vast amount of senseless declamation about the idea absolute” (237, *Zus.*). I have endeavoured, in sensibly small format, to set forth its “true content” as “only (*sic*) the

whole system”, the “absolute form”, confirming and recalling our first certainties, as the Possible is the Actual as including and hence yielding place to it. Reason will have nothing less, “only thyself”.¹

¹ According to legend Aquinas named thus in prayer the reward he would have for having “written well of me”, i.e. of God. Here, in company with Cicero (*De legibus*) and Hegel, I equate Reason with the Absolute or Divine. Reason, however, as endowing itself only, transcends reward in absolute subjectivity. Or, this is given only to those who have it already.

EPILOGUE, ON GRACE

Things, we say, happen by chance. Yet, Aristotle claims (in *Physics* IV), they do not, cannot conceptually, happen by chance absolutely. The pious soul, in consequence, is ever on the lookout for signs of divine intervention of a special sort, where arresting coincidences and the like appear, while such an assumption of intervention is at first repellent to the philosophic mind, since, so to say, occasional. This assumption suggests itself in just those cases that look as if they have no explanation otherwise. It is more rational, however, rather, to look for such intervention in the patterned reality as a whole, in which case, however, once found, it is no longer intervention as if in something else, in some reality alien to or alienated from the divine, from God, from the Idea (of ideas).

Nonetheless one can learn, or form the habit at least, to search for signs of the inner structure of that reality as and where one might find them more apparent or perspicuous, in nature in one way, in history in another, if related, way. Such is the generality of the case, however, that it will often be felt more where it is least apparent than in the cases more congenial to us and our representations generally. *Digitus Dei est hic*. The finger of God is here. Thus Hegel equates speculative thinking and “mysticism” and there is nothing strange in that. It means though that one omnipresent “intervention” dominates all, that “either man exists or God does”, to paraphrase Sartre.

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It is in this latter situation that the philosophic and religious mind seem most to unite, while, as applied to art, the initial form of such threefold Absolute Spirit, this is noted in the saying that in art the Idea is most manifested where from considerations of (absolute) spirit a rule is broken. To this, all the same, corresponds the rule in ethics to exercise the virtue of higher justice or *epieicheia*, equity, in final justice on the individual, that is to say actual case (since even the general rule is applied by the particular act of the individual judging and that always). It is the virtue of knowing when to break, in accordance with the mind of the legislator, the written or otherwise proclaimed law.

This virtue, however, like all the virtues, is not, as specified as a concept, or in its exercise rather, an instance of absolute spirit as is any activity denominatable truly as artistic, and this negative applies to morals generally, as distinct from ethics as assimilable to speculative philosophy or to religion even as “new commandment”, i.e. something more than such. Rather than assign this to Christianity exclusively, however, at least when phenomenally considered, one should rather take account of the latter’s spiritual nature as at work also in hidden form in any place at any time, an account, the religion taking all truth for its own, not obviously closed to adherents of “other” religions also, all having more and more the example of others before them. ●f each a devotee might truly say, insofar as mindful, his or her religion is not “a” religion but “religion itself” (De Lubac, though, as a Frenchman so to say, speaking uniquely of Christianity), religion in general counting as a virtue as a “potential part” of justice, the unfulfillable debt of all that we have and are. Philosophically, i.e. finally, this becomes the death-practicing stance of the philosophic mind that Aristotle recommends, whether or not he saw it as the one perfect *sacrifice* amid all the frantic blood-letting of other peoples. For this to be absolute, though, to be spiritual, one must, therefore, understand virtuous living, or some actions within it, as, precisely, art, a spiritual form elevating praxis into contemplation (theoria). Contemplation, that is, *sapientia*, sublates moral virtue as such, nor does the mind descend from it in performing, or declining to perform, practical tasks or duties. Mind is free, freedom as such, and what it contemplates is itself. “I am that”. Thus the system of logic shows all possible thoughts and/or things as sublated in this self-contemplation, of which their hierarchical ascent is “the method” whereby mind, in us, comes to itself as returning whence it never departed, precisely, with difference, the incarnational trajectory. The world’s necessities, that is, are one divine necessity constituting absolute freedom as *free mind*. The logical categories are our nearest traces of this, as of our own minds and personalities severally.

Yet by Hegel’s logic any line of demarcation here could not be much more than provisional, just as in the traditional theory of the transcendental predicates what is good will also be beautiful, one *ens rationis*, the good, including another, the beautiful, as together absorbed in the Idea, which, is, he says, the true Being (WL, Suhrkamp 6, p.572) or *ens* as such, identical in fact with just this logical method (of universal sublation, where God’s other is the other of or in himself). Admittedly some analogy is involved in transposing beauty from the realm of sense to that of pure thought, though the return in reverse, as Hegel expounds, softens this. “The highest cannot stand without the lowest” (Thomas of Kempen).

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These considerations give the background for such statements as that "everything is grace" (Karl Rahner), which is true without, however, destroying the possibility of what one might call "grace upon grace", an idea seeming to lead us back or hold us within a specifically religious dimension such as we had been expecting philosophy, perhaps, to lead us beyond, not clinging finitely to a "certainty against the spirit" (Hegel). But not a bit of it: the latter, grace upon grace, is rather the intensification of the religious spirit, whereby we cease to be spoken to in parables but are admitted to the words of the Word itself as "spirit and life". This example is effective as taken from the words of the Mediator and a fortiori sublimest of religious teachers to his innermost circle of followers. We may well compare here the information concerning Hegel's religion in W. Wallace's introduction concerning the "three prefaces of the Encyclopaedia" (*The Logic of Hegel*, Oxford University Press, 1873, 1965, pp. ix-xxvi).

It is confusing to equate this difference with that between the natural and the supernatural, philosophy and "sacred theology". This is precisely the error of special intervention thinking, again. The truth rather is that with the infinite, with God, absolute Idea, there is no separation or even distinction between individual and universal. As Hegel shows and states, in all seriousness, the individual is *the* universal, as "God is the absolute person". Our concern here though is with the individual that knows itself to be such, as individual gnats, say (an example of Hegel's), do not since, but also consequently, it is in knowing that I am known, by the conceptually prior act of being known (it is not a case of *having* been first known, as it were narratively).

What we are trying to sort out comes to a head in consideration of the idea, in its immediate form categorically rejected by Hegel as by Plato as just what would be unworthy of the Absolute Idea, of Infinite Being, where, namely, viewed, impossibly, as a *jealous* God. We have to be careful here. The fearful maybe do see God in this light, and there is indeed a holy fear of the Lord, given indeed by Spirit but as *the beginning* of wisdom, not then the end but fundamental all the same as, precisely, the first or incipient foundation of knowing the concrete absolute as more than some abstraction within our own heads merely.

Just as absolute God must seem jealous to one not yet weaned from the world in its falsely imagined otherness, as distinct from its true nothingness (cf. Enc. 50). Yet when Francis Thompson writes, in "The Hound of Heaven",

All which I took from thee I did but take,
 Not for thy harms,
 But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms

it is clearly not God's jealousy he experiences, which would be tyrannical indeed and hence "for thy harms", but rather the opposite, an invitation to the finding of the poet's true self, as the superlatively erotic image, of no mere amatory connotation, forcibly suggests. And yet it is just this omniscience that the passion of jealousy can lead people to ape, it being in fact just another way of destroying the good for the other person, that good which makes the jealous sad, i.e. their passion grows from and/or leads to *envy*, jealousy's own secret shadow.

This comes down to saying, and here is where we began, that it must belong to Infinity, as absolutely personal again, to have the power to make special friends of chosen individual persons, leaving aside questions of merit or destined choice for the moment. This is a philosophical, indeed syllogistic conclusion, i.e. the syllogism is the conclusion (*Schluss*). The choice, election, more rock-firm than finite necessity, is by a special grace, though nor would this specialness be destroyed were *all* to be thus finally chosen, "in the end", so to say, a phrase betraying the sub-teleological finitude of such a speculation. For our purposes here and now, anyhow, that question is indifferent, is "not our business". This is, then, a genuine matter of grace, of something freely given. "Grace perfects nature", says Thomas Aquinas, in the sense though of making it more itself, freeing the otherness from the alienation under which it "groans and travails". It cannot fall short of becoming God, as Hegel forcefully brings out, just as is confirmed in early Christian liturgy, speaking, at the Offertory of the Mass, of the bread and wine to be transformed (or whatever term is preferred), of God's becoming man that man might become God.

Man, I say, because this grace too, like the natural situation referred to above, becomes the norm and the normative. In political terms this was the foundation for the absolute power in the sense of judicial primacy of the Pope as worked out in medieval theory (and agreed upon by East and West at the Ecumenical Council of Florence, 1438) and as actualising the infallibility of the Church, the faith community, though, as Newman later brought out, the situation is similar with the otherwise contrasted individual conscience, "the aboriginal vicar of Christ", incidentally pointing to a or the redemptive quality at the back of what Hegel otherwise judged the wickedness of conscience, this in turn backing up his assertion, in the sense that he specifies, namely that neither Good (or Volition, finally sublated by the Absolute Idea) nor, *a fortiori*, Evil, a "sham-being" not posited as a category, have reality in the Concept. Good and evil are,

this means, as contrasted with the "true being" as "logical method" (i.e. God himself), but *entia rationis* (the position of Aquinas too! Cf. *QD de potentia*, VII), so that goodness and wickedness have as such to be the same in their difference, as, we might say, "Christ was made sin for us". The canonised Pauline dialectic is not really surpassed by Hegel's and thus may be claimed to be the same. In Hegel's system, anyhow, faith, the virtue, takes its place as uniting these two apparent opposites, individual and universal. Faith is achieved as "a certainty for humanity" by "the unity of divine and human nature". Absolute identity and difference, along with "oppositional thinking", are sublated. What the event pictures and pictured, simply as event, however, abides as final truth beyond all before and after. "Have we received good at the hands of the Lord and shall we not receive evil?" The question was Job's, as read in those Scriptures which Christianity claims to fulfil. Such texts, I would assert, appear on internal evidence to have been never far from Hegel's mind, at first perhaps as tending to be scorned but with which he came ever more to identify, though not without interpretation.

By Hegel's logic all consciousness of grace, even the certainty that "reality is friendly", comes to the living individual as subject and this would be so even if "everything is grace". This everything become grace is, so to say, distributed, even or especially if universal, i.e. conferred on every individual, as Christ's is a death, constitutively, for all, paralleling Adam's sin in the Scriptural iconography. This, the friendliness, is easy to believe today where the teaching about the first (sacramental) grace of baptism is recognised to be firstly conferred on all, even or especially new-born babies, seen as innocent. One may wonder what has happened to the doctrine of Original Sin, since the speculations about a Limbo have been authoritatively laid aside without that the babies now lie again under an original curse. Here Hegel's remarks about innocence falling short of goodness may come in useful eventually for the dogmatic theologians, if such a class, as kept so very apart from philosophy, is to remain, the elasticity of dogmatic pronouncements becoming ever more apparent, the spirit blowing where it will and beyond our final comprehension, as are we ourselves therefore if "born again of the spirit", against which or whom no certainty is unspiritually to be held to.

Such questions, however, as touching special intervention as such again, do not really belong to philosophy, which treats the individual not as individual but as universal, just as the universal must itself be seen as individual, supremely. "All shall be well and all manner of thing." The general point remains that grace can be and is freely given. This both implies and derives from the character of God, as infinity, as the absolute

person, “person” says Hegel and not merely “personal”. Grace, all the same, when brought into philosophical discourse must find itself as it were thrown into a crucible conceptually. We can look up the treatment it received from Church Fathers or from Aquinas or the Reformers. In Hegel it will be found not finally separable from the whole unity as not picture but Concept, if we can think it. There will not, for example, remain a separation of graces. “Reality is friendly”. But still there will be the work to be done from what he calls “our side”, though this side is something merely phenomenal, beside the “all” of God, of the Idea, Life being a category to be got over, as God draws us into himself, thought thinking only itself. Our side too is God’s side, as not only Luther taught and as Hegel did not need Luther to teach him, as Alma von Stockhausen would seem to suggest (see below). This is what McTaggart, though hampered by inherited atheism, so magnificently describes. We will here be perfecting our relation with God in knowing, more and more, that he, the Idea, infinity, has, just conceptually, no real relation with us (also the teaching of Aquinas), for, as Hegel makes clear, God is himself “the Concept” whole. So that is what we have to become, in need therefore of friendly grace, receiving everything in giving everything, up to a hating of whatever is not that, such as our “life in this world”, or “becoming all things to all men” in what seems to be a variant upon this rather than a mere missionary tactic. The Cross, seemingly brutal to nature, yet “sweetest wood and sweetest iron” to faith, gives “strength of mind” in this “union of opposites” to those become “as having nothing yet possessing all things”. As for faith:

For Hegel “faith” is just the revelation to the human spirit that its self-reflexive character derives from God’s own. As he puts it: “this knowledge on the part of the subject is a relationship that issues from God, and, as issuing from God, it is the absolute judgment that God is as spirit for spirit.” Like a seed, the gift of faith must grow and develop. But, and this point is crucial, the refusal to develop faith into knowledge of the truth mangles faith into a “certainty against the spirit.” (Jordan Daniel Wood and Justin Shaun Coyle: “Must Catholics Hate Hegel?” in *Church Life Journal*, June 8, 2018. See further, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Preface to the 3rd Edition)

*

What has happened, is happening, is not “monstrous perversion” (Alma von Stockhausen: “*Das Sein als Gleichnis Gottes – die vermittelnde Mitte zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Martin Heidegger*” in the volume entitled *Indubitanter ad veritatem*, “Studies offered to Leo J. Elders SVD”,

ed. Joergen Vijgen, *Verlag DAMON*, Budel, 2003, pp.400-422) but the paradoxes of the Gospel and its proclamation finding more and more their way into philosophy, not from within itself but as suggested from outside and then recognised, by the existing *sophia* (at all or any cultural level, though this too only gets learned now), as true, with, all the same, the further variant that such truth is itself untruth, in a necessarily self-conflicted reason, as in some varieties of "post-modernism", usually making strong appeal to Kant as if Hegel had never written.

Alma von Stockhausen misrepresents Hegel greatly, perhaps reading Heidegger back into him. Thus Hegel says expressly that the conquest of nature is "our affair". That is, we are not less but more free insofar as we are directly moved by God, a key thesis also of Thomas Aquinas. Von Stockhausen also assimilates Hegel to Luther and the latter's denial of free will, in the teeth of Hegel's texts on this. Aquinas had taught that God moves the will the more directly when we act freely and Hegel's account coincides inasmuch as Volition, the category of Good, purely logically gets assimilated (*aufgehoben*) to the Absolute Idea, which he also says, at the end of the earlier Greater Logic most clearly, that the Absolute Idea with which the logic ends as referring the whole dialectic, "the method", that has led up to it, that this, the Idea, logic, reason itself, is "the true Being". This dovetails, again, with Aquinas declaring that Good is not more than an *ens rationis* as naming true Being (i.e. not merely a being of reason) but as directed to will, just as True names it as directed to intellect, will and intellect being here considered as human faculties (QD *de potentia* VII). Hegel, that is, picks up the mantle of Aquinas, whether or not he was historically conscious of this, as, it seems to me, no one else has done before or since. He does it, that is, without in any way being a mere commentator on Aquinas, still less of Aristotle. Yet they are both Aristotelians, even if also either Platonist (like Aristotle) or Augustinian.

It should also be noted that Hegel, like Aquinas, was a conscious developer of Aristotle, in view of the Christian culture in which, *mutatis mutandis*, they both lived and moved. In this respect I would join Hegel to John Henry Newman (Roman cardinal and now a canonical saint, but who lived forty years or more within the Anglican Communion, as Hegel was and remained Lutheran). It was in virtue especially of Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* that after having closed the Second Vatican Council (1962-1964) the then Pope, Paul VI, also now a canonised saint (important as showing the mind of the communion or Church), declared that that Council, at which, by the decision of the previous Pope and also now saint, John XXIII, who initiated this Council, the first since 1870, in the first place, no dogmas were to be defined, was

and should therefore be regarded as “Newman’s Council”. Implicit here was an acknowledgement that our finite mental representations move with the times, perhaps the central thesis of Hegel’s philosophy. They move, that is, without effacing the earlier representation in any given case, even where they might appear to contradict it, since, as Hegel shows, the deeper recesses of this concept of contradiction are still unfolding for Thought, in the Idea. This does indeed, or should, affect, if not destroy, our conception of opinion as such, which indeed was the very criticism offered by an earlier Pope of the then modern “liberalism” (Gregory XVI, Encyclical Letter “*Mirari vos*”, 1831), contemporary with Hegel.

Newman’s essay, of course, deals more with the history of theology than with philosophy, which would give the rationale of the former situation, as Newman well understood, however (see his later, more philosophical work, *A Grammar of Assent*). Here, though, I would return to Hegel and to his 1830 Preface to the third addition of his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. What I would point out is that he and Newman had the same idea regarding the interpretation of Scripture, an idea best seen as established by the Fathers of the Church, no mean philosophers for the most part. “Orthodoxy stands or falls with the mystical interpretation of Scripture”, Newman declares, and so it was in this sense that the first Christians preached Jesus Christ as fulfilling the Scriptures, as the last-named himself best illustrates, as when he says that as Moses lifted up the serpent (to be seen by all) in the wilderness, so shall the Son of Man be lifted up (i.e. on the Cross), so that, namely, all who “look upon” the one or the other shall be “saved”, preserved, cured, of or from whatever misery oppresses them, as in the first case from the bite of the same serpent. We touch here already upon the sublation of Good and Evil or the turning of the one into the other, by one “made sin” for us. Hegel’s philosophy, his science of logic, I claim, results largely from this and similar traditions. It is the contradiction involved, further, that prompts to development, our subject here, as wishing to show that Hegel’s thought is a Christian development and a genuine one, keeping clear, by the strength of faith, from all “certainty against the spirit” or Spirit with the capital, as in context it seems to become in Hegel’s Preface here, whence I take this phrase. By it Hegel refers to just that obstinate literalism which we call, rather strangely, “fundamentalism”. In order to show that Spirit must go beyond the letter that kills, that this indeed is its very office, he here demonstrates, showing remarkable Scriptural insight while exhibiting a most faithful adherence to the spirit inherent in what is said, but not seen by all.

There is nothing so very strange or weird in Hegel's procedure. It is what theologians have been doing right down the Christian centuries, beginning within Scripture itself. The notion of a series of layers of meaning inherent in the literal text, of Scripture especially, is prominent in, for example, the four Gospels, as it is in the *Psalms of David* as commented on at length in Augustine's *Reflections on the Psalms* or as formally classified by Thomas Aquinas, who however stresses that the literal sense (of Scripture) is to be preferred or taken as the true sense wherever possible. One thinks immediately of the text concerning "those who have made themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake" and of Origen's erroneously (it is generally thought) taking this as literal. One also thinks of Christ's words in Gethsemane about buying a sword, the reply "Lord here are two swords" and his response, "It is enough", in weary realisation that they had not really understood. Or one thinks of his saying "I am the bread of life" and the uncomprehending response.

I am not an expert on these things and will not detail here the traditional senses, literal to anagogical. Anyone in the habit of reciting the Psalms daily quickly gets the knack of taking in these three or four levels of meaning at once, just as in Hegel's thought I am both myself and another and so is he or she. Here is the soil, then, for the concept of the fruitful contradiction, something that Alma von Stockhausen appears to forget in her talk of "monstrous perversion". What Hegel says is that in seeing that good and evil turn out to be the same we must simultaneously and energetically proclaim their mutual opposition, that they are not the same. Behind this lies the ultimate metaphysical conclusion that neither good nor evil nor, indeed, the two together form a reality on their own. As the finite is "ideal" in the negative sense, i.e. just an idea of Understanding (*Verstand*), so there is only one Word, that generated by God the Father (and not just God as Father), and that all our finite language therefore has its limits, is never the absolute truth where anything "synthetic" or put together is intended. It may be true in one way but not in another, and so on. So "twice two is four" says nothing and only thus appears absolute as if a final reality.

It is because of this, in general, that finite assertions can never validly stand firm beyond a certain point, a point, namely, of spiritual movement. The words of faith, therefore, can never be identified with faith itself. Hence the creed is called a *symbolum* only, and hence what was noticed to be a figure it is now regarded as harmless to assert. Take the article, "He ascended into heaven", just for example, and reflect on the different ways this has been taken down the centuries or by different classes of people alive at the same time, or by ourselves in different moods.

So what does Hegel say in that third Preface I mentioned? I translate:

The shibboleth (sc. of some pious people) is the name of the Lord Christ and the assurance that the Lord dwells in the heart of this one presuming to judge others. Christ says: (*Matthew 7, 20*) "By their fruits you shall know them". The monstrous insolence of the one rejecting and condemning is no good fruit. He continues: "Not everyone who says to me Lord, Lord, comes into the Kingdom of Heaven; many will say to me on that day: Lord, Lord, have we not spoken wisdom in your name? Have we not cast out devils in your name? Have we not done many good works in your name? Then I will declare to them: I never knew you, depart from me all you evildoers!"

After some scornful lines concerning the "subjective throbbing" (*Pochen*) of certain evangelicals or, rather, pietists then active, who disdain, rich in their assurance, "the foundation of the faith of the Christian Church", he gives his own rationale of the sending of the spirit which he finds these complacently ignorant enthusiasts to lack, simply by a citation of Scripture. (*John 7, 38*): "Whoever believes in me", says Christ, "from his belly shall flow streams of living water". Of this he says:

This is determined in V39 to mean that it is not the belief as such in the temporal, immediately visible (*simliche*) and present personality of Christ that effects this transformation, since this is not yet the truth as such. Rather, according to verse 39 following this belief, faith, as such is explicit that Christ said that of the spirit which those believing in him should or would receive (i.e. in the future "shall flow"). For the spirit was not yet given, since Jesus was not yet glorified. (parentheses added)

Hegel goes on to expand and emphasise this difference:

The not as yet glorified figure of Christ is the visibly represented personality on that occasion within time (stress added) or, which is in content the same, it is the personality as afterwards represented (Hegel seems here to fuse representation as characterising the temporal and or visible as such and subsequent representation by verbal or other narrative, picture etc.), as being the immediate object of belief. In this then present time Christ himself revealed orally to his disciples his eternal nature and his being destined towards God's reconciliation with himself and of mankind with him, revealed both the plan of salvation and true moral doctrine, while the faith which the disciples had in him grasped all this within itself. Apart from that this faith, falling short in nothing of the staunchest certainty, is declared to be only the beginning, the determinative foundation, for what is not yet fulfilled; those so believing have not yet the Spirit they shall shortly receive - him, the truth itself, him who first later, as that faith, is he who leads into all truth. Those we have been discussing above, however, stick fast in the

primal certainty which is merely the condition for what shall be revealed (in them); for certainty, itself only subjective, brings only the formal subjective fruit of assurance, and then within this arrogance the slander and condemnation. In contradiction of Scripture they stick wilfully fast only in their certainty against the Spirit, who is the expansion of knowledge and first then the truth.

What Hegel clearly implies here is that his own account, whether in the *Encyclopaedia* or elsewhere, is the last word to date in an ever developing, by the working of Spirit, whether graced or natural, in accordance with our discussion above, Christian theology. In this sense revelation finds its concept fulfilled as being continuous as what was first received in faith becomes more and more confirmed at the same time as it is transformed, confirming or absorbing without denying the earlier moment or moments, in the Spirit as renouncing "certainty against the Spirit". In this sense Hegel's Speculative Method (*Enc.* 238), as he had identifies it with his Logic as being in this sense more than simply "his", more than simply "method" even, is employed also or even abundantly, as is proper to a method, in fields outside of but controlled by reason, *logos*, itself. This method, therefore, remains one with the Absolute Idea, as "God is his revelation" (Hegel) and hence what we receive in it, this movement of development one with the eternal rest, the "shall be" which is. His logic, that is, is a perfect and sustained interpretation of the Cross in religion, its "bringing to nought the things which are". And so, as Aristotle said, of truth, always logical truth, recommending *athanatizein*, which one can understand as equally a practice of death or a self-immortalising, "a little of this is worth more than all the rest".

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